Kennedy and Cuba: Operation Mongoose

This summary of a CIA deputies’ meeting shows Director Dulles being “quite concerned” about the lack of proper records for some covert operations. The White House had proposed changes to the approval process for covert operations, and in the meantime, Dulles warned his colleagues “about the way essentially 5412 projects are being handled and stated—CIA is totally unprotected if we do not follow established procedures in discussing and obtaining approval of these projects before implementation.” Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell tried to assuage Dulles’ trepidations by explaining that he and C. Tracy Barnes “were seeing Mr. Goodwin of the White House today to discuss a 5412-type project on Cuba, and stated that this was an exploratory discussion only and at Mr. Goodwin’s request since he was already knowledgeable of the program.” Bissell then stressed that “he wanted to make it clear neither he nor Mr. Barnes are seeking formal authority from Goodwin to go ahead with the proposal in question.” Dulles then asked Bissell to prepare a brief memo on the Cuba project for him to use at a May 25^th Special Group meeting.

This memo explains some reservations raised at the June 8 Special Group meeting regarding U.S. support for militant Cuban exile groups. Ostensibly, the dispute was over a paper titled, “Policy Decisions Required for Agency Relationship with CRC [Cuban Revolutionary Council] and Other Cuban Exile Groups.” The Special Group decided to have the paper re-worked and negotiate the issue with the State Department before it returned for further Group deliberations. After discussing the desired degree of CIA involvement, budget issues, a new location for operations (in Florida), maritime activities, including a 85-foot craft, and the need for possible sabotage school sites, the memo closes with a stark statement showcasing the power of bureaucratic inertia, “It is abundantly clear that, for political reasons, the Special Group is not prepared to make any decisions on the CRC matter and this re-write job is strictly busy work. Accordingly, no significant changes in our previous position seem to be indicated.”

In this piercing memo, Arthur Schlesinger critiques the core assumptions behind CIA’s proposed program to overthrow Castro. The Kennedy confidant explains that, “what is intended is a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient to overthrow Castro.” Schlesinger then ridicules the CIA’s propensity to support pro-Batista groups and “reactionaries,” noting that, “Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations. I.e., the plan discriminates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates against men of independence and principle” (highlights in original). Such a focus, Schlesinger warns, is likely to fail because the U.S. is spurning the type of individuals who will rally popular support against Castro. He recommends the Cuba proposal be rethought and closes by warning that “it is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuum.”

This key memo summarizes the decisions reached by the Cuban Task Force on August 31. The President is informed of several covert action plans to overthrow Castro, including “covert activities [which] would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equipment, etc.” The U.S. covert program was based on “the principle that para-military activities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba.” However, the U.S. would be guiding the efforts. “Within that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose destruction will have the maximum economic impact.” In addition to economic sabotage, the group agreed to establish a psychological warfare group within the State Department that would be “charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietization of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc. - - much of which has been hitherto classified - - putting this information into readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through Latin America. Such dissemination would be primarily through USIA channels but would include” the propaganda function of “feeding it to Latin papers for ‘exclusive’ stories, helping to prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc.” Finally, the CIA was also responsible for creating “a precise, covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government. The object of this dialogue - - to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split.”

This brief report summarizes U.S. covert efforts against the Castro regime as of October 1961. Concerning intelligence, the CIA was controlling 26 agents inside Cuba and was working on infiltrating several more. Political action efforts were facing some challenges given that most exile groups “had unrealistic plans, but are now being more practical. About seven of these groups show promise as instruments for establishing internal assets. Selection, training, and planning are going on, and actual infiltration operations plus possible sabotage should begin in the next 30 to 60 days. The external groups are far from organized or coordinated. The internal opposition has made some efforts at consolidation and organization but with only moderate success so far.” The propaganda campaign showed more success. “Speaking tours by teacher, student, labor, jurist and women's groups, support of publications and distribution of pamphlets continues. Radion [sic] Swan, 60 Latin American stations and three stations in Florida broadcast anti-Castro programs. A broadcasting ship is ready.” The paramilitary front was also developing as all the exile groups were training agents and “In addition, a 35-man commando element is in being, ready for use. Boats are adequate for foreseeable maritime requirements. Air operations are not presently planned.” However, the report closes with a cautious note regarding sabotage operations, clearly a concern for the Kennedy administration, and an area where stronger oversight was needed, “Criteria for minor sabotage operations will include a favorable chance of avoiding prior detection, capability of appearing to be organized from inside, and avoidance of major disruption. Any major sabotage operations will be subject to approval by the Special Group.”

