Alerts, Crises, and DEFCONs

This “working paper” stayed in draft form but apparently SAC historians found it polished enough to treat it as a numbered study. This excised version provides a detailed account of the three components of SAC alert arrangements: ground alert beginning in 1955, airborne alert from 1959 to 1968, and ICBM alert.

The section on ground alert includes the Reflex Action program which deployed B-47 bombers to overseas bases on a rotating basis from 1957 to 1965. While most of the base locations, except for British bases, were excised from this study by the State Department, the Second Air Force and the Sixteenth Air Force histories listed below include relevant detail. Another ground alert system, Airmail, provided for rotating B-47 deployments at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.

Ground alert was a continuing activity until the end of the Cold War. Originally, the target was capability to launch bombers within 15 minutes, but by the early 1960s, with improved warning systems, the goal became “minutes and seconds.” By 1967 the program stipulated six minutes to launch alert aircraft in response to warning of an attack by submarine launched ballistic missiles, although that would change once it had become clearer that six minutes was not enough. Thus, SAC developed a new dispersal program to enhance survivability of the bomber force.

A related element of ground alert was training for a DEFCON1S posture, intended to be a “less severe” version of DEFCON1, which involved “maximum readiness” of military forces (see Document 7). While the details of DEFCON1S are classified, according to this account it was close to the Sustained Reaction Posture (SRP): whereby B-52s with “engines shut-down [were] positioned as close as possible to the runway for immediate takeoff.” There was an exception, however: the first four of the alert aircraft had their power on with pilots and a crew member living in the cockpit in twelve-hour shifts. Other crew would be housed in nearby trailers close to a klaxon that would alert them.

The section on airborne alert includes useful information on the history of the program to keep nuclear-armed B-52s in the air 24 hours a day, amounting to a continuous show of force. Code named Chrome Dome (later Giant Wheel), airborne alert provided for flights on various northern and southern routes, which included flights to Greenland and Spain. Keeping bombers constantly in the air involved major risks – so after a major B-52 crash in Spanish airspace in 1966, SAC planners began to look beyond airborne alert. They invented a new program, Selective Exercise of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA), which SAC leaders saw as incorporating the best features of air and ground alerts. Designed to provide an “instant response to tactical warning” of an attack, the various SEAGA options were compatible with SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) targeting priorities. When another B-52 accident occurred in January 1968, SAC brought airborne alert to an end and replaced it with SEAGA. That provided a range of alert options, including Giant Lance airborne alert, by a specific number of aircraft “to remain in full combat configuration and ready to respond instantly.”

A chapter on alert activities for the ICBM forces provides rich detail on the early years of the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman programs. By the mid-1960s, Titan II and especially Minuteman were the workhorses of missile alert efforts. Soon the bulk of SAC alert forces were Minuteman missiles, for which the goal was to keep on alert 24 hours a day. Probably because of the extreme secrecy involved, the actual launch time, or launch time goals, of the Minuteman force is not discussed.

This compendium of research notes includes information on military activities, especially SAC operations, during the 1948 Berlin Crisis, the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1968 crisis over North Korea’s seizure of the U.S. intelligence-gathering ship, the Pueblo.

The first volume of this CNA study was a detailed analysis of findings on the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ role in “modern crisis diplomacy.” It begins with the mid-1950s when the Soviet Union’s reactions became especially salient because it had begun to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons. The report focused on 99 crises and somewhat lesser incidents that involved decisions on the use of naval forces (and other military forces) by the president and the secretary of defense, that were not part of a limited war, and that were the subjects of reports prepared by the “politico-military process.” Excluded were such events as humanitarian operations, intelligence/special operations, and incidents at sea.

The report, which was unclassified, was accompanied by this volume – a detailed chronology, classified confidential, of the 99 events. It begins with the relocation of civilians from North to South Vietnam during 1954-1955 and concludes with the civil war in Lebanon in 1975. It covers a host of crises, from Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958 to Cuba in 1962 and Cyprus in 1965 and 1974. While the chronological survey is not footnoted, many entries provide sourcing to archival and other collections, described on pages C-85 and C-86. An additional list, at appendix D, covers events that had intrinsic interest but did not meet the criteria for the events covered by the main report.

