President’s Daily Brief Spotlighted Soviet Missile and Space Programs in 1960s and 1970s

ICBM tests from Tyuratam - in present-day Kazakhstan - the only complex for conducting these tests at the time, were frequently mentioned in PICL entries. U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that first-generation SS-6 ICBMs and two new ICBMs were being tested. However, they were unable to determine the new missiles' configuration, propulsion, guidance, range, or payload and simply designated them Category B and C (when these characteristics were determined later they were designated SS-7 and SS-8). John J. McCloy was head of the Ford Foundation and President Kennedy's chief disarmament advisor during this period.

The Soviets initially tested all their ICBMs from Tyuratam to Kamchatka Peninsula. From January through August 1961, 39 tests of the SS-6, Category B and C missiles, and space boosters took place on this range. Beginning on 13 September 1961, they began launching Category B missiles into the Central Pacific after successfully testing them to Kamchatka. A key indicator of the Central Pacific tests was the deployment of missile range instrumentation ships along the flight path and in the impact area. These ships enabled telemetry collection during the latter stages of flight and the recovery of any reentry vehicles and other debris for analysis.

Another indicator of ICBM tests into the Central Pacific was the notification the USSR gave that it would be conducting them in a certain time period to a specified area. By this date, CORONA had detected four operational ICBM complexes but still had not photographed large areas of the USSR. Nevertheless, based largely on this photography U.S. intelligence agencies drastically revised downward their estimate of Soviets ICBM launchers to only 10-25. This soon was confirmed by additional CORONA photography and finally ended the "missile gap" debate as the United States had 63 deployed ICBMs at the time.

The USSR had about 40 ballistic missile submarines in mid-1962. However, their SS-N-4 SLBMs only had a range of 400 miles, each submarine only carried three missiles, and they had to surface to fire them. There were also approximately 15 submarines which carried the SS-N-3 nuclear-tipped cruise missile with a range of 350 miles. These too could only be fired from the surface. Neither type of submarine conducted patrols within striking range of the United States. This entry describes one of a continuing series of tests of a longer-range SLBM that were being fired from a submerged vessel for the first time. U.S. intelligence agencies believed the new missile could be deployed on existing submarines (after their modification) or on an entirely new class under construction.

In another of the continuing series of new SLBM tests, the intelligence agencies were uncertain about whether it reached its maximum range of 2,300 miles. As shown on the map, the fact that the test flights were almost entirely over the interior of the USSR must have posed major problems in collecting data on the missiles at this time.

Long-range bombers (mostly B-52s) carrying gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles were an important part of the U.S. strategic nuclear striking force. This entry describes the deployment and capabilities of the recently developed SA-3 surface-to-air missile.

CORONA had become a reliable, broad area search system for locating missile complexes and other key targets, and monitoring developments at them. It flew 11 broad area search missions in 1963, for example, of which nine returned film with a maximum resolution of ten feet. They monitored developments at the 18 ICBM complexes CORONA had previously detected and located one new complex. Described here are the numbers of hard and soft launchers completed or under construction at these complexes for the second-generation SS-7 and SS-8. These missiles constituted the entire ICBM force, except for four SS-6s at one complex.

GAMBIT-1, carrying the KH-7 camera with a best resolution of two feet, was the first successful high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellite. The photography was essential to acquiring technical intelligence which CORONA could not do.

ABM development was centered at the Sary Shagan facility.

CORONA had been tracking construction of new widely dispersed single silos since early 1964, and this entry describes the detection of these new silos at a second complex. It was believed at the time that they were for the second-generation SS-9, whose testing had commenced in late 1963. The SS-9 was a larger and more accurate ICBM and carried a bigger warhead. As a result, it was the only missile capable of destroying U.S. ICBMs deployed in silos.

U.S. officials used hand-held cameras to photograph weapons systems at the annual May and October parades in Moscow. The high-resolution photographs often proved valuable.

This entry is based on a recent GAMBIT-1 photograph, one of the few satellite photographs that captured vehicles outside their storage buildings or on a launch pad.

Both satellite photography and signals intelligence contributed to this map of the Tyuratam test and space launch center and the vehicles launched at its launch areas. Although some ICBMs were now being tested from the Plesetsk and Omsk ICBM complexes, the majority were still conducted from Tyuratam. Tyuratam also continued to be the launch complex for most space launches. Satellite photography and signals intelligence, as well as ground photography during a recent Moscow parade, provided the information in the summary of the Soviet ICBM program.

This entry describes a GAMBIT-1 photograph of a prototype ABM launch site at Sary Shagan that was identical to eight sites being constructed around Moscow.

