Che Guevara and the CIA in the Mountains of Bolivia

After visiting Bolivia and meeting President Barrientos, U.S. General William Tope assesses the guerrilla situation in the Andes, warning of major challenges ahead. Barrientos informs the Americans that the Bolivian Army is investigating reports of “a group of bearded armed men…” spotted around Chuquisaca. Barrientos says the guerrillas are a “well organized, highly trained and well supplied group… and are at present maintaining contact with Salta, Argentina; Venezuela; and even Cuba.” Concerned about the broader security implications of the guerrilleros, Barrientos stresses that “the army must come up with some kind of a quick success.” Yet, General Tope counsels that “unfortunately, all of their quick fixes are unsound, would waste precious resources and probably would get them in worse trouble than they already have.” Tope further laments that “Since we have not yet figured out how to pull a rabbit out of the hat for them either, they are very difficult to divert from this line of thinking.” He recommends that Barrientos use “individuals who have received counterinsurgency training from us in the past,” to which the Bolivian responds that they had already done so. Fearing Bolivian incompetence, Tope concludes the telegram by highlighting the need for a significant U.S. role, “It is obvious we must take a practical, pragmatcw [sic] approach, building on what they now have, forcing improvements toward sound objectives, assisting all we can when there is the goal, and preventing the waste of either US or Bolivian resources when it is not.”

In this sobering memo on the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Bolivian government, staffer William G. Bowdler forwards to National Security Adviser Rostow the Embassy’s April 22 cable (see Document 1), which he calls a “grim report,” and warns that “The problem is not only adequacy of the troops in the field, but the attitude of those at the top, including Barrientos.” Bowdler explains that supplies have been sent to support U.S. troops already in the field and “We are concentrating on the training and equipping of a new Ranger battalion.”

This is the first CIA field report of “persons who claimed to have seen and talked with ‘Che’ Guevara since he disappeared in March 1965.” Based in large part on the interrogations of several captured persons, including Régis Debray, the CIA explains that Guevara “was present with the main group of Bolivian guerrillas in Southeast Bolivia from late March until at least 20 April 1967.”

In this memo, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow explains to the President that there is a credible report (Document 3) that Guevara is “alive and operating in South America” (highlight in original). Rostow concludes by noting that “we need more evidence before concluding that Guevara is operational – and not dead, as the intelligence community, with the passage of time, has been more and more inclined to believe.” A previous release of this document redacted the source for this report – “interrogation of guerrillas captured in Bolivia, among them Jules Debray, the young French Marxist who has been close to Castro.”

This intelligence summary based on the interrogation of Régis Debray describes three meetings the French intellectual had with Guevara. Debray explains that Guevara is trying to create a movement and funding source outside of Cuba as, “Guevara and Fidel Castro were not in total agreement, and that Guevara was trying to build mechanisms independent of Cuba, to support his personal revolutionary efforts.” The support was to come mainly from Europe, according to Debray, as the movement, “was to be organized and backed by Bertrand Russell of England, Jean Paul Sartre of France and Alberto Moravia of Italy, and was to support ‘Che’ Guevara and his guerrilla movement in Latin America … the moral and financial support was to come from individuals in Europe.”

This dire CIA intelligence assessment warns that there are currently seven distinct guerrilla groups in Bolivia and “Their presence poses a grave threat to Bolivian stability.” The analysts highlight the role played by Cuba and worry that the USSR could also intervene, “It has been evident from the outset that Cuba has played a key role in the initiation, implementation and execution of guerrilla activity in Bolivia.” The report explains that “Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara according to several reports from different sources, is personally directing Bolivian guerrilla activities and has been physically present with the guerrillas in Bolivia.” Consistent with past intelligence assessments, the CIA sees the government of President Barrientos as incompetent, having “repeatedly demonstrated its total inability to cope with the guerrillas.” The analysts think it is possible that the guerrilla situation could create a climate for a left-wing coup in Bolivia and broader regional instability, “This could lead to a government composed of a loose coalition of leftist parties. Both President Juan Carlos Ongania, of Argentina and President Eduardo Frei, of Chile agreed at a summit conference in Uruguay in April 1967, that if Barrientos is overthrown and replaced with a left-wing leader like Juan Lechin Oquendo, they will intervene with their armed forces.”

