The MIGHTY DERRINGER Nuclear Exercise of 1986

With this memo General Graves assigned Gates and the AEC's Nevada Operations Office responsibility for search and detection operations with respect to lost and stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear material as well as responding to nuclear bomb and radiation dispersal threats. The memo became the basis for the creation of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).

An interagency group of intelligence analysts explored the constraints on the exploitation of nuclear explosives, attitudes and behavior toward the United States, means of acquiring nuclear explosives, the ways in which nuclear devices might be used against the United States, and the capabilities of existing terrorist groups. While the authors considered it unlikely that the U.S. would be the target of a nuclear terrorist attack "in the next year or two," they also noted that, in the longer term, "we would expect a corresponding erosion of the constraints against terrorist use of nuclear explosives."

NEST began its existence as an unacknowledged government organization, but in 1977 it was concluded that NEST would have to interact with local law enforcement and political authorities in dealing with nuclear threats, and thus its existence would need to be acknowledged. This fact sheet, distributed to the press by ERDA, was the means by which NEST's existence was quietly announced.

This technical paper describes one piece of equipment designed specifically for NEST personnel - a portable Neutron Detection system that could be carried in any vehicle. The paper describes the detectors, the electronics, and the operations.

This estimate examined several incentives and constraints with regard to nuclear terrorism - including the availability of nuclear information, material, and trained personnel; changing levels of protection for nuclear weapons and other sources of nuclear/radioactive material; and terrorist capabilities and motivations (including possible state support to nuclear terrorism). The authors concluded that there was only a "low to very low" probability of nuclear terrorism that involved detonation of an improvised nuclear device or nuclear weapon - or the dispersal of radioactive material in a way that would threaten mass casualties or produce widespread contamination.

A senior Energy Department official informed Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey of the Department's conclusion on the need for a large-scale nuclear exercise in the early 1987 fiscal year and requested the CIA's participation.

This memorandum, from the head of the State Department's Counter-Terrorism Center, along with that attached memo to the president's national security adviser, described the level of State Department participation in MIGHTY DERRINGER.

A number of State Department officials were recipients of this secret memo, which informed them of the nature of MIGHTY DERRINGER, when it would take place, some requirements for the exercise to be realistic, and the State Department's participation.

This behavioral assessment mirrors the earliest phases of responding to an actual threat, especially trying to assess its credibility. It discusses the reliability of a source, motivations of other key figures in the terrorist group, and concludes that a credible threat exists to both the United States and 'Montrev.'

This assessment, conducted at Lawrence Livermore, where much of the credibility assessment effort has been located, reports that the available information suggests that the terrorist group possesses two improvised nuclear devices but that LLNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory disagree over the technical credibility of the threat.

The title of this memo indicates that a sketch of a device was included with the threat message. Technical experts had already begun to draw conclusions about the device in Montrev as well as the implications for finding a second device in the United States.

This message, from a Department of Energy manager, informs NEST participants at key laboratories and contractors that NEST is on "alert." The Department of State has received a threat and the Department of Energy has been asked to evaluate it. Other actions have been taken.

The plan described in this document notes the classification levels and types of information involved in the exercise as well as measures for the protection of cryptological matter and classified documents.

The MIGHTY DERRINGER scenario writers assumed that if it was a real-world event, part of it would be visible and covered extensively by the media. This document summarizes reports of fictional news services and television stations as well as interaction between the media and FBI and Department of Energy.

The first Situation Report (Sitrep) of the part of the exercise that takes place in Montrev summarizes the current situation (including the number of personnel in country) as well as the status of a variety of subjects - including command and control, intelligence, disablement, and weather.

This memo reports that MIGHTY DERRINGER was being conducted in area A-25 of the Nevada Test Site and would involve approximately 450 people. It focuses on "areas of responsibility … and those assets available" in the event of an actual medical emergency.