From CORONA's monitoring of the ICBM deployment complexes and other data, analysts had concluded that the larger single silos were for the SS-9 and the smaller ones for the second-generation SS-11, first tested in 1965. Along with the SS-9, it was initially deployed in 1966.

The ABM system around Moscow utilizing Galosh missiles was nearing completion at this time. This entry describes the status of two early warning and tracking radars which were part of the system. The United States was studying building an ABM system at this time, but no program had been approved.

Satellite photography disclosed continued production of the new Y-class of nuclear-powered submarines at Severodvinsk, the biggest submarine construction yard. It would carry the SS-N-6, which had a much longer range (1,700 miles) than any previously deployed SLBM. At this time, the USSR had 38 ballistic missile submarines with either the shorter-range SS-N-4 or the SS-N-5. It also had 60 submarines armed with the SS-N-3 cruise missile.

The SA-5 was the third and longest-range surface-to-air missile deployed by the Soviets. There was lengthy debate within the intelligence community on whether the missile also had an ABM capability, but in the end the IC concluded it did not.

Multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) enabled an ICBM or SLBM to carry more than one warhead, although they could only hit separate targets that were close together. Multiple[DJ1] independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) were able to hit targets far apart and posed an even greater threat. This entry describes the preliminary analysis of the first MRV test using a SS-9 on 23 August. The United States was ahead of the USSR in developing these technologies. It soon began deploying the Polaris A-3 SLBM with three MRVs and was developing the Poseidon SLBM with up to 14 MIRVs and the Minuteman III ICBM with three MIRVs.

Both satellite photography and signals intelligence contributed to this entry about the development of the second-generation SS-13 ICBM, which carried a single warhead and began to be deployed the following year. As of late 1968, the USSR had 896 deployed ICBMs (142 SS-7s and SS-8s in soft launchers, 78 SS-7s and SS-8s in silos, 156 SS-9s in silos, and 520 SS-11s in silos) and was building more silos. The United States had 1,054 deployed ICBMS and was not constructing any new silos.

Satellite photography contributed to this entry on developments at the Moscow ABM system, which was believed to have a limited operational capability at this time. The intelligence community had not detected any other ABM deployment sites. In March 1969, President Nixon announced his approval of the Safeguard ABM system, primarily designed to defend against a Soviet first strike on U.S. ICBMs to the extent that a devastating retaliatory second strike could still be launched. Congress narrowly approved the program later that year. The two ABMs ultimately developed, the Sprint and Spartan, were operational for only a brief time in 1975-1976.

CORONA photography provided the information for this entry on the deployment of SS-9s and SS-13s.

Satellite photography disclosed evidence of possible testing of a new ABM at Sary Shagan.

The status of construction of new silos at ICBM complexes described here is based on satellite photography.

This entry demonstrates the key importance of satellite photography in determining compliance with the ABM Treaty. CORONA had flown its last mission in May 1972 and it is unknown whether a GAMBIT-3 or HEXAGON took the photography in question.

The Soviets continued modernizing their ICBM force after SALT I. By the end of 1973, they had a total of 1,485 operational ICBMs (184 SS-7s, 19 SS-8s, 282 SS-9s, 940 SS-11s, and 60 SS-13s). Except for about one-third of the SS-9s with three MRVs[d2], all the other missiles at this time still only carried a single warhead. The United States continued to be ahead in this technology, with several hundred Minuteman IIIs with three MIRVs [d3]each having been deployed already.

Soviet air defenses continued to be monitored closely.

Testing of three new third-generation ICBMs commenced in early 1972. The SS-X-17 was a successor to the SS-11 and could be fired from modified SS-11 silos. It had greater accuracy and could carry MIRVs. The SS-X-18 was the successor to the SS-9 and could be fired from modified SS-9 silos. Testing of the Mod 1 version with a single warhead had been more extensive than testing of the Mod 2 version with MIRVs. The SS-X-19 was another successor to the SS-11 and was the first deployed ICBM with MIRVs.

The Soviets continued modernizing their ballistic missile submarine force after SALT I. At this time, they had 78 ballistic missile submarines carrying 815 SLBMs of four types. These included 156 SS-N-8s that now had been flown to a range of 4,800 miles. All the SLBMs had a single warhead. Some of the submarines were routinely conducting patrols within striking distance of the United States. In contrast, the United States had 41 ballistic missile submarines, each carrying either 16 Polaris A-3s with three MRVs or 16 Poseidons with up to 14 MIRVs.

Deployment of the SS-18 with MIRVs continued at two ICBM complexes in converted SS-9 silos.

