The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe, 1954-1962, Part I

This letter to a State Department official gives an overview of a course on “special weapons (atomic)” given by the U.S. Army Europe for NATO senior officers. It was during this period that the U.S. military was beginning to deploy nuclear weapons components and delivery systems in the United Kingdom and other European NATO countries, including West Germany. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration was determined to make nuclear weapons central to NATO strategy

The letter covered some of the substance of the course offering along with the reactions of attendees, which included both U.S. and European military officers. One of the conclusions reached was that “the wide-spread use of atomic weapons … would definitely not mean that armed forces could be decreased.” This was a notion with which President Eisenhower would have disagreed – he believed that nuclear weapons reduced the need for conventional forces. Other conclusions were that civilians faced “high relative vulnerability ... compared to troops,” and “that in most cases atomic weapons favor the aggressor.” The latter meant that “there is less likelihood … of waiting for the other side to be the first to use them.”

An interesting point gleaned from military maneuvers in West Germany was that it would take at least five hours and forty-five minutes, even as long as seven-and-a-half hours, to “get the final O.K. to expend an A-bomb, after a field commander decides to use one.” The students agreed that was far too long because in wartime conditions a “tactical target would remain a target” for a relatively short period of time. The letter does not describe the steps of the process for getting authorization for use, but probably communications (including coding and decoding messages) were a major hurdle.

On the frontlines of the Cold War, West Germany was one of the U.S.’s initial atomic weapon storage sites in continental Europe. The Defense Department asked the State Department to make the diplomatic arrangements necessary for German approval of the deployments. In July 1954, the State Department directed U.S. Ambassador James Conant to inform Chancellor Konrad Adenauer at an “appropriate time” that the U.S. “proposed to introduce atomic weapons under its rights as an Occupying Power, and he was requested to inform Adenauer of this decision.” The Department also asked Conant to discuss with Adenauer the matter of “arrangements for the storage and use of nuclear weapons during the Post-Contractuals period.” That is, after the formal end of the military occupation system, a contractual agreement with West Germany would be in place allowing the U.S. to keep its forces in the country.

On 12 July, while informing Adenauer that the U.S. intended to deploy “nuclear components for artillery shells,” Conant had asked “for assurances that the U.S. would have the right to store, and in an emergency to use, atomic weapons from U.S. bases in Germany after the Bonn Conventions [terminating the Occupation regime] come into effect.” Conant said he would make a formal request. What Conant requested was narrower than what Washington had in mind – more than nuclear artillery – but it did not matter because one of Adenauer’s top aides, Walter Hallstein, advised Conant that the U.S. request was approved and that a formal approach to Adenauer was unnecessary. Indeed, the U.S. did not need a written agreement with Germany on the deployments because “the reserved powers and military rights in the Bonn Conventions could be interpreted to give such rights without formal consent of the German Government.”

Those circumstances led Gerard C. Smith to recommend that negotiation with West Germany be dropped and that no further consideration be given to a proposal for a formal agreement with Adenauer because rights to deploy the weapons “already exist and that no further commitments from the Germans are necessary.” With the green light from the State Department, the U.S. followed the deployment of nuclear artillery by introducing nuclear warheads for Corporals and Honest John rockets in 1954, followed the next year by Matador missiles.[7]

Having placed nuclear weapons in the center of its “massive retaliation” military strategy, the Eisenhower administration sought similar arrangements for NATO. In December 1954 NATO’s Military Committee approved MC 48, , which assumed early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union.[8]

The U.S. played a central role in developing MC 48 and this transcript of a State Department-Defense Department meeting sheds light on high-level thinking about nuclear strategy for NATO and the necessity for developing a broad consensus in the Alliance on its validity. As Vice Admiral Davis put it, the purpose was to find out “how best and most tactfully to inoculate our NATO friends with the idea of the atomic weapons concept.” The participants agreed that it was necessary “to get in NATO the basic concept is that you have to fight this war as an atomic war and that atomic weapons have to be used initially whether the enemy uses them or not.”