This detailed chronology of the creation of the Strategic Air Command and the early years of its operations includes useful information, at pages 207-212, on SAC alert activities and deployments during the 1948 Berlin Crisis. Instigated by disagreements between the occupation powers in Germany – France, Great Britain, and the United States versus the Soviet Union – over the future of occupied Germany, the origins of the crisis lay in Western plans to create a West German state to expedite European recovery and ensure that the Western zones were aligned with the United States and its allies.

When the Americans and the British unilaterally introduced a new Deutschmark into their occupation zones and then into West Berlin, after the Soviets had introduced a new currency into the city, Moscow responded in late June 1948 by cutting off Western land-route access (water, rail, road) to occupied West Berlin.[9] Although trade between Western Berlin and the occupied Soviet zone of Germany (the future German Democratic Republic) continued, the Soviet blockade reduced the flow of essential food and fuel supplies to West Berlin from West Germany.[10] Because air access remained unimpeded, the U.S. Air Force was able to fly essential supplies through the famous Berlin Airlift, “Operation Vittles.” The airlift lasted for almost a year until the Western Allies and the Soviets negotiated a settlement in May 1949.

Washington was resolved to hold on to West Berlin and preserve its rights of access to the city, which it saw as a symbol of the U.S. commitment to Germany and Western European security generally. With the Truman administration unsure whether the Soviets would follow the blockade with other moves against West Berlin, the president authorized a show of force as a deterrent move. SAC units in the United States went on a short-term alert while other units were deployed to bases in the United Kingdom and West Germany. None of the SAC aircraft deployed to Western Europe, however, were nuclear capable; they only could carry iron bombs. Truman was not yet willing to turn over custody of nuclear weapons to the Pentagon. Indeed, the U.S. did not begin to deploy nuclear weapons overseas until 1950, starting with nuclear components for SAC bombers in the United Kingdom and the storage of bomb components on the aircraft carrier, Coral Sea.[11]

The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt after it had nationalized the Suez Canal became a major international crisis pitting the United States against allies and clients, which turned into a potential U.S.-Soviet confrontation. While the British had expected U.S. support, it kept Washington in the dark about its plans until the invasion of Egypt had begun. The Eisenhower administration, however, refusing to endorse such a blatant imperialist intervention gave higher priority to anti-colonial world opinion and the U.S. position in the Cold War. Washington put the brakes on this misadventure by threatening to withdraw support for the British pound unless Prime Minister Anthony Eden ordered a cease-fire. Eden had to back down.[12]

This empirically rich and well-sourced study gives a special focus to the multiple roles of the Sixth Fleet as a force to preclude the fighting, to deter Soviet military intervention, and to protect U.S. citizens and investments, but also support the United Nations role (its first peacekeeping mission). Moreover, other countries sought the aid of the Sixth Fleet at various moments, including Egypt and the Soviet Union, which proposed a joint intervention, as did various governments that sought aid in evacuating their nationals.

When the invasion unfolded in late October 1956, the Sixth Fleet was put on alert, with maximum readiness on 29 October, when the invasion began. While Secretary of State Dulles was interested in having the Sixth Fleet obstruct the invasion, CNO Arleigh Burke advised him that shooting was the only way to do th at, so Dulles settled on using the fleet as what the author calls a “passive obstacle” to British and French forces. With the Soviets in early November threatening the British and the French with “rockets” and menacing the Israelis over their “very existence as a state,” concern over Soviet intervention grew. In a meeting on 6 November 1956, Eisenhower approved various military readiness measures to address Soviet threats but, to avoid creating an uproar did not yet approve a SAC alert.[13]

The next day, 7 November, CNO Burke dispatched two attack carriers to support the Sixth Fleet – the USS Forrestal and the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt – the first time the former had been armed with nuclear-capable Douglas A-3 Skywarriors. Moreover, all U.S. ships were put on a “war-time alert,” ready to “implement emergency war plans.” The sense of Soviet threat persisted in the following weeks with the Navy remaining on 24-hour alert until 15 December. [14]

