

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 24, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM *WJO*  
SUBJECT: History of the Transformation of  
Our Strategic Doctrine

You asked for an essay of about 20 pages which traces what we have done in strategic doctrine over the last four years. I am attaching a paper which reviews the key Presidential Directives and cites a number of key memoranda. It gives you a view of the bureaucratic play as it appeared to me. It is not a detailed assessment of the change in strategic doctrine but rather a chronological account of how things were accomplished inside the Administration. It points you to the key documents in the files when you examine the record to write your own account.

I am puzzled about how to handle classification. Some of the material could be considered fairly sensitive, e.g. the substance of PD-18, the vulnerability of our "Federal Arc," the PD-58 references about our vulnerabilities and our scean for fixing them, and the PD-59 changes. Although I am not classifying the paper itself, you should treat it as fairly sensitive, something not to go beyond your files.

PRM-10/PD-18 Chapter

The new administration's basic strategy and force posture review was initiated by PRM-10, February 18, 1977. It prescribed two separate but related tasks. First, the Secretary of Defense was charged to conduct a force posture review. Second, a "comprehensive net assessment" of East-West relations was directed, led by the NSC staff (Huntington/Odom). The purpose of the net assessment was to "tell us how we are doing in the world vis-a-vis the Soviet Union." By July, the response was complete, and after an SCC and a PRC on the recommendations, PD-18 was drafted and finally signed on August 24, 1977.

The net assessment concluded that:

-- The military balance was "essential equivalence" but the trends in all categories of forces was "adverse."

-- In all other categories of power, technology, economics, intelligence, diplomacy, political-ideological action, and adaptability of political institutions, the U.S. and its allies enjoyed a significant lead. In key areas of technology, however, the gap was closing.

-- In the regions of competition, Europe was marked by political uncertainty in both its East and West parts; an equilibrium had developed in East Asia; the Persian Gulf region had become vital to the West and also vulnerable to the combination of internal fragility and growing Soviet power projection into the region; the Third World states most recently experiencing decolonialization and national liberalization struggles were particularly susceptible to Soviet influence (Africa and the Caribbean islands being the primary areas for this development) while other states which were beginning

to succeed economically (the "local influentials" like Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia) would be more enthusiastic for access to the industrialized West.

Based on this assessment, PD-18 directed that we maintain a strategic posture of "essential equivalence"; that we reaffirm NATO strategy as expressed in MC-14/3, i.e. a forward defense in Europe; that we maintain a "deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility" for global contingencies, particularly in the Persian Gulf region and Korea. PD-18 retained the nuclear weapons employment doctrine of NSDM-242 pending a targeting review.

The interagency debate over the PD-18 draft revealed a sharp dispute within the administration about the implications of PRM-10 net assessment. One side preferred to limit our strategic forces to an assured destruction capability and to consider general purpose force economies in Europe and Korea. The Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region would be addressed by arms control efforts with the USSR. The other side pointed to the momentum and character of Soviet military programs, the criticality of the oil-rich region around the Persian Gulf, and the growing Soviet projection of power in Africa, Southeast Asia, and possibly the Caribbean. The final version of the PD reflected NSC/Defense preferences for NATO and Korea, the NSC preference for a rapid deployment force, and a stalemate on the strategic forces issue. Actually, PD-18 directs that the U.S. not become inferior to the USSR in strategic forces, that a secure reserve force be maintained, and that limited nuclear options be prepared. In this respect, it did not regress from NSDM-242 but left the final policy decision on nuclear employment doctrine open for continued analysis and study.

Many of the parts of the PRM-10 net assessment inspired later PRMs and policy decisions. How to use our economic and technological advantages in the competition with the USSR, as PD-18 directed, became a question for debate in East-West economic policy. The imminent dangers to the Persian Gulf region and our oil supplies, cited by the net assessment, inspired petroleum vulnerability studies and a number of other actions in 1977 and 1978. It was not until 1979 and 1980, however, after the PRM-10 predictions were vindicated by events in Iran, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, that genuine progress was possible in two areas: (a) East-West economic policy and (b) a security system for the Persian Gulf region.

