Documents show Gorbachev’s desperate efforts to talk Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and head off the Bush administration’s military solution in the Gulf
Anatoly Chernyaev: The swan song of new policy aimed at ‘a new world order’
Karen Brutents: The first war of the New World Order
Mikhail Gorbachev: We had entered the new era to the thunder of cannon
Washington, D.C., February 26, 2021 – Thirty years ago this week, the U.S.-led coalition launched its ground offensive in the Persian Gulf after spending months trying to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait and comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions without conditions or linkages to a wider settlement in the Middle East. Only 100 hours after the ground offensive started (the air war had run for more than a month previously), the U.S. ceased hostilities as images of decimated Iraqi troops, strung along a “highway of death” out of Kuwait, ran on global media.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev spent weeks before combat began trying to prevent the application of military force, which he saw as antithetical to his “new thinking” about a post-Cold War, norms-based world order. But Gorbachev failed, undermined by the erratic decisions and stalling of the Iraqi dictator, by the inexorable military logic of the coalition build-up, and by the growing determination of U.S. President George H.W. Bush that Saddam could not be trusted.
Today’s publication of Soviet and American transcripts of highest-level phone calls, meetings, and letters documents what top Gorbachev aide Anatoly Chernyaev called a “diplomatic marathon” that Bush kept saying he appreciated – keeping Gorbachev inside the tent so to speak – while always pushing back and setting hard deadlines for action rather than just statements. The publication features, for the first time in English, memoranda of ten Gorbachev phone calls on February 23, 1991, alone – hours before ground combat started – with foreign leaders ranging from Bush to Iran’s Rafsanjani, India’s Gandhi, Egypt’s Mubarak, and Germany’s Kohl, among others. The collection also includes the declassified American summary of all the U.S.-Soviet discussions from January 11 through February 23, and the full U.S. memcons of the final set of Bush-Gorbachev calls on February 21, 22 and 23, 1991.
Military success in the Persian Gulf pushed Bush’s approval ratings to 90% in the U.S., yet he would lose his re-election bid less than two years later. The view from Moscow turned sour much sooner. Chernyaev wrote in his diary on February 25 that the war was the “swan song of new policy aimed at a new order.” Top Middle East expert on the Central Committee Karen Brutents commented ironically that instead of the last conflict of the Cold War, this was the first of the new unipolar world order. And Gorbachev wrote, “we had entered the new era, announced as the era of the new world order, to the thunder of cannons—not the best accompaniment.”[1] American restraint in not going on to Baghdad certainly proved wise in view of the disasters that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq by Bush’s son; but the events of January and February of 1991 marked the end of Gorbachev’s vision that the non-use of military force would become the hallmark of a new era.
Soviet support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) proved indispensable for creating a powerful international partnership willing and capable of reversing the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. From the first day of Saddam’s invasion through the end of the ground war, the Soviet Union provided unwavering support to the U.S.-led coalition, and was one of the main partners of the United States. The importance of Moscow’s support declined once the use-of-force resolution passed, because much of its leverage had come from its ability to prevent a military action, or otherwise to undermine American efforts in the region.
After passage of Resolution 678, the United States carefully watched events unfold in the Soviet Union where Gorbachev, under criticism for the failure of domestic reform and for his entanglement with the United States in the Gulf, steadily moved towards the conservatives and abandoned his democratic allies. On December 18, a senior NSC group on Soviet contingencies headed by Condoleezza Rice described the situation in the Soviet Union as “a creeping crackdown,” and a CIA analysis saw that Gorbachev had taken a “significant turn to the right.”[2]
Just two days later, White House worries escalated with the sudden resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Now the Bush administration pondered what their reaction should be if there was a serious conservative backlash in the USSR. A Scowcroft memo to the president on December 21 outlined possible scenarios and options, pointing quite accurately to the increased possibility of violence in the Baltics, where the army might “take advantage of the tense environment to create a pretext for the use of force. […] [A]n incident could flare without Gorbachev’s knowledge or acquiescence.” This was exactly what happened three weeks later. However, the memo concluded that while Gorbachev might have to take harsh steps to hold the Union together, “we will most certainly have the task of continuing our geostrategic cooperation with the Soviet Union – particularly in the Gulf – in the face of the rapid unraveling of the Soviet leadership’s commitment to internal reform.”[3]