The possibility of Soviet intervention in the Middle East remained of concern during November 1956 and on the 14th of the month the Joint Chiefs authorized a SAC alert, no doubt with Eisenhower’s consent, as another warning signal. At the same time, SAC had a test of the ground alert program in the works, but the alert reactions required by the Pentagon included more, such as the deployment of tankers to Greenland and Newfoundland. What the New York Times at the times described as a training program was an element of the alert: SAC put 1,000 B-47 bombers in the air during the second half of November. According to the Times article, the SAC flights took place at the “height” of the Suez crisis, but also the Hungarian revolt (which had already been crushed before 15 November). SAC forces remained on alert until 7 December.[15]

In June 1958, Lebanese Muslims, mainly Sunnis, backed by Egypt’s President Abdel Gamal Nasser, were trying to overthrow Christian President Camille Chamoun, when he illegally sought another term. Chamoun had enjoyed U.S. support in the past, including through covert political operations during the 1957 parliamentary elections. Lebanon was on the verge of civil war when Chamoun appealed to President Eisenhower for aid. But what especially sparked Chamoun’s fears was that at the same time a military coup had overthrown the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. Concerned about Nasser’s influence in Lebanon and Jordan and seeking to demonstrate U.S. interest in stability in the Middle East, on 15 July Eisenhower decided to intervene. His decision included several readiness measures, including a SAC alert. The next day, on 16 July, a Marine battalion arrived in Lebanon, after being airlifted from North Carolina. The U.S. assembled major naval forces offshore and soon Marines were landing on the beaches. By early August, over 14,000 U.S. troops were in Lebanon: over 8,000 Army and over 5,000 Marines.[16]

This study presents a detailed account of the crisis to give context to the Navy’s role in the intervention, with the various parts played by naval air, carriers, anti-submarine ships, and destroyers. As with the Suez Crisis, the Sixth Fleet operated as an instrument to support U.S. diplomacy. Even before the intervention, starting in May, Sixth Fleet destroyers were on patrol 30 miles off Lebanon’s shoreline. On 15 July, the day of the intervention, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were put on four-hour alert. Burke also ordered three carriers into the area: the aircraft carriers USS Saratoga and the USS Essex, which were equipped with nuclear-capable Skywarriors, and the anti-submarine warfare carrier USS Wasp. While the Saratoga had been deployed to provide air cover for the Marines landing it arrived some 15 minutes after the event.

During the period when the Essex and the Saratoga were in the area, from mid-July to 5 September, they launched nearly 7,000 sorties, some of them for shows of force during the days after the intervention began. The Wasp, with 50 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, stayed in the area to protect both carriers, although the submarine threat was remote. By 5 September, however, the Sixth Fleet returned to normal operations. By the end of September. the Marines had departed, and Army forces withdrew during October. With the situation apparently stable, the intervention officially closed at the end of the month.

This history details the SAC alert that Eisenhower ordered on 15 July 1958 as a warning to the Soviet against any thought of sending forces to Lebanon. The alert may have been the largest such operation prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. By the time of the alert, SAC had already established the “Reflex Action” program through which it periodically deployed B-47 bombers and tankers to bases in the United Kingdom, Spain, Morocco, Turkey, and Guam so that they would be closer to Soviet bloc targets. The alert put one-third of the bomber force on ground alert and more B-47s were sent overseas. By 18 July 1,132 SAC bombers were in combat configuration, that is, combat ready. Of the SAC force, 405 bombers and 182 tankers were on a high alert “full show of force” posture – with weapons loaded, among other attributes, which was maintained for 5 days. This posture included the bomber force deployed to the Reflex bases mentioned earlier. SAC forces, however, stayed on alert through the end of the month. [For details, see Document 2].

The Second Air Force, which is the subject of this document, was a major element of the Strategic Air Command and played an integral role in the 1958 Lebanon alert. The historian who compiled the data for this study claimed (citing an Air Force officer) that this history documents “the application of the B-47 medium bomber to the United States grand strategy of ‘the maintenance of ineluctable force with destructive power unacceptable to an enemy.’”