This CIA memo raises legal and operational concerns on several sabotage plans underway. As to the former, “from a legal standpoint, there was some question as to whether we are authorized to engage in minor sabotage activities without reference to the Special Group. It is clear that with regard to major sabotage, the Special Group must be consulted.” Regarding two active sabotage operations that were not pre-approved by the Special Group, Tom Parrott sought the advice of General Maxwell Taylor, who raised no objections. Nonetheless, to protect the Agency, Tracy Barnes noted that he would ask the DCI to notify the Special Group in order to “keep the record straight.” On the operational side, concerns were raised over CIA support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council and its leader Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, whose “potential misuse . . . of funds could become an embarrassment to the Administration.”

This memo by Richard Goodwin for President Kennedy raises the need for a “command operation” for Cuba given that the “the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.” But, “who should head this operation,” Goodwin asks and then rejects anyone dealing with Cuban affairs at the State Department and discounts the CIA since, “Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking - - and this will be very hard to do from the inside.” Sounding overly optimistic, Goodwin declares that, “The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at least, we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.” However, after recommending the Attorney General to chair this group and nominating himself to the deputy position, he does raise a potential political cost, “The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative.”

These startling notes by journalist Tad Szulc of a meeting with President Kennedy show the troubled mindset of the president a few months after the Bay of Pigs. According to Szulc’s notes, the President appeared very frustrated with both the CIA and Cuba. As to the CIA, Kennedy expressed the “need of controlling CIA in some way so that CIA wouldn’t construct another operation like Bay of Pigs. Said CIA was a problem in government: he and Bobby wanted to deal with it…” Regarding Cuba, which Szulc had recently visited, JFK asked “about how strong Castro regime is etc. whether new guerrilla operations by US would make sense.” Most strikingly, Szulc’s notes continue: “Then Suddenly, Pres leaned forward and asked me, ‘What would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?’” Szulc replied that such an action “would be terrible idea” as it would strengthen the regime and the US “had no business in assassinations.” Kennedy responded by saying that “he was testing” Szulc, and that “he felt the same way.” JFK noted that he raised the question “because he was under terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to ok a Castro murder.” Kennedy then mentioned that he was going to set up a Special Group on Cuba.

This memorandum establishes the Special Group (Augmented) to deal specifically with Cuba, in order to push a project “to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime.” Edward Lansdale is selected as the “Chief of Operations.” Representatives from State, DOD, and CIA will assist Lansdale and “should be able to exercise – either themselves or through the Secretaries and Director – effective operational control over all aspects of their Department’s operations dealing with Cuba.” The NSC’s 5412 is also to be kept closely informed of activities and will make recommendations.

This memorandum establishes Brigadier General W. H. Craig as the Department of Defense representative for the “Caribbean Survey Group”—essentially the Lansdale staff—and explains that “the overall plan envisages essentially indigenous initiation of activities on the ground in Cuba and elsewhere to be developed and accomplished by CIA and the Department of State.” The Department of Defense “must prepare for the sound and rapid implementation of plans for accomplishing those tasks accepted as a Defense responsibility.” Consequently, Craig’s first task will be to “construct a firm Defense position with respect to the Defense Department's stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, In this connection, it is necessary that the Defense role be precisely defined with respect to what actions would be undertaken by the Department of Defense or any of its agencies if a popular movement inside Cuba made headway in overthrowing the Communist regime and requested U.S. assistance.”

This highly sensitive operational plan against Cuba warns its readers that “Any inference that this plan exists could place the President of the United States in a most damaging position.” The document outlines a detailed six-phase project to establish a new government in Cuba “with which the United States can live in peace.” This “realistic course of action” as the memo calls it, sets up a series of target dates to “overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside help from the U.S. and elsewhere.” Some of the phases include: Phase II, “Activating the necessary operations inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, economic, and military-type support from outside Cuba”; Phase IV, “move into guerrilla operations”; and Phase V, “first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.” The project contains political, economic, psychological, military, sabotage, and intelligence components. Still to be decided is, “If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt?”

