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DOCUMENT NUMBER DJSM-1035-77	COPY NUMBER 0 w/encl	DATE OF DOCUMENT 14 Jun 77
SUBJECT Exercise IVORY ITEM		

SEC DEF HAS SEEN
3 JUL 1977

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TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
	CHAIRMAN, JCS	00	15-June 1977
3	EXECUTIVE	02	16 Jun 77
2	THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN	01	
4	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	04	
1	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MBR	01B	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MBR	01C	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MBR	01D	
	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MBR	01E	
	LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASST	01F	
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (SPEECHES)	01G	
	MARINE AIDE	05	
	ARMY AIDE	06	

- ACTION REQUESTED - APPROVAL PROPOSAL.
- As a result of problems experienced on IVORY ITEM exercise conducted 1 Jun 77, J-3 proposes that SECDEF and possibly other Washington principals receive two briefings which focus on explanation of the tactical warning systems and SIOP execution considerations and decision handbook procedures.
- Briefings would provide opportunities for SECDEF to exchange ideas with experts on the SIOP and hopefully take the DDO's out of that role.
- They recommend CJCS discuss this subject with SECDEF at 1130 (tentative) on Friday, 17 June, with offer to present suggested briefings at an early date. Recommend approval to J-3 be withheld pending discussion with SECDEF.

385-Exercises - 14 Jun 77 (Ivory Item)

File "D"
14 Jul 77

6/29
This is a useful critique. It should be worth showing to ZB. Not in light of the existence of the point paper.
AGR
COLONEL RENSHAW
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
EO 12958.3.4 (b) 5
DATE: SEP 28 2000
REVIEW DATE: Sep 2010

Declassified
Authority: 25723
By: Amanda Weimer
Date: 02-23-2017

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

2085

TO: CJCS		CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE J3M 1301 1977 13 JUN 1977			
THRU: DJS		Philip D. Shuter Major General, USMC Vice Director, Joint Staff		DJSM NO. 1035-77		ODJS SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT:		Exercise IVORY ITEM		DJSM DATE 14 June 77			
				ACTION			
				APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
				X			
REMARKS							
<p>1. (C) At TAB A is an After Action Report on the IVORY ITEM Exercise conducted 1 June 1977. The report discusses sequence of events, communications, and responds to questions raised in the course of discussion. The After Action Report is provided for your use as desired in discussing the exercise with the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>2. (TS) Exercise IVORY ITEM was designed to approximate a Missile Attack Conference and to exercise the SIOP Decision Handbook alternatives. The DDO (NMCC) is charged with being the conference manager and to lead a discussion of SIOP execution procedures from a "bolt out of the blue" perspective. I am confident that our DDOs can do that and do it well. I am less confident that they can answer questions on the "consequences of execution" details of a particular option, or that they are qualified to be offering doctrinaire opinions on the nuances of the SIOP. They have come dangerously close to doing both in our recent exercises.</p> <p>3. (TS) I believe our IVORY ITEM experience to date has identified the need for the Secretary of Defense, and possibly other Washington area principals, to receive two briefings which might preclude, in future exercises, the kinds of questions that concern us. They would focus on:</p> <p>a. (C) An exposure to, and explanation of, the tactical warning systems. Purpose would be to explain what information will be</p>							
ACTION OFFICER		COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
C.A. Stewart LTC, USA EA Div., J-3 X59514		OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
DATE OF PREPARATION		J-3	<i>CS</i>				
10 June 1977							

JCS FORM NO. 9
JULY 72

NW#: 25723

DocId: 31099450

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*Done at NORAD
But I'll take
briefing "then
to write about
SecDef.*

available, how it is displayed, and the confidence which can be assumed.

b. ~~(c)~~ A briefing on the SIOP Execution Considerations and SIOP Decision Handbook procedures. This will provide an appropriate vehicle for discussion and an exchange of information on the procedures which would be used for execution of the SIOP in both a developing crisis situation as well as a no-notice attack.

4. (U) The above briefings would afford the opportunity for the Secretary to sit down around the table with the experts for an exchange of ideas.

5. (U) Recommend CJCS invite the Secretary of Defense to attend the briefings discussed in subparagraphs 3a and b above.

16 June

General Brown -

After this was written by C.J. but before it got here Stases Halcombe called me about some thoughts Sec Def has about exercises involving the President. It boils down to Sec Def, you, Dep Sec Def, Byrnes getting together to discuss various ^{Soviet} attack options & possible US responses, how the "Black Book" helps & is used, etc. C.J. is working up some materials for such a session.

Fie

A

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
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AFTER ACTION REPORT: Exercise IVORY ITEM

1. An IVORY ITEM Exercise was directed by the Secretary of Defense on 1 June 1977. Sequence of exercise events follows:



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
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3. The following items, which arose during the discussion, are considered of sufficient importance to warrant clarification:

a. The desired intent of this scenario was to indicate a large-scale ICBM attack by the USSR against the CONUS. However, the attack was perceived as limited in nature due to the artificialities of the exercise:

(1) The number of



(a) was intended to assist in response option determination and decision time available.

(b) indicated that the BMEWS trackers were providing accurate information for initial attack characterization time-to-go before nuclear impact.

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[REDACTED]

EO25x5 JS

(d) receipt of SLBM launch reports would of course drastically reduce available decision time before nuclear detonation.