The follow-on targeting review prompted two studies in Defense, the targeting review, the Secure Reserve Force study, both of which were to contribute to PD-59 in 1980. They were not, however, the whole basis for that process. Already in the spring of 1977, when you directed me to provide NSC staff participation in the review of the White House Emergency Procedures, a process began which had as much if not more to do with your own, the President's, and Harold Brown's recognition of the need for an even more flexible targeting policy. When we began to examine how in practice we might exercise LNOs and the SIOP, the realities of our operational capabilities were not comforting. It became clear that we were organized with no defense, not even moderate civil defense and continuity of government; so-called "escalation control" and related concepts in our doctrine simply could not be adapted to our operational capabilities. We could recommend SIOP options to the President, probably execute them without significant coordination with theater forces, and then lose control of the

forces and the federal government for an indefinite period in face of a well-designed limited or major Soviet nuclear strike.

You sent Harold Brown a memo on March 31, 1977 as a result of my WHEP review, which asked him for three things: (a) a succinct statement of our nuclear war doctrine; (b) a brief statement of the procedures for conducting war beyond the initial stage, particularly the location for the President and the C<sup>3</sup>I capabilities in light of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report of 1970 which cited great deficiencies; (c) a statement of the basic objectives to be achieved through LNOs, including the military and political assumptions regarding specific LNOs. I cannot determine the full impact of these questions, but they apparently stirred Brown sufficiently for him to recommend the IVORY ITEM exercise the following fall. By June, however, he sent a memo in answer. My memo to you, "Secretary Brown's Answer to Your Questions on Nuclear War Doctrine," June 9, 1977, provided a critique and a memo for the President. It called into question the "realism" of our doctrine, particularly so-called "escalation control" and the assumptions about LNOs. You will find in both memos the earliest sense of where the changes in doctrine needed to be made.

Apparently this memo from Brown with your cover comments never got to the President. David Aaron held it all summer. Defense queried me, and I got calls warning that Brown would go directly to the President if the memo did not move. You and David apparently diffused this problem, and a later version was sent by Defense which did go forward in August. This was most unfortunate because it prevented an early clarification of the doctrinal issues through the operational requirements for an effective WHEP. That approach held more promise for preventing endless interagency debate and obfuscation

of the nuclear employment issues than any other. The WHEP implications were key in clearing my mind on the issues.

Some of these same implications were vaguely apparent from the net assessment. The agencies, including Defense, were reluctant to allow us to "net" assess U.S. and Soviet civil defense capabilities, mobilization capabilities, and C<sup>3</sup>I for an enduring conflict involving nuclear weapons. We insisted on including these categories of military power, and the assessment revealed a balance very adverse for the U.S:

#### FEMA Reorganization Chapter

Upon review of the White House Emergency Procedures, I discovered that the "continuity of government" responsibility, including providing for Presidential successors, had been placed in the Federal Preparedness Agency which was tucked away inside GSA. Our civil defense agency (Defense Civil Preparedness Agency) was in the Department of Defense. Natural disaster assistance responsibility resided with the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration within HUD. How had this dispersion of responsibilities come about. It disconnected closely related activities, tucked them away deep within other larger agencies, and insured that they would contribute little or nothing to our overall strategic defensive posture.

They had been together at the beginning of the Nixon Administration in 1969. The Office of Emergency Preparedness controlled all three of these smaller agencies (FPA, DCPA, and FDAA). The Director of EOP- was a statutory member of the National Security Council. This arrangement was what was left from the war mobilization and civil defense structure from World War II. In the 1950s under Eisenhower, it

received a significant modernization under the label, "continental defense." The FPA underground facility and a hardened government communications net were constructed along with a number of alternate hardened sites in the so-called "Federal Arc" a few hundred miles around the District of Columbia.

During the Kennedy Administration, a report was rendered to the President which judged the system increasingly inadequate to meet Soviet offensive nuclear capabilities. In 1970, Nixon received a similar assessment. Neither President acted to correct the inadequacies. Quite the contrary, Nixon took active measures to reduce our capabilities even further by splitting up the OEP in 1973 and putting the residual pieces in GSA, Defense, and HUD. Under the assumptions of "mutual assured destruction," the operative doctrine both for U.S. force structure at the time and for the SALT negotiations, "defense" of the U.S. mainland from nuclear attack made no sense. Neglect and active reduction of such capabilities by the Nixon Administration are a fundamental example of the effect of the MAD doctrine on our defense posture.

In April 1977, we received a bill which Proxmire and Percy were sponsoring in the Senate, S.1209. It in effect would have restored the OEP. These Senators were responding to state and local pressures for Federal funding in the emergency preparedness area, not to awareness of our defense inadequacies. I reported this to you by memos on April 11 and April 15, 1977.