Meanwhile, as New Year's 1991 rolled in and U.S. intentions were becoming more clear, Gorbachev was trying desperately to keep his American partners from initiating military action, and at the same time hoping to persuade Saddam to agree to a full and unconditional withdrawal. In January 1991, Gorbachev created an emergency group on the Persian Gulf, which included Primakov, Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov, and KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov but also Gorbachev’s most liberal adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev. The Soviet leader spent hours on the phone with European leaders and with Bush trying to persuade them to give negotiations a chance. In his phone conversations with Bush, Gorbachev spoke about loss of life and economic destruction, while also agreeing that Saddam’s position was untenable and that he was not responding to diplomatic overtures. Gorbachev tried to postpone the start of the air campaign but then, once it started, agreed it was inevitable because of Saddam’s intransigence.[4]
As early as January, the United States saw Gorbachev’s efforts to work out a peaceful solution as a problem and a nuisance. At that moment Washington was concerned that Saddam might actually comply with U.N. resolutions, which would undermine the grounds for Desert Storm. Gorbachev’s entreaties added to U.S. concerns and there was very little talk of the partnership. Scowcroft in his memoirs speaks about Gorbachev’s mediating efforts with condescension and tellingly admits: “we could not let him interfere with our Gulf diplomacy or our operations at a critical moment.”[5]
The fact that the USSR's value as a partner had declined, and that the Soviet leaders were only informed rather than consulted about important military and political moves made even some Soviet reformers skeptical about U.S. intentions in the Gulf. Some felt deeply frustrated that the United States was still playing a geopolitical game even while demanding Soviet cooperation. Top Gorbachev adviser Anatoly Chernyaev reacted with dismay when he heard the news of the beginning of the ground war; this was characteristic of the exasperation of policy makers who were deeply committed to new thinking and a new vision of world order. In his diary Chernyaev wrote about Gorbachev's last efforts to persuade Western leaders not to start the ground offensive after Saddam, during Tariq Aziz’s visit to Moscow on February 22, had conditionally agreed to withdraw troops: "[The West was] deliberately confusing [Gorbachev]. Sometimes he felt it, but continued to believe that the criteria of the new thinking would work, that trust meant something. Not in this case! What had worked was the traditional logic of politics: the might, the riches, the interests determine what is right. And it is not that hard to find a moral explanation for actions against Hussein."[6]
Gorbachev was incensed at this treatment at the time and complained bitterly to other leaders such as Rajiv Gandhi.[7] But in retrospect, he came to a more restrained conclusion in his memoirs: “I knew that George Bush in his heart wanted to use the occasion to crush Saddam’s regime with all military might. But he was also ready for a political settlement, although without compromises. However, Hussein, by his ambitious, insolent actions, which aggravated [his] illegal aggression, ‘helped’ the U.S. President to carry out the military option.”[8]
In the end, the coalition did not split, the Soviets stood firmly behind their American partners, and the aggressor was punished. But according to top Soviet expert Karen Brutents, writing in his memoirs, instead of the last war of the Cold War, this became the first war of the new era – previewing and symbolizing the new world order that was emerging – the unipolar world where the United States was calling the shots. Gorbachev was mistaken in his belief that the Soviet Union and the United States were genuine partners and that he and Bush shared the vision of a new, norms-based world. As historian Jeffrey Engel perceptively concluded: “Both wanted a new world order, but only one was willing to consider military force as part of it. Not surprisingly, it was the one with force to spare, capable of deploying troops across the world even as his counterpart struggled to bring his own forces home […].”[9]
Document 1
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, 2011-0796-MR
This Top Secret memo from Secretary of State Baker to President Bush summarizes his conversations with allies in London, just a day before a high-stakes meeting in Geneva with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Only a week was left before the January 15 deadline set by the November 1990 United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and Baker held little hope that Aziz would bring any message of compliance; but in Baker’s view, the Americans had to be seen as engaging in diplomacy in order to secure legitimacy for the military action almost sure to come. The memo mentions Spain’s agreement to allow staging for U.S. B-52 bombers, the British query about non-military targets and possible biological weapons in Iraq, and word from the French about “some hope” for Saddam’s withdrawal, but the underlying message is allied support for the “use of force if necessary.”
Document 2
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Richard Haass Files, FOIA 1999-0578-F
This fascinating Top Secret draft by senior NSC Middle East specialist Richard Haass (future director of the Council on Foreign Relations) gives a rough pecking order list of who really matters in the entire “new world order” on the eve of the Gulf War. This is the list of who exactly needed to be called by President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, or lower officials – and when – before the air war started on January 17, 1991. The handwritten notes, perhaps on Scowcroft’s instructions, change the order and the timing: “H-1” means the start of hostilities minus one hour. Attached to Haass’s draft is a more final, two-page listing, with the President reaching out to key heads of state like British Prime Minister John Major (“H-12”), and Baker calling allies like Spain and Italy (H-1), and notably the Soviet Union (Bessmertnykh, H-1). Haass’ original draft contemplated a direct message from the president through the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Jack Matlock, to Gorbachev.
