Engaging North Korea: Evidence from the Bush I Administration

This cable provides talking points on the results of U.S.-ROK consultations held August 6-7, 1991, in Hawaii on how to deal with the North Korea nuclear problem. The U.S. delegation was headed by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and included other Pentagon, State, ACDA and NSC officials, while South Korean national security advisor Kim Chong Whi led the South Korean team, which included representatives from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs. The talks were valuable in establishing areas of agreement going forward. Both sides agreed that North Korea's production of weapons-grade nuclear material posed a gravely serious threat to security, and Pyongyang should be pressed to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and place all its nuclear facilities, especially those at Yongbyon, under these safeguards as soon as possible. The cable notes that U.S., South Korea and its allies, especially Japan because of its potential leverage as a source of economic aid to North Korea, need to exert "maximum" diplomatic efforts with North Korea to secure quick implementation of Pyongyang's international obligations and to allow inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities by the IAEA. Wolfowitz also reasserted the U.S. commitment to South Korea's security, and while portions are redacted, stressed that this commitment cannot be linked to North Kora's obligations under the NPT. Finally, it was agreed that a nuclear weapons-free zone, as advocated by North Korea, was not the solution to the DPRK nuclear threat. Given the threat any North Korean ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear material would pose to peninsular and regional stability, its efforts in this area must either be forgone or reversed, according to the cable.

This memorandum discusses the U.S. approach to securing South Korean cooperation in pressing North Korea to adhere to its international obligations. President Bush had informed South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in early July that North Korea must fulfill its international obligations "without conditions." While the nature of these obligations has been redacted, the context and accounts such as that provided by former Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer[4], strongly suggest the reference is to Pyongyang's need to adhere to IAEA nuclear safeguards and accept inspection of its nuclear facilities, in line with its joining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in December 1985.

This issue must be viewed within the context of President Bush's announcement on September 27 that the U.S. would withdraw all of its tactical nuclear weapons from the field. The memorandum goes on to discuss a proposed "linkage strategy," which, while details are redacted, appears to involve a mutual agreement by South and North Korea to forego reprocessing of the spent fuel from their nuclear reactors, a process that produces plutonium that can be used for nuclear weapons. One possible problem with this approach is concern that, based on U.S.-ROK talks in Hawaii in August 1991 (see Document No. 1 above), it is not certain that Seoul would agree to issue such a demand to North Korea, possibly because South Korea wants to reserve its options for reprocessing in the future.

The memorandum lays out a game plan for consultations with President Roh's national security advisor, Kim Chong Hwi, to gauge Seoul's receptiveness to the U.S. position, to be followed by discussions between the Pentagon and the State Department to secure administration agreement in October on the linkage strategy and then formally informing Seoul of the strategy and persuading South Korea to accept the goal of no reprocessing on the entire Korean peninsula. Assuming a positive response, the next steps would be for the secretary of defense to use the Security Consultative Meeting in late November to formally give South Korea the go-ahead to pursue the strategy with North Korea.

The memorandum closes with a warning that persuading all the key players may be too difficult for the short time available. There was no guarantee the linkage strategy would succeed, but it put the U.S. on the "moral high ground" and in the best position "in the very likely event that the North continues to march on with its weapons program undeterred."

These two versions of a paper, with different redactions and marginal notes in one (Document No. 3-a) that were incorporated into the other version (Document No. 3-b), lay out the basic positions held by the U.S. and South Korea regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which poses a "serious challenge to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but also of Northeast Asia as a whole." To meet this challenge, the U.S. goal was a Korean peninsula "free of nuclear weapons grade material and the means to produce them." To this end, Washington and Seoul should use all possible diplomatic means and international pressure to bring Pyongyang to adhere fully to IAEA nuclear safeguards, according to the paper: declaring all nuclear-related materials and facilities, putting these under international inspection, and foregoing the reprocessing and enrichment of spent nuclear fuel. Under the U.S. security commitment to South Korea, including the nuclear umbrella, and with continued close consultation, South Korea should take the lead in discussions with North Korea to address the key elements of peace and stability on the peninsula, including confidence-building measures, non-aggression agreements, and North Korea's nuclear program.

