Anastas Mikoyan: Soviet First Responder and Smiling Diplomat

In 1936, Anastas Mikoyan, people’s commissar of the food industry, visited the United States to investigate how the food industry was organized in the leading capitalist economy with a view to adopting best practices for the Soviet Union. This never-before published report to the Central Committee of the CPSU, written as a stenogram of his live presentation, shows Mikoyan’s astonishment with the level and culture of food production and consumption in the United States and his efforts to stay within the limits of Soviet ideology while describing the United States’ clear superiority. Mikoyan praises Americans as “amazing organizers,” from whom “we need to learn.”

In comparison, he says, “we still build the economy like schoolchildren who need to learn – and all of us are learning but we have not finished our studies yet.” He notes that a Soviet worker is only 40 percent as productive as an American and that factories in the United States do not employ nearly as many (superfluous) auxiliary staff as in his country. He makes a stunning conclusion that the Soviet people “cannot catch up with American earning power and American living standards if we don't readjust.” With his keen eye, he notices the differences in levels of service, even at gas stations, where attendants clean windshields, check the oil, and provide water “free of charge,” and the “very many public bathrooms […] are very clean.”

He remarks on the relationship between workers and directors at factories, which is strikingly different from the one in the Soviet Union, being respectful and even friendly. He talks about conveniences that exist for regular people, ranging from the organization of workplace cafeterias, ease of communications, and shopping. Strikingly for a Soviet official, he talks publicly about the total absence of hygienic supplies for Soviet female workers, comparing it to the situation in the United States where such conveniences are available everywhere.

While praising numerous U.S. practices, however, Mikoyan is very careful to mention many times the superiority of the Soviet system. American public restrooms may be clean, but metros are cleaner in the USSR and in general “Americans are dirty.” Worker-management relations also seem warm because the “bourgeois” are “smart” and able to “fool the workers ingeniously” with an eye toward reaping “enormous” profits. In all, “[t]he Soviet system compared to the American one is a gift from God.”

Mikoyan is sent to Hungary immediately after the conclusion of the XX Congress of the CPSU to resolve economic issues between the two countries. The conversation, which shines an interesting light on the nature of relations between Moscow and its Central European allies, is recorded by the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary (and future KGB chief and CPSU general secretary) Yuri Andropov. After addressing the issue of payments for Austrian property, Mikoyan turns to the more difficult problem—the purchase of T-34 tanks from Czechoslovakia, which Hungary initially agreed to but refuses to complete. Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi calls the Czech tanks “outdated,” even though Voroshilov reminds him they are still in use by the Soviet Army. Mikoyan proposes a compromise solution and settles the issue. Turning to the balance of trade, he notes that “Hungary refuses to buy machinery and other industrial equipment from the Soviet Union,” but insists that the USSR does not want to impose those goods on Hungary. However, when Rákosi asks for aid including a loan of $20 million and 100 thousand tons of wheat, Mikoyan responds negatively and Voroshilov advises the Hungarians to “economize,” especially as far as foreign goods are concerned.

A month after visiting Hungary, Mikoyan is in India, on a mission to improve relations with this critically important Asian nation, but also to explain the outcomes of the landmark XX Party Congress, where Nikita Khrushchev denounced the many excesses of Joseph Stalin. After Mikoyan informs the Indian leader about the substance of Khrushchev’s secret speech to the congress, Nehru asks several key questions, including whether the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was the result of Stalin's cult of personality. Nehru and Mikoyan talk about changing Soviet views on the need for revolutionary violence and the nature of socialism in different countries. Listening to Mikoyan’s explanations, Nehru concludes that “the final picture of socialism should represent a variety of systems, and not complete uniformity,” to which Mikoyan agrees and cites variations in reforms and economic policies in the countries of the socialist bloc. To Nehru’s question about the break-up of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia, Mikoyan responds that “it was Stalin’s whim, that other government members did not share that opinion, but they could not do anything.”