Units of the Second Air Force were integral to the Reflex Action program sending bombers to bases in the northeastern U.S. (mainly Loring, Maine) and to unspecified bases in the United Kingdom and North Africa (Morocco) for their strike missions. The names of the overseas bases are excised from this release but are identified in Document 5, below. B-52s. then becoming integrated into SAC’s arsenal also went into a higher state of readiness during the Lebanon alert with some deployed to bases in Spain and Morocco.

This history is heavily excised but includes useful details, such as on the introduction of “Positive Control” (Fail Safe) procedures (pages 121-122) and the specific actions required to put a bomber in an “alert configuration” (pages 123-125). The latter included safeguards to prevent leakage of the tritium gas used in the secondaries of thermonuclear weapons. Crews were also provided thermite grenades, presumably used to destroy the weapons in an emergency.

With its control over bases in Spain and North Africa, the Sixteenth Air Force was in the forefront of the Reflex Action program, with the rotating deployment and redeployment of bombers flown from the continental United States. The Lebanon alert in mid-July was the exception because it temporarily ended the rotations, with the aircraft at hand placed on ground alert during the period. Sixteenth Air Force leaders saw that as problematic because B-47 bombers needed to be “exercised” to keep them operational. For example, staying in place in the hot temperatures of Morocco could harm the aircraft’s operating systems. To enforce the alert, so that crew members could return to their aircraft quickly klaxon horns were installed in dining areas, theaters, and other locations on the bases.

A section at the end of the chapter reviewed local reactions in Spain and Morocco to the July alert. Public and official opinion in Spain generally supported the U.S. intervention, although some thought that the U.S. should have wielded “a heavier hand.” In Morocco, views were altogether different: “All levels of the Moroccan public appeared to be hostile to American and British interventions and considered that such action underlined the United States’ dedication to colonial policies.” Nevertheless, no anti-U.S. incidents took place.

During the 1950s, Taiwan was a flash point in U.S.-China relations, as it is today. Like the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1958 crisis had the potential to go nuclear and Washington backed threats with a massive show of force in the region.[17] During 1954-1955, a Congressional resolution authorized the president to use military force to protect Taiwan and the Air Force and Pacific Command developed plans to defend Taiwan that assumed the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese air bases. Nevertheless, President Eisenhower was determined to prevent the 1958 crisis from getting out of control and supported talks with Beijing.[18]

Seeing the well-fortified Offshore Islands as a provocation Mao Zedong wanted to seize them from the Nationalists and test U.S. determination to support Chiang Kai-Shek, among other goals. The crisis began with major Chinese military preparations on nearby bases, dog fights between Chinese and Taiwanese aircraft, the shelling of the Kinmen (Quemoy) islands on 18 August, and a Soviet pledge to help China free Taiwan. On 21 August, the Chinese began shelling the islands on a massive scale, prompting Dulles to warn against an invasion (and the Soviets to rethink their support for Mao).

According to this account by Air Force historian Jacob van Staavaren, before the crisis broke out the U.S. Air Force had begun deploying more aircraft in the region and the commander-in-chief of Pacific Air Forces distributed a three-phase operations plan, which included: 1) patrol and reconnaissance activities, 2) “the defeat of the attacking forces,” and 3) “air operations to destroy the Chinese Communist capability to make war.” Phase 2 included nuclear targets and was reinforced with the deployment of nuclear-armed B-47s to Guam.[19]

After Eisenhower made basic military and diplomatic decisions on 25 August, a naval and air force build-up began on and around Taiwan, including moving “super-carriers” to the Taiwan Strait with 183 more atomic-armed aircraft added to Pacific Air Forces. In addition, the Marines deployed aircraft to Taiwan while the Army deployed Nike-Hercules air defense missiles.[20]

To keep the conflict localized, Eisenhower had instructed that initial military operations would rely on conventional weapons and that any nuclear use decisions would require his authorization.[21] Van Staaveren did not know the details of White House decisions, but his account indicated that the Pentagon ordered commanders in the Pacific to prepare a non-nuclear defense; conventional, “iron bombs” would be used first in any military encounters with the Chinese. This requirement caused angst among Air Force leaders who were dubious about the success of a conventional defense of the Offshore Islands against an invasion. While Dulles professed willingness to use nuclear weapons if the Chinese attacked Kinmen, on 6 September Eisenhower doubled down on the nonnuclear policy and Air Force leaders planned accordingly, even for major military operations against China.[22]

Military tensions did not get out of hand. In early September, after Dulles made a warning statement but indicating readiness to hold talks, Beijing and Washington agreed to discussions. Mao was ready for them, having been surprised by the vehemence of the U.S. response to the shelling.[23] After the Chinese called for a cease fire on 6 October, the Nationalists accepted it; although it broke down a few weeks later, the Chinese moderated the shelling, allowing the re-supply of the islands.

