The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60
Briefing NATO Allies

Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore alerts the Foreign Office to U.S. intelligence estimates and reporting of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba that had new information suggesting that “the type of arms introduced may not be entirely defensive. The Ambassador reports “much activity” at CIA, State, and Defense suggesting the preparation of “contingency plans for some kind of military action” and of updates of the situation for President Kennedy.

Ormsby-Gore does not mention that British intelligence officials, including Joint Intelligence Committee chair Hugh Southern Stephenson, were then in Washington for “five eyes” (Australia-Canada-New Zealand-UK-US) meetings on methodology. On October 19, CIA official Ray Cline gave the British a briefing on Soviet military deployments in Cuba, including missiles.[7]

With the decision for a blockade having been made, on October 21, President Kennedy and his close friend, Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore, met for lunch at the White House. Kennedy told the ambassador about the discovery of the Soviet missiles and the policy choices that he saw—either an air strike and then a blockade or a blockade without an air strike. Asked what choice he would make, the ambassador said he favored a blockade, in part because an air strike would damage the U.S. politically. Kennedy said that he and his “colleagues” had reached the same conclusion, although there were other alternatives, such as an invasion, which Ormsby-Gore said would be “most unwise.”

While Kennedy emphasized the need for secrecy, he wanted the British government to know. Advised by Ormsby-Gore to inform the Prime Minister, Kennedy sent him a message later in the day. Macmillan, however, did not see the Ambassador’s account until Tuesday, and even that held back on some sensitive issues discussed in a follow-up telegram (see Documents 11 and 14). Macmillan disclosed the Kennedy/Ormsby-Gore meeting in his memoirs, but the telegram remained classified until the 1990s.[8]

A few hours after meeting with Kennedy, Ormsby-Gore alerted Macmillan that he would be receiving an “extremely important message,” and that the fact of its existence “should on no account become known.”[9] Kennedy’s brief message informed him of the photographic intelligence about the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba, declaring that this “extraordinarily dangerous and aggressive Soviet step obviously creates a crisis of the most serious sort.” In the interests of “security and speed,” Kennedy had already made his “first decision,” a reference to the blockade, but “from now on I expect that we can and should be in the closest touch.” Ambassador Bruce would brief him the next day.

Ambassador David K.E. Bruce received early warning of the missile deployments when he and CIA station chief Archibald B. Roosevelt (Theodore Roosevelt’s grandson) met former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and two CIA officials at a military airport two hours away from London. On November 22, Bruce and CIA officer Chester Cooper met with Prime Minister Macmillan presenting him with a letter from President Kennedy. Bruce’s diary includes the text of the telegram he sent to the State Department describing the meeting. Accepting the validity of the evidence, Macmillan wondered about possible Soviet reactions in Berlin or against U.S. foreign bases, such as in Turkey. Cooper’s more detailed account [See Document 10] shows a Prime Minister who was more skeptical of Kennedy’s approach. Once Kennedy’s speech had arrived, Macmillan would comment further. Although was out of the top policymaking loop, Bruce would try to keep the British informed and listen to their concerns throughout the crisis.

When Ambassador Bruce met with Macmillan, he brought this message from President Kennedy. On its last page, Kennedy told the Prime Minister of his “personal satisfaction” that they would stay in “close touch” and that "I intend to keep you fully informed of my thinking as the situation evolves.” That turned out to be not entirely true. While Kennedy would ask for Macmillan’s advice at important stages of the crisis, he did not inform Macmillan of critical developments, such as the Defcon II alert and the deal involving Jupiter missiles in Turkey.[10]

This paper, provided by Ambassador Bruce and Chester Cooper to Macmillan during their meeting on October 22, 1962, was a precis of recent findings from U-2 photography over Cuba, including surface to air missiles (SAMs), jet fighters, and medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

In this message to Kennedy, Macmillan responded to the briefing in a supportive way but wanted more information on the legal case for a blockade. Expressing concern about possible Soviet reactions in Berlin, perhaps even imposing their own blockade, he noted that contingency plans for a Berlin crisis could lead to “world war” or to the “holding of a conference” with the Soviets, which he thought would be dangerous. Macmillan advised Kennedy to pay attention to European opinion and avoid moves on Berlin that could endanger Alliance unity.