One possible outcome of public or secret talks between Seoul and Pyongyang might be a South Korea declaration of "non-nuclear principles" drafted in close coordination with the U.S. (And in fact, President Roh would announce the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on November 8, 1991.) For its part, to secure the goal of a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula, the U.S. would be willing to lift economic sanctions against North Korea and work for the end of the country's diplomatic isolation.

These two versions of a paper, with different redactions and marginal notes in one (Document No. 3-a) that were incorporated into the other version (Document No. 3-b), lay out the basic positions held by the U.S. and South Korea regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which poses a "serious challenge to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but also of Northeast Asia as a whole." To meet this challenge, the U.S. goal was a Korean peninsula "free of nuclear weapons grade material and the means to produce them." To this end, Washington and Seoul should use all possible diplomatic means and international pressure to bring Pyongyang to adhere fully to IAEA nuclear safeguards, according to the paper: declaring all nuclear-related materials and facilities, putting these under international inspection, and foregoing the reprocessing and enrichment of spent nuclear fuel. Under the U.S. security commitment to South Korea, including the nuclear umbrella, and with continued close consultation, South Korea should take the lead in discussions with North Korea to address the key elements of peace and stability on the peninsula, including confidence-building measures, non-aggression agreements, and North Korea's nuclear program.

One possible outcome of public or secret talks between Seoul and Pyongyang might be a South Korea declaration of "non-nuclear principles" drafted in close coordination with the U.S. (And in fact, President Roh would announce the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on November 8, 1991.) For its part, to secure the goal of a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula, the U.S. would be willing to lift economic sanctions against North Korea and work for the end of the country's diplomatic isolation.

This and subsequent cables from the U.S. ambassador in Seoul, Donald Gregg, deal with U.S. efforts to ease South Korean's concerns over the impact of President Bush's decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea as part of his September initiative. A Washington Post article by Don Oberdorfer published two days before the meeting had revealed that the Bush administration had decided to remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.[5] According to officials at an earlier meeting, President Bush had not informed South Korean leader Roh of this decision when the two met on September 23 in New York, though USDP Wolfowitz had secretly informed Roh's national security advisor, Kim Chon Whi, earlier, giving rise to the widespread public impression in South Korea that Seoul had only been informed at the last minute.

At the meeting reported on in this cable between Kim, Gregg and General Robert RisCassi, the U.S. military commander in Seoul, the Roh government's displeasure with the situation was clear, and Gregg warned that the relationship was at a "pivotal time," with Seoul "chafing at the leak and intimations about a lack of prior consultations," as seen when Kim "caustically" remarked that non-consultation was "nothing new" for Seoul. It was clear that Roh's government had been put in a bind by the suspicion that Washington had not consulted it about such a major move, as well as concerned about how the nuclear withdrawal could affect the North-South summit meeting starting the next day. Kim felt that North Korea would see the U.S. step as part of a longer-term process of unilateral decisions by which it would leave the peninsula, and would argue that Seoul should not expect reciprocal moves by Pyongyang in response to decisions South Korea could not control. Referring to earlier discussions about defusing the nuclear issue, Kim said Seoul would not propose a mutual ban on reprocessing but would indicate that North Korea could not expect improved relations with the U.S. if it did not forego reprocessing and enrichment.

As to other issues at the upcoming North-South meeting, Seoul was willing to sign a non-aggression pact if North Korea agreed to a range of confidence-building steps and exchanges, and the agreements did not put at risk existing treaty arrangements. On all of these and related issues, South Korea felt there was an urgent need for consultations with Washington. In one bit of optimism, Kim believed that North Korea might be under pressure by the following spring to be more accommodating, as the usual food shortages combined with the loss of preferential trading terms with Russia.

