US Promoted Close Ties to Indonesian Military as Suharto’s Rule Came to an End in Spring 1998

This is an outline of Assistant Secretary Roth's travel plans in September 1997, accompanied by Special Assistant Jim Foster. Roth hopes to have intensive discussions on Cambodia in all posts except Seoul. While in Jakarta, Roth wants to meet with longtime CSIS friends and colleagues (Jusaf Wanandi and Clara Juwono), ideally in conjunction with a social event.

This telegram recounts a conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth and Indonesian Special Forces Commander (and Suharto son-in-law) Prabowo. In it, Prabowo thanks Roth for the $3 billion US contribution to the IMF stabilization package for Indonesia. Referring to Suharto, Prabowo states "the President does not always understand world concerns and pressures" and suggests "It would be better if Suharto stepped down in March 1998" and that "the Suharto era will soon end."

On November 24, 1997, leaders from the US and Indonesia - including Clinton and Suharto - met in Vancouver at an ASEAN summit. They discussed climate change, the IMF crisis, and human rights. Suharto thanked Clinton for providing assistance with putting out wildfires in Indonesia. Suharto explained how the IMF crisis impacted Indonesia. Clinton stressed that the US had a deep strategic role and interest in Indonesia as well as the Southeast Asian region. Clinton stated that he and Suharto had differences on human rights, East Timor, and the imprisoned labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan.

President Clinton called Suharto to discuss the financial situation in Indonesia, stressing that he valued Suharto's friendship and "just" wanted to talk personally. Clinton urged Suharto to support economic reforms and to keep interest rates high until stabilization of the rupiah. Clinton committed the services of Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers to consult on Suharto's economic team. Clinton stated that he would release a statement that day stressing the importance of the US-Indonesian relationship and pledging support for Suharto throughout the crisis.

Minister for Industry and Trade Tunky Ariwibowo called Ambassador Roy on January 9 to provide feedback on Suharto's call with Clinton in advance of visits. Prior to calling Roy, Ariwibowo spoke with Suharto. Suharto was reportedly impressed with Clinton; Clinton provided insights on how the international market viewed the Indonesian situation. Suharto tasked Ariwibowo to coordinate IMF-related structural and economic reforms. Ariwibowo mentioned that on January 8 there was panic buying of rice and oil. At Suharto's request, the ministers followed with a TV and press interview to ease the situation on January 9.

Transcript of the telephone conversation between Suharto and President Clinton. Suharto outlined his plans for the IMF agreement along with a detailed explanation of how it would be implemented. Suharto stated that there would be an immediate revision of the state budget and then a commitment to reforming the central and private banking system. Clinton stated that the US would continue to be involved and that he would release a statement about the call occurring and being encouraged by the plan.

Clinton called Suharto to express concerns about the financial situation in Indonesia. Clinton was very concerned about Suharto's plans to establish a currency board, stressing that this could cause a run on Indonesia's currency, severely depleting its reserves. Clinton stated that it would be better to focus on strengthening the banking system, resolving private sector debt, and continuing implementation of IMF reforms. Suharto discussed steps he was taking but stressed that there was no alternative to the currency board. Clinton stated that he would consult the G-7 nations and IMF to discuss alternatives.

At an April 6 meeting, Assistant Secretary Roth and Indonesian Ambassador Dorodjatun discussed the IMF agreement, EXIM bank, and human rights concerns. Roth told Doradjatun that he hoped there would be a new Indonesia-IMF agreement. Doradjatun stated that EXIM bank would soon announce steps on trade credits, but restructuring would take time. Roth and A/S Kreczko expressed concerns over the forcible repatriation and mistreatment of Acehnese refugees. Human rights issues such as detentions, disappearances, and banning on-campus demonstrations were also mentioned.

Members from two congressional staff delegations met with senior opposition figures on April 13. Discussion topics included the planned IMF package, political reform, increasing disappearances, US-Indonesian relations, and student activism. Discussants agreed that the IMF package would benefit Suharto in the short-term, but may challenge his power in the long-term. Reform advocates are organizing a watchdog committee to monitor IMF plan implementation, arguing that political reform must accompany economic reform. Increasing disappearances were believed to be the work of General Prabawo. Discussants questioned the long-term resolve of student protesters. Megawati stressed that the US should not attempt to determine Indonesia's next leader.

This document details a conversation between the Embassy Political Officer and a "leader of a mass student organization" who told the political officer ()Poloff "that he was informed by a Kopassus source (Indonesia's military special force) that the disappearances were carried out by 'Group 4' of Kopassus, under the command of Chairawan. His source (who happens to be not part of group 4) said there are CONFLICTS AMONG KOPASSUS DIVISIONS, that that Group 4 is still under the effective control of Prabowo. Disappearances were ordered by Prabowo who was following an order from President Soeharto."

This cable reports that the military is split on how to deal with demonstrators and how committed they should be to Suharto. If larger groups of non-students (housewives and unemployed men in particular) joined the demonstrations, it might represent a critical mass that pushes Suharto to order a violent military clampdown. Commander in Chief Wiranto told student demonstrators not to take their protests to the street while also assuring them that the armed forces were not hostile.