This plan addresses the evacuation of NEST personnel and equipment from Montrev City in the event of a nuclear detonation at the nearby Bullatcha Refinery No. 5. It focuses on execution, logistics, and command and control.

This report updates the Sitrep that had been prepared just after midnight on December 6 and reports on the significant developments that had occurred during the day. It covers thirteen different topics, and provides significant details of the terrorist site in Montrev, a summary of the behavioral assessment based on communications intelligence, and an assessment of the device. It notes that a "second nuclear device may be enroute [to] CONUS" and there is no confidence that the device is one-point safe, that is, the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation had to be taken into account (to be one-point safe there must be less than 1 in one million probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding the equivalent of 4 pounds of TNT when the high explosive inside the weapon is detonated at any single point).

This Sitrep prepared an about one hour after Sitrep No. 2, notes that "prestaging of equipment for access has been completed."

This assessment reports on attempts to determine the presence of a nuclear device at the terrorist site, the movements of the terrorist group's leader, the weapons and equipment possessed by the group, and a conclusion regarding the capability of Montrev's armed forces to secure the terrorist site.

The status of Montrev's forces is reported in this memo, which is based on information received from the Defense Intelligence Agency. It discusses their location, vehicle lift capability, and maintenance issues.

This memo conveys a report from the IWS news service on events in Montrev.

This Sitrep indicates a successful assault by forces of the Joint Special Operations Command, resulting in their control of both the north and south sites that had been under terrorist control. It reports on the status of the nuclear device and the initial implementation of the emergency disablement plan.

The technical assessment has been entirely redacted from this document, but the operational and behavioral assessments have been released in their entirety. They note that "The adversary has set up the Montrev situation in such a way that if and when he surfaces in CONUS and makes an explicit threat and demand, he must be taken seriously."

These bulletins convey various media reports of developments in Montrev, including the presence of NEST personnel.

These bulletins convey various media reports of developments in Montrev, including the presence of NEST personnel.

These bulletins convey various media reports of developments in Montrev, including the presence of NEST personnel.

This memo reports on the discovery, after the assault, of two containers, which appear to contain radioactive material.

Among the recommendations in this short memo are obtaining input from the Montrev Ministry of Information "to get an idea of what El Presidente will approve," developing a cover for the NEST operation, but preparing to admit NEST participation during the last phase of the operation.

This document focuses on the essential steps in disabling the nuclear device seized in Montrev and limiting damage. Thus, it addresses access, diagnostics, disablement, damage limitation, and hazards and effects.

This eight-page memo has been almost completely redacted but the opening paragraph notes the location of the Montrev device and that its location presents a "formidable problem" but that all participants reached a common conclusion for the solution.

This three-paragraph memo notes that hazard predictions (involving fallout dose and exposure rates) considered a variety of possible yields, wind projections, and the vulnerability of "the small village of Taco Caliente."

This assessment focuses on the likelihood that the terrorist group and its leader would have installed booby traps to prevent tampering with the nuclear device seized in Montrev. It notes the implications of the extensive anti-personnel attack defenses around the area.

This Sitrep notes presumed deadlines for nuclear device detonation and a proposed disablement schedule, the number of personnel on site, an extensive report on current intelligence, and that an "emergency destruct plan has been prepared."

This assessment notes the credibility of a threat message claiming the existence of a second nuclear device based on experimental measurements of the device seized in Montrev. The memo's contents suggest a U.S. target for the second device.

The memo includes a computer sketch of the terrorist nuclear device and the disablement method, as well as the reentry and evacuation plans - all of which have been redacted.

This heavily-redacted memo covers four topics - the situation, mission, execution, and administration and logistics. The released portion notes that disablement action had been completed and that an intact physics package had been recovered.

This memo marks plans for the ending the exercise - specifying the responsibilities of the individual organizations, procedures for transportation to the airport and the loading of aircraft, and command and control.