The group discussed a schedule for getting approval of the “yellow piece of paper” that was apparently an early text of MC 48, but they also had in mind the need for the “psychological preparation” of European populations for a nuclear strategy. According to SACEUR General Alfred Gruenther, “it would take time before Europeans see the bomb as “conventional means and they stop being afraid of it.” As an example, he explained how it would take time to persuade the Danes to accept atomic warfare but that he had argued to journalists that “in any war of the future we are going to have to use atomic bombs, unless you, your country is willing to make up the deficit in conventional forces” which he did not think was likely because “already you are kicking about taxes.” Gruenther said he had been meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to NATO and had made a similar point: they had already made the decision to use atomic weapons “by limiting us to these [conventional] forces” in the face of Soviet armies. In other words, NATO had failed to follow through on the goals for conventional forces established at NATO’s Lisbon conference in 1952. According to Gruenther, the Belgian representative André de Staercke said: “I think we ought to put this on paper,” but some of the governments had doubts about that. Apparently, the Portuguese representative argued that Gruenther was the one to decide on nuclear weapons use. “My advice to you is don’t tell us about it. If you do wrong, we’re going to cut your throat anyhow.” The governments didn’t want that problem put to them.

With the perceived shaky consensus among the NATO leadership, the State-Defense group agreed on a strategy for developing consent first by getting the paper accepted by the Military Committee and then by the chiefs of staff of the 14 government who would “support it with their political leaders.” Gruenther thought it possible for NATO ministers to agree to it at their December meeting but the matter should be “brought to a head as soon as it is convenient to do it.”

As part of the process for approving MC 48, President Eisenhower met with senior advisers on 8 December 1954 where he made it clear that the United States would be the controlling voice in any NATO nuclear use decisions: the “U. S. must retain freedom to use atomic weapons on its own decision in the event of threat to our own forces.” If the U.S. was to keep troops in Europe, “we must and will retain the freedom to initiate use of these weapons.”

During the discussion, Eisenhower agreed with JCS Chairman Admiral Radford’s point that the NATO Council should make it clear in any approval action that the Military Committee’s recommendations were not “to be construed to prejudge final decisions by governments on the implementation of [the] plans developed in support thereof.” In other words, MC 48 was for the purposes of military planning and preparations. NATO Ministers recognized nothing was written in stone when they approved MC 48 on 17 December 1954: in the final communique they stipulated that “this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities.”

Consistent with the preferences of U.S. policymakers MC 48, as approved, assumed early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union. In the event war broke out in Europe, it was “militarily essential that NATO forces should be able to use atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their defense from the outset.” Toward that end, NATO forces needed an “integrated atomic capability for use as rapidly as possible in order to give them maximum deterrent power and the ability to participate effectively in an immediate atomic counter-offensive in the event of war.”

With nuclear matters a major subject in Western Europe and U.S-European relations, Merchant and Smith recommended to Dulles a “coordinated study” to consider the varied problems, such as nuclear proliferation, NATO and deterrence, and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Making those issues especially salient was that the U.S. was seeking to deploy and store nuclear weapons in NATO countries (France, Italy, etc.) and considering arrangements for nuclear air defense in Canada and NATO Europe. Moreover, France was seeking training in the use of nuclear weapons while moving forward with its nuclear weapons program.

According to this State Department analysis, the central problem facing the U.S. was that it was seeking European cooperation in “building an effective deterrent” based on nuclear weapons, while at the same time it was trying to discourage independent national nuclear programs in Europe (although Eisenhower himself was far less worried about that prospect). Yet the U.S. was “not presently willing or able to furnish our allies with such weapons from our own resources.” As long as the United States sought to store nuclear weapons on the territories of European allies and the “use rights which we require,” it “must be prepared to pay some price.” At a minimum, the price would be the provision of “nuclear know-how, assured availability of weapons for their own defense, and participation in decisions with respect to use.”

In addition, there were issues concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that had to be explored, for example, how the U.S. should support EURATOM and whether Washington could link peaceful uses assistance to a moratorium on weapons development by “4^th countries”, such as France. To investigate these and other issues, Merchant and Smith recommended that a State Department working group prepare a “political analysis.”

Barnes informed Smith and Merchant that Dulles had not seen their memorandum but that they should go ahead and prepare a study “along the lines recommended.”

In light of the Defense Department’s decision that it was necessary to deploy nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in Italy, Dulles informed Wilson of a recent discussion between U.S. Ambassador to Italy Clare Booth Lucie and Italian Defense Minister Paolo Taviani of the propose deployment. Taviani assured Luce that the United States had “full authority” to initiate the deployments and Luce had recommended that they “proceed without further discussion with the Italian Government.”

