The Clinton-Yeltsin Relationship in Their Own Words

This is the first meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin as presidents. Starting with this one, in Vancouver, Canada, they will meet 18 times. Both of them are enthusiastic about the things they can do together—helping the Russian reform succeed, improve cooperation in space and energy, share their countries’ cultural achievements, and resolve conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Georgia. The conversation is upbeat, friendly and full of optimism for the future. Yeltsin describes the challenges in economic reform, explains that his managers only have experience in planned economy and that they only “have passed the exams for the first grade out of ten in market economics.” He introduces his young finance minister, Boris Fedorov, who explains the main elements of the reform program. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and his Russian counterpart discuss the urgent needs and suggest issues to be raised at the upcoming G-7 in Tokyo. Yeltsin only mentions the difficult domestic political situation in passing, but his true emotions are revealed when vice presidents are mentioned. He loves Bentsen’s suggestion that his oppositional vice president, Alexander Rutskoy, be sent to space for two years. The presidents joke about the meaning of their names in Russian—Bill means “hit,” and Boris “means fighting, struggling with no result!” The document reveals real warmth and chemistry emerging between Bill and Boris, who decide at this dinner to call each other by the first names, and the sense that anything is possible if they work together.

During the September 1994 Yeltsin state visit to Washington, the presidents covered the entire spectrum of U.S.-Russian relations including Russian economic reform, pulling nuclear weapons out of Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, the post-Soviet space and, surprising the U.S. officials, the nuclear “football”. On 27 September, after a wide-ranging discussion of security issues, Yeltsin proposed getting “rid of the nuclear footballs.” With the advanced state of communications, he saw no need to have someone “drag around one of these briefcases.”[9] [See William Burr EBB No. 632]

As Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev summarizes progress in dismantling nuclear missiles, he explained his government’s position on tactical nuclear weapons. In contrast to the United States, which had withdrawn overseas tactical nuclear weapons, Russia "cannot destroy all tactical nuclear weapons” because "within reasonable bounds we need some" for deterring possible aggression from “states to the south.” Near the end of the conversation, Grachev briefly raises the problem of limiting nuclear submarine patrolling zones because “some submarines have entered our territorial waters and we almost had a catastrophe.” That was a reference to the several recent collisions between U.S. and Russian submarines, one of them occurring in March 1993, just before the first Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in Vancouver. The two presidents agree to talk about the problem at their next meeting, but information on any further discussion has yet to be released.

The next day’s discussion, along with a private Clinton-Yeltsin luncheon, focuses on two sensitive issues—the Russian biological warfare program and NATO expansion.[10] During the meeting on 27 September, Yeltsin says that the Russians has presented a long-awaited paper on their biological weapons activities. That paper, like the record of the discussion on 28 September, remains classified.

On the eve of the 1994 Budapest meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), Yeltsin sends Clinton a letter describing the Russian view of European security. He warns against rapid NATO expansion. In many ways, the letter is a preview of Yeltsin’s confrontational “cold peace” speech, which would shock Clinton and the world media only days later at the Budapest meeting itself. Here Yeltsin writes that Russians see the institutionalization of CSCE into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, as a major step toward creating a “full-fledged all-European organization with a sound legal basis.” Of particular importance to Moscow is the fact that the OSCE will include all the aspiring NATO candidates among its members, as well as the United States and Russia as partners of equal standing. In other words, the Russians view the OSCE as the only fully integrative post-Cold War structure and think, as a result, that it should be developed and strengthened by Moscow and Washington jointly. In contrast, expansion of NATO would, in Moscow’s view, divert energy and attention from this more important all-European project.

Referring to their last conversation during the late September summit in Washington, Yeltsin writes that “we have agreed with you that there would be no surprises, that first we should pass through this stage of partnership, whereas issues of further evolution of NATO should not be decided without due account to the opinion and interests of Russia.” The Russian leader warns that discussions with prospective members and developing timetables “will be interpreted and not only in Russia as the beginning of a new split of Europe.”