In 1980, a sophisticated improvised (non-nuclear) explosive device placed at Harvey's Wagon Wheel Casino did substantial damage when disablement efforts failed. The memo suggests that publicly available information about the device may have been employed to construct the Montrev device.

This heavily redacted memo notes that "the diagnostic techniques used by the team produced a rather good estimate of both the materials present and their configuration."

The FEMA director begins with the observation that "At 0700, 11 December 1986, a nuclear detonation occurred in the City of Indianapolis" devastating 20 square blocks. He does not describe the type of damage produced, for example, whether the detonation led to any fires, or the extent to which it caused local fallout hazards. The FEMA director then describes the consequence management phase of the exercise, including involvement of state and federal authorities and agencies.

Some weeks after the exercise, Los Alamos official Carl Henry sent a large package of commentary on MIGHTY DERRINGER, which is presented below, piece by piece, except for the critique by Ray D. Duncan,which is attached to the Henry memorandum. Duncan, a manager at the Nevada Test Site, produced an extensive review which raised a number of issues, including the "unusual challenges" MIGHTY DERRINGER raised for NEST if it was ever deployed to a foreign country for a "covert operation." Perhaps some incident during the exercise led him to the recommendation for educational training for Delta Force and the Joint Special Operations Command so that their members "understand the potential consequences of moving or unintentionally shooting an IND [improvised nuclear device]."

This critique gives some detail on how the NEST group entered Montrev during the crisis. The State Department had created an approved access list and a simulated Montrev consulate processed the players when they entered the country. When players realized that they had forgotten some equipment, they were easily able to retrieve it as it was only 65 miles away. The commentator noted that in a "real world situation, the NEST contingent could be thousands of miles away from necessary equipment or supplies."

Schuld listed issues brought up by the "Outside Continental United States" exercise. For example, the JSOC solved its problem through a "quick assault" that created problems for other organizations in the exercise.

Like many of the commentators, Berniklau saw the exercise as "excellent" and "well managed," but he raised problems that others also brought up, such as fragmentation of information and "confusion."

Scolman, whose role was "Commander for Science," also saw an information management problem and pointed to other concerns, such as lack of support staff.

The "consequence phase" referred to the aftermath of the nuclear detonation in Indianapolis. Smale saw "great things" in the exercise, such as its technical organization, but he pointed to concerns such as the failure to present information that would be accessible to a non-technical audience and the lack of time to "develop good fallout plots."

O'Neill was impressed by the participation of "foreign speaking actors" which helped the participants to enter "wholeheartedly into the play."

Like O'Neill, Wolfson pointed to the "good actor play," especially by the actor who had the role of Montrev's "El General." Nevertheless, he argued that "too many people" slowed down the operation.

The discussion at FBI headquarters on organizational issues produced a consensus on the need for a White House-designated "leader," possibly at the cabinet level, responsible for managing post-nuclear disaster recovery activities.

Seeing a need for better integration of the consequences phase into MIGHTY DERRINGER, Gant emphasized the need for state and local actors to play a stronger role in such exercises to give them greater realism. Her discussion of the Federal Radiological Response Plan led to a recommendation that NEST staffers play a role in post-incident field monitoring of radiation hazards because they would be the "first available federal personnel."

Chambers provided some detail on the role of the Indianapolis nuclear detonation in MIGHTY DERRINGER. According to the script, the device had been "rendered-safe," but the exercise leaders "deviated" from the script by improvising a "simulated nuclear detonation."

Like Gant, Burson pointed to the need for more involvement by state and local actors in such exercises, suggesting that "if the real Governor and Mayor" had been present, "they would have had a much stronger influence."

Smale provides more detail on the role of nuclear devices in the exercise scenario, noting that "terrorists had stolen two … from a developing nuclear capable country." He also observed that "when control of the device had been obtained, the NEST scientists could have disabled it."

