Will China Help Pakistan Get the Bomb?

This recently declassified, lengthy report was INR's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57, which the bureau itself had requested in late April 1957. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the "Fourth Country" problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state.

While not part of the National Declassification Center’s recent release of INR lot files, this study has enough significance to merit inclusion as an exception. According to INR Soviet expert Helmut Sonnenfeldt, it was the “first time that systematic treatment has been given the fourth country problem from an intelligence standpoint.” The countries which received substantial assessments, in terms of their capabilities, the likelihood that they would go nuclear, and the impact of a nuclear weapons decision were: France, West Germany, Sweden, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Japan, China, India, Israel, and Brazil. INR considered the first three countries, including Sweden and West Germany, likely to develop nuclear weapons within the next 10 years, but subsequent events would prove this estimate to be partly mistaken. INR also argued that East Germany and Czechoslovakia had the technological capability to develop weapons, but that Moscow would not permit that to happen. As for China, for prestige reasons among other considerations, it would “almost certainly attempt to initiate a weapons phase in the development of its nuclear program” during the next 10 years, but China outperformed this estimate, acquiring a capability by 1964. Japan was estimated to have a capability to produce nuclear weapons by 1967, but proponents of weaponization would have to prevail against popularly-based anti-nuclear sentiment.

In light of its security concerns, "If Israel had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons, it would do so." The extent of French-Israel nuclear cooperation was unknown to U.S. intelligence, but it was "not impossible that France might give [weapons] assistance to Israel." Anti-nuclear sentiments were powerful in India, yet "one circumstance which might bring about a change in India's attitude toward the possession of such weapons [would be], their possession by neighboring states." Among the Latin American countries, Brazil was the only one which could produce nuclear weapons within 10 years but only "with substantial and continuing outside assistance." Nevertheless, Brazil had "evidenced no desire to develop an atomic war potential," and that was unlikely to change in the near future.

Having embarked on a nuclear weapons production program, the French would soon have enough plutonium to test a device. If France held a successful test it would be the "Fourth Power," after the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom, to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. According to intelligence reports, the French were trying to acquire from U.S. firms the diagnostic technology needed to measure a nuclear explosion. INR did not believe that France had identified a specific test site and noted that France was under pressure to hold a test somewhere other than North Africa; nevertheless it went ahead with one in Algeria in early 1960.

This and the intelligence brief on Yugoslavia were the only INR products on nuclear issues that showed up in a collection that included material from the late 1950s, although presumably other such briefs from that period touched on nuclear issues.

This report gives an overview of Yugoslavia's nuclear program and its tight links with both East and West in terms of financial aid and training programs. For INR analysts, prestige and economic purpose shaped the Yugoslavian nuclear program (INR might not have known that some scientists wanted a reactor that could produce plutonium). While Washington had tried to sell a reactor, the Yugoslavs rejected U.S. safeguards requirements and turned to the Soviets for help with constructing a research reactor, which gave them something "bigger and better" than any other reactor in Eastern Europe. A nuclear deal with the U.S. was in the works as long as the International Atomic Energy Agency provided the safeguards. Years later, Marshall Tito ordered work on a nuclear weapons capability for Yugoslavia, but possible military uses for the reactors were not on INR's radar screen.

Once the Soviet Union began to develop a capacity to strike the United States with long-range missiles and bombers, questions arose in European capitals and Washington about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent: would the United States respond to a Soviet attack on Western Europe by launching a retaliatory strike on Moscow, and thereby open itself to a Soviet attack on New York City or Washington, D.C.? That is, would Washington sacrifice New York for Hamburg? A differing European concern was that Washington might act precipitously in a conflict with Moscow and initiate a nuclear holocaust which could destroy Western Europe. Yet another worry, held in European capitals and Washington and shaped by alarming memories of World War II, was that West Germany might opt for a national nuclear option out of fear that it could not rely on the U.S. deterrent for protection (although INR saw no evidence of current interest in such an option).