The crisis wound down in the weeks that followed, but U.S. military operations and policy during the crisis - not least the decision on non-nuclear use, had serious implications for future planning. “For the JCS the iron bomb policy reemphasized the need for an awareness by military planners of (p. 53)

At a time when there was considerable interest within the U.S. government in crisis management, Morton Halperin, then assistant professor of government at Harvard and a part-time consultant with RAND, prepared a study on the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The study was requested by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The resulting 691-page top secret report was published in December 1966 (and is available online), but even before Halperin had finished its details, he prepared a summary, what he called a “condensation,” which RAND published in January of that year.  With sensitive details omitted and a lower classification it could have a wider readership in the government.   The Defense Department declassified the summary in 2001.

The focus of Halperin’s study was U.S. decision-making, policy implementation, and military actions during the crisis, but Halperin made use of Chinese and Soviet newspapers and radio broadcasts and U.S. intelligence reporting to provide a sense of policy developments on the “other side.” He also covered, to the extent possible, U.S-Chinese interactions and Chinese-Soviet relations during the crisis.  

Halperin’s summary conveyed the grave danger of the crisis: “because of the consequences that were thought to attend the loss of Quemoy, the United States came fairly close to using tactical nuclear weapons, despite opposition to its policy by most of its allies and many in the United States” (p. 45).   Moreover, even though Eisenhower had ordered, to the consternation of Air Force leaders (discussed in the full study), that conventional not nuclear weapons would be used first in a military confrontation with China, according to Halperin the “discussions in which he participated and the memorandums which he signed left little doubt in the minds of other officials that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons.”

Aggravating the danger was that during the crisis, Washington assumed “that a nuclear attack against the Chinese mainland would be returned in kind by the Sino-Soviet bloc.” Although some had argued that there were significant disagreements between Beijing and Moscow during the crisis, Halperin used the available (admittedly scanty) evidence to argue that this was “probably one of the last instances of close Sino-Soviet cooperation in international political maneuvering.” Indeed, recent research has indicated that if tensions escalated to the point that the U.S. attacked the interior of China, Mao wanted Moscow to use “all means at its disposal” to strike the United States. Yet, despite the demonstrations of solidarity, tensions secretly emerged during the crisis: Mao had kept Soviet leaders in the dark about his decisions on the shelling of Jianmin and Moscow worried that “Beijing’s provocation might get out of control” and spark a nuclear conflagration.[24]

Berlin remained a Cold War flashpoint and this document sheds light on the Eisenhower administration’s policy during the 1958-1959 crisis. After the crisis broke out in November 1958, the U.S. and its allies were unsure whether Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would make good on his vow that, without negotiations between the powers that were occupying Berlin, in six months he would negotiate a peace treaty with East Germany. What worried the U.S., and its allies was that if the Soviets signed the treaty the German Democratic Republic’s border guards would regulate the ground traffic of the allies between West Germany and West Berlin, and perhaps halt it altogether. As the western powers had not recognized the GDR the threatened peace treaty could launch a diplomatic crisis whose outcome would be uncertain. [25]

While the U.S. and its allies sought negotiations with Moscow that would avoid a confrontation, much less a separate treaty, preserving rights of access as occupying powers remained an issue that would be difficult to bargain away. According to Secretary of State Dulles, the Western position in Berlin was “untenable” but like the Kinmen-Matsu situation. “we were where we were and had to stand firm.” Nevertheless, Washington had to work with its European Allies, which were then under more direct threat, which made some diplomatic flexibility necessary. Nevertheless, the U.S., the British and the French began contingency planning, including the creation of the secret Live Oak group, in the event the worst case transpired. President Eisenhower supported diplomatic options that preserved Allied rights and prevented conflict, but as far as he was concerned any substantial use of force in the Berlin situation would quickly escalate to general war.[26]