This cable from U.S. Ambassador Donald Gregg to USDP Wolfowitz reports on a meeting Gregg had with South Korea national security advisor Kim Chong Whi, which was marked by South Korea's strong concerns that Seoul and Washington consult closely on nuclear weapons policies in the wake of President Bush's September announcement and on related efforts to engage with Pyongyang on nuclear and other issues. In the meeting, the South Korean national security advisor discussed Seoul's plan to move forward with an announcement of its nuclear policy (a reference to President Roh's November 8 statement, noted above), possibly before a planned visit by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney; the need to keep pressure on North Korea, and thus Kim's strong opposition to any high level U.S.-DPRK meeting in the near future; the need for Wolfowitz to come to South Korea for consultations on these issues; and his impressions from recent discussions with North Korea.

Regarding the recent North-South talks, Kim said the atmosphere had been "cold and sometimes bitter," with Kim at one point having to break up a "shouting match" between the two Korean prime ministers. While Kim felt the two sides remained apart on practically every issue discussed, he also sensed an "eagerness" on North Korea's part to establish better relations with the world, though any opening up of their system risked destroying the regime's legitimacy. But against this, Kim argued, North Korea also had to deal with an economy that "grows worse all the time." As evidence, Kim told Gregg that high-level North Korean officers had said they were walking to work to improve their health and avoid polluting the air, when the real reason was a lack of gasoline.

To take advantage of this leverage, Kim believed that if pressure was continued - "we must continue to tighten the screws" - North Korea could be made to accept a gradual opening of its system. For this reason, Kim directly asked Gregg that the U.S. not agree to a high-level meeting with Pyongyang until at least after the planned North-South meeting in December, and that Washington make it clear through its channels in Beijing that military matters must be discussed with Seoul. But Kim took a different tone in telling Gregg of a talk he had with Kim Jong Woo, North Korea's deputy minister of international projects, and possibly a relative of Kim Il Sung. The North Korean official was very interested in possible economic cooperation with Seoul, but this could not happen until a non-aggression pact was signed between the two Koreas.

Kim Chong Whi felt that Seoul should accommodate the wish for a non-aggression pact and that it could pave the way for discussion of nuclear matters, economic exchanges, and other issues. Kim also confided that he had advised his North Korean counterpart to move quickly in reaching agreements with Roh Tae Woo's conservative government, which might be replaced by elections in 1992. Kim had drawn a parallel between Roh and President Richard Nixon, telling the North Korean Kim that "it had been conservative American presidents who had made the greatest openings to previously hostile communist regimes."

Gregg's closing comments on the meeting stressed the fact that for the first time in over two years Kim Chong Whi had an official note-taker at the meeting, clearly for the purpose of building a paper record of their conversations. Gregg felt that Kim clearly felt "vulnerable" on the consultation issue, and the "threat" of an announcement, likely the nuclear policy statement, might be a bluff to pressure the U.S. on consultations. But Washington should not call this bluff, if at all possible.

While redactions make a firm determination difficult, what is known about the broader context suggests that this cable from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Wolfowitz to Ambassador Gregg reflects challenges the Bush I administration faced in easing South Korea's concerns about the U.S. security guarantee in light of President Bush's September 1991 nuclear initiative. Wolfowitz tells Gregg that more time is needed to advance key decisions in Washington that will allow the U.S. to address these concerns in a concrete manner. The likelihood that the issue at hand is reassuring Seoul is supported by the mention of South Korea's desire for detailed information on "comprehensive conventional enhancements," probably for South Korea's military forces. Though the Pentagon did not believe such "compensation" was needed, the U.S. did take seriously any signal that could be misread by North or South Korea regarding the U.S. defense commitment to Seoul, and believed there were conventional steps that would "not only reinforce deterrence but also increase the pressure on North Korea to deal with the nuclear problem."