Seeing a chance to use the local demand for funding to drive a re-organization project of importance to national security, I opened a dialogue with the President's re-organization staff, particularly

Harrison Wellford and Christopher Davis. In a memo to you on May 3, I recommended that you support the reorganization of FDA, FDAA, and DCPA into one agency to pull together those diverse functions for defense of the civil sector and in support of mobilization. The PRP did decide to undertake the project, and Greg Schneiders took charge.

In the re-organization process, we did not keep as much control as we should, but the issues were not considered very exciting. By March 1978, the plan was put to the President, who approved, and then it was submitted to the Congress and written into law.

Delay on implementing the re-organization, debates about how to tie FEMA to the White House and the NSC, and delay in appointing a director kept this re-organization achievement from having the impact it might otherwise have enjoyed on strategic doctrine and defense policy. Only by late spring, 1979, did John Macy take charge. Your memo to the President on February 22, 1979, "Director for FEMA," is a good summary of our expectations for FEMA even if they were not fulfilled.

Nonetheless, the implications of the reorganization are large. This agency could be vitalized, given more responsibility for influencing defense policy, and invited to participate more often in NSC deliberations. The structure is in place. The resources and leadership, however, have not yet been provided, but the historical trend from Eisenhower's second term, toward abandonment of strategic defense and the concept of a long general war in the nuclear age, was reversed in an organizational sense.



PD-41 Civil Defense Policy and PRM-32 Chapter

The need for a review of our civil defense policy became clear in the course of the PRM-10 net assessment. As soon as PD-18 was signed in August, Huntington and I began drafting a PRM. Utgoff and Molander became engaged in civil defense in July 1977 in light of the U.S. offer to engage in civil defense talks with the Soviet Union. They were, therefore, invited to discuss the PRM drafts. Molander was generally negative on the matter, citing the previous administration's NSSM on civil defense and the pointlessness, in his view, of civil defense as a serious program. In a memorandum of September 23, 1977 "Civil Defense PRM," Huntington gave you our proposal which you signed for action on September 30, 1977. That launched the year long inter-agency debate which produced -- 365 days later -- PD-41, the first significant civil defense policy since President Kennedy's momentary enthusiasm for civil defense in the early 1960s.

Almost everyone except Huntington and me entered the PRM-32 process with a negative attitude about its effectiveness. I had seen the Soviet program first hand, 1972-74, and had managed to get a report all the way to SecDef Laird in 1972 which he used in his posture statement. The intelligence community struggled with the evidence for the next five years, trying to ignore it even as it accumulated and indisputably indicated that the Soviet program was a serious one. The doctrinal implications, of course, were unacceptable to the arms control community and to Secretary of State Kissinger.

We drove the review process with two questions: (a) Does civil defense make a difference? (b) What modes of civil defense are most effective?

Analyses in Defense by the JCS's "SAGA" repeatedly demonstrated that the number of initial fatalities from a U.S. SIOP option could be reduced by several scores of millions of people if they dispersed according to Soviet evacuation plans. Similar findings resulted for U.S. losses based on assumed and feasible U.S. evacuation. Reallocating weapons in an effort to target relocated Soviet population did not significantly reduce the initial fatalities. We simply do not have enough weapons to chase the dispersed population. Nor do the Soviets. This finding was the fulcrum on which we pruned loose a lot of interagency resistance. It inspired Harold Brown to develop U.S. civil defense program options eventually presented to the PRC meeting in August 1978.

The answer to the second question was not seriously disputed. Sheltering against blast without dispersal promised little protection. Dispersal of population with fallout sheltering was agreed to be the most effective method of civil defense.

On longer term effects of nuclear strikes, no firm evidence was available. Thus the PRM did not try to make recommendations on that problem. The response to the PRM did report, however, the considerable difference population relocation can make; and the proposed program, "Option D Prime," was designed to exploit that finding by a five to seven year schedule of "crisis relocation planning."

There were two PRC meetings on PRM-32, August 3 and August 18. The first recommended Brown's program but could not agree on civil defense policy. The second recommended a wordy and confusing PD on policy, reflecting the successful effort of DOD/ISA, State, and ACDA to fog the policy issues and prevent a decision.

You forwarded this recommendation with ACDA's dissenting alternative on September 19, 1978. The President responded by not signing. "Zbig, it says nothing," he wrote, adding that at least some of ACDA's specifics be included. You asked me to revise accordingly.