This memo to the president from his national security adviser presents an update on the Bolivian guerrilla situation and highlights the “interrogation of several deserters and prisoners, including a young [sic] French communist – Jules Régis Debray – closely associated with Fidel Castro and suspected of serving as a Cuban courier.” The interrogation of these individuals “strongly suggests that the guerrillas are Cuban-sponsored, although this is hard to document. There is some evidence that ‘Che’ Guevara may have been with the group. Debray reports seeing him.” Rostow then explains U.S. efforts: “Soon after the presence of guerrillas had been established we sent a special team and some equipment to help organize another Ranger-type Battalion. On the military side, we are helping about as fast as the Bolivians are able to absorb our assistance” and “CIA has increased its operations.” Rostow concludes by noting that “while the outlook is not clear,” U.S. efforts should make a positive difference.

This intelligence assessment from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) downplays some of CIA’s more dire conclusions. On the threat posed by guerrilla movements, it notes, “There have been rumors of possible new guerrilla ‘fronts’, but such reports seem somewhat overdrawn and unrealistic in view of the small size of the guerrilla movement, estimated to number about 60 members. We have seen no evidence of successful recruiting efforts by the guerrillas … The present guerrilla movement can probably evade and harass the counterinsurgent forces for an indefinite period, but it does not in itself and at its present size constitute a serious threat to the government.” Ultimately, the analysts at State conclude that the stability of Bolivia is dependent on whether Barrientos makes concessions with disaffected groups or uses repression. “The greatest danger in the short term would lie in the coalescence of groups or movements capable of violence. If the government should take harshly repressive measures against the miners, that coalescence [sic] might occur. However, Barrientos has not authorized such measures thus far and his chances of avoiding drastic action seem somewhat better than even.”

This startling memcon by Bowdler summarizes his discussion with Bolivian Ambassador Julio Sanjines-Goytia, who requests U.S. assistance for the establishment of “what he called a ‘hunter killer’ team to ferret out guerrillas.” The ambassador explained that “this idea was not original with him, but came from friends of his in CIA.” Bowdler then asks if “the Ranger Battalion now in training were not sufficient,” to which Ambassador Sanjines-Coytia replies that what he had in mind are, “50 or 60 young army officers, with sufficient intelligence, motivation and drive, who could be trained quickly and could be counted on to search out the guerrillas with tenacity and courage.” Bowdler tells the ambassador that “his idea may have merit, but needs further careful examination.”

This brief cover note from Bowdler refers to its lengthy CIA attachment: “This does not constitute proof that Che Guevara is alive and operating in Bolivia but it certainly heightens the possibility. I think the President night like to read this one.” The report is based on the written statement by captured Argentine revolutionary Ciro Roverto Bustos, who explained that when he arrived at the Bolivian guerrilla camp, one guerrillero with a Cuban accent told him that the commander, “Ramon,” was none other than Guevara. Guevara did not want his presence known because, “the struggle should be a Bolivian movement, and only when it was well developed and his participation, along with his Cubans, was a simple fact of proletarian-revolutionary internationalism, should his presence be made known.” The report explains in detail Guevara’s strategic objective which places the U.S. at the center of the revolutionary struggle: “the underlying political basis for this is that the struggle against imperialism is the factor common to all Latin American nations. Imperialism is the real enemy, not the oligarchies, which are enemies of form rather than substance. Because the real enemy is a common one for all of Latin America, a new strategy is necessary. This strategy must start from the premise that in Latin America no single country can now or in the future carry out the revolution alone, not even a government supported by its own army and by its people. It would merely produce palliatives and imitations of change, but it would not make revolution. One country alone is quickly surrounded, strangled, and subjugated by the imperialists because revolution is a socio-economic fact and not a romantic, patriotic event. Economic underdevelopment in Latin America is caused by imperialism and its total control. Change will be possible only when there is total opposition. It is necessary, therefore, to unite the total strength of the Latin American nations in a decisive confrontation against the United States” [underlining in the original].