Concerns about the credibility of deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad's proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. At the close of the Eisenhower administration Secretary of State Christian Herter introduced the concept of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) of MRBMs sold by the United States with nuclear warheads under U.S. control. Herter also offered to NATO Polaris missile-launching submarines under control arrangements to be determined, an offer which the Kennedy administration took further. For some in Washington, an MLF could help meet alliance concerns about credibility and divert any leanings toward an independent European nuclear force or national nuclear forces. Others had doubts. The lengthy report which follows represented INR's assessment of "present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities," including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an "enhancement of NATO's nuclear role" could "deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs."

As discussion of an MLF unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed, especially because of the West German role; consequently, Soviet propaganda would play "upon lingering anti-German sentiment." The Soviets would try to counter the MLF diplomatically and politically, although they were unlikely to create a Warsaw Pact counterpart for sharing nuclear use decisions. According to the INR analysts, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Robert Baraz, "Soviet fear of West Germany, though exaggerated for propaganda purposes, appears to be genuine." Nevertheless, they believed that Moscow would accommodate itself to a NATO MLF as a lesser of two evils: "it will probably prefer NATO control (with a US veto) to independent national forces."

Before the words "nuclear nonproliferation" entered official discourse, the term "non-diffusion" (or "non-dissemination") of nuclear weapons was used routinely. In part stemming from the negotiations over Berlin, during 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration held talks with allies and adversaries on the possibility of a non-diffusion agreement which included Germany. In light of a recent Soviet proposal, INR veteran Soviet expert Sonnenfeldt explained why Moscow had moved away from earlier proposals singling out West Germany and was focusing on the general applicability of a non-diffusion agreement. According to Sonnenfeldt, the Soviets saw an agreement as relevant to strengthening "obstacles" to a West German nuclear weapons program, to hampering "non-aligned countries in developing nuclear weapons," and to "provid[ing] a platform" for criticizing U.S. nuclear deployments to NATO allies. Sonnenfeldt saw the Chinese factor as playing a significant role in Soviet calculations about a non-diffusion agreement.

How U.S. allies would respond to a future Chinese nuclear test was a matter of great interest in Washington and INR produced a series of reports on the likely responses of various countries. This "Limited Distribution" report on possible Japanese reactions did not anticipate that a test would cause basic changes in U.S.-Japan security relations or in Tokyo's general approach to nuclear weapons. There could be greater receptiveness to discussion of Japanese vulnerabilities to nuclear attack, but conservative advocates of expanded defense efforts would not find much traction in government circles while efforts to "condition" the public to take a more "realistic" view of nuclear weapons would go against mass opinion trends. To reduce the possibility that a Chinese test would cause a political shock in Japan, INR recommended specific advance moves, e.g. efforts to persuade elite or public opinion that the Chinese threat was manageable and the Japanese people should not be fearful of Chinese power.

This was a committee product, drafted by four of INR's East Asian experts, including the well-known China scholar Allen S. Whiting whom Hilsman had recruited from Columbia University, Susan Tait, Elmer Culbertson Hulen, and William Bradford Coolidge.

After the "Cuban fiasco," the Soviets rejected an "obviously inferior strategic posture." INR analysts pointed to events during mid-February 1963 which suggested that the Soviet leadership was taking steps to spend a greater share of the gross national product on military resources. "We believe that allocation decisions favoring the military have been made and that they involve significantly greater outlays than heretofore for strategic weapons systems." The pattern was clear in light of changes in military leadership, organizational changes, and Khrushchev's public and private statements. Exactly what the Soviets were seeking, whether strategic superiority or parity or qualitative improvements in strategic forces, was then imponderable.

France's staging of atmospheric and underground tests in Algeria became increasingly untenable when neighboring African countries protested and even temporarily broke diplomatic relations with Paris. Once Algeria became independent in 1962, French authorities made plans to develop a test site in Polynesia. They had not announced it officially, but told Australian authorities that they would select a specific site before the year ended. That French plans would generate controversy and criticism was evident; New Zealand labor organizations were calling for an economic boycott while other countries in the region, including Latin America, were likely to protest and call for a "nuclear free southern hemisphere."