Document 3
Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary manuscript donated by author to the National Security Archive
Anatoly Chernyaev is by Gorbachev’s side through all the developments of the Persian Gulf crisis, starting from day one. He is probably the most pro-Western of advisors and does not see any option other than supporting the U.S.-led coalition. In these diary entries he documents the internal decision making on Iraq as Gorbachev convenes a special group on the Persian Gulf, which includes several hardliners such as Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov and KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov (future leaders of the August 1991 coup), who feed Gorbachev bogus information that the U.S. is about to strike Hussein with nuclear weapons. The loyal advisor describes Gorbachev’s frustration with not being consulted by Bush about the start of the aerial campaign as he recounts their long conversation on January 18. What makes the Gorbachev position even more difficult is that all these events coincide with harsh domestic criticism of the Soviet leader after the use of force in Lithuania.
Document 4
Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Fond 1, opis 1
Gorbachev hopes that Mitterrand will support Soviet efforts to prevent further military action in the Gulf, reminding him “we together have done more than others to resolve this conflict by political means.” In Gorbachev’s view, after the first two days of bombing, Saddam must realize the he “suffered political defeat” as well as substantial damage to his troops and installations, and should be willing to negotiate on withdrawal. Gorbachev talks about human losses if the ground campaign starts and that by stopping the war now they can be avoided. Mitterrand is not convinced; he tells Gorbachev that he is fulfilling his allied obligations and points to the missile attack on Israel as evidence of Hussein’s effort to widen the conflict.
Document 5
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, 2009-0753-MR
This striking summary from the U.S. national security adviser to his British counterpart in what he calls “the third week of the war” provides remarkable detail on the progress of the air war against Saddam Hussein, including the U.S.-led coalition’s domination of the air space, degrading Iraqi command and control, and the British contribution to the destruction of the Iraqi navy. But the main point appears in the last paragraph, when Scowcroft tells Powell any discussion of an international conference to address the larger Middle East issues is “premature” at best. Bush had secretly promised Gorbachev such a conference when they met at Helsinki in September 1990, but only after dealing with Iraq. In February 1991, Saddam Hussein was attempting to push the proposal publicly as part of a conditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and the U.S. wanted no part of that deal.
Document 6
Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary manuscript donated by author to the National Security Archive
Chernyaev documents Gorbachev’s increasingly desperate efforts to persuade the Iraqis to agree to withdraw from Kuwait, and to persuade the Western coalition partners to give Iraq time and a chance to save face. Describing the Soviet internal debate, Chernyaev never mentions that the issue was discussed at any formal state bodies other than the ad-hoc Group on the Persian Gulf War. He is surprised to find that the academic experts were “divided into Westerners and Arab patriots,” just as were the Foreign Ministry experts. The diary documents the many phone calls Gorbachev is making to Western and Middle Eastern leaders. Chernyaev becomes more and more cynical in describing the Bush-Gorbachev interactions: “Gorbachev is trying to beat Bush on humanism, but by American standards it is worth nothing. […] One has to worry that the Americans might strike precisely during these days to foil [Gorbachev’s] plan.”
Document 7
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, 2009-0753-MR
This message from the U.S. national security advisor conveys the text he has just discussed with his British counterpart, intended as a Bush letter to all the members of the anti-Saddam coalition, rejecting the latest Gorbachev initiative to avoid a ground war. The text describes the Gorbachev-Iraq discussions as failing to meet the requirements of the UN resolutions by giving the Iraqis an indefinite amount of time for withdrawal from Kuwait. Meanwhile, the U.S. would allow no cease-fire unless Iraq began a “massive withdrawal” beforehand. Yet, “that said, we are not closing the door on diplomacy.” The ground war would begin one week from this message.
Document 8
Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Fond 1, opis 1
This short excerpt from the Gorbachev’s conversation with one of his most important Western partners shows the conundrum he is in. While trying to follow his vision of a new world without use of force, he cannot even persuade his former ally Saddam Hussein, the person whose country he is trying to shield from bloodshed. Hussein is playing for time and rejecting Gorbachev’s peace plan, as Gorbachev hears from the German chancellor.
Document 9
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Presidential Telcon Files, FOIA 2009-0275-S
This detailed transcript of Bush’s phone call with Gorbachev just three days before the ground war shows Gorbachev in the throes of his final “diplomatic marathon,” doing everything he can to head off troops going into Kuwait and what he sees as the enormous human cost that use of force will incur. But he is talking to American leaders who have supervised for the previous month a devastating air war that already decimated Saddam Hussein’s forces – and many Iraqi civilians. Plus Gorbachev’s peace initiatives depended upon Saddam’s own erratic decisions, and the Iraqi dictator apparently believed the Americans would never commit ground troops. Bush tells Gorbachev, “Very candidly, just to be very honest with you, we have no trust anymore in anything the man says.” Yet Bush assures the Soviet leader, “nobody here thinks you are doing anything other than trying to be extra helpful and working toward peace,” and leaves the door open a crack.