This significant report summarizes the end of Operation Mongoose’s Phase I. The goals of the first phase were relatively cautious (“quiet operation”), “Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention…. and remain in position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S. prestige.” Lansdale explains that the intelligence effort “Inside Cuba, the recruitment and placement of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban collection nets, particularly in urban centers, has made Operation Mongoose numerically the largest U. S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state.”

The two political actions taken under Mongoose were less successful, “results in both instances were mostly negative,” and the U.S. had taken a restrained approach towards Cuban-exiles, “Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland…” Psychological efforts had mixed results as “the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people.” This allowed for creative efforts to be employed, including “Clandestine broadcasts from a submarine (appearing as broadcasts by Cuban guerrillas inside Cuba) have been initiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans by word-of-mouth.” Economic efforts were more successful, “The evidence is that Cuba's economy is suffering. Trade with the Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along…”

On the guerrilla front, the work is “slow and dangerous” and has had mixed results, “CIA reports that 11 teams will have been infiltrated by the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted.” Restraint is evident with regards to sabotage as it “has not taken place, on a U.S.-sponsored basis.” Nonetheless, “Planning for such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets… a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approval.” Looking into the future, the report is optimistic about the capabilities of the U.S. and its allies. “Our own U.S. assets in organization, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the decision to do so... There are enough ablebodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job.” However, Lansdale warns that time is not on Washington’s side: “my concern is strong that time is running out for the U. S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubans have looked and are looking to the U. S. for guidance on what to aspire to and do next.”

After a night’s reflection, the State Department Legal Adviser expresses his “intensified” concern over a proposed project to use chemical agents on sugar exports given that the treated sugar “will almost certainly be discovered.” Furthermore, Chayes warns that, “Even if the matter cannot be tied to any particular cargo, I think the USSR could and would accuse the U.S. and with considerable plausibility in world forums.” Ethically, Chayes cautions that “I have no confidence in the scientific judgement that the substance is harmless” and asks, “how you would feel about the same thing happening to yourself or your family, if the action had been taken by the other side.” Chayes concludes his memo by making it clear that, “it is wrong to contaminate food supplies” and asks to be present when the issue is discussed with the president.

This detailed operational plan by William Harvey, the leader of Task Force W, the CIA’s unit carrying out Operation Mongoose, starts by rejecting a key conclusion in the August 1 National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba, otherwise, “this operation plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.” (The rejected text read: “The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action” [NIE 85-2-62, August 1, 1962, p.2]). In addition to discarding the NIE, the paper assumes that “fortuitous circumstances” are necessary for the plan to succeed. Nonetheless, Phase II of Mongoose provides for covert support to the controversial Miró CRC group and other exile organizations. It envisions direct sabotage by “raider type teams” against parts of the Cuban civilian infrastructure, “Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities,” although some restraints were placed: “No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such.” In today’s cyberwar era, attacks aimed at public utilities, transportation (which would affect food and medical supplies) and others of these target sets, would likely be construed as terrorist acts. In this and other, even more ambitious, plans provided below, the CIA had identical goals. In defiance of CIA’s own analytical judgment, in the NIE, the plan also aimed to “strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population,” to “recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells” and, if feasible and approved, to “initiate an internal uprising.”

These alarming minutes outline a number of proposed sabotage operations against Cuba. Most concerning is the proposed use of biological or chemical agents against Cuban agricultural crops. CIA Deputy Director Carter explains that there could be serious repercussions if agricultural sabotage could be attributed to the U.S. But Carter stepped back from that objection by noting "the possibility of producing crop failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin” (Version B). McGeorge Bundy “had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc. unless they could be completely covered up” (Version B again). So Bundy proved more cautious when it came to chemical warfare—not for legal or ethical reasons—but because of the potential that the U.S. might lose plausible deniability.