I prepared two alternatives, one including some ACDA language in the original PRC recommendations. The other was much shorter. It took my original three points for policy, added Brown's caveat on retaining the emphasis on strategic offensive forces, and included "dual-use" of natural disaster and civil defense programs. You apparently decided to push the second alternative. How the decision to sign it came about I am not sure, but the PD that emerged was the short version which "said something."

PD-41's implications, of course, included abandonment of the view that strategic defense is impossible or destabilizing. The Soviets clearly never held that view. Now the US official policy acknowledged that strategic defense -- including civil defense -- is part of the overall strategic balance. Previously we considered only offensive forces as relevant to that balance.

One part of PRM-32 was left uncompleted, Continuity of Government was also included in the review, but FPA's work left Harold Brown unable to make a choice among recommended alternatives. FPA's staff was too weak to exploit the PRM-32 opportunity. Thus the change in COG policy had to await further efforts before we got to PD-58.

Press leaks about PD-41 were delayed for a few weeks. When they came, they included the false assertion that the President had approved a \$2 billion a year civil defense program. In fact, the

D Prime program required an addition of only \$1 billion spread over five to seven years. The President's reaction to hysterical editorials in the Washington Post and New York Times in December 1978. and OMB opposition prevented the D Prime program from surviving in the FY 1980 budget. You made a separate appeal to the President in a late December memo, encouraging him to approve both MX and civil defense funds. Of the \$40 million recommended increase, he approved \$10 million. Bardyl Tirana, the DCPA Director, told the Congress in budget hearings that if all \$40 million were not voted, the \$10 million was of no value. That caused Congress to vote no increase but to try to pass a law mandating the D Prime five-year program. OMB and Defense refused to support this strong House support for civil defense. As late as 1980, we still have had almost no increase in civil defense funding, and the proponents of civil defense in Congress are angry that we do not take PD-41 seriously.

PD-53 and Telecommunications/C<sup>3</sup>I Policy Chapter

One of the first steps of the President's Reorganization Project was the abolition of the Office of Telecommunications Policy in the EOP. At once a problem emerged in reassigning the OTP functions which included emergency management for wartime and national security telecommunications policy oversight. In the fall of 1977 NTIA at Commerce (Henry Geller) made a strong effort to take both of these functions. The context of the debate was de-regulation. The administration was generally committed to de-regulation. It was doing this in other areas. Telecommunications was naturally another possible de-regulation success to score. Moreover, the antipathy to the AT&T monopoly was large, and the Communications Act of 1934 seemed too old

to still be useful. Congressman Van Deerlin introduced a new bill for communications which had de-regulation as its main goal.

The structure of the Defense telecommunications organization is not tidy. A new Assistant Secretary of C<sup>3</sup>I has been created in DR&E. A Deputy Under Secretary for Policy has C<sup>3</sup>I policy. And the National Communications System, established in 1962 by President Kennedy after he discovered the lack of interagency interoperability of communications during the Cuban Missile Crisis, is still active, managed by the Defense Communications Agency.

OSTP became alarmed about NTIA taking over the policy role for national security issues and proposed that the policy function be placed with the NSC/SCC. Because PD-2 gave the crisis management function to the SCC, it was argued that emergency and crisis communications policy should be kept there as well. The emergency management functions (restoration of telecommunications priorities) could not be given the SCC, however, because Brzezinski is not confirmed by the Senate, a requirement for a "management" function. A joint memorandum of understanding was worked out between the NCS on the one hand and Press and Brzezinski on the other. This began the move toward a settlement with OMB in writing the Executive Order, 12046, resigning OTP functions. NTIA lost, and Press and Brzezinski picked up the telecommunications functions as they affect national security.

This was a mystery issue for me at first. I was told by the NCS and DR&E/DOD that they would provide staff support and warn me of issues. A visit to Commerce to see Henry Geller produced nothing. He evaded any discussion of upcoming issues. So did Rick Neustadt, Domestic Policy Council staffer and proponent of de-regulation. A visit with

Gerry Dinneen, Assistant Secretary for C<sup>3</sup>I, shed no more light from that viewpoint. Thus the matter rested into the spring of 1978.

