Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Posed “Acute Dilemma” for U.S. Policy

During the early 1970s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made formative decisions on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Although he never acknowledged that to U.S. officials, a conversation that Bhutto had with U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade demonstrated his deep, strongly nationalistic, commitment to the nuclear program and his emotional response to U.S. nonproliferation concerns.[3] Bhutto claimed that he was especially chagrined that President Ford’s March 1976 letter advising against the purchase of a reprocessing plant had arrived “almost coincidentally with the actual signing of the agreement with France.”[4] By that point, he argued, his decision was “irreversible” and that to “back down now would be disastrous for him as a political leader and would leave him ‘prostrate.’”

Discussing his motivations, Bhutto observed that the “confidence and morale” of the people depended on Pakistan keeping abreast of modern technology. Just as important, the “general feeling of lack of security” had a deep impact on the “morale of the Pakistani people as a whole, even including the illiterates.” According to Bhutto, the 1974 Indian test made it necessary to raise the “comfort” of the population by showing that Pakistan “could match the technology of others.”

During the conversation, Byroade mentioned the possibility of a “long-term” solution for a more “sensible” world: internationally supervised multinational processing plants as an alternative to reprocessing on nationalist lines. But that would have little bearing on Pakistan’s immediate decision to acquire “sensitive nuclear technology.” Nevertheless, later in his message, Byroade suggests further review of the multilateral approach. “I think that judging from his mood in our discussion Bhutto would be prepared to listen to what we had to say about prospects along these lines, particularly in view of Symington Amendment” (which would cut off aid to countries receiving reprocessing technology).

In his comments to Washington, Byroade acknowledged that “we were … quite delinquent in not letting [Bhutto] know our views in a more timely fashion.” He further observed that there should be a “better Washington-mission relationship on such important matters.” While not questioning the importance of nonproliferation policy, Byroade observed that “it should not be considered alone and in isolation from other foreign policy objectives.”

During much of 1978, trying to check Islamabad’s effort to develop a reprocessing capability was a top priority for U.S. policy toward Pakistan.[5] That Pakistan was also seeking an enrichment capability does not appear to have been on the mental map of interested officials, as indicated by the assumptions spelled out in this report of a meeting. The purpose of the discussion was to formulate a request to what became known as the “Z” Division at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and which, in a few months, produced a study of Pakistani capabilities to take the plutonium route to the bomb.

The Z Division would study two paths. One was to reprocess spent fuel from the KANUPP reactor, which was safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The other was to build a secret production reactor as a source for spent fuel.

A note from Smith that was attached to the memorandum indicated that he wanted to make sure that the study was in the works and how long it would take Pakistan to finish the plant.

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs official Allen Locke sent this this record of a conversation with a British embassy official to Deputy Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Joseph Nye. It provides the earliest known indication of State Department recognition that the Pakistanis might be undertaking a uranium enrichment program. As Locke learned from diplomat Michael Pakenham, Emerson Electric Industrial Controls, the British branch of a U.S. multinational, had received suspicious orders from a Pakistani firm for inverters (used for running centrifuges at ultra-high speeds) for which there was reason to suspect they “were destined for use in a centrifuge enrichment plant.” The problem was that that existing export controls did not cover inverters and the British wanted to initiate discussions of way and means to prevent exports of such dual-use products. This report made the State Department aware of suspect Pakistani nuclear activities, although what officials did with the information – for example, whether it went to the CIA and other intelligence agencies – remains obscure.[6]

A conversation between American scholar Stephen P. Cohen and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had led the military coup against Bhutto in mid-1977, sheds light on the latter’s nuclear thinking. During an early May 1978 dinner in Islamabad with Cohen, then a rising political scientist at the University of Illinois, General Zia and his top people disclosed interest in acquiring “two or three nuclear weapons as a deterrent against approximately 20 Indian weapons.” Cohen’s revelation, reported as part of a “long de-briefing” to the American Embassy, is forwarded to the Department in this telegram.

A year after the military coup against the Bhutto government, U.S. intelligence analysts reviewed Pakistan’s uncertain political future and concluded that a military regime was likely to stay in power for several years. One thing that was not likely to change under General Zia was the commitment to a nuclear weapons program, which the analysts believed had the “support of virtually all military and civilian leaders.” Apparently intelligence on the gas centrifuge program had not reached CIA analysts because this estimate considered the search for a capability to produce plutonium with a reprocessing plant as the “most critical single element now being sought.” If the French did not complete the plant, the Pakistanis “may attempt to complete and operate it themselves” or even build a small plant using designs available in the open literature. As it turned out, the French had already decided to cancel the contract, but the Pakistanis remained determined to develop a reprocessing plant.

This memorandum, prepared by DI52, the nuclear group at the U.K.’s Defence Intelligence Staff, indicates how far the British had gone in identifying the parameters of Pakistan’s secret enrichment program. That the British are still protecting intelligence sources after more than 40 years is evident from the several excisions in the report.