This briefing book provides an invaluable and detailed look at how the Bush I administration deliberated over the critical next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program, as well as concerns held by the Pentagon about the approach recommended by the State Department. This briefing book was prepared for a NSC/Deputies' Committee meeting to be held on December 17. The Deputies' Committee was composed of high-ranking representatives below the Cabinet level from the State Department, the Secretary of Defense and JCS, the CIA and ACDA, as well as other agencies as required, and met to discuss policy issues that cut across the agencies' briefs. The level of detail found in this briefing book regarding the various negotiating goals and approaches defies easy summarization, and the materials should be read closely to capture all the nuances and factors entering into the U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Pyongyang's nuclear program. The contents of the briefing book, with comments on significant points, include: (page numbers refer to the PDF copy):

A) Cover memo, table of contents and agenda (pages 1-3)

B) Meeting objectives memorandum (page 4)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider a "gameplan" to bring North Korea's nuclear weapons program under control. Specific steps to be considered included preliminary contact with North Korea at the deputy assistant secretary level. This would be accompanied by an approach by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy in Beijing to invite North Korea to send a high-level official to meet with a U.S. counterpart in New York before President Bush visited Seoul in early January. Also under consideration were talking points for these meetings and demarches to countries with relations or potential influence in Pyongyang informing them of the U.S. concerns about the DPRK nuclear program.

C) Memorandum for ASD/ISA James R. Lilley, Subject DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program, ca. December 12, 1991 (pages 5-6)

This memorandum summarizes the key points in the gameplan and lays out the Pentagon's concerns that the talking points are too "forward-leaning" with respect to offering the prospect of normalized relations with North Korea at this early point in the process. The Pentagon was already concerned that South Korea had rushed ahead in talks with North Korea about a non-aggression agreement while putting the nuclear issue off to the side. ACDA Director Ronald Lehman in his recent visit to Seoul (see 5 and 6 below) had sought to bolster South Korea's determination to press Pyongyang on this issue by agreeing to the idea of a North-South inspection regime. The Pentagon agreed with the key point of the gameplan, which was a high-level meeting to make sure Kim Il Sung knew directly about U.S. concerns regarding North Korea's nuclear program and that, for real progress, signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was not sufficient but the DPRK should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo's November 8 non-nuclear declaration foreswearing the development, including reprocessing and enrichment, of nuclear weapons. But the Pentagon strongly held that the U.S. side should not offer too much by way of a possible normalization of relations in these early contacts. In its view, the mere fact that these two meetings might take place were carrot enough, and the U.S. should make any second meeting conditional on North Korea signing and implementing safeguards, and agreeing to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with Seoul and to at least trial inspections.

This memorandum has the following attachments:

1) Suggested Talking Points for Mr. Lilley (page 7) - This paper summarizes the main points Lilley should make in the Deputies' Committee meeting to drive home the Pentagon's concerns: keep the pressure on South Korea to push North Korea on the nuclear issue in its bilateral talks and to avoid prematurely raising the prospect of normalized relations in the initial meetings with North Korea, which should focus on making clear the U.S. concerns and benchmarks for progress on the nuclear issue.

2) Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue (Gameplan paper) (pages 8-15) - This is the State Department paper laying out the diplomatic, political, and economic steps the U.S. should adopt as it works to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem, along with a timeline. The basic components of the plan were: continued international efforts to press North Korea; ensuring that Seoul press Pyongyang at the North-South talks on the nuclear issue; and clearly stating the U.S. position on a peninsula-wide ban on reprocessing and enrichment, both to the world and especially to the DPRK in proposed initial and follow-up, high-level meetings. While there were current signs of movement and success in building international pressures on the DPRK, the paper also sounded a number of warnings, noting that "there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations . . . only to back off at the last minute with additional demands,"