Dulles agreed with the proposed action and reminded Wilson of his earlier letter in which he had made a commitment to inform the Department when the deployment had taken place. When it had, Dulles planned to authorize Luce to inform the Italian chief of staff of the “general location” of the nuclear sites “if she deems this necessary in light of her conversation with Taviani.”

While MC 48 had given nuclear weapons a central role in NATO military strategy, most of the members had no prospect of acquiring the atomic capability that NATO had deemed all-important for defense. It was for this reason, among others, including facilitating NATO cohesion and U.S. plans to disperse nuclear weapons, that in the fall of 1956 U.S. officials discussed training their NATO partners in the use of the weapons.

Political considerations influenced thinking about the training offer. The Suez Crisis had just ended with the collapse of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, which Washington had opposed with financial pressure. In that context, the “earliest possible recementing of the ties among the allies” was seen as an important reason for a nuclear initiative.

The training offer was to be made at the NATO ministerial meeting. According to the memorandum to Eisenhower, if the allies asked whether the U.S. would make the weapons available to them, the U.S. was prepared to “reply … that we would make atomic weapons available to NATO forces trained in their use if and when this should become necessary in view of an emergency facing NATO.” Both the Defense Department and the State Department interpreted such a move as consistent with the Atomic Energy Act. Whether such a discussion took place at the December 1956 NATO meeting remains unclear, but in remarks to the NATO Council Secretary of Defense Wilson made an offer of training in the use of “new weapons.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary. Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 17, Miscellaneous (2)

The same day that State Department officials made the nuclear weapons training proposal to higher-ups at the Department, Defense Department officials were trying out an idea that they would support in the years ahead: amending the Atomic Energy Act so that it would be possible to transfer the “custody of atomic weapons” to select NATO countries and other allies. In this way they could achieve a state of “atomic readiness.”

Defense officials envisaged transferring weapons and weapons information first to the British and the Canadians (air defense weapons), then to NATO countries (“defensive weapons”), and later “defensive weapons” to other allies including Australia and New Zealand, and possibly to Japan and the Philippines. To make such transfers possible, the Atomic Energy Act would be amended to “vest the authority for transfer of information in the Secretary of Defense and for the transfer of custody of atomic weapons in the President.”

The memorandum noted the dissenting view of the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission who questioned the “wisdom” of the proposal and whether Congress would support it. One of the chairman’s concerns was “the possibility of serious breaches in U.S. security with respect to atomic information.” According to the draft memorandum “notwithstanding these difficulties, the proposal merits any possible effort to secure favorable Congressional action.” Moreover, the “net advantages militarily and politically … warrant the calculated risk of a possible breach of U.S. atomic information security.”

The Defense Department would make more proposals for the transfer of custody of atomic weapons, and it would meet similar objections from the AEC and also the State Department (see document 25).

With the French proposing a NATO atomic capability and the NATO Council supporting nuclear stockpiles (see Document 10), Merchant and Smith argued against Defense Department proposals to change U.S. law permitting the peacetime transfer of nuclear weapons, in part because of the risk of irresponsible use of the weapons. Nevertheless, the U.S. had already gone far in endorsing a nuclear role for NATO forces, with its support for MC 54, by offering dual-use weapons systems such as Honest John missiles, and by making offers to train NATO forces in the use of those weapons. “The inevitable next step in the program is to assure our allies that their forces trained in the delivery thereof would have nuclear warheads available to them in the event of hostilities.”

The warheads “would remain the property of the United States” and in the custody of the Commander-in-Chief European Command [CINCEUR]. An emergency transfer of the weapons from CINCEUR to the national military authorities of NATO countries would require the assent of the North Atlantic Council. In an extreme emergency, however, SACEUR could approve transfer action by CINCEUR, who could make the necessary transfers in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the “spirit” of the recently approved NATO Political Directive which called for the “use of nuclear weapons at the outset” in response to “armed aggression” (although conventional forces could be used in the event of “local hostile actions”).

The whole idea would be to give the proposed arrangement as much of a “NATO flavor as possible,” even though the weapons would remain under U.S. control, thus preventing their “irresponsible use.” Elbrick saw some outside chance that the proposal would “have some influence on the French decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program.” The United States could not explicitly ask the French for a pledge of “abstention” in return for participation in the stockpile plan unless it was prepared to provide them with nuclear weapons “without any conditions on their use.” Nevertheless, the thought that the stockpile arrangement would help discourage further nuclear proliferation in Europe would remain an element in U.S. thinking.