This cable describes the killing of six students shot by security forces on the campus of Trisakti University on May 12. Protesters, not necessarily students, burned down a gas station and several vehicles. The violence prompted President Suharto to cut short his visit to Cairo and return to Jakarta on May 14. In honor of the six students killed, thousands participated in a peaceful rally on the campus. By late afternoon, the center of Jakarta's Jalan Sudirman Business District was paralyzed by clashes between police and masses of people who emerged from office building and adjoining neighborhoods.

This cable describes the growing calls for political reform in the wake of the Trisakti killings. As student protesters and opposition figures become bolder and increasingly focus on the need for immediate transition, discussion of the more limited, yet critical, agenda of political reform has persisted, even in government circles. In the past two weeks, the President, the Speaker of the House, and the Defense Minister have raised the possibility of political reform. After the May 12 shootings at Trisakti University, government officials believed that student protesters would not accept moderate political reforms. Public statements from government leaders indicate that reforms will not come quickly and will not satisfy student demonstrators, especially after the May 12 shooting.

This DIA cable discusses the actions of Indonesian armed forces in the Trisakti massacre. It observes that there has been no change in ABRI rules of engagement and that there were "multiple blatant violations at Trisakti University for an extended period of time in situations that were very unprovocative."

A DIA officer notes that "more and more people are beginning to say aloud that Suharto must go," including many former military supporters. Source says that Kopassus and KODAM Jaya forces involved in kidnapping students and bullet fragments recovered from Trisakti prove ABRI soldiers used live ammunition.

Former Minister of Home Affairs Rudini, an influential retired military leader and regime critic, believed that President Suharto's safety could not be guaranteed once he returned from Cairo (following the May 13 [tk: May 12? ]violence) and that students were planning to march to Parliament on May 14. Rudini divulged that students and academics had approached him to serve as a replacement for Suharto. Rudini said he was ready to assume the role and that he would have student support as well as the backing of major opposition figures. Rudini envisioned himself serving as President until 2002.

This cable reports that the death toll in Jakarta rioting climbed to over 500 people with the discovery of remains found in burned out buildings. Over 1,000 people have been arrested by the police in connection with the rioting. Jakarta remained somewhat calm on May 17, but May 15-16 saw rioting in central Java towns. Tensions were high in Medan after three students were reportedly wounded by gunfire. Minister of Defense Wiranto released the preliminary results of the police's investigation of the shooting that killed six students at Trisakti University. The report acknowledges errors were made by security forces. An NGO has demanded investigations of other alleged shootings of student protesters in other cities. Banks will reopen on May 18.

This cable reports that the Armed Forces met on the morning of May 17 to resolve tensions between the factions led by former Defense Minister/CINC (Commander-in-Chief) Wiranto and Strategic Reserve Commander Prawobo. Two alternatives were proposed: broaden Wiranto's mandate (how was not specified) or choose a new Commander-in-Chief who would be acceptable to both factions. By the afternoon of May 17, local journalists reported that Wiranto had been removed as CINC but would retain his Defense Minister portfolio. The Cabinet reshuffle may be announced tomorrow (May 18). The armed forces and an elite Muslim organization (ICMI) appeared to agree that the President's eldest daughter (Tutut), Minister of Trade Bob Hasan, and retired General Hartono should be removed from their official positions. Reports also indicated three activists were offered spots in the Cabinet but that proposal was shot down.

This cable reports that thousands of students gathered at the Parliament in Jakarta on May 18 to press for the president's resignation. The gathering was billed as a precursor to nationwide rallies culminating Wednesday with what students and other forces in opposition to the President claimed would be massive demonstrations The May 18 Jakarta protests appeared to be peaceful. A late report indicated that the Parliament is prepared to formally request the President's resignation, the armed forces however has given no public sign that it will withdraw support for the President. In Unjung Pandang, Indonesia's fourth largest city, expatriates are planning to leave the city before massive protests on May 20. Life in Jakarta is racked with turmoil at the moment. Prices for basic foods have skyrocketed, food availability is spotty in certain areas, there have been bank runs and long lines to make withdrawals, and even though businesses and government offices were open on May 18, many closed early.

This cable reports that politicians, activists, and students quickly moved beyond Suharto's resignation to discuss Habibie's assumption of the office of President and the difficult issues that need to be tackled. Students insisted that protests would continue as some protesters had demanded Habibie's resignation as well. Habibie does not command full support from his party or Parliament, and some democratic activists are formulating plans for bringing about fundamental political change. Mass Islamic organizations and oppositional figures have indicated that they could see Habibie as a transitional figure, but during this transition period real reforms must be undertaken. If Habibie is not open to reforms, then a special session of Parliament could be called to remove him from office.