In June 1978, I made a trip to SAC to examine many of the assertions about our C<sup>3</sup>I vulnerabilities and to learn more about how our WHEP ties in with SAC. I gave you a trip report by memo, June 15, 1978. You accepted the recommendation that you also make such a trip, and you did so, August 20-21, 1978. You gave the President a memo, "Report on My SAC/NORAD Trip," on August 30, in which you summed up the observations you made of our C<sup>3</sup>I vulnerabilities to a Soviet C<sup>3</sup>I strike. You also drew a number of doctrinal conclusions about the way our forces are organized for war (one large response), lack of ICBM silo reload capability, and weakness in our DSP and other tactical warning systems. My memo to you of September 22, 1978, "Follow-up on Your Report to the President on Your SAC/NORAD Trip," outlined a number of additional doctrinal issues and made staff assignments for various parts of the follow-up tasks.

You will find in these memos a clear forecast of where we were to come out with PD-53, PD-58, and PD-59. I had the feeling that you basically doubted many of the points I had been making since 1977, beginning with WHEP. This SAC trip appeared to remove that doubt fully. It appeared to give you a better grasp of the realities of our forces and their strengths and weaknesses and greater confidence in debating Brown on the force structure and doctrinal issues. I recall the trip as a turning point in your determination to transform our doctrine.

You took another specific follow-up step after your SAC trip based on the E.O. 12046 authority for telecommunications policy.

You sent Charles Duncan a memo, "C<sup>3</sup>I" September 30, 1978, telling him of your concern over our C<sup>3</sup>I vulnerability to a relatively small Soviet attack, and our lack of C<sup>3</sup>I endurance in the event of a war. You asked him to look into corrections for both problems. This is the first action you took which clearly asked Defense to think about programs that could support a protracted general war in which nuclear weapons were employed. (PD-37 on satellite hardness may be an earlier step, but I was not involved and do not know how consciously the long-war issue was raised in that context.) Duncan give you a bureaucratic response on November 17, 1978, but it at least announced that several Defense studies on the matter were in progress. The Defense Science Board was also discovering the C<sup>3</sup>I problem. I held a meeting with its C<sup>3</sup>I panel under John McLucas. Their terms of reference were narrow, and I tried to re-orient them toward our findings and to expand them for more programmatic implications.

Duncan's answer also raised the Congress's attempt to write a new Communications Act (HR 13015). The Van Deerlin bill for de-regulating telecommunications brought Defense alive. In the fall of 1978, I found myself chairing meetings and refereeing disputes between Commerce and Defense. Implicitly Defense was defending AT&T. The needs of national security for a centrally managed system, nation-wide interoperability, and blast resistance were said by Defense to be met if AT&T were left unbothered. Commerce argued that this remained unproven. Moreover, they declared that AT&T, to the extent that it does those things for national security, passes the costs onto the private ratepayer. This, it was argued, is taxing telephone subscribers to subsidize the Defense budget.

Tom Leney, an Army Captain at Harvard in the JFK School, asked in late 1978 to become a summer intern at the NSC in 1979. I took him and put him to work on this problem. I told him that it is not clear that AT&T does all those things for Defense that Dinneen and others claim. Nor was it clear that de-regulation will destroy our C<sup>3</sup>I system if certain parameters are established for the market action.

He went to work, and by mid-summer it was clear that AT&T was very vulnerable to Soviet attack, that no hardening or upgrading had been done by AT&T for years because Defense gave no guidance. Not analyzing the system's vulnerability, Defense was ill-prepared to tell AT&T how to fix the problems. At the same time, it became clear that de-regulation without explicit limits and helpful FCC decisions could leave us facing an enormous degradation of the national security telecommunications capabilities.

Leney discovered a fact that I knew vaguely but had never verified: nowhere were there national objectives set down in unambiguous language for C<sup>3</sup>I and telecommunications capabilities. Commerce could argue that Defense did not need "endurance" and "connectivity." No Presidential directive specified these capabilities. I had long realized that the J-3 in the JCS had a responsibility to aggregate the CINCs needs for C<sup>3</sup>I and give them to Dinneen in DR&E for budget and program purposes. But these "requirements" were never accepted as rigid or "directive." I also knew from my "continuity of government" review efforts (an FPA Program Review was started in January 1979) and the PEADs for the WHEP that there were analogous problems of no clear statement of requirements in related emergency areas.