Becoming more and more concerned about the latest intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hummel wanted to warn the leadership in Islamabad that they risked an aid cut-off if they did not stop. In this message he stated his intention to let the Pakistani government know at a “high level” that the U.S. had “some information about their about [its] nrichment/reprocessing/nuclear explosive research.” Hummel presented the Department, for its approval, possible language for use in making such demarches. Yet, State Department officials sat on Hummel’s request for months, believing that the available intelligence information was not yet sufficient to justify a demarche, although the Ambassador would make several more pleas for action.

While still considering how and when to approach General Zia, the State Department developed a multilateral and bilateral strategy to check the Pakistani nuclear program. Noting that the intelligence was ambiguous, the report underestimated what the Pakistanis were doing, for example, observing that they “were looking into the gas centrifuge process,” when it would become evident that they were doing far more than that. The report identified four major “benchmarks” or “critical indicators” of Pakistani nuclear progress that had to be identified, including acquisition of fissile material and research and design of explosive devices.

The proposed multilateral strategy included action by nuclear suppliers to prevent exports of sensitive technology, alerting the IAEA, and possible engagement with Iran and Saudi Arabia to deflect Pakistan from its course. Moreover, if Pakistan reached a critical benchmark, the U.S. could consult with other countries to bring “concerted pressure.”

On bilateral action, the U.S. had limited leverage because military and economic aid was small. Acknowledging that it “might be useful to put GOP on notice that we are aware of their covert activity in the nuclear field,” it would have to be done in a way that “avoid[ed] compromising intelligence sources, which could affect adversely our collection efforts.” The report also suggested restoring U.S. economic and military relations “so that the costs of proceeding [with the nuclear program] would be more apparent to the Pakistanis.”

This telegram has been previously released and cited by others, but it is a useful reminder of the role of the varied sources of intelligence on the Pakistani nuclear program. It may be the earliest declassified reference to the enrichment plant at Kahuta, near Islamabad. In this instance, a French diplomat, Jean Forlot, reported that he had observed, over the months, a construction project at Kahuta, which he thought might be an “enrichment plant.” He showed photographs of the site to U.S. diplomats, who had seen similar photos taken by Australian embassy officials. The U.S. embassy officer told Forlot that he had “heard of construction work at Kahuta,” and added, accurately or not, that his knowledge was “limited.”

Harold Saunders, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, and Thomas Pickering, the assistant secretary for oceans, international environmental, and scientific affairs, reported to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on the latest intelligence on Pakistan, among other matters. This memorandum, along with the one to Under Secretary David Newsom [Document 11] that follows, provides interesting detail on what Washington was learning about the scope of the Pakistani nuclear program. The Saunders-Pickering memorandum to Vance looks at policy options for responding to the Pakistani nuclear program, including application of the Symington Amendment (aid cut-off to countries that were illicitly enriching uranium). Their analysis spelled out the complex diplomatic problems raised by the U.S.’s new knowledge of Pakistan’s secret nuclear program.

What made policy options necessary were two findings about Pakistani efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons: One was that Pakistan was “building a facility capable of small-scale reprocessing, near the PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute for Science and Technology] research center” that would be capable of producing enough plutonium for at least one nuclear device annually. This was a reference to the “New Labs” project, among other activities. The other was that a “secret gas centrifuge program is intended to yield significant quantities of HEU.” The Pakistanis had already “succeeded in operating small numbers of centrifuge units.” Moreover, referring to Kahuta, but not naming it, the Pakistanis “have plans for 7,000 units, and have begun to construct buildings to house the facility and to acquire equipment for the plant.” It would take about 2 years of work for the plant to operate and another two years before it could produce HEU.

The discussion of the Symington Amendment, which required an aid cut-off if Pakistan was found to be receiving technology for an enrichment program after 4 August 1977 (when the amendment went into effect), indicated the problems of interpretation. Even if the technology that Pakistan was acquiring was not specifically nuclear enrichment equipment, “it is clear nevertheless that the items are being imported for use in combination in the same facility and in a way that is only consistent with the construction of gas centrifuges for enrichment.”

Cutting off aid to Pakistan raised a variety of policy problems (such as the Indian reaction), but at “present juncture, a cut-off of aid in fact risks enhancing Pakistan's sense of isolation and insecurity which are the primary motivating factors prompting their search for a nuclear deterrent.” Yet, because it would be necessary to decide on Symington in the near term, “we cannot wait and must move quickly to maximize the influence we can bring to bear by seeking the diplomatic support of others who have influence in Islamabad.” That made it necessary to consider approaches to China, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Western allies, and the nuclear suppliers, all of whom were discussed in this memorandum.