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi visits Moscow to take advantage of Khrushchev’s new peace offensive and to see post-XX Congress changes for himself. He is received by the entire top Soviet leadership. Khrushchev and his entourage are eager to improve relations with Iran, which is seen as firmly in the Western camp after the U.S. and Britain helped to restore the Shah to the throne three years earlier. But the thorn in Moscow’s side is Iran’s decision to join the Baghdad Pact. Here, as in other conversations, Mikoyan addresses the issue of mistakes made during Stalin’s rule and the cult of personality. When the Shah cites Soviet (and tsarist Russian) transgressions against Iran, Mikoyan responds: “we regret the erroneous acts that took place then; but to tell the truth, those present here should not be held personally responsible for these mistakes.”

Mikoyan is especially concerned about the Middle East and South Asia. He talks about his trip to Pakistan and India and his conversations with the Turkish leadership about the need to improve relations with Middle Eastern countries. The main problem for the Soviet Union is that the Kremlin views the Baghdad Pact as a threat to its southern borders. The transcript conveys the tension in the room as Mikoyan and his colleagues voice their strong objections to Iran’s decision to join the pact. Since they grant that they cannot force Tehran to leave it, they want the Shah at least to give a public assurance that “Iran will not allow its territory to be used against the Soviet Union.” The Shah is palpably uncomfortable under the pressure and “stays silent for some time” before providing various justifications, including somewhat feebly reminding his hosts of his respect for the father of Soviet Communism: “You must know that there is not a single bad word said about Lenin in Iran.” Finally, he offers the statement: “If Iran itself is not dangerous for you, but you think that you may be in danger from the territory of Iran, then I declare that while I am alive, no danger will threaten you from Iran.”

In this conversation, Premier Khrushchev displays his usual braggadocio about the military might of the Soviet Union, making a point of reminding Mohammad Reza of the consequences to neighbors if they act aggressively against it. Along with references to his own concerns about the historical threat posed by Russia, the Shah repeatedly mentions the danger of nuclear weapons and the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to agree to abolish them.

In January 1959 Mikoyan arrives in the United States ostensibly on a personal trip but actually to promote Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence, improve trade relations, and prepare for Khrushchev’s trip to the United States in September. In this meeting with Secretary Dulles, Mikoyan signals the Soviet willingness to negotiate and settle all of the most important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations in pursuit of peace and disarmament, and tells Dulles that he is “a man on holiday” with a completely flexible schedule to set up more meetings.

To Dulles’ question about the international communist movement, Mikoyan asserts that the Soviet Union does not interfere in the internal affairs of others, that it has good relations with states with very different political systems, like South Africa or Afghanistan, and does not pass judgment on those systems, but that its natural sympathies lie with communist movements. Obviously referring to Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign, he states that “in the USSR there are no political prisoners.”

The most important part of the conversation deals with Germany and West Berlin. Mikoyan defuses the tension created by Khrushchev’s announcement of November 1958 that in six months, if Western powers do not agree on withdrawing all foreign troops from Berlin, he will transfer all authority on Berlin to East Germany. He assures Dulles that “the fact that the Soviet Union talked about six months—which was long enough for any negotiations on the matter—did not mean that this was an ultimatum or a threat.” Dulles, however, sounds more belligerent, saying that the United States “did not want war over Berlin, nor for that matter, over anything; but we were not prepared to avoid war by retreating wherever we were under pressure,” referring to what could happen if the Soviets pressured the United States to withdraw from West Berlin. In response, Mikoyan assures him again that the “Soviet Government was not asking anyone to withdraw, it was asking for the problem to be settled by negotiation.” These reassurances are welcomed by the U.S. side and create a positive context for the rest of the visit.