An alternative method to wartime transfer of weapons would be amending the Atomic Energy Act to authorize peacetime transfers of nuclear weapons with their use prohibited except as authorized by the North Atlantic Council or by CINCEUR in an emergency. As Elbrick and Smith noted, those would only be “paper safeguards” and it was doubtful whether such a solution would be acceptable in Washington or Western Europe.

They recommended that Dulles approve a letter to the secretary of defense that said it was not “feasible nor desirable” to change the Atomic Energy Act. Instead the U.S. government should pursue arrangements to share nuclear weapons with allies in emergency conditions as a means of assurance to NATO. This issue would not be quickly settled because the Pentagon remained interested in amending the Atomic Energy Act for several years ahead.

Pressure was growing for NATO nuclear arrangements, with the French proposing an integrated NATO stockpile and U.S. ambassadors in Western Europe recommending action on the proposals for a stockpile. Meanwhile, U.S. forces in NATO Europe were increasingly equipped with nuclear-capable delivery systems and hundreds of NATO personnel were receiving training in “techniques of delivery of nuclear weapons.” In that context, “there is a natural desire on the part of our allies to know that the final step needed to give meaning to all the previous steps will in fact be taken—that atomic bombs and warheads will be available to them in event of hostilities.”

According to Elbrick, the inter-agency process in Washington was stuck with the Defense Department “unresponsive” to State Department proposals for moving forward. He recommended that Dulles inform senior Defense officials that the atomic stockpile issue “should be pursued as a matter of urgency.”

A few days after Elbrick turned in this memorandum, one of Dulles’s aides, Joseph Green, informed him that President Eisenhower and the National Security Council had met and approved the concept of a NATO atomic stockpile. It was simply a matter of State and Defense working out a proposal. Nevertheless, Elbrick’s memorandum is useful because it summarizes an important message sent from SACEUR General Lauris Norstad on the “Minimum Force 1958-1963” prepared by his staff at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. According to the message the minimum force had “two basic building blocks.” One was the creation of a nuclear delivery capability for NATO forces “without regard to national or command affiliations.” The other was dispersal of delivery systems. But the two blocks would only be useful, Norstad argued, as long as nuclear weapons were also dispersed.

According to Norstad, NATO needed a “store of weapons of appropriate numbers and types so located that the Allied delivery systems can use them effectively.” Elbrick supported this concept, treating it as “imperative that the U.S. Government be in a position to announce its intention of proceeding with [such] a stockpile.”

In the midst of the policy review of the atomic stockpile, on 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first Earth satellite. The Soviets had already tested an ICBM a few months earlier, but their latest technological feat raised alarm in Washington and NATO because it portended a capability to launch missiles to targets in the West. Thus, on 22 October Dulles told Eisenhower that in the new context U.S. alliances were "approaching a somewhat precarious state” and that the U.S. had to move quickly on the atomic stockpile proposal on which the Defense Department had been moving slowly.[9]

The State Department supported the idea of a multilateral NATO stockpile under the control of SACEUR General Norstad. While atomic weapons depots would be located in a number of countries, the weapons would “form part of a single stockpile and the weapons held in the NATO stockpile would not be reserved or earmarked for the forces of any particular country.” Designating the stockpile as a “NATO stockpile” would have important “political advantages” but the U.S. would have control.

Complicating matters were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who objected to the multilateral stockpile that Norstad and the State Department had in mind because of its “dangerous implications.” According to the Chiefs, it implied the “commitment of weapons to individual nations or their transfer to international control or infer the allocation of weapons on the basis of the desires of individual countries, rather than on the basis of NATO approved requirements.” Instead, the Chiefs envisaged “bilateral country-by-country agreements for storage sites.”

Elbrick was highly critical of the JCS’s smaller-bore approach: the NATO stockpile “cannot serve its intended political and military purposes” unless it is “genuinely multilateral” and “common.” More needs to be learned about the debate that unfolded in the following weeks, but the JCS conception was the one that prevailed.

Dulles made a formal stockpile offer at the NATO meeting on 26 December 1957; in addition, he offered NATO deployment of U.S. intermediate range ballistic missiles, presaging the Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey. But even before the NATO meeting, the U.S. had been sharing its thinking with allies. Thus, Adenauer opened up the substance of this meeting by telling Dulles that he was “confident that his Parliament would approve of the storage of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear sites” (not mentioned were the U.S.’s existing nuclear sites.”