After noting that his "overall reaction" was "quite positive," Dahlstrom believed that "confusion" emanated from a basic problem: the players did "not comprehend the complexity of an OCONUS deployment - specifically how the State Department controls the matter."

Jessen pointed to a number of problems, for example, that "many of the participating agencies were not serious players," the "unrealistic background information" on the "fictitious" countries and people, "bad guidance on the use of existing proliferant country data," and failure to recognize that "information to be assessed related to intelligence reports of a nuclear terrorist threat." Especially disturbing was the relocation of the command post to a "safe location," while NEST personnel were not notified": "the blatant lack of concern for [their] safety … is inexcusable."

During the exercise, the on-scene commander at Indianapolis had decided against building a "containment structure" to prevent the spread of hazardous material because of the risks. That meant, however, that plutonium would be scattered about which presented dangers of "lung doses." Los Alamos staffer Julie Orcutt recommended the provision of more anti-contamination equipment, such as foam mitigation, to reduce dangers to officials entering the blast area.

Noting that the exercise provided "very valuable training," Doyle saw such problems as the "sheer magnitude" in numbers of players, cramped space, and inadequate communications staffing.

Among the shortcomings cited in Allen's rather critical evaluation were poor communications and weaknesses in interagency coordination.

Jumping the gun was a weakness cited in Nelson's critique: players "did not wait for establishment of credibility before acting," which made a "shambles of an orderly assessment of information." He also observed that NEST search team "escorts" needed "experience in covert operations" to "prevent inadvertent acts that would alert terrorists." Nelson's report included a number of observations made by other participants.

The overall positive evaluation - the "most realistic exercise ever conducted by the NEST community" - included some criticisms, such as "chaotic" operations at the Working Point [WP] and a shambolic state of affairs at the "reentry" point (detonation zone).

Madsen's comments included suggestions for future improvements in NEST's organization: for example, to avoid fragmented committee operations, NEST needed a technical program manager.

Energy Department spokesperson Mygatt's evaluation of the player's management of the media was generally positive, although he saw a few failings, e.g., the Joint Information Center never called a news conference, "which is unheard of in an emergency.".

An official at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Nervik wondered who would provide security after JSOC operatives attacked the terrorists in an overseas environment. Special forces personnel would leave the scene but the NEST would still need security resources.

Nervik was critical in another evaluation: the NEST team was far too large, players were complacent about a nuclear threat, there were no "penalties" for making a mistake, and playing conditions were "unreal." With respect to the latter point, the fact that the Montrev phase of the exercise occurred on U.S.-controlled territory, (the Nevada Test Site), "severely limits the stress placed on players in unfamiliar surroundings, dealing with strangers, and relying on untested sources of support." Nervik also saw a danger that participants would see exercises as "more of a game than a serious test of all facets of the NEST capabilities."

Campbell pointed to a weakness: higher level officials did not really "play." For example, after the JSOC assault, the State Department left Montrev, even though "lives of American correspondents were in jeopardy." Another surprise was that the Department of Energy NEST team did not establish a "public affairs" function, although in real life such a group would be highly active.

These handwritten notes raised several issues, such as the interaction between EOD and the Delta force players and the impact of the "play" in the United States on decisions in the OCONUS (Montrev) activity. One impact was that a "risky" disablement option was taken in Montrev in order to preserve evidence to help raise the chance for a successful operation in "site city" (Indianapolis).

Handwritten notes by another player raised basic organizational issues. The absence of a "chain of command" prior to the deployment made it unclear who EOD worked for. A serious concern was that the Delta Force players did not appreciate the "gravity of dealing with a nuclear device," an issue suggested by other reports (see document 41).

This document provides a review of organizational arrangements established for the device search in Indianapolis.

This review of communications systems concluded that this was the "best NEST communications exercise that I have observed."

This critique points to operational security (OPSEC) as the "real" problem, noting that players had organizational logos on their clothing and that "loose talk" in hotels and bars was "particularly bad."