I sent you a long memo on August 7, 1979, entitled "C<sup>3</sup>I; Policy and Programs." It summed up Leney's work, all of my experience with telecommunications, COG, and the WHEP as they affect C<sup>3</sup>I. It recommended some limited actions, and it gave you a memo for Defense which would ask for telecommunication/C<sup>3</sup>I national objectives and tie this effort with the continuity of government and NCA survivability effort. You signed it to Defense on August 10. That memo led in the short run to PD-53 and in the longer run to PD-58. By November, we had an inter-agency response to the first part of that August 10 memorandum. We had suggested national telecommunication objectives which included not only SIOP connectivity but also for management of a protracted nuclear conflict. We added the objectives of diplomatic and intelligence support, COG, and mobilization. The agencies accepted them all slightly revised in style of statement, not one whit in substance. They also added some telecommunications guidelines on dealing with common carriers. Defense insisted that the PD be unclassified so that it could be used with common carriers.

The implications of PD-53 were monumental in principle. For a time I could not believe it had all gone so easily. Here in a document for use with the public, we had as clear a statement of the need for a capability to manage a protracted nuclear conflict as could be asked for. At the same time, it recognized the supporting activities so critical in such a conflict but usually ignored: mobilization, continuity of government, intelligence. For the first time, we had established "national" objectives for C<sup>3</sup>I, transcending Defense and including all parts of the government. We had also created a basis for forcing NTIA and the Domestic Policy Staff to face the national security issue in legislation for de-regulation. For a time, we had

the lead in national telecommunications policy, not just the security side of it.

Prior to PD-53, of course, you had faced the intercept issue and given the President PD-24. This all transpired before I was permitted to be involved. It was a very small part of the larger PD-53 concern. In trying to implement PD-53, I have returned to the PD-24 experience, but it is so narrow that the analogy is limited use.

Defense should have taken the lead in PD-53 implementation, but they simply sat on it except for occasions when they wanted to fight H.R. 13015 and de-regulation. Two things needed doing. First, Defense should have insisted that PD-53 influence all their internal C<sup>3</sup>I programs for budget review. Second, through the NCS, for which Defense is the Executive Agent, they should have generated guidance for AT&T as well as any other common carriers with national security significance. Brown, Dinneen, Perry, and Dan Murphy managed to ignore the matter. The JCS has focussed all its attention on the "short-warning" problem and SIOP connectivity.

To try to overcome this bureaucratic obstructionism, I created a PD-53 working group early this fall and tasked the NCS to tell us what is wrong with the common carrier network in the way of vulnerabilities to attack and to recommend what we might ask the common carriers to do about these problems. The new Director of DCA and Manager for the NCS, LTG Hilsman, has made some progress in providing answers -- the first ever since the 1950s.

The issues of "who pays?" and "can de-regulation be made compatible with national security requirements?" will surface bitterly if

PD-53 implementation is pursued. The signing of the Paperwork Reduction Act, of course, is a major step backwards in light of PD-53. And it will make NSC policy oversight virtually impossible if OMB exercises its new authority and resources.

PD-57 Chapter

Charlie Stebbins carried through on this effort. I had little to do with it after the FEMA re-organization and the NIFTY NUGGET exercise. That exercise led to some NSC mobilization scenario studies. They in turn became the basis for the PD-58 guidance. Stebbins and I stayed in touch, and I considered this effort as complementary to my COG/C<sup>3</sup>I effort which led to PD-58. Both are compatible. In fact, the exercises prescribed by PD-58 should, in time, include the mobilization scenarios and the work of PD-57.

The significance of PD-57 is that this is the first national level guidance on mobilization planning in more than two decades. Defense, FPA, Commerce, and other relevant agencies have abandoned even their legal responsibilities to keep up mobilization planning and wartime surge capacity information for industrial production. Although the beginning is all we can claim credit for, the first step was the hardest. Finally, however, the military services, by agreeing to a "no-fault" mobilization exercise in NIFTY NUGGET, produced the information and stimulated the conditions that made Stebbins able to persevere with PD-57. Stebbins provided the direction and conceptual work for the overall effort. It was quite an achievement.

PD-58 Chapter

The inadequacy of the continuity of government programs were apparent with the earliest days of the administration. How to overcome them, however, was not clear or simple. Twice in the past twenty years, major studies were completed which led to no concrete improvements. After NSSM-58 in 1970, OEP did make some internal progress on COG, but Nixon and the NSC did not take effective interest.

PRM-32 included continuity of government, but the study results offered by FPA did not address the central problems effectively. Therefore, the PRC meeting in August 1978 refused, at Harold Brown's request, to take a decision. You, however, insisted that followup on COG be continued as rapidly as possible.