In this intelligence assessment, the CIA concludes that, the success of the guerrilla movement in Bolivia “is due largely to the ineptitude of the Bolivian military.” Conversely, Bowdler in his cover note to Rostow, describes the report as “the next thing to a whitewash and is being rewritten. Autocriticism is sometimes hard to take. A great deal of the fault lies with the Bolivians. But there are areas where we clearly fall down.” In the report, CIA analysts highlight the unique strengths of the Bolivian guerrillas: “one major point is clear. The Bolivian guerrillas are a well trained and disciplined group. The insurgents are better led and better equipped than the untrained, poorly organized Bolivian military forces” [underlining in original]. On the leadership of the guerrillas, the CIA carefully qualifies the intelligence on Guevara: “A few known Bolivian Communists have been identified as leaders of the insurgents. Other reports from within Bolivia and elsewhere allege that one of the leaders is Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, the Argentine-born revolutionary who was a key figure in the Castro government in Cuba until he dropped out of sight in March 1965. These reports, which come from sources of varying credibility, are in essential agreement on the details of where and when Guevara is supposed to have been with the guerrillas, but conclusive evidence of Che’s direct participation has not been obtained. Whether Guevara is a participant, or indeed whether he is even alive, it is plain in any case that the guerrilla leaders are well-schooled in the insurgency techniques and doctrines previously espoused by Guevara” [underlining in original]. The agency concludes by suggesting that this case might have broader repercussions: “because worldwide publicity has been given both to the alleged presence of Che Guevara with the guerrillas and to the capture of [Régis] Debray, this insurgency movement will be kept in the public eye. It could become a focus for the continuing polemical debate in the Communist world over the wisdom of political versus militant revolutionary action.”

This memorandum presents several proposals for handling captured documents taken from Che Guevara’s camp by Bolivian troops in early August and turned over to the Americans. The concern is that the revelation of the U.S. as the sole authentication source of the documents might carry some risks. The strategic value of the documents is assessed. Recommendations are that Bolivia only make public some documents and that La Paz should seek public assistance from the U.S. and other countries simultaneously in order to minimize U.S. exposure. Option 3, in which Bolivia announces possession of captured documents and publicly asks the U.S. for help analyzing them, and Option 4, in which Bolivia would expand the circle to include all OAS members, garner the most support. American officials are aware of the Bolivian desire that the documents be used as evidence in the Régis Debray trial. The U.S. role should be protected given that, “The Communists, for example, may assert we fabricated the documents. The French press may charge we are out to get Debray, etc.”

In this memorandum for the president, Rostow explains two major developments concerning the Bolivian situation. First, after the capture of several guerrilla documents, “The preliminary reading from CIA shows rather conclusively that ‘Che’ Guevara travelled to Bolivia via Spain and Brazil in late 1966 using false documents.” Second, “Bolivian armed forces on August 30 finally scored their first victory and it seems to have been a big one. An army unit caught up with the rearguard of the guerrillas and killed 10 and captured one … two of the dead guerrillas are Bolivians and the rest either Cubans or Argentines.” Rostow recommends that “it is not in our interest, or the Bolivians’, to have the U.S. appear as the sole authenticating agent for the documents.”

This memo shows that after further analysis of the captured guerrilla documents in Bolivia, “two of the passports bearing different names carry the same photograph and fingerprints.” The Agency has concluded that, “the fingerprints are identical to examples of prints of Guevara furnished to CIA [REDACTED] in 1954 and [REDACTED] in 1965.” The photographs, the CIA assesses are “most probably” of Guevara “in disguise.”

Bowdler makes no comment in forwarding these field reports of rebel activities in Bolivia to National Security Adviser Rostow, but the attached CIA intelligence cables reveal the dire straits into which Che Guevara’s band had fallen. One tells the story of the battle with Bolivian army troops which effectively destroyed Guevara’s rearguard. The other, reporting information from the interrogation of one of the guerrillas, gives an inside account of developments within the rebel band. Che Guevara is discussed under his nom de guerre “Ramon.” He is reported to be angry and upset at various developments in the movement.

Bowdler sends Rostow a copy of the CIA’s preliminary analysis of the documents that were captured from Che Guevara’s rebel band in Bolivia. The agency focuses on evidence related to the question of whether Che is actually in that country, which has been one of the major mysteries from the beginning. The evidence includes two passports, identity cards, health certificates and photographs. The passports show a correspondence to fingerprints Argentine authorities gave CIA in 1954 and 1965, and indicate that Che most likely went from Brazil to Bolivia in November 1966. “These findings lead to a strong presumption . . . but they are still short of conclusive proof. The CIA report does not draw conclusions at this stage.” Bowdler also tells Rostow the Bolivians want to use the captured documents in the trial of Régis Debray. The staffer worries the documents may be tarred as a CIA hoax, and recommends that Rostow approve a course of action under which countries other than the U.S. authenticate the material, as in an option approved by the 303 Committee by telephone the previous day.