After the Special Group’s “stated desire for a more aggressive sabotage action,” Harvey drafts this plan to expand offensive operations. The plan envisions striking both maritime and land targets. Under its proposals, “Cuban owned ships” and “Cuban Port Facilities” are to be attacked. The CIA was also “actively investigating the feasibility and practicality of mining the entrance of selected Cuban harbors with non-United States Government attributable mines” or by “Blocking a Cuban Harbor by Sinking a Ship in the Entrance Channel.” Attacks against Soviet Bloc shipping were also being considered, through “mining and hit-and-run operations in Cuban ports and waters.” On land, the CIA set a detailed list of 33 targets “in order of economic importance in Cuba” to be attacked, including: steam and electric power plants, aqueducts, sewage disposal facilities, flour mills, piers, refineries, radio, and TV stations.

This memorandum outlines eight sabotage missions proposed by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone. These include a “Grenade attack on the Chinese communist embassy in Havana, to be carried out by a recruited Cuban agent;” the demolition of a railroad bridge by an eight-man raider team; an “underwater demolition attack by two Cuban frogmen against shipping and port facilities;” as well as the mining of six harbors, the demolition of a power plant, a “mortar and gunfire attack on the Soviet SAM site near Santa Lucia,” an incendiary attack on a nickel plant, and a raid to “Set a fire by gunfire on an oil tanker.”

At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this sobering memo starts by recognizing that even though Operation Mongoose is in full swing its strategic goal is still not clear, “Is the end objective the removal of the Castro/Communist regime or to bring it to its knees? Should Mongoose help generate a popular revolt with the probable need for overt U.S. military help as the regime moves in to crush it? Or, is the aim that of maximum harassment, to make Cuba a maximum burden for the Bloc?” The memo then summarizes the status of a number of actions including the infiltration of several small sabotage teams with arms and explosives into Cuba and the ongoing sabotage of 22 Cuban-owned ships. At the preparatory level, “Teams being trained for major sabotage were made part of teams now being sent in by submarines. (SAM sites [unclear] Soviet technicians are not targets).” The memo also shows a new plan for the “Sabotage of sugar production and delivery.” Yet, that project lacks “current capability. Now trying to act against shipments of jute bagging.”

This memo summarizes the status of 20 infiltration teams by the CIA Chief of Base in Miami. The teams “are currently being held awaiting policy decisions.” Given the context, the teams appeared highly motivated and prepared, “Equipment checkout, commo briefings, discussion infil routes and assignment two-fold mission of intel collection re missile sites and imminence hostilities indicators plus preparations to provide support to U.S. military forces during any military action has brought teams to highest possible pitch of motivation and state of readiness.” However, the memo warns that such excitement cannot be maintained, “This particularly true with Cubans who volatile, emotional, expressive people” and that the situation might even be combustible, “we are sitting on explosive human situation which could blow at any time within next forty-eight hours. Wish to assure you that while full gamut of leadership tradecraft psychology and discipline will be harnessed to prevent any human explosion we cannot guarantee that it will not happen. Believe positive or negative action is only guarantee which will insure our retaining control over these human resources to extent that flap will be avoided. There is in my judgment no middle ground on this issue.”

As the Cuban Missile Crisis ebbed, this memo with orders from the president finally commands the CIA to “do everything to insure no refugee or émigré provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days” yet the Agency was to do this “without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups” (emphasis in original). The memo acknowledges that stopping some of these Cuban exile groups might be challenging, “The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.” The memo ends by making it clear that “The activities of Operation Mongoose are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, cashing of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation Mongoose will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.”

In this memo, William Harvey attempts to set the record straight on how a sabotage operation aimed at the Matahambre mine was carried out during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Harvey outlines a succession of instances where Lansdale, the attorney general, or the Special Group were informed of the decision to “re-run” the operation. He implies the senior officials could have stopped the mission at any time, suggesting they had responsibility for the failure. In one case, Harvey notes that he had heard “I believe, from General Taylor, who asked in effect, ‘whatever happened to that sabotage operation’, and [who] was advised orally that it had been re-run; that the caching part of the operation had been successful, but that the sabotage team had not been heard from and must be presumed lost.” Fabián Escalante reports that the strike group landed in Cuba on October 20, and that its leader and a second fighter, who were to establish an arms cache, were captured on November 5, missing the planned rendezvous with the remainder of the mission team. The others were captured in their turn on November 14.[22]

In this memo, Richard Helms warns Director McCone that the October 26 “stand down” order for Mongoose must be revoked or, “the AM/Torrid team in Oriente and the Cobra team in Pinar del Rio if they are to remain effective.” The AM/Torrid team was in danger of being compromised, but the Cobra team was in a much stronger position and had “received two maritime resupplies totaling 2, 000 lbs. of arms and demolitions.” Three attachments to the memo show that the teams had provided some valuable intelligence, “specific instances of Cobra and AM/Torrid reporting” furnished “early collateral information on various Soviet activities, missile related installations and IL-28 jet bombers. In several instances their reports provided the stimulus for aerial reconnaissance of certain areas and NPIC read-out of these areas.”