This is a “meet and greet” conversation between Mikoyan, Richard Nixon, and other high level representatives, focusing generally on U.S.-Soviet relations. Nixon and Mikoyan discuss the political situation in the U.S., in particular bipartisan agreement on foreign policy, with Nixon noting that “in the area of foreign policy, Congress supported the President and the Secretary of State on major issues.” Nixon mentions areas of agreement between the U.S. and the USSR, and Mikoyan highlights the importance of frequent meetings and contacts at all levels to address the prejudices that stand in the way of improving relations. The two additionally discuss propaganda, the “Hungarian question,” air incidents, issues relating to the United Nations, the concept of preventive war, and “the German problem.”

Mikoyan and Dulles meet again for practically a full day of conversations focusing on the German question. Dulles mentions the bipartisan U.S. view on the issue, which Mikoyan agrees with, adding that he thought the American position “required a change from a rigid to a more flexible attitude.” Mikoyan discusses the importance of negotiations, and says that Berlin could be a “testing ground for cooperation between us instead of a hot-bed of aggression.” Dulles speaks of the U.S. also having a strong interest in negotiating not only about Berlin and a peace treaty, but also about German reunification, while the “Soviet peace treaty draft was a call to perpetuate the division of Germany.” The two discuss other issues surrounding Germany, such as free elections, alleged Western attempts to incite turmoil, and the economic situation.

In the afternoon, as the two continue to discuss Berlin. Dulles warns his Soviet counterpart that the “Western Powers would not acquiesce in any Soviet turnover of responsibilities in the Eastern zone to the GDR.” Mikoyan notes that the Soviets are proposing establishing a free city in Berlin. Dulles adds that he has authorization from the United Kingdom and France to state that they support the U.S. stance on the issue. Mikoyan responds that Dulles’ “reference to the authorization of our Allies might have stemmed from some apprehension on the Secretary’s part that he had been leading them forward and that they had been hanging on his coattails.”

These conversations show how alarmed the U.S. leadership was about the Khrushchev “ultimatum” on Berlin and help explain why even during the Cuban Missile Crisis the Kennedy administration connected the Soviet actions with Berlin. Mikoyan’s visit helped allay the worst fears about possible Soviet action on Berlin in 1959 and prepared the way for the foreign ministers’ conference on Berlin in May 1959.

After traveling around the United States, Mikoyan gets a meeting with the president. Mikoyan argues for disarmament and the overall need to improve relations. The Soviet representative complains about very high military spending by the United states and suggests “we should end the cold war. This was the reason for the military appropriations by the Congress and the Soviet Union did not consider that it was to blame for the cold war.” The bulk of the conversation is about Germany and West Berlin. Mikoyan again pushes the Soviet position, saying that all foreign troops should leave Berlin, the occupation should end, and a peace treaty should be signed. Secretary Dulles intervenes, saying that “one of the difficulties is that it is believed in Germany and elsewhere that the government in East Germany was not a Government of Germans but one that was wholly imposed upon them and hated by the Germans. It was a form of masked occupation.” President Eisenhower agrees with Mikoyan that nobody wants war and that armament levels are too high, but he does not budge on Berlin, noting repeatedly that this conversation is not a negotiation, that he needs to consult with allies, and that experts should be involved in negotiations. The American bottom line is no troop withdrawal from West Berlin and no peace treaty at this point.

This conversation focuses on the desirability to expand trade between the U.S. and the USSR. Under Secretary of State Dillon stresses the importance of relaxed tensions in gradually expanding trade. He also discusses Nikita Khrushchev’s recent letter on expanding trade, which featured many Soviet items already produced in the U.S. Dillon also notes that business negotiations are conducted by private companies in the U.S. Mikoyan disagrees with this point, noting that “so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, they [private companies and firms] are tied hand and foot by the State Department.” Mikoyan makes far-reaching demands about granting the USSR most-favored nation status, providing credits and removing all restrictions on trading in strategic materials. Dillon and Mikoyan discuss patent claims, the U.S. ban on Soviet furs, and chemical firms. The lend-lease program is also discussed at length, with disagreements emerging over Soviet payments.