Yeltsin is very appreciative of the fact that Clinton has come to Moscow to celebrate the 50th anniversary of their shared victory in World War II. This long and wide-ranging conversation is remarkable as a glimpse into the Bill-Boris relationship, particularly because it contains Yeltsin’s cri de coeur on NATO. He sees “nothing but humiliation” for Russia if NATO expands, calling it a new form of “encirclement.” Yeltsin argues for a new European security system, not the continuation of an old bloc. He says emotionally that “for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding toward those of Russia – that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.” In response, Clinton patiently and clearly explains the U.S. position on NATO expansion: that it should be seen in the context of continuing U.S. involvement in European security, and an effort to create a fully integrated Europe. He hints at trade-offs if Yeltsin accepts NATO expansion, namely, that Russia could become a founding member of the post-COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) regime, join the G-7, and have a special relationship with NATO – but only if Russia “walk[s] through the doors that we open for you.”

Yeltsin’s urgent priority is the upcoming elections; he confides in the U.S. president that his “position heading into 1996 elections is not exactly brilliant.” He asks the president to postpone the expansion discussion until at least after the election. In response, Clinton is straightforward about his own electoral pressures, from Republicans and from voters in Wisconsin, Illinois and Ohio, all pushing for NATO expansion. Yeltsin eventually agrees reluctantly to Clinton’s proposal that there will be no NATO decisions until after elections are over, only a study of expansion. Yeltsin needs Clinton’s support to win the 1996 elections and he sees no alternatives other than relying on the American’s assurances.

IIn this meeting with Clinton, Yeltsin returns to the subject of NATO and once again emphasizes Russian priorities. Yeltsin seeks a treaty or some other, special accord between NATO and Russia; but, most importantly, he promotes the OSCE as “the principal mechanism” for building a new security order in Europe. “NATO is a factor, too, of course, but NATO should evolve into a political organization” he adds. The Russian president prioritizes success in building a new European security order above all other projects. Clinton does not directly respond, but talks about the importance of the fact that Russia’s and NATO’s militaries are working together and engaging in peacekeeping. The character of this meeting is cordial. The two leaders reach mutual understanding on difficult issues such as sales of reactors to Iran, on policy toward North Korea, and on nuclear testing, START and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) accord – although these understandings are mostly on U.S. terms, with Clinton proposing and Yeltsin accepting. Yeltsin believes that their personal partnership is crucial to their success: “We’ll build the partnership on the basis of our friendship, yours and mine, and we’ll do so for the sake of world peace.” At one point the Russian leader even reaches out and pats Clinton on his knee.

Clinton initiates this call and congratulates Yeltsin on announcing his candidacy for the upcoming Russian presidential elections. (At the time, Yeltsin’s approval rating was in the single digits, and Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov seemed to be the likely winner). Clinton encourages Yeltsin, praising the Russian leader for “guaranteeing free and fair elections.” Clinton is planning to visit Moscow in April, mainly to shore up Yeltsin’s electoral chances. The U.S. President asks Yeltsin to put pressure on the Russian Duma to ratify START II so that the two presidents might exchange instruments of ratification during the visit. (This exchange does not happen, due to the Duma’s strong opposition to NATO expansion and to its perception that the U.S. intends to modify, or withdraw from, the ABM treaty). Clinton also urges Yeltsin to reach a peaceful settlement in the Chechen war, which Yeltsin promises to “finish, finish this up, before the election.” He emphasizes their personal “partnership and friendship,” which is especially important “during this election year.”

For his part, Yeltsin raises their May 1995 agreement on NATO expansion: “you and I agreed that for one year there would be some kind of hiatus and that no one would raise this issue very strongly” before the elections. Clinton reassures him that, true to their agreement, only informal conversations are taking place with future candidates. There were no set timetables no decisions taken: “there will be no surprises on the agenda. We are going to stay with the agreement.” At the end of the conversation Yeltsin thanks Clinton profusely and asks for money. He wants Clinton “to use your influence [with the IMF] to perhaps add a little, from 9 to 13 billion dollars – to deal with social problems in this very important pre-election situation and help the people.” Clinton promises to “do some work on it.”

Yeltsin calls Clinton to report on his trip to China and to ask, again, for financial support. The Russian president reports that Jiang Zemin wants to begin improving relations with the United States and adds that Beijing would like to “take part in the CTBT [Conventional Test Ban Treaty].” Clinton asks Yeltsin about Chechnya (following up on a recent letter on this subject) and suggests that Yeltsin should engage King Hassan, who has agreed to help arrange a peaceful settlement. Yeltsin tells his counterpart that he has decided to fly to Chechnya and to participate in trilateral negotiations between the Chechen government, the field commanders and the federal government.