When Dulles mentioned a “Soviet proposal,” probably a reference to the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear free Central Europe, he indirectly referred to the U.S. IRBM offer by suggesting that “it might not be desirable or important” to deploy missiles to sites east of the Rhine. Nevertheless, a “special status” for West Germany should not be formalized because it “might be a move toward neutralization,” which was Adenauer’s concern as well.

Adenauer also told Dulles about the ongoing FIG project (France-Italy-Germany), which, whether deliberately or not, he inaccurately described as only a “proposal,” but acknowledged that research would be on nuclear weapons. Dulles suggested that he had some reservations because he suggested a broader arrangement that included the United States and the United Kingdom to “keep the situation under control as regards the undue spreading of nuclear weapons”).

With the Soviet and Polish governments condemning plans for West German participation in NATO stockpile arrangements, Timmons provided Merchant with an update. After Adenauer declared that the Bundeswehr would be equipped with “atomic capable weapons,” the West Germans started to order nuclear delivery systems from the United States, including Hercules air-defense, Honest John, and Matador missiles. They had also acquired F-84 fighter bombers with “conversion kits” that could make them nuclear capable. Bonn was also engaged in negotiations for acquiring F-104s, which had a nuclear capability. All of these acquisitions were in keeping with MC 70, which stipulated minimum requirements for each country for the 1958-1963 period.[10] So far, no U.S. atomic weapons had been deployed to West Germany for the use of those delivery systems.

Smith had been worried about the timing of negotiations with West Germany over an agreement over nuclear deployments under the stockpile system. With a diplomatic crisis over the status of West Berlin unfolding, he worried that “free world support for our position … might be somewhat weakened by distracting and conflicting concerns over imminent West German nuclear rearmament.” Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant, however, was less worried; as he reminded Smith, Adenauer realized that publicity would be widespread but was “prepared for the consequences.” He wanted no delay in the negotiations.

According to Merchant, SHAPE had plans for thirteen weapons stockpile sites in Germany for five different types of atomic weapons. One of them, named WAGON TRAIN, would provide weapons assigned to a fighter bomber squadron. So far there had been no “adverse reactions” to these plans within NATO and the State Department would continue the negotiations for the stockpile agreement.

Acting Secretary Christian Herter (Dulles was then mortally ill) informed Eisenhower that the nuclear stockpile program involved two types of bilateral agreements, one covering the introduction of U.S. custodial and training personnel, financial costs, and arrangements for control and weapons use. The other, required by the Atomic Energy Act, provided for the “transmission of restricted data and equipment necessary for the training of the host country forces.” That was essential because the atomic capability of the host country depended on having such an agreement in force.

Herter reported that the U.S. had signed classified stockpile agreements with both Turkey and West Germany, but the negotiation of atomic cooperation agreements still had to be completed. Both Greece and the Netherlands had agreed in principle to negotiate stockpile agreements and atomic cooperation agreements were already being negotiated.

Herter hoped that the agreements could be negotiated quickly because they had to be sent to Congress’s Joint Committee on Atomic Energy “so they could lie before Congress for the required 60 days” before they would go into effect officially. Early submission was desirable so that “public attention attracted to them may have subsided before the opening of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on May 11.” Implicitly, Herter wanted to weaken a Soviet propaganda point before negotiations on Berlin and Germany had begun.

At this meeting, government lawyers, including future Iran-Contra prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, discussed plans to provide the British with the Genie air-to-air missile, which raised controversial custody issues because the nuclear warhead was embedded in the missile to be carried by Royal Air Force interceptors. The Defense Department’s general counsel explained that under the plan the U.S. would retain ownership and custody of the missile “while on the ground,” and CINCEUR would have to declare a state of air alert “before the plane could take off with the missile.” Moreover, CINCEUR or his presentative would have to agree that the target was hostile prior to firing the missile.”

Burke further explained that the missile would have no “defense value” unless the interceptor was air-borne which meant that “actual United States custody” would exist “only up to the point of takeoff” while “control without physical custody” would obtain when it was in the air. Burke and State Department lawyer Eric Hager agreed the arrangement was consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and within the powers of the president. Moreover, both Secretary Herter and Deputy Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates had approved it. The proposal was at the White House where President Eisenhower would eventually approve it. Nevertheless, when the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy learned of the proposal its members would strongly object because of the unusual custody arrangement.