In this conversation, Mikoyan is hardly recognizable—instead of his usual charming and eloquent persona, he acts as an assertive and even aggressive negotiator, accusing the United States of waging a Cold War in the sphere of trade. The conversation so worries U.S. officials that it is discussed specifically at a National Security Council meeting on January 22 after Mikoyan leaves the United States. At that meeting Secretary of State Dulles describes how in his conversation with Dillon, “Mikoyan had violently denounced Dillon’s proposals for a gradual improvement in trade relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, he went on to make of Mr. Dillon far-reaching demands which he must have known would have to be refused.”[1]

This conversation takes place during Vice President Nixon’s famous visit to the Soviet Union and covers U.S.-Soviet relations, a recent Congressional resolution on captive nations, colonialism, and Mikoyan’s meetings during his visit to the U.S. in January. Mikoyan’s discussions with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Douglas Dillon [see Document 10] become a major focus of the conversation, with Mikoyan repeating his point that “he can see that the State Department is systematically conducting cold war in trade.” Mikoyan also notes that his view of the situation is that “the United States could not do without the ‘cold war’ because the ‘cold war’ apparently keeps its allies in line, prevents a breakdown of military pacts and makes it possible to have high taxes for the production of armaments.” Nixon notes that “the President is convinced that trade is one of the means towards consolidating peace throughout the world.” The meeting ends with Nixon stating that the trade situation will improve, but “it could improve more rapidly if the political situation improves and develops faster.”

This crucial conversation, which lasted over four hours in the evening of November 22, more than a month after the start of the Cuban missile crisis, settled all major remaining issues between Moscow and Havana—most importantly, the fate of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba. Mikoyan admitted that they were still in Cuba and that the Americans indeed had no idea that they were deployed, but that the Soviet Union decided to pull them back due to what he disingenuously claimed was an "unpublished law" prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. This memcon provides an extraordinary glimpse into Soviet-Cuban relations and helps one understand the depth of Castro's humiliation at Soviet hands during the crisis. For him, the resolution meant that he had been abandoned by his Soviet ally and left to the mercy of the American imperialists—because Cuban security now depended not on powerful Soviet weapons but on U.S. non-invasion assurances, which the Cubans were hardly inclined to trust. The document also shows Mikoyan as a masterful negotiator with an incredible grasp of the issues, who could be empathetic and tough at the same time.

In this remarkably candid conversation, Kennedy and Mikoyan are trying to settle the remaining issues of the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the wording of the declaration or separate statements that would include pledges of non-invasion and no introduction of nuclear weapons. Kennedy raises the issue of Soviet lies about deployment of missiles in Cuba and Mikoyan responds that the weapons were deployed for defensive purposes and moreover, “wishing to not complicate the position of the president,” Khrushchev decided to inform him about the deployment confidentially immediately after the elections. Mikoyan assures the U.S. president that all offensive weapons have been removed and therefore the Soviet side has fulfilled its obligations. The disagreement centers on the U.S. wording tying the non-invasion pledge to Cuban behavior in the hemisphere, including that it would refrain from “subversive actions.” Mikoyan tells the president: “You want to continue subversive work against Cuba and at the same time keep the ‘right’ to attack Cuba should Castro want to respond in kind.” In the end, Kennedy agrees that the language could be softened and that after the settlement of the crisis the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in improving bilateral relations and reducing the threat of war.

Exactly a year after leaving Cuba for the United States, and on his birthday, Mikoyan attends the funeral ceremony for President Kennedy and a White House reception. He gives the Kremlin an emotional report of a brief encounter with Jacqueline Kennedy at the end of the reception. Mikoyan says she “clasped” his hand in both of hers, and said “with great emotion and nearly sobbing” that her husband and Khrushchev “could have been successful in the search for peace,” and that now the Soviet Union should continue and “bring it to completion.” Mikoyan, who lost his wife of 50 years when he was in Cuba, was touched and impressed by Jackie.  He concludes his telegram: “Her fortitude is most impressive.”