Deployment of the SS-19 with a single warhead or six MIRVs continued at four ICBM complexes in converted SS-11 silos. At this time, the USSR had 1,485 deployed ICBMs. These included 69 SS-7s, 272 SS-9s (some of which carried three MRVs), 770 SS-11s (over half of which carried three MRVs), 60 SS-13s, 50 SS-17s (each of which carried three MIRVs), 36 SS-18s (each of which carried eight MIRVs), and 210 SS-19s (over half of which carried six MIRVs). The United States still had the 1,054 ICBM launchers completed in the late 1960s, but the mix of missiles had changed somewhat. There were now 550 Minuteman IIIs with three MIRVs each, 450 Minuteman IIs with a single warhead, and 54 Titan IIs with a single warhead.

The Soviets placed the first human in space, Yuri Gagarin, in April 1961 on a one-orbit mission and earned tremendous prestige from the accomplishment. This entry describes their second human spaceflight in which the cosmonaut completed 17 orbits. The first U.S. orbital human spaceflight took place in February 1962 with John Glenn.

Because the Soviet Union did not have a worldwide network of tracking and command and control[d4][D5] ground stations, they deployed ships and aircraft before human spaceflights to increase the amount of time the cosmonauts were in contact with ground controllers. These deployments were a key indicator of a pending mission.

The Soviets orbited two cosmonauts in separate capsules at the same time in their third and fourth human spaceflights. This was another "first" in the competition with the United States.

The Soviets again orbited two cosmonauts in separate capsules at the same time in their fifth and sixth human spaceflights. Vostok 6 carried Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman in space.

Open sources were monitored closely for information on current and future spaceflight events. However, the information was not always reliable. The Soviets had conducted just one human spaceflight in 1964 and one in 1965. . Meanwhile, the Gemini program flew ten successful missions in 1965 and 1966 and the United States overtook the USSR in the human spaceflight competition.

In contrast to the United States, the USSR never publicly committed to a manned lunar landing program. Its political leaders and scientists made conflicting statements on the importance of such a project. U.S. intelligence agencies constantly struggled with the question of whether they had a manned lunar landing program and, if so, whether it was competitive with Apollo. One key piece of evidence was the massive Launch Complex J being constructed at Tyuratam, which was frequently photographed by CORONA and GAMBIT satellites. The USSR needed both a larger rocket and this complex to launch it if the country were ever to attempt to land humans on the Moon. At the same time, the complex and rocket could be used for other missions such as launching a large, manned space station.

This entry covered problems with the Soviets' human spaceflight program. The next attempted flight took place in April 1967 but ended with the death of the cosmonaut.

The new camera system which photographed Complex J was the GAMBIT-3, which was first launched on 29 August and stayed in orbit for five days. Its maximum resolution was better than two feet, exceeding that of GAMBIT-1 (the exact resolution remains classified, as does all of the imagery).

Continuing photography of Complex J disclosed that the construction of one of the two launch pads was nearly complete. However, the failure to test new spacecraft and to test other required equipment and techniques for a manned lunar landing led U.S. intelligence agencies to conclude that if the Soviets were to attempt such a mission it would not be until mid-1971.

An 11 August GAMBIT-3 photograph of Complex J captured the Soviet Moon rocket for the second time. The United States had designated it the "J vehicle."

In October 1968, the Soviets conducted their first human spaceflight mission since April 1967. Two Soyuz capsules were launched, one of which carried a cosmonaut. U.S. intelligence agencies had for several years been predicting that the USSR might fly a manned circumlunar mission before the United States to recapture some of the prestige its early human spaceflights had earned and blunt the expected propaganda value of Apollo. Beginning in fall 1967, they closely monitored the unmanned Zond missions that were part of such a program. NASA started preparing for a manned lunar orbital mission (Apollo 8) in August 1968, but did not announce it until late October after extensive reviews had determined that it was feasible. The flight was set for December. As noted in the Annex, there was insufficient information at this date to state whether the Soviets would try a manned circumlunar mission before then.

By this time, additional intelligence had been collected to support the conclusion that the USSR would not attempt a manned circumlunar mission before Apollo 8. This apparently included the lack of deployment of ships for tracking, command and control, and recovery of the spacecraft. Apollo 8 launched on December 21 and orbited the Moon 10 times before returning to Earth. The Soviets never attempted a manned circumlunar or lunar orbital flight.

Satellite photography provided the basis for this entry on Complex J.

Soyuz 5 and 6 were the next Soviet human spaceflights after the October 1968 mission.

