No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/11/15 : NLC-12-6-7-8-7

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE "Outside the System"

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

August 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

WILLIAM E. ODOM /3/

SUBJECT:

Key Points from Your SAC/NORAD Trip

You asked for a short summary of key points you might use in a report to the President. I suggest the following:

1. Our strategic forces are well organized and designed for a single large retaliatory attack, but for any lesser variant, or for a war lasting weeks and months, they are in poor condition to respond. Not only is the planning for lesser attacks and longer periods of conflict rudimentary at best (LNOs), but the command and control system has neither the flexibility nor the durability to cope.

2. Our C<sup>3</sup>I vulnerability is extremely serious. A small Soviet attack on our C<sup>3</sup>I could make it virtually impossible for the surviving or successor NCA to retaliate for days and weeks, perhaps months. This may be a more serious problem for crisis stability than our land-based ICBM vulnerability. Geographic asymmetries and Soviet growing SSBN capabilities add to this vulnerability each year.

3. Our infrared satellite warning system (DSP) has occasional blind spots as well as growing requirements which it cannot meet without added capabilities -- additional satellites. The downlink and ground communications for NORAD are also highly vulnerable to attack.

4. Is the lack of a Minute Man silo reload capability an issue which needs more emphasis in SALT in light of the Soviet silo reload potential? You pressed this point with General Jones.

5. You mentioned two things we might do here to explore the rigidities of our strategic posture and our planning flexibility. First, IVORY ITEM drills could be based on limited nuclear scenarios, perhaps taken from Soviet exercise data. Second, the President may review political implications of present LNOs.

6. The Air Force is doing impressive tactical fighter training in Nevada which is being shared with a number of foreign countries. You mentioned the need to involve Korea.

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