What would make it difficult to discuss the Pakistani nuclear issue with many countries was “the fact that our knowledge … is derived from extremely sensitive intelligence primarily of third-country origin, which we presumably could not use publicly.” Evidently, some of the sources were British [see Document 12], based on contacts in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the French may also have provided intelligence. How much information on the secret nuclear program the U.S. could get from Pakistani diplomatic telegram traffic remains to be learned, but that source was certainly wide open owing to a backroom deal between the CIA and the Swiss producer of encoding machines.[7]

Most of the text is essentially the same as Document 10, although some of the intelligence findings are truncated. It includes, however, an appendix on “Intelligence Relevant to the Timing of Pakistani Imports of Items for Use in Their Gas Centrifuge Program,” listing items that were “reportedly sent or received after August 1977” or “may have been sent after August 1977”—the cutoff for the Symington Amendment. The list included various types of bellows, rotor drives, and inverters. Moreover, to make the point that the Pakistanis had an ongoing enrichment program under the terms of the Symington Amendment, the report listed three continuing activities: an “eight-machine cascade,” a reference to the test installation at Chaklala air force base; a 64-machine cascade planned for June 1979, a reference to the pilot plant at Sihala; and a 1,000-machine cascade projected for 1980, which referred to Kahuta.

Finally granting Ambassador Hummel’s request to make a demarche to the Pakistani leadership, the State Department authorized a statement that he could deliver. A general discussion with Zia provided Hummel with an opportunity to make the demarche, which expressed concern about Pakistan’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, including enrichment activities. Zia’s response was outrage: that the allegations were “outright lies” and that if the U.S identified the sources and named the sites he would demonstrate that “no such activity was under way.” He further insisted that “nothing could be going on without his knowledge.”

Hummel reported that he could detect “no false note” in Zia’s statements.[8] He also showed some doubt about the intelligence : he wanted the Department to check the “validity of our assessments which I understand come from single British source, and from data on purchase of equipment, which could have multiple purposes.” Hummel further suggested that the U.S. follow up on Zia’s offer “to open sites for an inspection.” If the U.S. sent a nuclear expert to Pakistan to look at the suspect site, it would “underline the seriousness of our concern.”

Replying to Ambassador Hummel’s account of his meeting with Zia, the State Department discussed what might have motivated the general to make such a strong denial of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Conceding that Zia might not have “up-to-date” knowledge of the nuclear program it was nevertheless doubtful that he was “unaware” of it. He may have doubted that the U.S. had good intelligence on the activities, or he may have been engaging in a form of “sophistry” by separating the development of a capability from “a positive intention to do so.” Or perhaps his denial was based on a rationalization that the enrichment program was part of an attempt to create a full fuel cycle for economic reasons. Or perhaps Hummel had “caught [him] unaware” and he had “shot from the hip” and was already regretting his inspection offer.

On Hummel’s questions about intelligence sources, the text is excised, but what comes through is the Department’s “high confidence” in the reliability of the information.

On the possibility of an inspection, the State Department was most interested in visits to Chaklala, Sihala, Kahuta, and PINSTECH on the grounds that even if the Pakistanis dismantled equipment at the sites, something could be learned (although what that was is excised in this release). The Department asked Hummel for his views on how best to obtain Zia’s consent “for an expert team to visit these sites as soon as possible.”

Meeting with two British embassy officials, Assistant Secretary Thomas Pickering stated that the Pakistani nuclear situation had “become more complex” since talks with Patrick Moberly earlier in January. In a statement to be passed on to the Foreign Office, Pickering acknowledged that Pakistan is “moving more rapidly toward acquisition of nuclear capability than we had earlier estimated,” a development that required “urgent action.” Noting that the U.S. was considering ways and means to halt the Pakistani nuclear program, the statement mentioned the demarche to General Zia and U.S. interest in taking up his inspection offer, plans to bring up the “threat to the region” during Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Washington, and “technical talks” with nuclear supplier governments to restrict Pakistan’s access to enrichment-related technology.

The discussions with Deng about Pakistan were not fruitful. China was far too close to Pakistan to oppose its nuclear program; the two countries had already shared enrichment technology and weapons design information and Beijing had provided Islamabad with UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) that could be fed into gas centrifuges.[9] The best that Deng could come up with was to suggest that huge levels of aid could induce Islamabad to stop its nuclear effort. A U.S. buy out, however, was not in the cards.

In this telegram to Ambassadors Hummel and Goheen, senior State Department officials cited the “acute dilemma” posed by the Pakistani nuclear program at a time when “we wish to be more supportive” of Islamabad. Given the role of the 1974 Indian test in stimulating Pakistan’s nuclear efforts, the views of both ambassadors were sought on “whether we can deal with these as related problems.” With its “good intelligence” on the secret enrichment program, the Government of India was “concerned” that domestic politics could make “untenable” Prime Minister Desai’s “principled stand” against nuclear testing. That could lead to pressure to weaponize. Therefore, to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the Department was considering the merits of asking Ambassador Goheen to meet with Desai to discuss the possibility of an India-Pakistan declaration on “non-development and non-use” of nuclear weapons.