This State Department cable to Ambassador Henderson in La Paz makes clear Washington’s determination to get maximum use out of Che’s captured documents. State Department officials deem it essential that the documents be publicized before they are brought into the Organization of American States (OAS). To this end the Department wants to make use of President Barrientos’s and General Ovando’s desire to put the documents into evidence at the trial of Régis Debray. While U.S. officials admit the documents have no direct evidence against Debray, “the trial would be [the] most convenient setting for making [the] documents public.” Henderson is to see Bolivian officials and urge them to surface the documents in the Debray trial, and take the occasion to advise the Bolivians to inform other OAS member states that they intend to bring these materials before the regional group as proof of Cuban subversion in the hemisphere.

State Department instructions to Embassy La Paz inform Ambassador Henderson that Bolivian Foreign Minister Guevara-Arce is being given a “narrative” and “props” he can use at the Organization of American States (OAS) conference. The narrative is to account for where the materials being presented came from, how the Bolivian government dealt with them, and what they show. The Bolivians are supposed to rewrite this exposition so it appears to come from them. The props are versions of the captured documents. Ambassador Henderson is ordered to present copies of the same material to Bolivian leader Barrientos and military strongman General Ovando, and to obtain from them a clear understanding that Bolivia will take complete responsibility and make no attribution whatever to the United States.

At the State Department, INR officers responsible for the Department’s dealings with the 303 Committee prepare a memorandum reminding committee members of the proposals made for the documents captured in Bolivia (Document 16), affirming that 303 had made a telephonic decision, confirmed at a September 8 meeting, and now noting actions taken on that basis that will enable the Bolivian government to unveil the documents at the Organization of American States meeting the next day. INR specifies that the Bolivian government will take complete responsibility for the documents but calls it an acceptable risk if circumstances oblige the United States to admit it has given Bolivia an opinion interpreting the material.

In a brief note forwarding copies of field reports, NSC staffer William Bowdler informs Rostow that Bolivian leader René Barrientos is claiming Che’s capture in a battle with Bolivian troops in the mountains. Bowdler affirms that the unit which engaged the guerrillas is the same Ranger battalion the United States had helped train. He reports that, before confirming the presence of Che Guevara among the wounded, the CIA wants to verify his fingerprints.

In a brief field report the CIA in Bolivia confirms a battle action in the highlands east of La Paz on October 8. The battle lasted through the afternoon and resulted in several guerrillas killed and two captured. “One of those captured may be Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara de la Serna, who is either seriously wounded or very ill and may die.” The rebel remnants appeared to be trapped and were expected to be wiped out the next day.

Here National Security Advisor Rostow reports the tentative information that Guevara had been taken by the Bolivian military and was dead, attributed to President Barrientos’s private contacts with journalists in La Paz the morning of the 9th. The note correctly identifies several members of Che’s guerrilla band, including the man who had been with him when he was captured. Nightfall, according to this report, prevented the Bolivians from evacuating the prisoners and wounded from the highlands. (In reality, the Rangers were awaiting instructions on whether to kill the rebels.)

The CIA monitoring service known as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) typically listens in to radio broadcasts from many different sources. This compendium on Guevara’s death included material from La Paz radio (La Cruz del Sur), the French press agency AFP, and the Argentinian agency ANSA. Bolivian military officers holding a press conference not only claimed Guevara had died of battle wounds, they revealed that his diary had been captured. A French reporter recorded that the diary book was colored red and had been manufactured in Germany. Another report noted the diary contained daily entries that had detailed events in his Bolivian guerrilla campaign.

In this memo, CIA Director Helms calls attention to the fact that published accounts of Che’s death have been based on a Bolivian army press conference the previous day, which attributed his death to battle wounds and claimed Guevara had been in a coma when captured. Helms noted the agency had received contrary information from its officer, Felix Rodriguez, who was with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. Helms now reported Che had been taken with a leg wound “but was otherwise in fair condition.” The CIA added that orders had come through from Bolivian Army Headquarters to kill the Argentine revolutionary and that they had been carried out the same day “with a burst of fire from an M-2 automatic rifle.”

Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that “CIA will not give us a categorical answer” as to whether Che is dead. Rostow is “99 percent sure,” but that is deemed not good enough. CIA reported that Che was taken alive, questioned for a short time to establish his identity, and then killed on the orders of Bolivian chief General Ovando. “I regard this as stupid,” Rostow adds, “but it is understandable from a Bolivian standpoint.” He notes that this “marks the passing of another of the aggressive, romantic revolutionaries” and that “it will have a strong impact in discouraging would-be guerrillas.”

“‘Che’ Guevara’s death was a crippling—perhaps fatal—blow to the Bolivian guerrilla movement and may prove a serious setback for Fidel Castro’s hopes to foment violent revolution” in Latin America, proclaimed this State Department wrap-up analysis. INR observes that Bolivia has been a testing ground for the foco theory of revolution. While Castro would not escape the “I told you so” criticisms of Latin communists, INR predicts, he would still hold the esteem of Latino youth. Guevara’s demise would set up a test, however. “If the Bolivian guerrilla movement is soon eliminated as a serious subversive threat, the death of Guevara will have even more important repercussions among Latin American communists. The dominant peaceful line groups, who were either in total disagreement with Castro or paid only lip service to the guerrilla struggle, will be able to argue with more authority against the Castro-Guevara-Debray thesis.”

Here the CIA director recounts for senior administration officials some of what Che Guevara said at La Higuera while he lay wounded on October 9. Helms affirms that Guevara refused to be interrogated but did not mind a conversation reflecting on recent history. Che talked about the Cuban economy, the relationship between Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos (whom some thought Castro had had executed, but Guevara insisted had died in a plane crash), and Castro himself, whom Che said had not been a communist until after the success of the revolution, breaking another frequently-held belief in the U.S. Guevara spoke of his campaign in the Congo, the treatment of prisoners in Cuba, and the future of the guerrilla movement in Bolivia—“he predicted a resurgence in the future.” Helms also details the telegraphic code the Bolivians used to decree life or death for Che.

Che Guevara’s diary, among his effects taken at La Higuera, would be published widely, including by Cuba, in the U.S. by the magazine Ramparts, in book form by Ramparts editors, and by others. Before any of those publications, however, the U.S. Government already knew what was in the diary, because the CIA made a copy and summarized it for Washington officials. In this field report, which Walt Rostow forwarded to President Johnson, there are highlights of the Guevara diary. The account began by putting a date on Che’s arrival in Bolivia and focused on details such as who had accompanied him, Che’s account of his break with the Bolivian communists, and the precarious situation at the end of September. Another, more extensive, summary appeared in a CIA report on November 9 (also part of the Digital National Security Archive’s CIA Set III) as the full diary was still being translated. Comparison of these summaries with the diary readily confirms the CIA was working from the actual diary materials.

In 1975, the “Year of Intelligence” (see Digital National Security Archive CIA Set II), both the Church Committee and the Rockefeller Commission investigated assassination plots attributed to the CIA. At this time Felix Rodriguez (“Benton H. Mizones”) was interviewed on his Bolivia assignment by colleagues at the Latin America Division, for the Inspector General’s office to compile a record of his time fighting Che. Rodriguez was of interest because it was he who had passed along instructions from the Bolivian high command that Guevara be killed. The Rodriguez interview record provides a straightforward chronology of his work in Bolivia, commencing with his recruitment by CIA, his trip to La Paz, meeting with President Barrientos, and his work with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. In the account which the CIA Inspector General passed along to the Church committee, Rodriguez takes credit for saving the life of one guerrilla prisoner, from whom he recounts obtaining information critical to catching Che, and for the suggestion to put the Rangers into action, which led to the gun battle in which Che Guevara would be wounded and captured. Rodriguez would be the only American to see Che alive, and the only one to speak with him before his death. In these interviews the CIA contract officer says little about what he and Che discussed, but a fuller account of that conversation was reported by Director Helms in Document 27. This release of the Rodriguez statement goes further than previous versions of the document in revealing the name of CIA colleague Villoldo, and mentioning the Deputy Chief of Station in La Paz.