Due to the above artificialities and time constraints associated with the scenario, the increasing number of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Future scenarios will be designed to eliminate this misunderstanding.

b. In this exercise scenario or in any where CONUS is under a large-scale surprise missile attack and Washington is assessed to be a target - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1) Post attack execution of the SIOP would be jeopardized by:

[REDACTED]

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E025K5-JS

The recommended procedure is to execute the alternative considered appropriate based on the most complete and confident attack assessment available. To not do so could not only jeopardize the

c. Additional clarification on how the recommendation would be formulated for presentation to the President:

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The Chairman as well as the remainder of the Joint Chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands would be available for consultation as time permits. It is expected that the Chairman would be the primary spokesman for the military in presenting recommendations to the NCA. These procedures and the three alternatives were reviewed with the President in the Blair House presentation.

d. With respect to the comment on the [redacted] as a possible alternative: EO25x5 JS

[redacted] are not available for immediate execution in a surprise attack scenario.

e. In regard to calculating residual fatalities:

- The fatality assessments provided in the scenario were computed by the JSTPS using the Comprehensive Blast and Radiation Assessment (COBRA) computer program. This program predicts the expected fatalities from both prompt effects (blast and initial radiation) and delayed effects (fallout for a six-month period) for the specific attack option executed. The COBRA program provides the best estimates available at this time.

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29 JUN 1977

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

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TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE			
THRU: DJS		DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE		
		DJSM DATE			
SUBJECT: Exercise IVORY ITEM		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
		X			

REMARKS

- Reference J-3 memorandum J3M 1301, 13 June 77, subject: Exercise IVORY ITEM After Action Report.
- Attached point paper responds to oral tasking from ACJCS related to subject exercise.

E025x5 JS

4. IVORY ITEM exercise experience and this tasking again points out the urgency of a CJCS meeting with the Secretary and appropriate JCS staff to discuss tactical warning systems and SIOP Execution Considerations/Decision Handbook procedures.

SEC DEF HAS SEEN

6 JUL 1977

*6/29
MSH - I think this
is a useful briefing
added for use
with new President*

ACTION OFFICER L. W. MAGEE Col, USAF Chief, Strat Ops Div, J-3 Ext 57920	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3	<i>[Signature]</i>				
DATE OF PREPARATION						

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24 June 77

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WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Point Paper for the Secretary of Defense for use in discussions with White House.

SUBJECT: Exercise IVORY ITEM

MAIN THRUST OF POINT PAPER

- Summarizes intended purpose of IVORY ITEM Exercises, addresses support of NCA SIOP decisionmaking in non-time-constrained, fully-generated force posture, and surprise attack, normal readiness posture, situations. Provides an illustrative matrix.

DISCUSSION

- Exercise IVORY ITEM was designed to approximate a Missile Attack Conference in a time-constrained, large-scale, surprise attack situation with forces in normal readiness posture and to exercise principals in SIOP execution procedures

[Redacted]

EQ25X5 JS

- In a non-time-constrained, mounting crisis situation allowing for generation of our nuclear forces, a wide range of options is available for consideration by the NCA. These include selective release of specific weapons,

[Redacted]

and the full range of SIOP options. (TAB A)

- In response to NUWEP guidance the SIOP is currently constructed so that under day-to-day,

[Redacted]

available only under generated conditions. (TAB B)

- In-depth discussion of the SIOP would be of more value if conducted with appropriate staff support. IVORY ITEM exercises not currently constructed to provide it.


- Decision matrix is a useful educational tool but is not considered appropriate for actual response decisions under surprise attack.

- Real-time Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment data will not be available with sufficient precision to support fine-grained decisionmaking implied by matrix. (TAB C).

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- Publication of a matrix for use in actual situations would create sensitive pre-decision documents subject to compromise/leak.
- Matrix entering values are subjective and best estimate of USSR options - may not cover complete range. (TAB D)



Good
point.
Bill

- Regarding question on recognition of telephone conferees, adequate procedures exist. (TAB E)

ACTION OFFICER:

COL MAGEE

J-3

Ex 57920

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
TAB A

NON-TIME-CONSTRAINED NUCLEAR RESPONSE

I think it would be useful for the President the VP to spend a morning (at NAEC or ANCC) going through such a scenario. HB

In a non-time-constrained situation involving a mounting world-wide crisis, sufficient time would probably be available to generate all or most of the non-alert, SIOP-committed weapons. Under such conditions the NCA has a broad range of options.

Based on information provided by the CINCs and the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and with guidance from the NCA and their advisers (i.e., the NSC and other government agency principals), the JCS would develop appropriate options



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Extent of deliberations regarding the wide range of employment options outlined above is a function of time available in a mounting crisis vis-a-vis the urgent Black Book response driven by a surprise strategic nuclear attack.

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Tab A

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
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TAB **B**


MECHANICS OF THE SIOP

In surprise nuclear attack, decision/reaction time will be minimal. Under current guidance the SIOP is constructed



The three alternative responses listed below are intended to give the NCA the broadest choice of options available under a day-to-day surprise attack situation.

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TAB **B**

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SUMMARY
US TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT
CAPABILITY

The following paragraphs summarize current sensor capability to provide the kinds of tactical warning/attack assessment (TW/AA) data required for SIOP retaliatory decisionmaking. The sequential questions critical to the decision process are used as the means of assessing existing capability.

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
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
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ILLUSTRATIVE DECISION MATRIX



NOTES:

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Subject: MISSILE ATTACK CONFEREE RECOGNITION

The following factors provide for the recognition of Missile Attack Conferrees:

- The conference is established on dedicated circuits terminating in CINC command centers which "track" the CINCs and extend the call to their current locations. Washington Principals are "tracked" by the NMCC. Those Principals or their alternates who are at an NMCC direct line are conferenced first. Time permitting, principals at other than NMCC direct lines are added to the conference.

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