A U.S. team, including State Department officials Michael Guhin and Robert Gallucci, and a gas centrifuge expert with Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Leslie Powers, travelled to Western Europe for meetings with government officials in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Switzerland. During a meeting in the Netherlands, the scene of A. Q. Khan’s theft of gas centrifuge technology from URENCO, the U.S. envoys stressed the “urgency and seriousness” of Islamabad’s nuclear program, while the Dutch officials provided intelligence on earlier and unsuccessful Pakistani efforts to acquire technology and promised to provide detail on what items the Pakistanis were likely to seek to develop their gas centrifuge program. During the discussion of export controls, the Dutch acknowledged that “gray areas” could make it possible to circumvent the system.

The U.S. team asked the Dutch if they had any information on the firm IBIS Kunstoffen BV, which had had contacts with the Pakistanis, but the Dutch had nothing on it (that would turn out to be somewhat of a dead-end). In what may be the earliest declassified reference to A. Q. Khan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official A. J. Van Galen noted that “Khan had returned to Europe for [a] time after leaving the Netherlands and had been based in Antwerp.”

When Van Galen asked whether the U.S. government believed that the Pakistanis “had all the technology and blueprints necessary for a gas centrifuge facility,” Gallucci replied that “on the basis of Pak shopping expeditions for centrifuge components, it appeared that they had access to the necessary technology.” Given the scope of Khan’s espionage, Van Galen probably knew the answer to his own question. In the weeks that followed, the U.S. Embassy in West Germany reported that Khan had been holding discussions with German firms.

Discussions with French officials, including Andre Jacomet and Jean Leygonie, disclosed that they had little practical knowledge of gas centrifuge technology and needed U.S. assistance to develop a list of products that would require export controls. The U.S. team agreed that a list would be provided but wanted to know if the French had any information on a company named Calorstat. Neither Jacomet nor Leygonie knew of that firm and the Americans would not tell them what they had learned because it was “sensitive intelligence.” Nevertheless, the U.S. asked the right question because, as the French would soon discover, Calorstat was up to its neck in dealings with Pakistani shoppers for nuclear-related technology.

According to the U.S. report, Jacomet “appreciated” the consultations and was “sympathetic to efforts to control supply and noted desirability of continued exchange and consultation on these matters.” Discussions and close cooperation with the French would continue.

This meeting with the West Germans included a briefing by Leslie Powers who described the “probable nature” of the Pakistani gas centrifuge program based on the “shopping effort.” A German gas centrifuge expert named Czygan (first name unknown) commented that the Pakistani machines “seemed similar to ‘early vintage’ (1960s) URENCO design and that URENCO was now much more sophisticated.” Nevertheless, Czygan agreed with Powers that the “technology level in ‘early URENCO’ is adequate … to provide high-enriched product for an explosive device.”

Guhin provided information about Team Industries, an intermediary that had shipped the British-produced inverters to the Pakistanis, and another firm, Leybold-Heraus, which had a role in the gas centrifuge business. Not knowing much about either firm, the Germans suggested that in the case of Team Industries it was the responsibility of the supplying country to impose controls. The U.S. team thought otherwise, suggesting that “responsible supplier controls would require consultation” when “dummy companies” purchasing through “intermediaries” were involved. The Germans did not know, when asked, whether Team Industries had informed the [British] “supplying companies” that Pakistan was the destination for the product.

Earlier in the discussion, one of the Germans, Werner Rouget, observed that the German trade “philosophy was ‘free export,’” which would prove to be an obstacle to comprehensive export controls over nuclear-related technology. It would be years before Bonn and Washington were on the same page on that issue.[10]

Gerard C. Smith’s deputy, MIT professor George Rathjens, prepared this account of a meeting of the NSC’s Policy Review Committee, which discussed the Symington Amendment, the impact of export controls, and ways and means to “dissuade the Pakistanis from going ahead.”[11]

On the Symington amendment, CIA Director Stansfield Turner believed it had been “triggered,” but there was much discussion over “whether this had happened in a formal sense” and whether Secretary of State Vance had to decide. On the efficacy of export controls, National Intelligence Officer for Nonproliferation John Despres explained that an estimate that it would take the Pakistanis three to five years to produce a nuclear weapon was “predicated on substantial supply restraints” and that at best, controls could “achieve an additional year's slippage in the construction of a 7,000-unit centrifuge plant.” Despres thought that the Pakistanis “already had all of the equipment needed for the first 1,000 units and probably all that would be needed for the next 3,000.” With a 1,000-unit plant in place by 1980, “sufficient material for a weapon would be available by 1982.”

As for dissuading Pakistan from going ahead with its nuclear plans, Rathjens observed that “There was much skepticism in this meeting, and also in the one the night before, about any action being successful.” Yet, he was hopeful that it would be possible for the Indians and the Pakistanis to “reach some kind of an accommodation that would enable Pakistan to get off the track it is on.” As for the option of “trying to buy the Pakistanis off by a combination of aid, debt rescheduling and arms,” he did not believe it would work and would set the “worst possible precedent in any future cases.”