Then Yeltsin raises the main issue: “Bill, for my election campaign, I urgently need for Russia a loan of $2.5 billion.” He says he only had received $300 million, and IMF officials tell him another billion would first become available later, in the second half of the year. Yeltsin makes clear that he needs the funds right away, before the election, in order “to pay pensions and wages.” Clinton promises to check on the matter. He then thanks Yeltsin for making progress on a dispute about CFE (the flank issue) and expresses hope that the matter will soon be finalized.

Clinton also comments that Yeltsin did the right thing in not postponing the elections (as some members of Yeltsin’s circle, such as his bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov, had suggested) because, in Clinton’s view, “this election will be the milestone for Russian democracy.” In conclusion, they return to the issue of loans, and Clinton asks with whom in the Russian government he can have U.S. counterparts deal with this issue. Yeltsin names Deputy Chairman Oleg Davydov

The state of Yeltsin’s health often loomed large in the two presidents’ conversations. Yeltsin suffered from a variety of heart and other ailments, exacerbated by a drinking problem, and would periodically disappear for extended hospital stays and recovery periods. In this brief, nine-minute phone call, Clinton praises Yeltsin for the Russian leader’s decision to announce publicly that he will need heart surgery, ending months of official silence and rumors. Yeltsin thanks Clinton, and adds that “it would be a good idea if experts from the U.S. could come to consult for the operation.” The Russian president notes that there is an international conference for heart surgeons scheduled to be held in Moscow on September 26 and 27, 1996, and asks if Clinton would mind if he, Yeltsin, consulted with “your specialists” while they are here. Clinton says “I think that’s a fine idea.” Yeltsin then asks how Clinton sees his electoral chances, and the president responds “I just hope I can do as well as you.” Yeltsin would go on to have successful bypass surgery in November 1996.

The Helsinki summit is the first meeting between Yeltsin and Clinton after the Russian president’s multiple bypass surgery in November 1996. The talks cover several crucial issues including the importance of Russian-Chinese-United States cooperation and the problem of nuclear proliferation. Yeltsin makes it clear that he opposes missile sales that could build up India’s nuclear potential. On Iran, which Clinton asks about, Yeltsin declares that he also opposes missile sales to Iran but not submarines or nuclear power stations. He is more doubtful about the proposed sale of an enrichment plant to Iran because it could bring Tehran “closer to having weapons-grade uranium.”

When Clinton mentions recent intelligence that “some very dangerous” missile technologies “have reached Iran from Russia,” Yeltsin denies the reports, arguing that technology is from China or North Korea. Asking about U.S. efforts to “build bridges” to Iran, Clinton acknowledges that he “was willing to talk to them as long [as] terrorism is one of the issues on the agenda, but they always refuse.” The United States cannot have discussions with Iran “in ways that might make it see that we’re acquiescent in Iranian behavior that threatens our people, our friends, and our allies.”

Three years after Yeltsin first proposed it during the Washington summit, he shows that he remains interested in getting rid of the nuclear Football. Recalling that during his recent surgery he passed temporary control over the Football to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin mentions that he took part in a recent nuclear exercise with the Russian Football where a nuclear weapon was launched at the Kamchatka Peninsula. That reminds Clinton of the plot of the “The Crimson Tide,” which involved “nuclear hair triggers,” but which his advisers have told him “could not actually happen.” [See William Burr EBB No. 632]

This hour-long conversation takes place in the Gold Room of the Brown Palace during the Denver summit. Yeltsin, as part of his recovery from his surgery of November 1996, claims he has “lost 30 kilograms” and that he is now “moving with more energy.” Clinton responds “[y]ou look good” and Yeltsin quips “I prefer that women would tell me that!” They go on to discuss various aspects of arms control, until Yeltsin has to admit that “I am not as up on the issues as I should be.” Clinton emphasizes that his goal is successful completion of START III (a goal he will never achieve, as negotiations will eventually break down). The president pushes Yeltsin on “reports that we have that Russians – not you – are providing cooperation with Iran on SA-10 missiles and ground-to-ground medium-range ballistic missiles.” While the U.S. hopes that “elections will lead to a new course in Iran,” Clinton “can’t imagine anything more destabilizing than an Iranian capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction over intermediate-range distances.” Yeltsin insists that Russia is delivering “nothing in the way of complete missiles, just parts of missiles.” He promises to “establish another commission” to look into this, after a previous commission failed to “provide me with adequate information.”