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their "lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons." Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were "relatively satisfied," while only West Germany was "restive" to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force (but not in a West German national capability). Nevertheless, some governments, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, were interested in a multilateral force as an instrument to make NATO more cohesive and to offset any tendencies toward national nuclear forces.

In light of the recently negotiated limited nuclear test ban treaty, which Sweden signed on 12 August, INR looked at the implications for Swedish nuclear weapons planning. Since the late 1950s, U.S. intelligence had considered Sweden a likely candidate for a nuclear weapons capability, with pressure for nuclear status coming from military leaders and Conservative politicians, who believed it was necessary to deter Soviet attack. The military had secretly carried out detailed planning for a nuclear option, but U.S. intelligence may not have been aware of this or, more significantly, that Social Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander had decided against such an option in 1961.

To maintain political balance, Erlander used technical arguments to postpone making a formal decision on the nuclear program. Thus, when his government signed the test ban treaty, it declared that the treaty "did not bind it in any way concerning the acquisition of' nuclear weapons." Nevertheless, anti-nuclear sentiments were ascendant: "opposition to acquisitions based on emotional and moral arguments against nuclear warfare has spread throughout the Swedish people." Major parties wanted to postpone debate and discussion on nuclear weapons while the test ban treaty had created anticipation that the Soviet bloc was changing. In this context, Swedish politicians argued that a decision in favor of a nuclear capability would be contrary to the "spirit" of the LTBT and would complicate further efforts toward disarmament.

An intelligence report that the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay was being changed every six months raised questions about India's nuclear objectives: a six-month period was quite short for "normal research reactor operations," but it was the optimum time for using the CIR's spent fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium. That the Canadians had not established specific safeguards when they made the reactor available gave the Indians a free hand in using the newly-built Phoenix plutonium separation plant to produce the fissile material.

India's leadership might have had nationalistic motives for building the Phoenix plant but if it wanted a nuclear weapons capability it would seek such a capability. INR had no "direct evidence" of an Indian weapons program and believed it "unlikely" that India had made a decision to build a bomb. Nevertheless, it was "probably no accident" that "everything the Indians [had] done so far would be compatible with a weapons program if at some future date it appeared desirable to start one." According to INR, India had taken the "first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon," which was to have "available, on demand, unsafeguarded weapons-grade plutonium or, at the least, the capacity to produce it." One scholar has recently characterized this as India's "proliferation drift": "the slow but sure moves towards the development of nuclear weapons."

This highly classified report concerning a Soviet demarche to the French government proposing a security pact on Germany and nuclear weapons, was so sensitive that, even though it was graded "noforn," INR instructed its readers that the "information is not to be discussed with any foreign nationals, including the French." INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to "play upon French concern" that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF. INR also suggested that the Soviets might have concluded that it might not be possible to stop MLF-type arrangements and that they needed ways to "shape them in a manner which maximizes restraints upon West Germany." While INR did not think that Moscow had much hope for the acceptance of their proposal, it was likely that a demand for a "new international agreement barring West German acquisition of nuclear weapons" would probably be an element of a Soviet diplomatic campaign for a European security agreement.

Only months after China's first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb. INR generally found it "unlikely" that Beijing would provide "substantial [nuclear] assistance to any country within the next two or three years, "but it saw "reasons for continued concern about [China's] intentions." China had made statements about the need to break the U.S. nuclear weapons monopoly and might want to aid other countries to limit U.S. freedom of action in using nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Beijing had limited nuclear resources and if it helped one country, such action would "inspire demands for similar assistance from many others." Moreover, helping countries like Pakistan or North Korea "would obviously stimulate efforts of third countries like India and Japan to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own." Such reasons explain why Beijing "thus far seems cautious, indecisive and uncertain about helping other nations acquire nuclear weapons."

INR analyzed Supreme Commander's Torsten Rapp's nuclear budget request as "the latest move in a propaganda campaign of the military" based on the argument that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter Soviet incursions.