The Policy Planning Staff paper that Smith was commenting on needs to be identified (although it may be a version of this report), but Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher found Smith’s comments to be the “best thing that’s been done so far.” Smith considered the “historical roots” and ramifications of a “do nothing approach” but also provided arguments against it: if Pakistan developed the bomb “it will be hard to keep Germany and Japan away from nuclear weapons, to say nothing of Libya.” Among his comments and suggestions, the first touched upon the possibility of U.N. action that would put the “glare of world attention” on the secret Pakistani nuclear program, on the basis of the Brandeisian idea that “sunlight was the best disinfectant.” Believing that neither sanctions, nor an Indian-Pakistan arrangement, nor a U.S.-Pakistan security deal would work, Smith put the most thought into a “sunshine approach.”

Smith mentioned other options, including security guarantees under the NPT and “brutal” measures involving the “possibility/likelihood of some other country sabotaging or destroying the Pakistani plants.” Next to that, Christopher wrote “Yes.” The “brutal” approach received further consideration and endured the “glare” of publicity when it was leaked to the New York Times later in the summer. Yet how far the Carter administration went into exploring the “brutal” option with other governments remains mysterious.

Information from the British raised doubts about the prospects for an India-Pakistan non-nuclear arrangement. On the idea of a South Asian “regional nuclear security treaty,” London had recently asked the High Commissioner’s office for its thinking. A major problem was that the Indians would not want to be “frozen into [a] position of nuclear inferiority” vis-à-vis China. Moreover, the Indians believed that assistance would have to be given to a Pakistani peaceful nuclear program, a “prospect which India would find very worrisome.” In addition, the Indians would probably want the Soviet Union (with which New Delhi had a security relationship) to be included, probably in guaranteeing the project. Finally, verification of the whole project would require something close to full-scope safeguards by IAEA inspectors over nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan.

Whatever the particulars of India’s objections were, senior diplomat Sir Michael Palliser got “absolutely nowhere” when he raised the British proposal for a regional arrangement with Indian officials. Indeed, in early June, when U.S. ambassador Goheen met with Desai to try out a proposal for a regional arrangement, he met with a flat rejection.

Reporters for West German public TV station ZDF [Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen] were on the trail of the Pakistani nuclear story and discovered some of its key elements, notably A.Q. [“Aku”] Khan’s theft of information from the URENCO contractor FDO. The report identified Khan as the director of the project to build the gas centrifuge plant, but his actual role was broader: head of the enrichment program. This ZDF report was probably the first public discussion of Khan’s espionage, but apparently U.S. journalists did not pick it up, at least in finished stories, for some months.

The ZDF report mentioned Emerson Electric’s sale of inverters to Khan’s organization through the German firm Team Industries, a topic that had been the subject of discussion in the British Parliament. For such transactions, ZDF reported that Pakistan had a commercial mission in Brussels. The reference to Brigadier General Amis Ali Said is to Anis Syed, an Army general in the Engineers Corps, who had some managerial role in procurement for the gas centrifuge project.

The highly dramatic, somewhat overwrought, report linked Pakistan’s nuclear program to Libya and terrorism in the Arab world: to Gaddafi’s search for nuclear weapons and the possibility that if Qaddafi had nuclear weapons, then the PLO would get them “almost automatically.” The reporters were right to raise the Libyan connection: Libya did provide financial and other aid to the Pakistani nuclear program [see Document 31], but apparently that did not provide Gaddafi with any special access to the program’s results. [12]

During what NIO John Despres characterized as a “tedious” meeting of the NSC’s Policy Review Committee, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci discussed the downside of publicizing the Pakistani nuclear program. The general discussion suggested that publicity could be “damaging to broader U.S. relations and interests” with Carlucci noting the “current mood and possible adverse response of anti-US political forces in the Arab, Muslim, and non-aligned movements.” In that context, Deputy Secretary of State Cristopher “set aside” Smith’s proposal because of its possibly destabilizing implications for U.S. policy in the Muslim world.

Commenting on State Department telegram 085585 which had been sent a few days earlier without his approval, Smith took issue with its approach toward Pakistan. According to the message, Washington sought to “insulate” the security relationship with Pakistan from the “negative” impact on diplomatic ties caused by U.S. nonproliferation policy. It put nuclear proliferation and security issues on different “levels,” an approach that Smith believed was “impossible” because the issues were intertwined. Rather than taking a “mild” approach, Smith plainly favored a hard line. If Washington had any chance of “turn[ing] the Pakistanis,” it had to “make clear that in the last analysis its nuclear policy puts our whole relation at stake.”

This memorandum went to Smith the same day that he criticized the “two levels” approach. Plainly, the writing was on the wall—there would be no change in policy­—­which Smith recognized by writing “aye sir” on the memo.

What was driving policy was concern about Afghanistan, that cross border raids from Pakistan by Afghan refugees were angering Moscow and its Afghan clients. According to the Raphel memorandum, the problem was “the potential threat posed to Pakistan from events in Afghanistan and the consequent instability it could cause in South Asia.” That gave the U.S. a “real and immediate interest in cooperating with Pakistan to oppose that threat.”