The paper acknowledges that the odds may be against the U.S. in pursuing the gameplan. It was entirely possible that North Korea had no intention of changing course, and would aim to "delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions." Adding to the uncertainties were the gaps in intelligence regarding North Korea's processing of nuclear material at Yongbyon. There were also signs that North Korea might try to move and hide its processing facilities before agreeing to inspections. The proposed plan for the next few months was to combine increased international pressure with concrete incentives for North Korea to take the steps needed to rein in its nuclear program. The international campaign would be waged on a number of fronts, including with Japan, China, Russia, the IAEA, and the UN. The latter posed particular issues, such as possibly inviting "invidious comparisons" to other unsafeguarded nuclear programs, such as Israel's. China also posed its own set of possibilities and concerns. The U.S. hoped Beijing would provide more reliable information about the North Korean nuclear program as well as exert its influence. But the U.S. could not be "absolutely certain of PRC motives ... and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyonguang regime in question."

These efforts needed to be coordinated with two other key arenas of discussion: the North-South dialogue and bilateral U.S.-DPRK contacts. The North-South channel was crucial to solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. A meeting to discuss a ROK/DPRK non-nuclear agreement that incorporated a ban on reprocessing and enrichment as well as a bilateral inspection regime was planned for December 20. In support of this initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney had told Seoul that the U.S. could consider inspections of U.S. bases in South Korea under the right circumstances; i.e., inspections must be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities, and should come after the public commitment from both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. ACDA Director Lehman had elaborated on this position during his visit to Seoul. The North/South talks also carried the risk that South Korea might not be willing to pay the political price of taking tougher steps towards North Korea if needed.

The bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue raised the points at issue in the NSC/Deputies' Committee meeting regarding what should be said at these sessions. They would provide a venue for sending a critical message to the top North Korean leadership: should the U.S., at any point, "learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization." This stick would be paired with the carrot of a possible easing of tensions and moves towards normalization of relations in a step-by-step fashion as North Korea met specific benchmarks in bringing its nuclear program under international safeguards and inspections. Another potential stick was explicitly taken off the table, however: Cheney had told South Korean and Japanese leaders that the U.S. should not consider "military measures" as such discussion could jeopardize the current diplomatic strategy.

3) State Department Talking Points - Preliminary Contact with DPRK (pages 16-17) - This and the following document provide talking points that address U.S. concerns about the North Korean nuclear program and the necessary steps to address them, as discussed in the document above. Notable are the marginal notes, assumed to be by a Pentagon official, that would underscore the need to discuss the nuclear issue, and that called for deleting the talking point about possible normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

4) State Department Talking Points for High-Level Meeting (pages 18-23) - Again, these talking points elaborate on the U.S. concerns and position regarding North Korea's nuclear program, to be presented at a high-level gathering following the initial meeting. The points are familiar, taken from the gameplan document; of particular interest are the Pentagon marginal notes. The Pentagon remained focused on making it clear to North Korea that its nuclear program was unacceptable and on laying out the steps North Korea must take to bring this program under international review and inspection.

5) Memorandum, Col. Eden Y. Woon (OSD/ISA) for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: ACDEA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue, ca. December 30, 1991 (pages 24-26) - This memorandum reports on the interagency team that ACDA Director Lehman took to Seoul on December 6-9. The team consisted of representatives from ACDA, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. After stressing to the South Koreans that the North Korea nuclear issue should be "front and center" in the upcoming North/South ministerial meetings, the U.S. delegation then focused on revising serious problems with a draft joint declaration Seoul planned to propose to Pyongyang at these meetings. Key among these concerns was keeping North Korea's international obligation regarding IAEA safeguards separate from bilateral nuclear agreements; insuring that a North/South inspection regime included both military and civilian sites, as IAEA inspections alone might not be able to detect a covert weapons program at Yongbyon and other suspected sites; and avoiding any statement that the purpose of a bilateral inspection regime was "to check on the presence of nuclear weapons." The U.S. feared this would come too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons, whereas the purpose of the inspections should be to verify both Koreas are abiding by any joint nuclear declaration.