Finucane sent Goodpaster the latest version of the “War Emergency Check List and Master Readiness File” which had been relabeled the “Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Actions File.” The file would be included in the “President's

emergency actions pouch” (later known as the Football). A new item in the file was an Emergency Message, EM-5, which would make “available atomic weapons to NATO and to such other allies as may be programmed to use U.S. atomic weapons.” With that directive in the pouch, an essential part of the NATO stockpile system was in place: a presidential order to make the weapons available in a military emergency.

The “advanced weapons” discussed in this paper were mostly nuclear weapons delivery systems; a few were conventional weapons only. All of them were slated for NATO forces under MC-70 and toward that end the U.S. had already allocated some one billion dollars to finance the delivery of missiles and aircraft over and above what was being sold directly. All of the countries involved would be participating in nuclear stockpile arrangements, although some of the negotiations were not yet completed.

The nuclear delivery systems that had been under offer included Nike air defense (Germany, with Belgium and Denmark not yet having accepted offers); Honest John missiles (Germany, United Kingdom); Corporal missiles (United Kingdom); Matador missiles (Germany); IRBMs (UK; Italy, Turkey); 1000 F-84 conversion kits (unidentified countries); F-100 aircraft (France, Turkey, Denmark); Lacrosse missile (Italy); Sergeant missiles (Belgium and Netherlands); Mace missiles (unidentified countries); Davy Crockett (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Belgium, and the Netherlands); and F-104 fighter-bombers (Turkey, Greece, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy). In a number of instances, offers of delivery systems had been made but arrangements were still being discussed. In some instances, negotiations were never completed and the weapons were not deployed, for example, Davy Crockett’s and Lacrosse’s for Italy.

The stockpile negotiations with Italy were protracted, not concluded until late 1961.[11] One of the issues that was difficult to resolve was a financial one: how would the costs of maintaining the weapons deployment be borne. So far, the Italians wanted the U.S. to cover the costs, which led Adams to wonder why bother having the agreement. The United States already had nuclear weapons in Italy and they were “being happily taken care of without a stockpile agreement.” And the United States could introduce weapons into Italy without any problem. Therefore, he asked, “does the stockpile agreement have any merit?”

Millar’s response is not available, but the answer was “yes,” because U.S. negotiators soldiered on and reached agreement with the Italians on costs and other thorny issues, such as nuclear use consultations [See Part II of this posting series, forthcoming]

Macomber informed Morgan of recent progress in negotiations on atomic stockpile agreements with NATO countries. Earlier in the year agreements with Belgium and the Netherlands had been concluded. Negotiations with Italy were continuing. An agreement with the French for stockpile arrangement for French forces in West Germany was near completion. An additional understanding with Belgium concerning stockpile arrangements for Belgian forces in Germany had been concluded in Belgium. A comparable agreement with the Netherlands was nearly finished while an arrangement for British forces in Germany was in the works. General Norstad had made an approach to the Portuguese, while the Canadians were discussing internally a possible deal with the U.S. on the storage of U.S. atomic weapons to support Canada’s forces assigned to SACEUR, SACLANT, and NORAD.

The agreements required by the Atomic Energy Act to provide weapons training and other technical assistance to NATO countries had already been concluded with Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey. A similar deal would be reached with the French once the stockpile arrangements for French forces in West Germany had been concluded. An agreement with Belgium was anticipated.

U.S. Embassy officials met at the Foreign Office to discuss an atomic stockpile agreement with British diplomats and defense officials. The British initially objected to the U.S. proposal for an “umbrella” stockpile agreement in part because it was “superfluous” in light of the agreement on Corporal missile deployments and prospective agreements between the War Office and USAREUR (which would cover weapons assigned to the British Army on the Rhine). Moreover, an umbrella agreement could “tie our hands” in the future; for example, the Royal Navy was still working out its nuclear arrangements and it was possible they would be compatible with the umbrella agreement.

In their reply, U.S. embassy officials argued that they preferred an umbrella agreement “precisely for reasons of flexibility. An agreement could be drafted in “sufficiently broad terms to cover all likely eventualities.” It would provide a framework for future service-to-service agreements but also avoid the further tying of hands as would be the case with the War Office-USAREUR agreement “which was very detailed and hence more likely require future revisions.” The British accepted the U.S. arguments “surprisingly readily,” but they hoped that an umbrella agreement “should cover only essential point and be as general as possible.”