Analysis of new political pressures created by the military's budget request for planning and research funds for nuclear weapons. The budget request has "slim" odds because "the leaders of the four noncommunist parties have not permitted the issue of nuclear weapons to come to a decisive vote in parliament."

INR examined the implications of Sweden's decisions on military spending which dropped the share of the GNP given to defense below 4% for the first time in over 10 years. The budget situation and impending decisions on the NPT made it "extremely unlikely that the authorities will take any positive action" on the military's proposal to expand nuclear weapons research.

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. The report was for Department of State use only, perhaps because the Department leadership wanted to avoid controversy with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which strongly supported a treaty. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the "international climate" and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a "group capability." But on the main question, INR believed that key countries - Italy, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and the United Kingdom - would support a treaty sooner or later. West Germany was likely to resist at first, in part because Bonn worried that East Germany would sign the treaty, thus contributing to its de facto international recognition. Once an agreement had support from major countries, however, domestic and world opinion would "impel Germany to sign." The French were not likely to sign because they saw proliferation as "inevitable," while the Chinese would probably reject any U.S.-Soviet initiative even though they were "not hostile to the idea of a non-dissemination, non-acquisition agreement." According to INR, Israel and Egypt would sign the treaty together or "not at all." INR saw a "good chance" that the two governments, even if Israel was "toying with the idea" of building the bomb, would sign the treaty if they were sure that the other would sign. As for India, it was likely to "attach to its accession so many conditions ... that its adherence must be rated as doubtful." A key issue was whether Moscow and Washington could provide India with security guarantees against China to leverage New Delhi into giving up the nuclear option.

Statements by Indonesian authorities notwithstanding, INR analysts did not "believe that Indonesia possesses the facilities, personnel and radioactive material necessary for producing an atomic device with any speed." A general had made wild claims about forthcoming nuclear tests while President Achmed Sukarno had said that Indonesia should have a nuclear capability. Indonesia, however, had meager nuclear resources and the two Communist powers which had provided aid to Sukarno - China and the Soviet Union - had shown little interest in building Indonesia's nuclear infrastructure. For example, China was providing "limited training facilities": five scientists and engineers had gone to China for training in fissile materials. The anti-Sukarno military coup in the fall of 1965 would effectively put an end to such projects.

Looking at the Soviet position on draft nonproliferation treaties, this report examines "whether there is a precise point on the spectrum of possible Western [nuclear] sharing arrangements" which Moscow will accept and sign a nonproliferation treaty.

INR saw Moscow as "trying to put off any final definitions of what it will tolerate in the way of NATO sharing and still conclude a nonproliferation agreement."

Intelligence reports about recent visits to Beijing by Pakistani defense and science officials raised questions whether China was or would be providing nuclear aid to Pakistan. The latter was already developing close relations with China, a matter which was of great concern to U.S. policymakers, but INR analyst Thomas Thornton concluded that Pakistan was highly unlikely to seek a significant degree of Chinese nuclear assistance: it would cause severe strains in U.S. relations with Pakistan and there are "few things that would be as certain to trigger an Indian decision to produce nuclear weapons as would a Sino-Pakistani arrangement for nuclear arms collaboration." Moreover, China was unlikely to be responsive: "We remain unconvinced by the evidence thus far obtained that there is any definite plan for Sino-Pakistani cooperation of any type in the nuclear area, but if there is, it is most likely in the peaceful area."

One of the visitors to China, presidential science adviser Abdus Salam, a future Nobel Prize winner in theoretical physics was later ostracized because of his adherence to a minority Muslim sect. Whether Salam played an affirmative role in Bhutto's decision in 1972 to build the bomb has been a matter of controversy, but Feroz Hassan Khan's history places Salam in the center of events. Moreover, once Bhutto had made the decision to go ahead, Salam recruited top scientists to help carry it out.