In a letter to Macmillan, Kennedy wrote that he will instruct “experts to confer at once with yours to provide the best possible legal case” for the blockade. Recognizing the “hazards” that Macmillan discussed, Kennedy observed that he had “to take account also of the effect of inaction in the face of so obvious and deep a Soviet challenge.”

Soon after President Kennedy delivered his televised speech, he had a lengthy telephone conversation with Macmillan, which partly amounted to a further briefing on U.S. policy. After Kennedy stated the policy dilemma presented by Soviet action, Macmillan took a tough position, asking whether the U.S. was going to invade Cuba or “is this going to just drag on?” Kennedy explained that he was taking actions that could prevent early “escalation to war” with the blockade focusing on “offensive weapons of war.” Asked by Macmillan what he thought could happen, Kennedy replied that negotiations over the missiles “should be the object of our policy,” although the U.S. was preparing for an invasion and recognized the possibility of a Berlin crisis.

Informing Macmillan that he had just written to Khrushchev about what the U.S. was going to do, Kennedy emphasized that “our action is moderated by the realisation that we could move very quickly into a World War over this or to a nuclear war or to lose Berlin.” Particularly worrisome to Macmillan was that if the U.S. was forced into a “conference” with Moscow as a “last resort,” Khrushchev would have “all the cards.” When Macmillan suggested that the threat of an invasion was “more cards in our hand,” Kennedy observed that if that course appeared to be “wise,” the U.S. could implement the plan at the end of the week. Macmillan asked that Kennedy stay in touch with him and Ormsby-Gore.

Cooper, then on the staff of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates, was in transition to a new job at the Directorate of Intelligence. He had spent several years at the CIA station in London and was wired into the British intelligence establishment. His account of his “mission” discusses briefings for the Prime Minister and other high level British officials, including Labour leaders. Before Cooper arrived in London, British intelligence officials in Washington, D.C., had received advance word of the missile deployments, so Macmillan was probably not caught by surprise.[11] After hearing the briefing, Macmillan said that the evidence was “good enough for him,” although he and his advisers were concerned that the British public and the United Nations would need to be convinced. Macmillan also wondered whether a blockade would work and whether Kennedy should have delivered a “private ultimatum” to Khrushchev first. Cooper would learn from British Labour leaders that Macmillan had “expressed annoyance about the lack of advance knowledge of U.S. actions.” [For more details see Document 12].

Cooper’s report also discusses the briefing of the British press and the circumstances surrounding the release of some of the photos to the media, following “instructions received from Washington.” Sherman Kent’s 1972 article on the intelligence briefings [See Document 25] included an annex, “Release of Picture to Press,” that was not included in this CIA release.

Ambassador Ormsby-Gore follows up his earlier message on President Kennedy’s thinking with additional details which “he had previously hesitated to report because in some instances they were so frank.” Among them are that Kennedy had no intention to invade Cuba, that the crisis “will be resolved through negotiation and discussion,” and that one possibility would be the “reciprocal closing of military bases” involving the U.S. missile base in Turkey, which were “more or less worthless.” Thus, Kennedy foreshadowed the secret deal negotiated a week later. There would be more discussions with the British about the Jupiters, although Macmillan would not be told about the deal with Khrushchev. Ormsby-Gore writes that he had previously “hesitated to report these remarks because in some instances they were so frank that he would not repeat them to any member of his Administration except his brother Bobby.” Kennedy made some remarks on the Berlin situation “which I could not possibly put on the record,” according to Ormsby-Gore, but which Macmillan would find reassuring. Remarkably, Ormsby-Gore offers to fly to the UK to brief Macmillan on what Kennedy had said.

Macmillan had recommended to Bruce and Cooper that opposition Labour leaders receive a briefing to help win their support. Arranged by the Embassy and the CIA, the briefing for Hugh Gaitskell and George Brown occurred at the residence of CIA station chief Roosevelt.[12] While Ambassador Bruce is mentioned in the telegram, he did not stay for the briefing. According to the message, both Brown and Gaitskell were “impressed but not equally” by the presentation, with Gaitskell especially concerned about the U.S.’s “unilateral approach” and doubtful about U.S. “proof.” Brown was “more ready to accept strong presumptive evidence of hostile Soviet intentions,” but noted that Macmillan felt “hurt” by the lack of advance word and consultation. Both thought that U.S. bases, such as in Turkey, could be part of a “trade-off,” but they opposed any bargaining over West Berlin. Brown expressed hope that he could keep Labour opinion “on [the] rails.”