Smith was uncomfortable with the approach outlined by Raphel. Next to the sentence that Washington would “attempt to maximize [its] chances to be successful in the nuclear and security areas,” Smith asked, “what gets priority?” He feared that security concerns would get priority over nonproliferation and prevent the public approach to Pakistan’s nuclear program that he believed was necessary.

To try to balance security and nonproliferation concerns, the State Department tried a new approach with the Pakistanis—to seek their agreement to a freeze on activity at their enrichment facilities, which would be coupled with a presidential waiver of the Symington amendment and the possibility of “additional support.” Moreover, acceptance of a freeze could facilitate an eventual India-Pakistan non-nuclear arrangement.

This message consists of a set of talking points for use by Ambassador Hummel in a presentation of the freeze to General Zia. While some of the specifics of the proposal are excised, there can be no question that the focus was a freeze on work at the experimental test bed of eight gas centrifuges at Chaklala, the pilot plant at Sihala, and the large-scale plant in the works at Kahuta. The excisions exemplify the inconsistent position that State Department reviewers take on such details because elsewhere they have declassified the names of those facilities, as a search in NARA’s Access to Archival Databases will confirm.

General Zia and his advisers rejected the proposal; while Zia acknowledged the existence of an enrichment program he insisted that Pakistan required both reprocessing and enrichment for its nuclear energy needs. He said he would study the proposal further, but Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz later officially turned it down. Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi privately stated that Pakistan could not accept a freeze “at the present levels because it would be too expensive and difficult to resume in the future.”

This memorandum from Secretary Vance to President Carter had as its premise several developments. One was a statement by Foreign Affairs Advisor Shahi that Pakistan might test a nuclear device in a matter of months. Another was Indian Prime Minister Desai’s rejection of the U.S. proposal for an India-Pakistan understanding. Moreover, Peter Constable, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, had suggested a way to break the stalemate with Pakistan. In a message to Washington, subsequently forwarded to the embassy in New Delhi, Constable argued that U.S. policy toward the Pakistani nuclear program had reached a “dead end.” Washington could no longer hope to reverse the secret enrichment program, even though it would need to maintain "vigilance" to prevent sensitive exports from reaching Pakistan. Thus, Constable proposed seeking a pledge from General Zia that his country would not test nuclear weapons and would not export nuclear technology (preventing an “Islamic bomb” scenario). While that would leave the gas centrifuge program intact, it could prevent a nuclear breakout in South Asia, which would constitute a major setback for the nonproliferation system.

During a meeting with Zia, Constable had brought up the idea of a pledge and found Zia receptive, stating that he was willing to put a commitment “in writing” to no peaceful nuclear explosions. To encourage the General to do so, Vance’s advisers suggested that the U.S. follow up by sending him a letter from President Carter requesting an assurance. Vance supported that recommendation: if Zia agreed to put an assurance in writing it would be a “significant step” toward realizing U.S. nonproliferation goals. The proposed letter to President Zia was attached to Vance’s memorandum to the president.

Vance realized that the Constable proposal would not solve the “fundamental” problem of Pakistan. His advisers informed him that Gerard C. Smith had argued that the Constable plan would leave the Pakistani enrichment program intact, which would “foreshadow likely acceptance of an Israeli-type situation … where a nuclear weapons potential is legitimized as long as there are no tests.”

A meeting with Jean Leygonie brought out French intelligence information on the role of Calorstat in supporting the Pakistani gas centrifuge program. After Leygonie made a point about the sophistication and speed of Pakistani centrifuges, he reported that Calorstat had provided the bellows that were to be used to connect the rotor tubes of gas centrifuges. After alerting the customs and export control bureaucracy, on 2 May France stopped Calorstat from making any sales to Pakistan. By then, however, Calorstat had already shipped 1,000 of a total order of 10,000 bellows, as well as the design specifications and plan for bellows-making machinery.

According to Leygonie, the bellows and the centrifuge tubes were made from maraging steel, a specialized high-strength type of steel, which Calorstat had imported from the Netherlands. After a detailed examination of the bellows and the manufacturing plans, the French had concluded that they would be “identical to those used at URENCO.” Not said specifically by Leygonie but maraging steel had been used for the bellows of the Dutch 4M gas centrifuge developed in the mid-1970s (and became the model for the Iranian P-1 centrifuge).

Allan Locke, from Smith’s staff, and Robert Gallucci, with the Policy Planning Staff, along with Embassy officials, met with Leygonie for more discussions of gas centrifuge intelligence, including Calorstat and the role of maraging steel supplies from the Netherlands. Before providing a detailed briefing of the Calorstat affairs, the French disclosed that the Pakistanis were acquiring both safeguarded and unsafeguarded uranium from Niger, which was being shipped through Libya. They thought the uranium might be concentrated (or “yellow cake” as it is often called).