This document focuses on the advanced contingency planning that began in early 1959. While Eisenhower had ruled out immediately mobilizing U.S. military forces as unduly provocative, he supported measures to reinforce the U.S. military position, partly as signals to the Soviets. The discussion at the White House covered the sensitive and complex issues that were at stake in contingency planning, including whether the Allies would allow the GDR to stamp travel documents, the use of force (and what amount) to enter West Berlin if the East Germans or Soviets were blocking access and the attitudes of U.S. allies. With respect to the latter, Eisenhower noted that West Berlin Mayor (and future West German Chancellor) Willy Brandt had been “inconsistent in his position,” even supporting changes in the status of the city. Somewhat tartly, Eisenhower observed that the U.S. would be in an untenable position if “we were saving people who do not desire to be saved.”

Another military action taken during March-June 1959 was a major SAC test of its nuclear-armed airborne alert system, with many flights taking place in Canadian air space. (See Document 1 for more details on airborne alert.) This document includes the text of the U.S. request to Canada to approve the tests, which would involve over 1,400 bomber launches during March through June, although not all would fly over Canada.

The point of airborne alert was to “counter the compression of time and space of missile warfare” by keeping nuclear armed bombers in the air 24 hours a day. To allow for advance planning of nuclear-armed overflights, Ottawa and Washington had already been discussing getting rid of the “X, Y, Z” system that had required clearance of individual flights. A new system would provide advance clearance for several months at a time.

Coincidentally, the proposed alert test series, which SAC had planned for some time, overlapped with the tense months of the 1958-1959 Berlin Crisis. In that context, senior U.S. officials probably saw the airborne alert test as a welcome happenstance.

Before Ottawa approved the U.S. request on airborne alert, Merchant briefed Herter about “softness” in Canadian official thinking disclosed in recent discussions. One problem involved the Canadian reaction to the U.S. proposal on nuclear-armed overflights. According to Merchant, during a recent conversation with Canadian Ambassador Arnold Heeney, the latter expressed some apprehension about the “timing and possible implications of an extensive exercise of this nature while the Berlin situation was acute.”

In another talk with Heeney, Merchant had explained that if the Soviets turned over the Autobahn checkpoints to East German guards, one U.S. reaction would be to raise the “readiness of our armed forces in ways that would be clearly apparent to Soviet intelligence.” That worried Heeney who thought that the Soviets might read such action as preparation for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. He did not say this outright, but the subtext was that Moscow might interpret the proposed SAC exercise as the precursor of an attack, especially considering Khrushchev’s “emotionalism.”

Downplaying those apprehensions, Merchant expressed confidence that Moscow would realize that as long as Eisenhower was president the U.S. “would not launch a nuclear attack on them.” Moreover, Merchant argued that the war danger would be “reduced in direct relation to the firmness and unity of purpose demonstrated by the West.” Implicitly, if Ottawa went along with Washington’s request for the airborne alert test, among other actions, the Soviets would recognize that the two allies were cooperating on that matter despite the Berlin situation.

Ambassador Heeney let Acting Secretary Herter know that Ottawa had approved the request for SAC overflights because it would improve U.S. deterrence capabilities. Nevertheless, the Canadian government remained anxious that the Soviets might misinterpret the airborne alert test and that it could even aggravate the Berlin Crisis. Therefore, the Canadians wanted it understood that the flights would receive no publicity and that no information should reach the press.

The airborne alert test, Head Start II, had already begun on 2 March but until the 13^th the B-52s were flying without weapons until Eisenhower gave his approval and the Canadians had also assented. SAC had plenty of opportunity for nuclear-armed flights over Canada.[27]

As noted, one strand of Eisenhower administration policy involved signaling: taking military and other measures that Soviet intelligence would notice and that would serve as moves to deter Moscow from considering action that could threaten access to West Berlin. The 5 March 1959 special meeting (Document 11) mentioned moving the Second Fleet, but that was only one of numerous naval actions taken during the April-May 1959 period, when policymakers worried that a crisis would break out at the end of Khrushchev’s six-month deadline.