The second and last launch pad at Complex J was nearly complete and a J-vehicle was on it. Intelligence agencies had still not detected any flight tests of the rocket, although one had taken place in February 1969, which had ended in failure shortly after launch. The first manned lunar landing, Apollo 11, took place in July 1969 and thus ended the race to the Moon.

Notwithstanding the fact that the United States had won the race to Moon, it continued to monitor Complex J and other aspects of a possible Soviet manned lunar landing program.

Information on cosmonaut training facilities was important in evaluating likely future human spaceflight missions.

Manned Salyut space stations were a major part of the human spaceflight program during this period and had both civilian and military applications, but there were early failures. Salyut 1 reached orbit in April 1971 and one group of cosmonauts boarded it for several weeks. However, they were killed when the Soyuz capsule returning them to Earth malfunctioned. The next successful boarding was with Salyut 4 in early 1975.

Lunar and planetary probes obtained important scientific data but were also part of the space competition between the superpowers. Both of the spacecraft described here were in fact Mars probes but did not acquire any data.

The Lunik IV lunar probe passed within 4,000-8,000 miles of the Moon but did not send back any data.

U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that this was probably an engineering test of a planetary probe. It did not reach orbit.

This unsuccessful lunar probe failed to reach its parking orbit.

Zond III was the second successful lunar probe out of 16 attempts since 1958. The Soviets enjoyed greater success in the coming years, with six of fourteen spacecraft returning data from August 1965 to October 1970. The U.S. lunar probe record by August 1965 was only slightly better. None of the four Pioneer spacecraft launched in 1958-1959 returned data, but the last three of nine Rangers launched from 1961-1965 did. The record improved in the coming years. All five Lunar Orbiters in 1966-1967 returned data and five of the seven Surveyors from 1966-1968 did the same.

Luna 16 was the first Soviet spacecraft to collect a lunar soil sample and return it to Earth.

Several of the Mars probes discussed here were successful and returned data to Earth. They were the first to do so after numerous attempts beginning in 1960.

Development of all types of boosters was followed closely. The SL-12 was the largest operational launch vehicle at the time and was used for a variety of Earth-orbital, lunar, and planetary missions.

The first successful Soviet photoreconnaissance mission was in 1961, more than a year after the first U.S. success. Both the USSR and United States utilized film return systems in their early programs. However, in contrast to the United States the Soviets deorbited the entire satellite instead of just the film return capsule. By the end of 1962, the USSR had successfully flown seven photoreconnaissance satellites. It became the most successful of all the Soviet robotic satellite programs.

U.S. intelligence agencies had detected the first Soviet high resolution photoreconnaissance satellite in 1964, and the Soviets continued to launch them as well as low-resolution satellites. The former's resolution was estimated to be between five and ten feet, the latter's between 10 and 30 feet. This entry also describes expansion of the Soviet signals intelligence ship program.

The Soviet communications satellite program was not as advanced as the U.S. program. In 1964, the USSR launched the first two Molniya satellites and it continued to launch them in subsequent years. They were placed in highly elliptical orbits to provide coverage to all areas of the USSR. By this time, the United States had successfully launched several civilian communications satellites and Initial Defense Communications Satellite Program satellites into geosynchronous orbit.

The United States and its allies were not the only targets of Soviet photoreconnaissance satellites. Although intercepts of downlinked telemetry were fragmentary, through analysis of them and precise tracking of the spacecraft U.S. intelligence agencies were still able to determine some of the areas of the Earth photographed.

Most likely through the interception and analysis of downlinked telemetry and other data as well as uplinked commands, U.S. intelligence agencies determined that some of the photoreconnaissance satellites also carried signals intelligence payloads. The United States placed signals intelligence payloads on CORONA satellites from 1960-1967 under the AFTRACK program.

After many failures, the Soviets launched their first successful weather satellite in June. The United States intercepted and analyzed the downlinked imagery and other data to determine how well they were operating. The United States enjoyed much greater success in its civilian and military weather satellite programs.

This entry refers to one of the two types of non-recoverable signals intelligence satellites the Soviets had begun launching in 1968. As described, it took the U.S. intelligence agencies some time before determining exactly what their missions were.

Soviet testing of an anti-satellite interceptor started in 1968. This capability posed a major threat to the growing reliance of the United States on national security satellites in low-Earth orbit. At the time, the United States had a very limited operational anti-satellite system, which utilized nuclear-tipped Thor missiles based on Kwajalein that could destroy some satellites in low-Earth orbit.

This entry describes photoreconnaissance and signals intelligence satellite coverage of the Middle East during the Yom Kippur War.