The briefing on Calorstat disclosed that the Pakistani embassy in Bonn had made the purchase orders and provided manufacturing designs to the company. After Calorstat got the design right, it provided over one thousand of the 10,000 that the Pakistanis had ordered. What made the last shipment in May possible was that Calorstat had “improperly marked” it to avoid customs controls. The French had added bellows to their export control list and instructed Calorstat to stop selling bellows or bellows manufacturing equipment Later the French said that the Pakistanis found it “easier” to try to import bellows than manufacture them themselves because of a “shortage of skilled technicians.”.

Further discussion disclosed the French belief that the Pakistani gas centrifuge rotors were made from maraging steel. Throughout the meeting, the French “implied … that Pakistan was continuing to receive help from individuals who are associated with URENCO,” but apparently no details were provided. The U.S. team agreed to provide the French with an explanation of how Washington had concluded that the Pakistani gas centrifuge design included four aluminum tubes. The discussion considered the possibility that the Pakistanis were using “more than one design.” Further conversation covered the possibility that the Pakistanis were developing a “lower technology” centrifuge, which the Americans thought possible although “mistakes could be made in modifying technology.”

Intelligence disclosing that Foreign Affairs Advisor Shahi had overestimated his country’s ability to test a device reduced U.S. momentum for securing a no-test assurance from Zia. In a memo to help their boss, Zbigniew Brzezinski, prepare a meeting with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, two of his aides discounted the need for a Carter letter to Zia. While State’s support for a presidential letter was subsiding, if Vance still sought one, Brzezinski could make the point that an “assurance” from Zia was not necessarily reliable, and it would be better to keep such a letter “in reserve.” If Vance insisted on a letter as a “fall back” Brzezinski could suggest that Ambassador Hummel ask Zia for a “written guarantee.” Brzezinski would accept a presidential letter as a last resort.

During the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Iraq’s alleged attempts to secure yellow cake (uranium concentrate) from Niger were a talking point in the Bush administration case, although it was soon learned that the documents about the case were forgeries. In the Pakistan case over 20 years earlier, yellow cake from Niger was not a spurious story.[13] In this report on the production of uranium in Niger, INR reviewed supplies of uranium for both Libya and Pakistan, as well as the prospects for Libyan-Pakistani nuclear relations.

Some of Niger’s uranium sales to Pakistan were legitimate and under IAEA safeguards but, as the French had reported, unsafeguarded uranium had been shipped by air to Pakistan, through Libya with Pakistani guards, in large quantities of over 300 metric tons, according to the INR report. This was not the last word, of course, on what had happened and the State Department would continue to seek more information from both the French and the Nigerians, in large part to make sure that such shipments did not happen again. By the end of the year, investigations were continuing and the IAEA had become involved at the highest levels, in part to find out what had happened and to ensure the application of safeguards to all Nigerian uranium exports.

The INR report also assessed the prospects for Libyan-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, noting that “underlying political problems” made any such project unlikely. Military cooperation between the two countries was occurring at high levels, but the Pakistanis were put off by Muammar Qaddafi’s interest in unrestricted access to Pakistani military personnel and his government’s ‘unreliability” in making good on financial promises. For his part, Qaddafi was “angered” by the execution of Bhutto, on whose behalf he had made several pleas for clemency.

The idea of a presidential letter [see Document 30] fell by the wayside, but the Carter administration still wanted to see whether General Zia would provide a “written assurance.” Ambassador Hummel raised questions about the merits of an approach to Zia, but the State Department “still want[ed] to go ahead.” It provided new talking points to use with Zia as well as arguments on why an approach was necessary. While there was a risk that the Pakistani leader would try to “string” the U.S. along while pursuing his nuclear ambitions, it was worth following up this “admittedly small opening.” If Zia provided an assurance, it could be “used for some leverage in our future efforts” on the nonproliferation front with Zia and his successors. Moreover, the U.S. faced “risks” if it did not follow up Zia’s offer: that he made it is a “matter of record” and “has, in effect, put us on the spot”: ignoring it could be “misinterpreted” by the Pakistanis and other governments.

Zia was unwilling to make specific assurances. While he made a commitment to no-test language when he met with Hummel, his follow-up letter to President Carter in August 1979 included no such assurance, thus leaving his country’s options open.

Allen Locke, on Gerard C. Smith’s staff, underscored the lack of U.S. leverage over the Pakistani nuclear program. While he thought it possible to “discourage” Islamabad from testing, he believed that by 1982 the Pakistanis could have enough highly enriched uranium for a device, which they would not necessarily need to test. According to Locke, they could “design an HEU-fueled, gun-type device with reasonable confidence that it will behave more or less as predicted, without verifying it empirically.”