During an ExComm meeting President Kennedy had expressed irritation about the British media getting the photos before they were released in the U.S.[13] NSC staffer Michael Forrestal phoned Chester Cooper and sent the Embassy a message to convey White House annoyance. This message, probably written by Cooper, gives a truncated explanation of the Embassy’s actions. Concerned by the skeptical British press reaction to Kennedy’s speech, Cooper and the U.S. Embassy sought and obtained the permission of CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray Cline to display the photos in a televised press conference. According to the message, the photos, described as “examples of typical sites,” were shown on television and appeared in Wednesday morning newspapers, indicating “complete acceptance validity” of U.S. evidence.

There was more to the story than what is described in this message, however, which may have elided several developments. According to Cooper’s later account and his oral history [Document 19], after Kennedy’s speech, he sent Cline a message saying that if he heard nothing back, he would act on this own. Having received no reply, Cooper released the sanitized photos to the press. In the middle of the night, Ray Cline called and complained, and later Cooper received angry phone calls from the White House and the Pentagon. As noted, the release of the photos had a positive impact on British opinion, and Cooper heard little more about his initiative.[14]

As the crisis unfolded, Sir Kenneth Strong, chairman of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Bureau, was in Washington for the “five eyes” meetings on intelligence methodology. During the following days he learned of the missile discovery and picked up some intelligence on the U.S. internal discussions. Some weeks later, Strong briefed Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Alexander Douglas-Home on what he had learned. Notes from that briefing show some confusion about the ExComm and that Strong's sources were biased, as indicated by the slighting reference to Secretary of State Rusk. Strong credited an article by Kennedy national security adviser McGeorge Bundy in the October 1962 issue of Foreign Affairs as having an impact on the Cuba discussions.

Probably the most significant point of Strong’s briefing to Macmillan was his understanding that, if the Soviets moved against Berlin as a reaction to the blockade, the Americans “were prepared to go it alone either without consulting their allies or irrespective of what their allies said.” The U.S. government was prepared to “escalate into the nuclear” through a preemptive bomber strike against Soviet ICBM bases. It’s not known who told Strong about this plan, whether it represented a serious element in U.S. continency planning during October 1962, or whether the disclosure to Strong was meant to convey U.S. determination. Significantly, it evoked the first strike plan that U.S. National Security Council staffer Carl Kaysen developed during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. In any event, for Strong, the plan represented an “over-confident” notion that the ICBMs could be located and destroyed, and that was something that also worried Macmillan.[15]

West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer also received a briefing on October 22, from Ambassador Walter Dowling and CIA intelligence official R. Jack Smith. Dowling presented Adenauer with a letter from President Kennedy on the discovery of the missiles, plans for a quarantine, and a meeting of the U.N. Security Council. Professing not to be surprised at all, Adenauer said, “It had to happen. The President is absolutely right.” During the intelligence briefing, Adenauer “was obviously impressed with material shown him. “Adenauer again expressed his approval of the President’s actions.”

Smith is not mentioned in Dowling’s account, but he provided information about the briefing to Sherman Kent, who included it in an article for Studies in Intelligence in 1972 [See Document 25]. When Smith was introduced, a suspicious Adenauer (who was familiar with intelligence personnel using cover names) asked: “Are you sure your name is Smith? Perhaps you have two names.” According to the account, Smith was “unruffled” and said his name was really Smith.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson had participated in Cuban Missile Crisis policy discussions, but President Kennedy had rejected the recommendations from him and others for an air strike. According to Acheson’s oral history a few years later, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked him to serve as a special envoy to French President Charles de Gaulle, Rusk had said, “Well, you don’t mind that your advice isn’t being followed?” to which Acheson replied, “Of course not, I’m not the President, and I’ll do whatever I can do.”[16]

Accompanied by deputy mission chief Cecil Lyon, Acheson delivered a letter from President Kennedy to De Gaulle on the discovery of the missiles and plans for a quarantine and a meeting of the U.N. Security Council. After Acheson made a statement, De Gaulle said he found U.S. policy justifiable on self-defense grounds; he was not sure whether the blockade would lead to the removal of the missiles but agreed that it would stop further shipments. Recognizing that he was not being consulted on U.S. policy, De Gaulle said he “appreciated being informed.” While Soviet intentions were difficult to discern, he did not believe that that the situation would lead to war. The Soviets, however, might be seeking to maneuver the U.S. into talks on Berlin and Cuba, according to the French president.