One possibility of a major COG review, of course, was the formation of FEMA and the appointment of a new director who might take the opportunity to initiate a new departure in COG. The Posvar candidacy held promise in this regard. All fall, however, there was delay in search of a FEMA director. You sent a number of memos to Ham Jordan on the matter. Finally, on February 22, 1979, you sent a memo to the President, "Director for FEMA," which made the case for exploiting the re-organization for a COG upgrade.

To make sure that time did not run out on us, I encouraged you to initiate a continuity of government "program review," to be conducted by FPA. The new director, Joe Mitchell, discovered how out of date his programs were but had no clear idea of what to do about them. Your memo to him, "Program Review," January 26, 1979, asked him for a comprehensive assessment of all COG programs in five areas:

- protection of national leadership;
- continuity of essential functions of the Federal Government;
- protection of state and local government;
- emergency telecommunications;
- resource allocations, mobilization, and recovery.

FPA worked all spring and summer, accomplishing nothing. FEMA became operative in the process, and the FEMA director, John Macy, began to take hold. The major stumbling block, however, remained the lack of innovation by the FEMA/FPA staff and the inability of anyone to gather empirical evidence which would help us judge how austerely a government can be in wartime, how small the civil staff for the President can be, how small the military staff can be. Thus, the FEMA report in response to your memo of January 26, 1979, was a thick study of no practical use for decision-making.

Seeing this to be the case, I searched for a way to bring Defense's analytical skills to deal with FEMA's problems. Your memo of August 10, "Telecommunications and C<sup>3</sup>I Policy Issues," to Harold Brown, became the vehicle. Its second part concerns the problem of NCA survivability beyond 72 hours in the NEACP and it asks Brown to help Macy in finding a solution. It uses the analogy between NCA vulnerability and ICBM vulnerability to try to get Brown's attention. His obsession with the latter while the former is more critical has always perplexed me. Key parts of your memo follow:

"The vulnerability of our 'continuity of government' system as well as our 'NCA survivability system' is growing no less rapidly than the vulnerability of some of our weapons systems; i.e. land-based ICBMs. I request, therefore, that you give special assistance to

John Macy, the Director of FEMA, in working out a new concept of basing of the NCA for both of the leadership responsibilities in an emergency: commanding the armed forces and governing the country."

"I am also particularly concerned that military contingency planning for less than all-out nuclear war be fully integrated with the basing and protection of our civil leadership in emergencies."

"Crisis stability in the future could depend on managing a conventional conflict from a leadership posture which could survive a surprise attack. Furthermore, a number of vulnerabilities revealed by the recent JCS connectivity studies can be dealt with only through a significantly different approach to leadership protection."

Defense did not react effectively. Brown more or less ignored this part of the August 10 memo. I put together a small C<sup>3</sup>I/COG working group and gave them direction for treating the NCA survivability problem more or less like the MX basing issue had been treated. I worked out a scheme for mixing hardness, redundancy, and mobility and let the group develop it further. The Defense membership still could not succeed. When Shoemaker came on board the NSC staff, I did a draft of the concept paper with him. He caught on fast, and for the remainder of the spring, 1980, he followed the issue with the working group which finally brought PD-58 to be signed in June 1980.

PD-58 itself does not solve the problems, but it establishes a Joint Program Office (FEMA and Defense) under an NSC steering group. Furthermore, it gives a concept of a system and directs that a testbed be established to determine how austere a staff the

President needs for a general war. And it foresees the establishment of ten small surrogate White Houses at the ten Federal Regional Centers supported by a nucleus Federal government and a nuclear national military staff, presumably the JCS. Heretofore, the plan of emergency staffing of the President has been concerned only with military assistance for making SIOP decisions. On the civil side, the old plans of the 1950s and 1960s have not been updated significantly, particularly the economic mobilization scheme under the concept of the "Office of Defense Resources," which would be established by the present set of Presidential Emergency Action Documents. Until a new and survivable basing system for the President and his civil and military support staffs is designed, none of the operations plans can be brought up to date. PD-58 is aimed at getting through this mess, and it provides a sound road map if it is followed.

PD-59 Chapter

You will find my earliest concerns with targeting in the memo of March 31 which you sent to Brown asking three questions about our war doctrine and procedures. My memo of June 9, 1977, to you with Brown's first answer explained once again that we have a highly unrealistic doctrine of escalation control. In the cover memo you gave to the President on Brown's response (the second one, hand-carried to the President, September 16, 1977) says, "To sum up, we have a limited nuclear war doctrine and targeting capability, but seem to lack some of the defensive capabilities which would make it practical." Of course, the PRM-10 process which led to PD-18 faced the targeting issue but left it unresolved and tasked Defense to do

a targeting study. Thus, we saw the problems in 1977, set in motion a number of efforts to deal with them, and let it proceed in Defense for the next two years.