If the Indians proceeded to weaponize during the early 1980s, the results could be a regional “nuclear balance.” Rejecting a stalemate as a “preferred outcome,” Locke did not see how U.S. “acquiescence in such a development cannot fail to spell difficulty for maintaining a serious global non-proliferation effort.” He also rejected any consideration of a “buy-out” of the Pakistani nuclear program through an influx of sophisticated weapons from various arms suppliers: that “invites an arm race in the subcontinent which India is in a position to win” and would cause greater instability.”

Locke further considered the idea of a nuclear free zone in the region. He noted that in August 1974, “90 days after the Indian test, Bhutto asked the PRC for two things: 5 Kg of plutonium, and diplomatic support for a South Asian, NWFZ” with the Chinese rebuffing him on “both counts.” The U.S. supported a NWFZ, but owing to India’s opposition, “the conventional wisdom is that a South Asian NWFZ is not a viable concept for now.” Locke was not willing to give up, suggesting that there “are alternatives to the NWFZ that could be made acceptable to all states in the region.” That the Pakistanis could have a nuclear capability by 1982 made it necessary to look hard for new approaches to the problem.

Locke’s estimate of 1982 for supplies of HEU turned out to be mistaken because an earthquake caused considerable damage to the Kahuta plant, which did not reach the point where it could produce weapons-grade uranium until 1985. Nevertheless, he correctly estimated that the Pakistanis would soon have a usable device: in 1983 Pakistan was conducting successful “cold tests” of nuclear devices, which meant that it could have the bomb when it had the HEU.[14]

By 1980, the Pakistani nuclear program was on the backburner as far as high-level U.S. policy was concerned; responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had the highest priority for the Carter White House and that required working with Pakistan and substantial financial aid to support covert military operations. All the same, U.S. government agencies continued to monitor Pakistan’s shopping trips around the world and tried to educate key nuclear suppliers about the need for tight controls.

As a source of high-tech exports, West Germany was a continuing concern because a variety of its firms were involved in nuclear trade with Pakistan. In this message to the U.S. Embassy, the State Department provided a technical intelligence assessment—section three of the message—of Pakistan’s enrichment and reprocessing program that was to be provided to Bonn as a “non-paper,” devoid of U.S. attribution information.[15] In addition, Embassy officials were to brief the Germans on the contents of section four of the message, which reported on various nuclear-related transactions between the Pakistanis and West German firms, including Leybold-Hereaus.[16] According to the Department, the information was of “extreme sensitivity.”

The “non-paper” includes fascinating detail on the pilot enrichment plant at Sihala and the large plant then under construction at Kahuta. To secure equipment for the Kahuta enrichment plant, the Pakistanis had set up “dummy companies using false-end use statements” operating from Dubai and Kuwait. Nevertheless, the Pakistanis appeared to be having “continuing difficulties” with the gas centrifuge enrichment process, which gave the Department “fairly high confidence that sufficient HEU for a [Pakistani] nuclear device could not be available from the Kahuta plant for two or more years.”

The non-paper also reviewed Pakistan’s efforts to build plants for reprocessing spent fuel for plutonium. Four projects were in the works, including the “New Labs” facility at PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute for Science and Technology] and the plant at Chasma for which the contract with the French had been broken. U.S. intelligence was uncertain about how far Pakistan had gone in producing plutonium but “it now appears possible that the Pakistanis have made more progress in the area of reprocessing than we previously believed.” According to U.S. intelligence, if New Labs became “fully operational by mid-1980, Pakistan conceivably could separate sufficient plutonium from spent KANUPP reactor fuel for its first nuclear device by early 1981.”

Swiss nuclear-related exports to Pakistan were also of concern to the Carter administration, as was Bern’s general “hands-off” approach. This message consisted entirely of a “non-paper” to be provided to Swiss officials. As Switzerland was not a NATO ally, the information on Pakistan’s nuclear program was more of a general nature than that provided to the West Germans, but the litany of suspicious Swiss commercial activities was detailed and lengthy. The “non-paper” was not the first expression of State Department concern, as its text made clear, because Washington had been monitoring Swiss firms for at least a few years.

Like the message to Bonn, this non-paper demonstrated how far the Pakistanis had gone in acquiring technology from the Swiss that was vital to their fissile material production efforts. With respect to the plutonium program, such firms as Sulzer Brothers and Luna AG had been playing significant roles to enable work at “New Labs.” On the enrichment program, two firms were of particular concern: CORA Engineering and VAT (Vakuum Apparat Technik) because they supported the gas centrifuge program. For example, CORA Engineering had “delivered a complete installation for feeding uranium hexafluoride into the uranium enrichment plant.” As for VAT, it had been supplying valves for gas centrifuges.

According to the non-paper, as recently as May both VAT and CORA Engineering, or individuals working with them, had “enter[ed] into contracts worth several millions of dollars.” Considering the previous and ongoing transactions, the U.S. government asked the Swiss government to “take actions to ensure control of exports and other types of assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programs.” Like West Germany, Switzerland was not an enthusiastic partner in this endeavor. Although a signatory of the NPT, Switzerland’s reluctance to take economic action against another state brought considerable frustration to the Carter administration and its successors.