In his oral history, Acheson provided his personal account of the meeting with De Gaulle, noting that the general said that he did not need to see the photos to be convinced, although he would study them later. According to Acheson, De Gaulle said: “I accept what you tell me as a fact without any proof of any sort needed.”

Sherman Kent, as Chair of the CIA’s Board of National Estimates, had wrongly estimated that the Soviets would not ship missiles to Cuba, but his senior role at the Agency made him a natural choice for providing intelligence briefings to both De Gaulle and the NATO Council. Soon after his mission, Kent prepared this detailed account of the briefings, which also included presentations to senior French intelligence officials and U.S. officials. According to Kent, De Gaulle paid close attention to the explanation of the photographs, using reading glasses to look at them closely.

Kent was also indirectly involved in press briefings in Paris, which took place on October 23 with the instruction that a few photos were to be shown but not distributed. As Kent found out the next day, the U.S. and British press had received access to photos, and, by the morning of October 24, a few French newspapers were publishing them as well. Kent received permission from CIA headquarters to release four photos to the press.

Kent also made efforts to win over skeptical journalists. Andre Fontaine, a lead columnist for Le Monde, wrote that “the American intelligence services sometimes make mistakes.” Kent, under the “pseudo of a Department of Defense civilian temporarily in Paris,” had a chance to give Fountain a private briefing. By then the latter needed less convincing because of Fidel Castro’s public complaints about U.S. violations of Cuban air space: “This is good enough for me to believe that you have been overflying Cuba and photographing from the air.”

Excised from Kent’s report is the name and official role of Laughlin A. Campbell, the CIA Station Chief, who accompanied Acheson and Kent to the Elysée Palace. His name and title were released in a version of his 1972 article in Studies in Intelligence. Campbell’s name, but not his title, appears in the release of the otherwise fuller version of the Studies article used in this posting [See Document 25].

One briefing that did not go smoothly was that of Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, but that was no surprise given the personal and political tensions in the Kennedy-Diefenbaker relationship. A few hours before Kennedy’s speech, Diefenbaker met with recently retired U.S. Ambassador Livingston Merchant, CIA officer William Tidwell (who had worked in the Miami station) and Station Chief Rolfe Kingsley. At Diefenbaker’s insistence, Merchant read aloud the text of Kennedy’s speech, with the Prime Minister interrupting to ask why the matter had not gone to the U.N. Security Council first. Merchant replied that “time was of the essence as the photographic evidence would show.” Reacting critically, Diefenbaker was worried that the U.S. position was “provocative” and that a blockade was “dangerous and a threat to allies of the United States.” During the intelligence briefing, he “scrutinized” the photos and asked questions about them, also asking about the earliest “ground report” of the missiles, which led to explanation of “various refugee and agents’ reports.” As Diefenbaker received the briefing, Merchant described his attitude as changing from “skepticism bordering on antagonism” to a “more considered, friendly, and cooperative manner.” The next day, the Canadian Air Force raised alert levels of air defense forces in response to a U.S. request, and, after a gaffe in his parliamentary remarks, Diefenbaker became vocally supportive of U.S. policy.[17]

As a good intelligence collector, Tidwell noticed that Diefenbaker had torn up some notes after the meeting, so he picked up the scraps and took them back to Washington. The notes concerned elements of the U.S. position that had bothered Diefenbaker, mainly the characterization of the Soviet position and the need to show the evidence to the U.N. [See Document 25].

Later that day, at 10:00 p.m., Acheson and Kent briefed the North Atlantic Council. A detailed contemporaneous U.S. account of the meeting has not surfaced; this abbreviated account is all that is available. A useful Canadian record of the meeting is online, although NATO has yet to declassify its account. According to U.S. Ambassador to NATO Thomas Finletter, the audience “showed satisfactory recognition of importance [sic] need for allied solidarity.” For Finletter, “the highlight was [a] statement by French Permrep [Permanent Representative] [Roger] Seydoux saying that France recognized [the] need to stand with US in this matter.”