The U.S. team had to counter serious South Korean resistance to making changes to address these concerns, fearing it would make the joint declaration too tough for North Korea to accept. More worrisome for Seoul was that it would be hard to pressure North Korea on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing was legal. Fighting back against what the Americans saw as a reversion to old thinking, which the U.S. thought had disappeared with Roh's November 8 announcement of non-nuclear principles, the U.S. delegation spent the better part of the meeting explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections alone, the need to press North Korea to stop reprocessing and the requirement for persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh Tae Woo's powerful non-nuclear policy.

In the end, the U.S. delegation persuaded the South Koreans to make the necessary changes in the draft joint declaration. Looking ahead, it was clear Washington needed to do more to reassure South Korea that international pressure on North Korea would not ease once the DPRK signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. To this end, the U.S. would have to send out a "core demarche" cable to its friends and allies stating the American goal of persuading North Korea to reciprocate Roh's non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing, and declaring its position that merely signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was insufficient to address international concerns. Sending this cable would also serve to shield the United States from criticism that it was "moving the goalposts" in its demands on North Korea. And again, Washington needed to engage with China, possibly through high-level talks in the near future, to secure its role in putting pressure on North Korea, a role that would increase if the issue had to move to the U.N. Finally, the U.S. and South Korea needed to make a decision on whether to hold the 1992 Team Spirit joint military exercises, a matter on which South Korean views were divided.

6) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13075 to SecState, Subject: Lehman Visit:

ROKG Proposal for a N/S Non-Nuclear Joint Declaration, December 9, 1991 (pages 27-30) - This cable summarizes the results of the U.S.-ROK meeting on nuclear issues that is the focus of the preceding memorandum. As noted above, these issues were distinguishing between IAEA inspections and any bilateral North/South inspection agreement, the need to include civil sites in any bilateral agreement, the U.S. opposition to having the stated purpose of bilateral inspections include checking for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the need to include trial inspections as a goal of the North/ South talks. The South Koreans accepted the U.S. changes, which would be incorporated into the draft Seoul would present to the DPRK at the ministerial discussions beginning on December 10. The cable reiterates the South Korean agreement that the nuclear issue should be "front and center" at these talks and that the draft joint declaration will be used to "attack" North Korea's position on nuclear weapons. The South Koreans expected this strategy to lead to a "major confrontation" on the nuclear issue, with Seoul determined to come out of the fight this round as "top dog." The rest of the cable gives the text of the revised draft joint declaration.

7) Cable, Amembassy Seoul 13322 to SecState, Subject: Prime Ministers Sign Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression: "The Most Comprehensive North-South Document Since the Division of the Peninsula, December 13, 1991 (pages 31-33) - This cable reports that on December 13, North and South Korea's prime ministers signed the "Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchanges," and provides details on a briefing that Assistant Foreign Minister Lee See Young gave the diplomatic corps on the agreement and the negotiations leading to it. Lee said that Seoul had put strong emphasis on the nuclear issue throughout the negotiations, pressing the DPRK to accept nuclear inspections and halt nuclear weapons development, and calling for agreement to end all reprocessing and enrichment to insure nuclear weapons would not be produced on the peninsula. South Korea had also pushed for North Korea to accept that trial inspections of military and civilian facilities, one of the confidence-building measures, be carried out within the month. Regarding the ROK draft declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, North Korea had initially responded by repeating its call for a nuclear-free zone, but Seoul had pushed to have further talks on a joint nuclear declaration work from the South Korean draft. Lee also noted the "unexpectedly flexible" North Korean stance at the talks, but felt that Pyongyang may need more concrete proof of progress in the North/South dialogue as a step towards improving its international standing and ending its political and economic isolation. For its part, Seoul held that further moves towards normalizing relations with North Korea should wait to ensure the DPRK followed through on implementing the agreement and its continued stand on the nuclear issue. Summing up, Lee asserted that the joint agreement was the most comprehensive North-South document since the division of the peninsula," which could bring about "a major change in North-South relations."