This memo by Lansdale notes that Operation Mongoose is in the process of being “phased out.” Lansdale recommends that the files pertaining to Mongoose be transferred to the officer currently responsible for operations in Cuba and that his files will be given to SG (A) Executive Secretary Thomas Parrot.

This CIA information telegram describes a raid carried out by members of the L-66 exile group that attacked a Soviet freighter in a Cuban port. “The raiding party entered the port of Caibarién quite openly, with lights on the boat. There were several ships and various small craft in the harbor, which was also lit up. The raiding group at random selected the largest ship and opened fire with rifles and heavier weapons from a distance of about 200 yards. The raiders came alongside the target ship, attached a 20 pound limpet and placed a boat loaded with explosives along the hull of the target. The limpet and boat were joined PRIMACORD. The explosive in the boat was activated by a one and a half minute time delay fuse. After accomplishing this, the raiders retired, but threw grenades on the deck of the vessel as they pulled away. The explosions took place when the raiders were about 250 to 300 yards from the target vessel.” The cable ends by explaining that “L-66 realizes that hit and run raids are not the most effective means of fighting Castro, but considers these raids at least symbolic support to arrested colleagues in Cuba. Most activists are married men, living in Miami, who express intent to move to another country if the U.S. continues to harass them . . . Money is raised mostly in the Miami area and arms are purchased in Europe and the United States.”

In this memo DCI McCone summarizes the views of members of the Executive Committee, as expressed to President Kennedy, regarding what U.S. policy should be towards hit-and-run raids carried out by exile groups including Second Front of the Escambrey, Alpha 66, and L-66. Secretary Rusk argued that “the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. At a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.” Douglas Dillon expresses skepticism that such raids could be stopped given logistical challenges, but is rebuffed by McNamara, who says the military could handle it. RFK proposes to use the justice system and “outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures.” Vice President Johnson notes that the U.S. would be criticized whether it stopped the raids or not. LBJ recommends that “all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.”

In the attached memo, McCone expresses his mixed feelings towards the raids. On the one hand, “Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate [sic] problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are (un)desirable [‘un’ is added with handwritten notes].” Looking at the bright side, McCone argues that, “successful harassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba.” While McCone concedes that it is “impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal,” he nonetheless argues in favor of “tolerating” the raids “while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.”

This memo and its attachment prepared by NSC staff show the continuing struggle that the Kennedy administration faced as it attempted to tamp down the sabotage raids. The first memo by Gordon Chase shows his support for a public relations effort intended to counter the press’ account of the administration’s new policy towards some exile groups: “To correct the press imbalance you referred to, Crimmins would like to have INS brief the newsman, on a background basis attributable to INS, that departure controls are limited to less than thirty people whom we had reason to believe intended to carry out raids in the immediate future.” The other memorandum shows the White House struggling to contain diplomatic and public relations fallout from the March 27 raid by the L-66 group (See Document 22). After the White House realizes that a photographer from Life magazine was on one of the raiding boats and has pictures showing that “the attack originated from the United States,” Chase stresses that “The implication is that we don’t want the pictures published since we said in our March 30 statement that ‘Our preliminary evidence suggests that these raids have not in fact been launched… from the U.S..” Another problem was that the British captured one of the raiding boats, but Washington was in the middle of working out a plan where, “the British will release the 17 men and the boat intact tomorrow afternoon. The boat will be escorted to Bahamian authorities to the three mile limit and will then be picked up by the USCG and escorted back to Miami. John Crimmins is asking the American Consulate General in the Bahamas to urge the British to remove the ammunition from the boat before sending it off. When the boat reaches Miami, INS will detain the aliens for no more than 48 hours. INS and the FBI will question the one American aboard and release him. The boat will be impounded.”