The agreement with the French, signed in Paris on 2 September 1960, was unusual because the French had refused to participate in the stockpile plan since it would leave the United States in control of nuclear weapons stored in France. As long as the agreement did not apply to their forces in France, the French did not object to U.S. custody of weapons that would be assigned to their forces in West Germany. Herter suggested that one reason the French had accepted U.S. custody for their forces in Germany was that they did “not wish to forego” nuclear capable forces that had “been programmed for France for some time.” Moreover, the West Germans had been participating in the atomic stockpile system and “the French want to have the same capability.” An atomic cooperation agreement with France concerning the forces in Germany was also being negotiated and would be concluded by year’s end.

Recognizing that previous U.S. nuclear deployments to British forces had been on an ad hoc basis, Merchant, like others in the Department, supported a comprehensive stockpile agreement so that the British were on the same footing as other NATO members. The State Department had begun the talks, but the British wanted to be sure that the agreement “would be broad enough to cover all foreseeable requirements.” The agreement should cover the proposed SACLANT arrangements for nuclear support for the British navy but the State Department needed to learn more about the proposed custody arrangements; moreover, to ensure that the agreement was consistent with previous custodial arrangements such as for British Canberras the Defense Department should provide copies of the inter-service agreements and information on the custodial arrangements that were in effect.

The Embassy reported that the USAREUR had queried CINCEUR General Norstad whether British Honest John units should, in event of an emergency, be made ready for use even though the umbrella agreement had not been finalized. The European Command supported “operational status” for the units but no action should be taken that would weaken the U.S. negotiating position for the stockpile agreement. Moreover, it was “urgent” that the British conclude the agreement so there would be “no delay in providing atomic support for UK Honest John delivery units.”

This paper addresses the power relations within NATO stemming from U.S. control over nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe. In particular, it tackles the nuclear use issue raised by the stockpile agreements that were being negotiated bilaterally. Given that the decision to use the weapons was a “purely U.S. decision,” the NATO countries would need to be confident that the U.S. and General Norstad would use atomic weapons “when they should be used [and accordingly] released by the U.S. to other NATO countries and will not be used when they should not be used.”

The matter of consultation was pivotal. The premise was that the use of nuclear weapons was “an inseparable part of the general question of the use of force to repel aggression.” If time was available, the U.S. would consult with NATO before it used force but “if an attack develops so quickly as to render prior consultation in NATO impoasible, the U.S. will of course respond at once, and with all appropriate force.”

The briefing paper did not mention pre-delegation of nuclear use authority, but that was the subject of an on-going and highly secret discussion in the Eisenhower administration. It led in 1959 to the promulgation of advanced authorization directives to the commanders-in-chief of various top commands, including CINCEUR.

The Soviet ICBM-nuclear challenge, the Berlin Crisis, the ongoing demise of European colonialism, and divisions within Western Europe epitomized by Charles de Gaulle’s independent course raised divisive issues in the Western alliance. A specially commissioned report prepared by former State Department official Robert Bowie addressed those and other issues. At the heart of the report was the crisis of confidence raised by Western European dependence on U.S. nuclear weapons when the Soviet nuclear threat appeared particularly acute. With the threat of massive retaliation less and less credible and limited nuclear war in Europe wholly unacceptable, Bowie, like others, supported improved conventional defenses so that NATO could fight a non-nuclear war.

Bowie was concerned about nuclear proliferation, which influenced his thinking about proposals to aid the French nuclear program in order to “preserve inter-allied harmony.” While Bowie conceded that could be true in the short-term, it would only encourage France to persist with their nuclear program, the British would be unconstrained from developing their program, and “West Germany [was] certain to claim the same privilege before long and Italy may be induced to demand equal status as a ‘middle power.’” Bowie thought it better to try to slow down the pursuit of independent national deterrents.

As a way to discourage proliferation further and to give the European NATO governments a role in nuclear decision-making, Bowie proposed a “collective deterrent for NATO.” What he had in mind was that a “multi-national strategic capability be established in Europe under the command of SACEUR.” The purpose would be to give “European members of NATO a missile threat against the USSR which would be a serious strategic deterrent.” He suggested that the North Atlantic Council give SACEUR advance authorization “to use the force against key Soviet strategic targets in the event that the Soviets initiate major nuclear attack on the Treaty Area.” The U.S would have no veto on the use of the force.