This memorandum reveals the growing concern within the Pentagon, State Department, and ACDA that North Korea might be stalling on ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement that would place its nuclear facilities under international inspection. There had been positive movement in the new year, as on January 20 Seoul and Pyongyang had signed the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and ten days later North Korea had concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.[6] The State Department was sympathetic to Seoul's strategy of putting the process of North-South reconciliation on a separate track from the nuclear issue, hoping that progress on the former would lead to resolution of the latter. The upcoming sixth round of North-South ministerial meetings would provide a forum for Seoul to press Pyongyang on ratifying the agreement by the date of the next ministerial, February 19. Cancelling this meeting was not a good option, as holding the meeting would allow the December 31, 1991, "Joint Declaration for a Non-nuclear Korean Peninsula" to come into effect and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to start working on a bilateral inspection regime, which is, a marginal note says, "our major concern."

The Pentagon's preferred short term strategy was to persuade Seoul to lay down a marker for North Korea that if the inspections were not implemented, the seventh round of North-South meetings might not take place. The memorandum then lays out the case for a Deputies' Committee meeting to discuss these issues and agree on a possible course of action to stiffen South Korea's back on the inspections issue. The meeting should also review possible timelines for North Korea on inspections, and the "nooses" available to tighten around the North Koreans should they continue to stall. An attached paper lays out talking points for a call from Wolfowitz to persuade State and ACDA that the meeting is necessary.

"Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable." The state of play in avoiding this outcome is the focus of this memorandum, prepared for a meeting of the North Korea Deputies' Committee. It was a "testing period" for the DPRK, in which the U.S. and its allies waited for Pyongyang to carry out its promise to ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement reached in January, having already failed to meet a commitment to do this in February. While there were promising signs that North Korea might still ratify the IAEA agreement in April, and talks were underway to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the North-South non-nuclear agreement, the North's intentions remained unclear. There were signs of an internal debate possibly slowing decisions, as the DPRK might see some political advantage in delay, or it might be playing for time so that it could "destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities," even to hide its nuclear weapons program or produce and then hide "significant amounts of plutonium before allowing inspections. Or perhaps it might plan not to accept meaningful inspections at all.

South Korea and Japan agreed with the U.S. that improved political relations with North Korea were off the table until the nuclear issue was resolved. Seoul had made progress on this issue a prerequisite for movement in other North-South talks, going so far as to postpone a summit meeting and would likely postpone the next round of prime ministerial talks in May absent real progress. Even if the DPRK did ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and negotiated a bilateral inspection regime, the next test would be the completeness of North Korea's declarations to the IAEA. A further complicating factor was the willingness of some countries, especially China and Russia, to give the DPRK the benefit of the doubt for "plausible delay." Absent undeniable proof that the DPRK did not intend to carry out its promises, it would be difficult to mobilize international pressure in the near term. A "worst case" scenario in which North Korea delayed action on its IAEA commitments until October was attached to the memorandum.

For the moment, the U.S. had to walk a fine line between accepting that North Korea would meet its obligations and maintaining international concern, while at the same time laying the basis for action that could enable it to narrow North Korea's freedom of action and tighten international pressure. The key challenge was "to minimize DPRK "wiggle room," by building international support for a reasonable deadline for initial IAEA inspections at all the DPRK's nuclear facilities, which would in turn lay the basis for international action if it became necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A best case scenario (also attached) would find the DPRK submitting its nuclear inventory in late May, laying the basis for initial inspections in early June. Future U,S. diplomacy needed to focus on bolstering support for the best-case scenario, while not giving North Korea grounds to charge the U.S. was "pressuring" it. A critical target of this diplomacy would be China, which had the most influence with North Korea. Washington was to stress with Beijing that the U.S. timetable was "critical" and urge the Chinese to "make it happen," emphasizing China's national interest and the U.S. determination to pursue tough international steps, which Beijing should support, if Pyongyang "fails to perform." Other venues at which the U.S. should press its case were the IAEA, the UN and in U.S.-DPRK counselors talks in Beijing. Should coercive steps be needed, these could be pursued through economic sanctions under the UN aegis, in concert with like-minded nations, or unilaterally if need be.