In this 27-minute phone call, Yeltsin asks Clinton “to abide strictly by the provisions of the START I accord. We have some fears that the U.S. is not complying fully with the provisions of the accords that have been reached.” Yeltsin is also concerned about the level of espionage that the U.S. and Russia are conducting against each other, apparently in response to U.S. complaints over “the growing Russian intelligence presence in the U.S.” Yeltsin feels that “neither you nor I need to become enmeshed in a competition over who had more intelligence officers infiltrated in the country of the other side.” The Russian president also complains that Washington is using “the special services of the other countries of the CIS and former Warsaw Pact … against Russia.” Clinton assures Yeltsin that the U.S. will “follow through on our promises on START I.” There is no response to Yeltsin’s comments about intelligence operations in this document, however.

Clinton and Yeltsin meet for a summit in Birmingham, England. In this conversation from 11:47 a.m. to 12:33 p.m., Yeltsin expresses concern about the growing criticism he is receiving for his relationship with Clinton. He notes that “I’ve been under fire for this, and so have you.” Yeltsin wants both of them to “push back against the idea that there are deep and irreconcilable tensions in our relations.” They discuss Yeltsin’s forming of a new government, and his attempts to get START II ratified in the Duma. Clinton calls for bilateral cooperation on Kosovo, saying there is “no way to resolve this whole problem unless we continue to work together.” He praises U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke for having “unusual chemistry with Milosevic.”

Kosovo dominates this conversation. Yeltsin informs Clinton that he has invited Slobodan Milosevic to Moscow. The Russian president indicates that he plans to have “a tough talk with Milosevic” and “demand that the disproportionate use of force be stopped.” Yeltsin suggests he and Clinton should work together to put pressure on their respective allies in Kosovo—Yeltsin on Belgrade and Clinton on the Kosovar Albanians. The Russian president clearly expresses his strong conviction that any “use of force by NATO is inadmissible.” Moreover, “if there should be a strike by NATO against Yugoslavia without UN Security Council sanction, that would be considered a blow to cooperation between Russia and NATO.” In return, Clinton expresses his hope that all parties involved will be able to work through the United Nations and that “no NATO action would be necessary.” The U.S. president hopes Russia and NATO will work on this situation in the Permanent Joint Council, “being honest and open and candid.” Clinton also comments on the dire Russian financial situation and the new government of young reformers headed by 35-year-old Sergey Kirienko (with Boris Nemtsov as deputy prime minister) that Yeltsin had put in place in the end of April. Clinton believes that “what’s happened in Russia with investments and stocks is a function of what’s going on in Asia spilling over.” He assures Yeltsin that “I have been supporting more IMF and World Bank funding for Russia if necessary” and also encourages Yeltsin to make another push to ratify START II.

Three days before the Russian default, Clinton calls Yeltsin in preparation for their upcoming meeting in September and to check on the state of the reform program that the embattled Kirienko government has been trying to push through the Russian parliament. The U.S. president warns his Russian counterpart about the looming danger of the Asian financial crisis for Russia and urges him to stay with the reformist course; he also encourages him to work with Yegor Gaidar. The IMF money that Yeltsin is hoping for would not be sufficient if there is no feeling of confidence in the reform in the country and the Duma is uncooperative. Clinton offers to meet with Duma members when he comes to Moscow. Yeltsin in turn proposes that they address the Duma together, and his remark is revealing of his total lack of interaction with the parliament: “members of Duma are not accustomed to seeing their own president on their premises, but if the President of the U.S. comes to Russia and together with the President of Russia you and I go to the Duma and address them, I think that would be a very strong move on our part.”

Clinton promises to do “[w]hatever I can do to get them to vote for you and your program.” He talks about the urgency of the situation, and that the next IMF move expected before his visit to Russia might be too late. In the second part of the conversation, Clinton addresses the situation in Kosovo telling Yeltsin that “Milosevich has not kept his promise to you,” and has already displaced 200,000 civilians from their homes. He warns that if the Serbian autocrat “feels he has a green light from Russia for a military solution, it will be much harder to get him to negotiate.”

Throughout the conversation, Yeltsin repeatedly refers to the importance of their personal relationship, the “you and me” and how their “views are identical.” Clinton shows genuine empathy and desire to help his Russian partner. The Russian president is quite effusive in signing off: “I hug you, Bill. I give you a good warm hug.”