On 4 and 9 March 1959, CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke directed his deputy CNOs for Strategy and Policy (Op-06) and Fleet Operations and Readiness (Op-03) to prepare memos that would keep top military and civilian officials informed of what action the Navy was taking (or could take) to support the U.S. position if a crisis broke out. Op-03, Vice Admiral Wallace Beakley, prepared reports for circulation to the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State, the Director of CIA, and Presidential Naval Aide Captain E.P. “Pete” Aurand to forward to President Eisenhower and his national security advisors. Beakley told Burke that from a “Top Secret-Limited Distribution” report with sensitive operational details and considerable technical information, he had prepared a more “general” version that was suitable for dissemination to top officials. The point of both versions, attached to Beakley’s memorandum, was to provide a detailed schedule for Navy readiness measures in the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Mediterranean in the event a crisis unfolded after 27 May 1959, the end of the Soviet deadline if negotiations at Geneva had not eased tensions over Berlin.

The “Top Secret-Limited Distribution” version includes such then-sensitive details as the locations of submarine patrols and the names of the submarines involved. New nuclear-powered attack subs Swordfish and Skate were assigned to surveillance patrols of the North Cape-Murmansk area in the Barents Sea watching for deployments from Soviet Northern Fleet bases. Other submarines, all hunter-killers, included Becuna and Entemedor, were assigned to patrol in waters near Egypt and Albania where Soviet naval forces had anchorages, while Bugara, Bream, and Bluegill were to conduct surveillance off the Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet bases of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.* Moreover, if necessary, aircraft carriers in the First Fleet Eastern Pacific could be loaded with nuclear weapons, prepare their air groups, and be ready to deploy. Both versions of the memorandum provide a striking picture of U.S. Navy activities around the world, which no doubt preoccupied Soviet naval intelligence during this period.

* Submarine patrols off Soviet Northern and Pacific Fleet bases were standard in the Cold War from at least the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s. During the 1956 Suez crisis, Admiral Burke informed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Arthur Radford of that fact in a memo on “Submarine Patrols” on 7 November 1956 (Source: Arleigh Burke Papers as CNO, Originators File, U.S. Navy Heritage and History Command, Archives, Declassified by ONI 1993). Shortly after President Gerald Ford took office on 13 August 1974, CNO Admiral James L. Holloway, III briefed him that “One tactical nuclear sub is usually in the Barents Sea for reconnaissance” and “One nuclear sub is on reconnaissance off Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk.” ( Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-76, Vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2014), 200-205.

During a long NSC discussion of contingency planning alternatives, President Eisenhower declared that he saw three possible outcomes: 1) “some kind of a deal through negotiations,” 2) a Soviet “backdown,” or 3) “general war.” With planners looking at the use of ground forces if the Soviets blocked access, Eisenhower argued that “once we resort to the use of force … there are really no limits that can be set.” While there were a “number of things we could do to try to change the Soviet mind …we should never forget the possibility of war.” Yet, in his “judgement there would not be war.”

What is especially interesting in this discussion record are the portions that were excised in the FRUS version, which cover two issues: 1) covert operations in Eastern Europe and 2) nuclear deployments in NATO Europe. U.S. officials thought that both could reinforce the U.S. deterrent position if a crisis broke out.

On covert action, CIA Director Allen Dulles discussed a highly secret paper on the increase of “feasible and disruptive activities within the Soviet bloc.”. Dulles argued the Soviet Union’s “Achilles heel” was the memory of past uprisings in East Germany and Hungary. The Soviet leadership would become “extremely worried” if they believed that Washington could make “real efforts to subvert their position in Eastern Europe.” Sending such a message covertly could serve as a “deterrent to Soviet action to deny us access to Berlin.”[28]

The other excisions concern U.S nuclear deployments to Western Europe to support the NATO nuclear stockpile system. U.S. plans were ongoing and the initial deployments to West Germany were in the works. Once the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings “on certain aspects of the transaction,” they would become known. Secretary of State Christian Herter argued that the deployments “might indicate to the Soviets how serious we were about the Berlin crisis.” While Eisenhower expressed some concern lest anyone get the idea that we were trying to “dragoon” European allies into accepting the weapons, Herter assured him that the Germans “had been pushing hard” to get them, while other countries, such as Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands were involved in negotiations with the U.S. about the prospective deployments.