This memorandum covers many of the same points addressed in the above document, updated to reflect recent developments since the March 12 Deputies' Committee meeting. North Korea was still on a plausible schedule leading to compliance with its IAEA and bilateral non-proliferation agreements, and attached timelines addressed different scenarios, including how the DPRK could "plausibly" delay IAEA inspections until later September, an ideal timeline for the DPRK on the IAEA safeguards in which North Korean ratification, submission of accurate initial nuclear inventory, and routine inspections would take place between April and August 1991, and one covering bilateral inspections according to a schedule agreed between Seoul and Pyongyang on Mach 14, in which these inspections would begin in June. The questions before the Deputies' Committee remained much the same: how long the U.S. could wait before initiating coercive steps against North Korea, what steps would be both feasible and effective, and what were the tactical and longer-term implications? There had been progress since the last DC meeting. North Korea had informed the U.S. at a meeting in Beijing on March 17 that it would ratify the IAEA agreement on April 8. Regarding the North-South bilateral nuclear talks, while the DPRK had rejected Seoul's call for a specific date for inspections, it did agree to formation of the JNCC which would negotiate the bilateral inspection regime.

However, North Korea had taken advantage of every opportunity to prolong these talks, though its options continued to narrow. There was also no sign that North Korea was either increasing activity or taking steps to move material out of its Yongbyon complex. If it appeared inspections would begin in June, this might signal a satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue which the U.S. "carrot and stick" policy was designed to achieve. But, as always, North Korea's past record meant Washington had to remain on its guard. The rest of the memorandum discusses in similar fashion U.S. concerns that North Korea might take advantage of other countries giving it wiggle room for "plausible delay" in carrying out its commitments, and the need to coordinate continued pressure on Pyongyang in concert with South Korea, Japan, China, the UN and the IAEA, with an eye to more coercive steps if it became clear North Korea was significantly stalling. The U.S. had also made it clear in bilateral talks with North Korea in Beijing on March 17 that Pyongyang should have "no illusions that we will acquiesce in delaying tactics." Beyond pressure in international organizations, possible coercive steps would fall into three areas: economic, political, and a third that has been redacted. Steps to reduce political contacts with North Korea were possible, but "would be cutting into a pretty small pie," with uncertain results, though this was seen as possibly affecting the legitimacy of the succession, presumably a reference to a post-Kim Il Sung regime.

This paper reviews the current situation regarding inspection of North Korea nuclear facilities, which was troubling for two main reasons. First, with the fourth IAEA inspection of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon currently under way, it was becoming clear that North Korean non-cooperation was more evident as IAEA inspections became more aggressive. Second, there was a sense that South Korea, after several unproductive JNCC meetings, might be ready to adopt a bilateral inspection regime that fell short of meeting U.S. concerns or might not be carried out rigorously by Seoul, but would provide Pyongyang with "underserved respectability" on the nuclear inspection issue. There was also concern that Seoul would not have the political will to agree to a challenge inspection for the North Korean facilities. A meeting with officials from State, ACDA, and the NSC revealed these concerns were shared, and that several steps should be taken. First, the U.S. needed to define for Seoul essential principles in the bilateral inspection proposal now under discussion that could not be compromised, including the need for an adequate number of challenge inspections and access to any site, military or civilian. If need be, the U.S. should explore possible alternative "new" or "hybrid" inspection regimes incorporating these essential principles under which perhaps the IAEA, with "more credible" or even U.S. inspectors, could initiate and carry out intrusive challenge inspections. No new initiative should in any way lead North or South Korea to view the U.S. as weakening on its basic goal of stopping any DPRK weapons program with a credible challenge inspection regime.