Bowie further proposed what was a first draft of the Multilateral Force proposal that Herter brought to NATO later in the year. Before the creation of a multinational capability for NATO Europe, an “interim force” would be established “of US-manned POLARIS submarines under the control of SACEUR.” SACEUR would order any firing of the missiles in the “event of a large scale nuclear attack,” but the NAC could also order missile firing “in other circumstances.” The United States could also make a decision “in the absence of an affirmative SACEUR or NAC decision.”

For several years, the Defense Department had been seeking changes in the Atomic Energy Act so that the U.S. could transfer complete atomic weapons and nuclear information to key allies, including France. With his assumption that nuclear proliferation in Europe was inevitable, President Eisenhower had expressed interest in nuclear aid to France, but the proposal attracted little support outside the Defense Department. In 1960, various proposals to provide nuclear aid to France were under consideration, in part to slow down the French weapons program, but they never reached fruition. The AEC and the State Department rejected the latest proposal from Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates.

Arguing along the same lines as Robert Bowie, AEC Chairman John McCone observed that helping France in that way would have “profound implications” because it could raise “pressures from the Germans” for similar treatment. Then the “Chinese would press the Russians as would the East Germans.” Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon further noted that “he had been “struck by General Norstad’s argument that it would be bad policy to reward General DeGaulle by nuclear sharing with him after his continuous non-cooperation with NATO.”

Dillon, Gates, and McCone also discussed a request from the government of the Netherlands for nuclear submarine technology which had been under discussion since 1959.[12] The request was in doubt because of opposition from the JCAE, but McCone was not on board either: providing the Dutch with the technology was not a “sensible use of their resources” when they were not spending enough on the forces needed for their NATO missions. Their “military expenditures for NATO are very much below MC-70 requirements,” although he did not mention that MC-70 required the Netherlands to build four submarines. Policy Planning Staff chief Gerard C. Smith noted that the “President had made a commitment in NATO and that we had little choice but to cooperate or welsh.”

McCone also cited the “unique reactor technology in the Nautilus submarine,” which was one of the reasons for the JCAE opposition: fear that it would leak to the Soviet Union.

This wide-ranging discussion by the North Atlantic Council touched upon the most sensitive matter of how decisions to use nuclear weapons would be made and who would make them as well as the role of independent nuclear capabilities in the NATO context. This report deserves a careful read because no summary can capture all of the nuances. It would be interesting to compare the U.S. record with the British and other accounts of the meeting.

What sparked the discussion was news coverage of the Bowie report, which proposed providing NATO Europe with its own nuclear strike force (See Document 24). NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak observed that the news reports suggested that the U.S. was moving from its “classical position on nuclear arms,” which had assumed “sole reliance on U.S. in atomic matters.” The French representative, Pierre de Leusse, spoke of the problem of inequality within NATO where the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, the U.K. made the decisions for the atomic defense of Europe. “The Europeans have nothing today.”

When the Greek representatives spoke of fears that the U.S. would use the bomb without consulting others, de Leusse argued that his fear was a different one: whether the U.S. “would decide to use the A-bomb or not,” if conventional forces could not stop “conventional Communist aggression in Europe or in the Formosa Straits,”

U.S. Ambassador Randolph Burgess provided assurances that the U.S. would consult the Council during crises, as it had during the Taiwan Strait and the Lebanon/Jordan situations. The “U.S. plans to follow practice of discussing here every situation that might conceivably lead to the use of atomic weapons.” If, however, there was a surprise attack, the “situation is as clear as crystal,” although he acknowledged there were “marginal cases” suggesting that some situations would require nonnuclear responses.

Characterizing that response as “excellent,” Spaak observed that “readiness to consult on developments of policy is the most that can reasonably be asked.” He cautioned the French that if “they wanted a veto over U.S., the U.S. would want a veto over them.” Later, as a riposte, French representative Jurgensen argued that the “French would not fear the U.S. using atomic weapons, but fear that the U.S. might not react.” Justifying the force de frappe, he argued that a “French capability to launch atomic weapons would be pressure on the U.S. to do so.” Conceding that such a “situation was not probable, the Europeans in such event would be able to use atomic weapons if the U.S. were reluctant to.”

Spaak later cautioned that “French logic can lead to a chain reaction” with every NATO member saying they needed their own force de frappe in case France did not use its own: “the question was whether anyone could fire atomic weapons without the approval of the other.”