In the months that followed, the U.S. and its allies negotiated with the Soviets in Geneva. Stalemated negotiations did not lead to further crisis because Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev met with President Eisenhower to discuss the deadlock. An East-West summit scheduled for May 1960 would be the next step for high-level negotiations.

This excerpt from an official history details more of the signaling activity conducted by the U.S. Navy during the Berlin crisis. In addition to the actions itemized in Document 14A, the Navy put the Second Fleet on alert while the Sixth Fleet went to “an advanced state of readiness and [was] deployed in alert posture. For most of the May-June 1959 period, two carrier task groups sailed in the Mediterranean “with at least six aircraft in immediate launch status.” According to a contemporaneous report by CNO Arleigh Burke, target assignments for Sixth Fleet nuclear strike aircraft included five government control centers in the Soviet Union. Also, during the period, the Sixth Fleet’s anti-submarine and shipping surveillance patrols flew continuously.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the DEFCON system in 1959 to provide military forces with a “uniform system of progressive readiness conditions.” The point was to enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide subordinate commands with “accurate, timely, and clear direction” so that they would have the greatest possible level of effectiveness in preparing to execute “contingency or emergency war plans.”

The point of the new system was to provide a common language for communications and consultations concerning readiness conditions between the Joint Chiefs and the commanders of specified and unified commands. The provisions allowed for changes in DEFCONS by commanders in consultation with the JCS when possible or by JCS instructions to the commanders. If a commander declared DEFCON 1, maximum state of readiness, the Joint Chiefs would request the president to participate in a conference with the Chiefs and the secretary of defense “to review the situation and consider recommendations regarding immediate actions to be taken, including the relocation of the National Command Authorities.”

The five DEFCONs levels that would set the pace for military readiness were described in an appendix: from DEFCON 5 (code-named “Fade Out”), the lowest level of operational readiness, to DEFCON 1 (“Cocked Pistol”), ready to go to war, with DEFCON 4 (“Double Take”) to DEFCON 3 (“Round House”) to DEFCON2 (“Fast Pace”) in between. The commanders-in-chief of the various unified and specified commands (SAC, Pacific Command, European Command, etc.) were to prepare for the JCS a report on “uniform readiness conditions” for their respective command so there was common understanding of what a given DEFCON would require whenever the CINCs authorized it.

The SIOP emerged in 1960, after the creation of the DEFCON system, so the 1961 DEFCON update took that into account. For example, a declaration of DEFCON 1, 2, or 3 would require the Joint Chiefs to convene an emergency conference to take such steps as the declaration of an “A” hour, which was the base time for bringing military forces to readiness for SIOP execution.[29]

The collapse of the Paris Summit, in the wake of the U-2 crisis and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to walk out of the meeting, may have led to some concern that the Soviets might take a run at the U.S. or its European allies. Seeing it as a “prudent” move, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates instructed the Chiefs to “quietly implement state of military vigilance” along with a communications alert and, if directed, to “prepare to move into a higher state of readiness.”[30]

Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas informed Secretary Gates that all U.S. commands were in DEFCON 3 and ‘prepared to go higher.” DEFCON 3 put one-third of the SAC bomber and tanker force on ground alert, earlier than the planned date of July 1960 (see Document 1 at page 9). Douglas asked Gates to provide the basis for his instructions.

Deputy Defense Secretary Douglas further reported that press inquiries had led the Pentagon to announce, somewhat misleadingly, that the JCS “had conducted a world-wide communications readiness test” and that it had been completed.

The Joint Chiefs did not know why Secretary Gates had issued the order to prepare for a possible “higher state of readiness” (Document 17), but after translating it into a decision to go on a DEFCON 3 posture, they wanted the Canadian Chiefs of Staff to know what was going on.

While the May 1960 DEFCON was a world-wide alert involving all U.S. commands, the Pentagon would also use DEFCONs in local crises. During the Laos Crisis that was developing in 1960, Navy task groups that had been deployed to the South China Sea (elements of Joint Task Force 116), were put on DEFCON 3.