In this conversation, the first since Clinton’s visit to Moscow in early September 1998 and soon after the Russian default, Yeltsin walks Clinton through the new government he has just appointed. His new prime minister is Yevgeny Primakov, a known quantity for the Americans in his prior position as a tough but effective foreign minister since January 1996. His new chairman of the Central Bank, Victor Geraschenko, and Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov are holdovers from the Soviet time (Geraschenko was chairman of the USSR State Bank in 1989-1991 and Maslyukov was a full Politburo member and deputy defense industry minister in the USSR). Clinton expresses his concern about the new government being seen as conservative and anti-reformist: “as a friend I owe it to you to say the appointments you made raise concerns that Russia will return to the hyperinflation Russia suffered in 1992.”

This telcon gives great insight into how the relationship between the two presidents worked. Clinton starts the conversation by praising Yeltsin for leading his country through a difficult financial crisis “under tremendous political pressure” and saying that Yeltsin “held true to your role of being the father of Russian democracy.” Later in the conversation Clinton expresses his concerns and suggests specific things he hopes Yeltsin could do to address them. In the end of the conversation, Yeltsin agrees with Clinton’s suggestions and characteristically promises: “I understand your point, Bill, and I will act as you suggest I should, especially since this is part of past practice established between you and me, and it has never failed us in the past.”

JJust three and a half hours before the start of the NATO strikes on Belgrade, Clinton calls Yeltsin to inform him about the allied decision. Yeltsin is angry about not being consulted, either through the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council or through the Contact Group on Yugoslavia and he makes a last-ditch effort to stop the strikes. Clinton explains his reasoning: that he is repulsed by Milosevich’s latest evacuation of Albanian villages (he is careful not to use the term “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide”) and frustrated with the futile effort to negotiate with the Serbian leadership over the last year. But for Yeltsin, this is the red line—the newly expanded NATO, without going through the UN Security Council and over strong and consistent Russian objections, is about to bomb a Russian ally—and a personal humiliation, which would cost him dearly at home.

Yeltsin appeals to their friendship, alternatively threatening and pleading with Clinton. He threatens that the Russians “have many steps to aim against your decision, maybe inadmissible steps,” that the Duma will not ratify START II Treaty and that it would forever damage their friendship. Clinton in response reminds him that “I have always been there for you, working hard with my people to support Russia economically. I came there last Fall. I was there in 1996 when a lot of people said I shouldn’t go.” The Russian president then pleads: “In the name of our future, in the name of you and me, in the name of the future of our countries, in the name of security in Europe, I ask you to renounce that strike,” and prophetically comments that “our people certainly from now have a bad attitude with regard to America and with NATO.”

This document and the next, among the final conversations between Clinton and Yeltsin before the latter suddenly resigns at the end of the year, are primarily of interest for what they reveal about the selection of Putin as Yeltsin’s successor. Yeltsin informs the U.S. president that he “took a lot of time to think who might be the next Russian president in the year 2000.” In theory that choice would in the hands of the voters, but Yeltsin clearly thinks otherwise. After much searching, Yeltsin tells Clinton, “I came across him, that is, Putin, and I explored his bio, his interests, his acquaintances, and so on and so forth.” Yeltsin came to the conclusion that Putin was “highly qualified.” While Yeltsin does not explain how he will ensure that Putin becomes his successor, in the year 2000 Yeltsin and his daughter, Tatyana, regale Clinton and Strobe Talbott (as described in Talbott’s book The Russia Hand, p. 7) with “a self-congratulatory account of how he had maneuvered Putin from obscurity into the presidency over fierce resistance,” a feat Tatyana called “‘one of the hardest things we ever pulled off.’” Talbott also chooses not to share details, so the exact nature of the deals struck behind the scenes at the time of this critical power transition in Russia remain murky to this day.

The final phone conversation between Clinton and Yeltsin before the latter leaves office is a brief affair, lasting ten minutes. Clinton congratulates Yeltsin on a “courageous decision” to resign, adding pointedly that the U.S. “will work with Putin and the Russian people as they make their choice for the next democratically elected president.” Yeltsin indicates that “this was not an easy decision for me” but the he had wanted to “support Putin 100 percent and now I’ve given him three months” for people to “get used to him” – in other words, the advantage of incumbency. Yeltsin is leaving secure in the knowledge that “Putin is a strong person and he will be able to cope with the task he has.”