U.S. policymakers were concerned about China's nuclear weapons capabilities. Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China's main weapons goal, an eventual means for a "credible threat" to Beijing's U.S. and Soviet "arch enemies." In that context, medium-range ballistic missiles were a step toward an ICBM system. Estimating that China would be deploying MRBMs on its borders, including those with India, the Chinese nevertheless were trying to avoid alarming their Asian neighbors and had "taken pains" to emphasize the defensive nature of their nuclear deployments; moreover, their no first use pledges recognized that nuclear weapons were a "breed apart." Whether China would be deploying MRBMs on its non-Communist periphery "will be dictated by a desire to improve its prestige, its defense potential, and its ability to confront US military strength in Asia with some degree (at least in Chinese terms) of nuclear power."

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the "adverse consequences" of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking. For example, if the United States "was reasonably well-protected by ABMs," a U.S. president "might calculate the risks of nuclear war with the Soviet Union differently from the leaders of European countries which were as exposed as ever to Soviet missiles." Differing perceptions of risks "could lead West Europeans to conclude that their safety lay more in neutrality rather than in dependence on the US."

Such apprehensions emerged especially from the British. During meetings in Washington, British officials "indicated that the UK and other European countries would be concerned that their own status within the Alliance would be reduced, that the present system of deterrence would be undermined, and that the prospects for detente would be damaged in the wake of a new arms race." Moreover, the British press raised the problem of strategic instability: according to the New Statesman, competing ABM systems "would disturb the balance of deterrence, since a nation believing itself secure (rightly or wrongly) would be tempted to risk war or would be suspected by the antagonist of being so tempted."

Among other key allies, West German official opinion was somewhat divided. Apparently out of concern that ABM deployments amounted to an admission that the U.S. deterrent was insufficient, some Foreign Office officials worried that an ABM race could produce a "reduction in the credibility of the West's nuclear deterrent, with serious consequences for NATO." Others in the government tied the ABM issue to the ongoing NPT negotiations. Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder declared during a cabinet meeting that the NPT should not prevent West Germany from having "defensive nuclear systems" while the West German ambassador in Washington told Secretary of State Rusk that Bonn would not abandon its objections to the Treaty unless the Soviets agreed that a European nuclear ABM system would be permissible.

The treaty creating the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967. The first nuclear free zone agreement covering a populated area, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was, according to INR's analyst, the result of "ingenious, if somewhat ambiguous comprises" forged by the Mexican government. While the proponents of the treaty saw it as having great "psychological and practical significance," a "cold analysis of it does not justify euphoria." Taking a close look at key provisions, INR found that the entry into force provisions included loopholes which "unenthusiastic" states could use so the treaty did not cover their territory. Some of the protocols were problematic, such as a guarantee by the five nuclear weapons states: China had rebuffed overtures and the Soviet Union would not sign unless all the nuclear powers did. Provisions for the peaceful uses of atomic energy also raised serious problems: while the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, argued that it was impossible to differentiate between nuclear weapons and "peaceful nuclear explosives," Argentina and Brazil claimed there was a difference and insisted on "rigid" definitions of "military" and "peaceful" explosive devices.

That said, INR believed that treaty language creating a control system to ensure that members observed its provisions were "precedent-setting" with important implications for the future. Both London and Washington were satisfied with the flexible provisions concerning the transit of nuclear weapons by non-contracting parties to the treaty. Less satisfactory to Washington were the LANFZ boundaries because the provisions were not in accordance with international law. Technical deficiencies notwithstanding, INR believed that LANFZ treaty could set an important precedent because a "major part of the world has deliberately chosen to exclude itself from the nuclear arms race."

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, U.S. intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a "few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles" as early as 1971. (A few months later, a coordinated estimate acknowledged that a 1971 deployment was conceivable, although on a "tight schedule.") China sought ICBMs as a deterrent, but the leadership might believe that only a "few" were necessary: even "fears of a [a] relatively small-scale retaliation would be enough to put restraints on the US" so that it did not launch an attack on China. From Beijing's perspective, limiting U.S. freedom of action would enable China to take "a greater degree of militancy" and increase its "political leverage in Asia." China, however, was not likely to use the missiles offensively; it has "displayed an eminent degree of caution and realism in its approach to the US, which it knows will remain incomparably stronger even after the Chinese acquire operable ICBMs." Among the possible implications of a Chinese ICBM force were greater pressures in India and Japan for "acquiring independent nuclear missile capabilities," but also demands from Asian allies for "stronger US (or Soviet) commitments to Asian defenses" and even an "accommodation with China."