The Security Analysis Cluster and David took these issues for the most part. I was denied access to almost all of the proceedings that led to a series of three SCCs, April 24, 25, 26, 1979. From staffers in the Pentagon, however, I followed the process, and it appeared that Brown had dismissed the reservations about "Hard Target Kill" and our acquisition of the MX in light of Soviet programs which he said make the HTK issue moot. In any event, David asked for more Defense studies. The issue was left there until Welch came to the NSC staff. I encouraged you to ask him to give highest priority to drafting a PD on targeting, because from what I could see, we were dragging our feet with re-studies of old and essentially resolved issues.

In March 1980, you asked me to comment on Welch's memo from you to Brown, asking more questions on targeting. At the meeting with you and Welch, I offered an outline of a PD and recommended against the memo to Brown. You asked me to draft a PD for a meeting the next day. I did but also found myself confronted with an expanding coalition of people who did not want to see a draft go out. To clarify the issues, I gave you a memo, March 21, "Draft PD on Nuclear Targeting," in which I made the arguments for my version. In the series of exchanges that followed, my draft was accepted with a few modifications, largely the inclusion of the section on "pre-planned options."

Brown's response was to stuff our draft with a lot of "assured destruction" rhetoric, nothing new whatsoever. Surprisingly, he



fell off his points when we pointed out that most of his additions were redundant. Thus, the final version was distinguished by nothing from Brown but a small effort to downgrade and blunt the innovations of the draft you gave him. To some extent we got him on board by using his "countervailing" term for describing our innovations. Thus he was in a difficult position of having to deny his own label.

The process of getting it signed, of course, is recorded in the "Chronology of the PD 59 Decision," dated September 4, 1980.

The implications of the new targeting directive are spelled out in your memo to the President, August 26, 1980, "The Carter Transformation of Our Strategic Doctrine."

- Flexibility was expanded beyond pre-planned options to include targeting mobile as well as fixed forces.
- Targeting emphasis is on all military, C<sup>3</sup>I, and war-supporting industries, only on economic recovery insofar as the SIOP is retained.
- C<sup>3</sup>I is treated as a broader requirement, for control of both strategic and general purpose forces in a protracted conflict, and calling for a "look-shoot-look" capability for identifying new and moving targets.
- The secure reserve force is to be increased for influencing campaigns, not only for psychological coercion.
- Acquisition policy is tied to employment policy for the first time.

### Conclusions

With the drift from "assured destruction" as a budget device under McNamara to "mutual assured destruction" as a doctrine as the backdrop for SALT in the 1970s, all doctrinal basis for concern with

a long war and attendant requirements for mobilization, command and control, and adaptation to the conditions of new technologies and weapons disappeared. We had come to what might be called the "1914 syndrome." At that time, every general staff in Europe expected that war would be short -- a few weeks, maybe months -- that no economic mobilization would be necessary, that peacetime war stocks would be enough. Each major continental power also had one big war plan which, if initiated, could not be reversed without total chaos. At the same time, it was not clear that these war plans were designed for any particular war aims. The war started, the plans were implemented, and governments were carried along, trying to decide their war aims as the war unfolded, dragging them into coalitions and conflicts they hardly dreamed of entering before hand.

Our SIOP is our one big war plan. Once implemented, it will not be reversible. It presumes a short war, a few days at most. It presumes no mobilization requirements. It even presumes no defense! What war aims it will support is difficult to determine. It might well leave the bulk of Soviet general purpose forces unharmed and free to roam the European continent after we have expended the bulk of our forces in execution of the SIOP against Soviet economic recovery targets.

The series of PDs you have managed to get accepted breaks radically from this 1914 syndrome. The new directives are concerned with mobilization, defense, command and control for a long conflict, and flexible use of our forces, strategic and general purpose, for war aims we choose as we decide to go to war.

These directives, however, remain essentially a paper policy. They have not significantly affected the budget process, program designs in Defense, or operational procedures in the JCS and unified commands. The dialectical unity of thought and practice has yet to occur. We can only hope that the next administration may grasp the same realities and be willing to work out the program implications.