Sherman Kent provided a fuller account [See document 19], noting that there were “no questions whatever to indicate any doubt that Mr. Acheson’s story was not in fact a true story.” Kent provided some additional detail on a matter that Finletter had mentioned in his message as a “minor flap.” A radio report led Belgian representative Andre de Staercke to complain that the Council had not been told that Gen. Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), was putting NATO forces on alert. The Dutch representative agreed, noting that “even the small powers” should be consulted. The chief of staff of NATO headquarters (SHAPE), Gen. James E. Moore, soothed the discontent by reading Norstad’s statement, which said nothing about “alerts,” but emphasized the need for NATO commanders to increase their “vigilance.” According to Kent, De Staercke did not “exactly apologize,” but he and the Dutch representative both withdrew their remarks.

Not long before President Kennedy gave his television address on the missile deployments, Dean Acheson and Sherman Kent delivered an intelligence briefing to a “small private meeting” of Permanent Representatives to NATO. This message from the British delegation summarized Acheson’s account of the missile, MIG, and IL-28 sites detected through U-2 photography. The presumed nuclear weapons storage sites had not yet been identified. Acheson then described the contents of Kennedy’s speech, with the plans for a blockade, and proposed U.S. action at the U.N. Security Council.

The NATO representatives could not speak for their governments but expressed “sympathy” with the U.S. position. In answer to a question, Acheson declared that the Soviet action was a “threat to N.A.T.O. as a whole” because it was a step “toward readjusting the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. The alliance “should not break step at this time,” especially when action against Berlin “seemed inevitable.” When asked by the Dutch and Belgian representatives for recommendations on what the Allies should do, Ambassador Finletter emphasized the importance of “solidarity.”

The British account provided a parallel account of the “minor flap” involving the Belgian Ambassador mentioned by Finletter and described in detail by Kent.

The day after the NATO briefing, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium Douglas MacArthur II (nephew of the famous general) met with Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri-Spaak, who had previously served as NATO Secretary-General. Spaak was “understanding” about why Washington had made decisions before consulting with allies, but “would frankly have preferred U.S. to inform NATO allies 24 hours in advance of our action,” especially because “nobody could have valid objection” to what the U.S. was doing.

This review of reactions by NATO allies, including Canada, makes the general point that the overall response had been one of “understanding and support.” Nevertheless, allies had expressed concern about lack of consultation and advance notice, had some initial doubts about the evidence, and projected a “widespread fear” that the Soviets could respond in Berlin or elsewhere, escalating the crisis into a war in Europe.[18] According to the report, “The failure of Italy and Norway to give clear support to actions was conspicuous.” On De Gaulle’s attitude, sources indicated that his support was limited by a “to-be-expected pique or resentment at not being consulted.” On the legal case for the blockade, the British “were not satisfied” that it conformed to international law.

In an interview conducted by his former assistant, Lucius Battle, former secretary of state Dean Acheson discusses his relationship with President Kennedy and his role during the administration, including NATO policy discussions and the Berlin crisis. On the missile crisis, he gives a personal account of the debates within ExComm over an air strike, the De Gaulle briefing, and a follow-up briefing to Konrad Adenauer. According to Acheson’s account, De Gaulle said he did not need to see the photos to be convinced: “I accept what you tell me as a fact without any proof of any sort needed,” although he expressed interest in seeing it.

Later in the decade, Acheson published an account of U.S. policymaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis in Esquire magazine, in which he sharply criticized the blockade, defended the air strike option, and slammed the ExComm procedure, even though he had been involved in only a small part of the process.[19]

Included in this oral history are Cooper’s recollections of the briefings given to Macmillan and other British officials. He also discussed his efforts to get permission to share photographs with the British press, including the release of sanitized versions of the photos.

Kent’s account, prepared ten years later, tells the story of the briefings to NATO allies in large part through the reports that he and Cooper prepared. While there are several other versions of his article online, this appears to be the most complete.

Kent closes his account with an extended discussion on the “Credibility of Photographic Evidence,” noting that the photo intelligence analysts had excellent reproductions, that, when used with the latest technology, including multi-power stereoscopic viewers, made it possible to look at images in three dimensions and measure the objects in feet and fractions of feet. The work experience of the analysts enabled them to determine exactly what they were seeing and to provide answers to those senior officials who wondered whether those really were Soviet ballistic missiles. None of that could be conveyed by the “appallingly deficient copies” that appeared in newspapers. Nevertheless, from the perspective of top officials, the “credibility” of the photographs had been established, and they supported release of the information to the public. Referring to the influence of the photo interpreters and a few top officials, Kent concluded that “never have so many taken so much on the say-so of so few.”