This report based on information from May 20, the day before Suharto's resignation, indicates student demonstrations continued in Surabaya. They were mostly peaceful but 24 students were injured, 3 seriously. Massive crowds gathered calling for the President to resign. 1,000 laborers demonstrated outside the Office of the Official Labor Union (SPSI).

This is a lengthy discussion of splits within the Indonesian armed forces over President BJ Habibie, the process of reform, and differences between TNI Commander General Wiranto and Kopassus Commander Prabowo. It provides a detailed timeline of intra-military discussions in the lead-up to Suharto's resignation.

This cable reports that Darusman met with Congressman Smith and Senior Staffer Joseph Rees and questioned why certain portions of the information surrounding the Trisakti shootings were being kept classified. Marzuki believed that the new government was moving too slowly on releasing political prisoners. Marzuki also expressed concern that there seemed to be a divergence between the police and the military in competing narratives and objectives in the investigation of these shootings/disappearances. Marzuki believed that East Timorese Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao was "a political prisoner, full stop." Additionally, Marzuki announced the launching of a "National Action Plan" on human rights.

This cable reports that after visiting Cipinang prison, Congressman Smith urges the release of prisoners not based on category but on principles. Smith raised other human rights concerns such as torture, the release of Xanana Gusmao, military repression and military accountability. Minister Muladi responded that the government was actively considering release for many prisoners but that the decision was not his to make. Muladi added that if the military objected to the release of a prisoner the release could not take place. Smith and Muladi conversed further on categorizations and obstacles to prisoner releases.

This cable reports that the military will begin a trial of 18 police officers responsible for the shooting deaths of 4 students at Trisakti University on May 12. Critics, including the Human Rights Commission, believe that the perpetrators were army personnel and the police were scapegoated. Evidence produced by US journalists supports the critics. The military court trial will begin on June 6. Forensic evidence shows that victims were likely deliberately targeted, with military deployed from a helicopter to target students.

This document provides continued discussion of Indonesian military thinking in the aftermath of Suharto's ouster; topics include the role of civilian government, demands for reform, human rights, intra-military disputes, and military views on BJ Habibie.

Twenty-two interviews were conducted in the Sino-Indonesian community to gauge current sentiment toward Indonesian economic and political climate. The first section reports on socio-economic conditions and statistics of the Chinese community in Indonesia. The second section reports on capital flows while the third section explains why the Chinese see this crisis as different from previous anti-Chinese unrest.

This cable describes the Indonesian Human Rights Commission's (KOMNAS-HAM) efforts to press the incoming Habibie administration to undertake a systematic investigation of recent human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian Armed Forces, not just during the May 1998 protests that drove Suharto from power but also in Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor. A member of the Commission tells US officials that "ABRI abuse of human rights was continuing, notwithstanding public condemnation and ongoing investigation" and that "ABRI credibility was eroding as case after case came to light."

This cable reports that the Indonesian government released 27 political prisoners, most of whom were involved in separatist activity and some of whom were affiliated with the PKI. Prominent political prisoners were not among the released. The regime has been criticized for both the gradual release of prisoners and the use of prisoners as hostages to be released strategically in order to gain international good will. There were also reports of a 200-person demonstration led by Megawati Sukarnoputri supporters.

This cable describes the testimony of a member of a government fact-finding team investigating the May 1998 riots and violence before a Parliamentary commission. The witness states that the team has concluded that sexual assaults were connected to the kidnapping and torture of political activists and to the shooting deaths at Trisakti University.

This DIA cable describes open-source reporting from a Kompas article describing preliminary forensic testing of bullets found at the scene of the so-called Semanggi incident of November 13, 1998, in which 17 people were killed by Indonesian police and special forces. The tests revealed that ammunition used in the killings came from US-provided or sold M-16 rifles used by the Indonesian special forces (KOSTRAD). The cable notes that the US provided 28,471 such rifles as grant aid from 1972-1977 and sold more under commercial auspices.

This DIA cable describes the start of the trial of 11 low-ranking Kopassus officers accused of participation in student kidnappings in the early months of 1998. According to an unnamed DIA source, "Human rights activists say the 11 are merely scapegoats for the high-ranking officials who ordered the kidnappings," including Lt. Gen. Prabowo.

In a lengthy conversation with the defense attaché, Suparman discusses the relationship between KODAM and local police forces, their role in the Semanggi incident, his belief that student activists are acting in an "overly aggressive" manner designed to invite repression and bring down the government, and his observations on the involvement of the military-backed youth militia Pemuda Pancasila in drugs, prostitution, and other illegal activities.

This is a DIA discussion with Indonesian military officer regarding East Timor military strategy, military attitudes towards BJ Habibie, and "cover-ups during recent military trials." It notes that most senior military leaders are unhappy with Habibie's new East Timor policy because they were not consulted. Regarding recent trials of Kopassus members for Trisakti murders, an individual whose name is excised in the document "Admitted in front of his own staff that high level officer cover-ups were possible in these cases. But, if so, it was for the greater good of the nation" because "if you pursue the more senior people involved, it would be counter-productive to the welfare of the nation."