"This paper surveys the major stated West German objections to the draft treaty, identifies its chief critics and defenders, and tries to analyze the real (and largely unstated) reasons for the opposition within the FRG."

This report prepared a month later wondered whether Bonn was trying to wreck the NPT. According to INR, "the weight of available evidence indicates that it may now be a considered policy of the Bonn Government to try to kill off the treaty project," if it could do so without opening itself to charges that it bore "the prime responsibility for wrecking an agreement."

INR assessed several recent newspaper articles by Kiichi Saeki, a defense expert close to the government, whose thinking was "noteworthy for [its] frank consideration of Japan's need for nuclear-defense planning to cope with Communist China's growing potential." In the articles Saeki supported a nondiscriminatory NPT that would allow non-nuclear states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses and would be "flexible enough to permit adjustment to future international developments." Saeki also emphasized the need to eliminate Japan's "nuclear taboo" and to develop industrial and technical capabilities that would give Japan a nuclear option, among other military capabilities. According to INR, the line of approach in the articles paralleled a paper written for Prime Minister Sato, which Saeki had also helped draft. The internal paper took the approach that "Japan should favor an NPT, [but] it should also reserve the right to produce nuclear weapons in the future, maintain close liaison with the United States on defense planning, and continue research and development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy." After reading the paper, "Prime Minister Sato reportedly requested further studies on how long it would take Japan to produce an atomic bomb following a decision to do so." Also, with U.S. nuclear deployments on Okinawa complicating reversion negotiations, Sato wanted to know "how the reversion of Okinawa could be reconciled with present Japanese policy against the deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil." INR did not believe that Japan was about to "go nuclear" - strong domestic opposition would prevent that - but it saw greater "flexibility" in official circles on nuclear defense issues.

The Soviets object to American interpretations of NPT Articles I and II, especially interpretations of Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed united Western Europe.

A study of the Soviet's hard bargaining over Articles II and III of the NPT.

By spring 1967, China had staged five nuclear tests (and would soon conduct a sixth), including one, in October 1966, in which the device was launched by a guided missile that flew some 450 nautical miles. Those developments, along with a series of missile tests, led the U.S. intelligence community to estimate that during 1968 China could deploy a force of medium-range ballistic missiles in the 1,000 n.m. range, which would put major U.S. bases within striking distance. A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it "might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it." China might feel that it could take more risks because even a "modest nuclear capability" would have "significant deterrent value" since Washington "would be particularly reluctant to risk nuclear exchanges in the context of the Vietnam [War], which Peking appears to be convinced is unpopular with large and influential segment of the US population." While INR believed that Beijing was likely to avoid "extreme risk taking" in the Vietnam War it was probably convinced that "by raising the specter of its own nuclear power, it would be freer to pursue its basic policy of providing aid to North Vietnam."

Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the U.S. intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. The large SS-9 ICBM would provide the first two stages for the FOBS while the third stage would orbit and fire the warhead through the atmosphere. It could attack targets in a southerly direction and thereby evade the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System which provided early notice of missiles coming from the north. Apparently the Soviets saw FOBs as important for attacking U.S. anti-ballistic missile sites; while INR did mention a role for FOBS in complicating ABM defenses, it saw a different primary mission: "Soviet strategists probably look on FOBS as useful primarily in a pre-emptive attack" on time-urgent soft targets such as SAC bases with alert bombers and key military and civilian headquarters.

At that point, August 1967, the U.S. had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.

Reports Coordination and review Staff, Intelligence Reports, 1961, 1963-67, box 3, Chron/Ins April 1963. No record of Brubeck's response has surfaced.