In this paper for DCI McCone, Desmond FitzGerald summarizes the point of view of different actors on the expected effects of the recent U.S. decision to stop the raids into Cuba by exile groups. The CIA expects Fidel Castro to “have mixed feelings” since “His first will be elation at our having stopped the majority of these raids, but he will soon recognize that we know they have been more spectacular than damaging. Fidel will, we think, recognize that this order will not stop a few determined Cubans just as such an injunction did not deter him in his fight to oust Batista. To a degree Castro will view this order with apprehension. [sic] He will probably wonder what we plan instead.” As for the anti-Castro elements inside Cuba, including U.S. agents, they “will be seriously disheartened.” As far as the exiles themselves, the CIA expected varied reactions. For the “non-activist type” they too would be demoralized, would see U.S. policy as “appeasement,” and some might even leave Miami. For the “activists” they would likely not be deterred and might even “profit by the decree. It will now be a greater honor to engage in operations against Fidel. The double jeopardy arising from the threat of detention by U.S. agents and the chance for martyrdom at the hands of Fidel…,” although the CIA also notes that “the supply of recruits for such hit and run raids may run shallow but not dry.” Finally, the new policy would likely affect exile power centers: “the loci of power will have a tendency to move back to its traditional center: the exiled-monied interests such as the Bosches, Prios, Batistas.”

This memo to DCI McCone explains a series of threats made by Dr. Jose Miró Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council—which the U.S. had been funding for years—to resign from the organization and publish sections of his 25-page resignation letter that might include “sensitive and confidential areas.” After explaining the controversy and the politics surrounding Miró Cardona’s actions among the Cuban exile community, FitzGerald points out, “We conclude from the foregoing that Dr. MIRO’s usefulness to the U.S. Government and to the Cuban exile community has come to an end, even if he should reconsider at the last moment his decision to resign.” The attached memo provides a breakdown of the more than $11 million the U.S. government has given the Cuban Revolutionary Council, including a monthly stipend to Miró Cardona, “During the period 1 May 1961 through 31 March 1963 the CRC received $3,000,000 from the U.S. Government for administrative and operational expenses. (Note: This figure does not include Brigade payments which totaled $8,300,000 for this same period.) Dr. Miró Cardona, President of the CRC, receives compensation of $600 a month ($7,200 annually) plus travel and related business expenses.”

This memo is a summary of McCone’s meeting with the president where JFK appeared frustrated with Miró Cardona’s actions, “President raised the question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts.” While the president had not abandoned his desire to remove Castro, he continued to show skepticism about U.S.-based sabotage operations, “whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could only come from within Cuba." The attached memo is a summary of William Donovan’s trip to Cuba and meetings with Fidel Castro. Donovan reports that Castro, “knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos.”

This comprehensive policy paper by Bromley Smith shows that the Kennedy administration decided to put an end to American restraint and once again committed the CIA to sabotage campaigns against Cuba, “This paper presents a covert Harassment/sabotage program targeted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals.” The paper acknowledges that “While this program will cause a certain amount of economic damage, it will in no sense critically injure the economy or cause the overthrow of Castro.” But it might “create a situation which will delay the consolidation and stabilization of Castro’s revolution…” The paper then summarizes previously approved programs of “subtle” sabotage and makes a series of new proposals, including attacks on shipping by “the placing of explosive devices with suitable time delays on the outside of ships either in Cuban or in non-Cuban ports,” as well as other maritime strikes and attacks on land targets.

In this summary of a five-and-a-half hour session between two CIA officers and a handful of members of the Cuban Brigade, the saboteurs raise a number of concerns with regard to “not only their own personal future but also that of the rank and file of the Brigade.” The rebels are “disheartened” with the training they have been receiving from the U.S. as well as with the plans the Agency has for them, given that “They do not believe that unconventional warfare in itself, including commando type raids, can liberate Cuba, without the use of U.S. forces in the final stages.” The CIA officers counter by explaining the “necessity for building a resistance movement inside, keeping the flame of resistance alive.” They further point out that “one of the best means currently available seemed to be to split the regime through the use of members of the 26^th of July Movement who were and are anti-Communist and who now believe that the revolution has been betrayed.”