Document 10
Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Fond 1, opis 1
Gorbachev calls Mitterrand to inform him that Tariq Aziz is flying to Moscow with a response to Gorbachev’s peace proposals. While the Soviet leader does not know exactly what the message contains, he hopes Hussein has finally accepted his peace plan. Mitterrand praises Gorbachev’s role as “the decisive one at this current turning point, which will decide whether there will be peace or whether military operations will be expanded.” He encourages Gorbachev to be firm with Hussein and to make it clear to him that time is running out. In his usual manner, Mitterrand hints about “some persons and some countries, which, even in the face of a positive reply from Saddam Hussein, would still strive to continue the conflict,” which to Gorbachev’s ears sounds like the French leader shares his feelings about the U.S. priorities.
Document 11
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Presidential Telcon Files, FOIA 2009-0275-S
This transcript of Gorbachev’s phone call with the White House on February 22 marks the end, in the American view, of any remote possibility that a diplomatic solution could be in the offing; and the core of the U.S. argument, first from Baker before Bush joins the call, then emphasized by Bush – “the blackest fire covering almost all of Kuwait you have ever seen in your life” – points to Saddam’s “scorched earth” actions that day in burning the Kuwait oil fields. In response to Gorbachev, the Americans had come up with a 24-hour “waiting period” for Saddam to begin withdrawing before they would start the ground invasion, but even Gorbachev admits here that Saddam has not agreed to what Aziz had been saying in Moscow about withdrawal after a ceasefire.
Document 12
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Presidential Telcon Files, FOIA 2009-0275-S
This transcript contains some of the last gasps of Gorbachev’s diplomatic efforts to prevent a ground war in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet leader calls Bush at Camp David to say there’s been “a white flag from Saddam Hussein” – a press statement about a withdrawal within four days. But Bush disagrees: “I can’t say you must move out by noon and – with no movement and continued destruction of the oil fields – do nothing.” Bush tells Gorbachev that the U.S. just cannot wait any longer; he appreciates Gorbachev’s efforts “but I don’t want to leave a false impression that there is any more time.”
Document 13
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Presidential Telcon Files, FOIA 2009-0275-S
Less than two hours after the last Bush-Gorbachev conversation on February 23 (Document 12), Kohl calls to check in, especially worried about the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Kohl owes Gorbachev enormous gratitude for the latter’s acquiescence in the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the German leader wants to make sure that the Americans “continue to regard [Gorbachev] as an ally” despite his efforts to make peace with Saddam. Bush assures Kohl, “He [Gorbachev] wants to consider his country as a great power with interests in the region, and he wants to be taken seriously. I have told him we feel the same way.”
Document 14
Gorbachev describes in his memoirs that he “never left the phone,” spending the entire day of February 23, starting with a quarter after midnight and finishing his last conversation after 9 p.m., trying to make one last effort to achieve a “non-military solution” in the Gulf. [10] He believed that after the Iraqi acceptance of his plan—which did not satisfy all U.S. demands—there was still a chance to convene a session of the U.N. Security Council and to prevent the ground offensive. Chernyaev called this effort a “diplomatic marathon.” Starting with a tough conversation with Aziz right after midnight, Gorbachev makes demands, tries to persuade, pleads, appeals to principles—but in the end he does not find enough support among his interlocutors. Most of them tell him that they share his ideals but do not trust Saddam Hussein’s assurances. Even Mubarak, who speaks Russian with Gorbachev, tells him bluntly: “Among the Arabs, nobody believes Saddam Hussein. […] I don’t believe him. He has lied to us too many times.” These conversations also provide little vignettes of Gorbachev’s relationships with various world leaders. He is most trusting of Rajiv Gandhi, to whom Gorbachev vents his frustration and even sympathetically listens to the suggestion that the United States might have been laying a trap for Iraq from the very beginning. The Iranian leader Hashemi Rafsanjani is most supportive of Gorbachev’s plan among the countries of the region. Helmut Kohl seems to be most empathetic and truthful with Gorbachev but also tells him that he has to be “together with George.”
Document 15
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Brent Scowcroft Files
This chronological summary of the Bush-Gorbachev and Bush-Bessmertnykh phone calls, meetings, and letters during the runup to the Persian Gulf War provides a useful overview of the U.S.-Soviet discussions as Gorbachev launched his “diplomatic marathon” trying to prevent the ground war in Kuwait that ultimately began on February 24. The American president keeps expressing his appreciation for Gorbachev while declining to accept the various Soviet and Iraqi ideas for conditional Iraq withdrawal from Kuwait. On February 14, for example, Bush writes Gorbachev that the U.S. can make no promises to pause the air war just on hopes that Saddam will comply with the UN resolutions. The Bush-Gorbachev conversations were so closely held (Scowcroft created a whole separate compartment for the transcripts under his personal control) that a very senior staffer must have written these summaries afterwards, perhaps to show the closeness of U.S.-Soviet cooperation even though it did not produce agreement.
Document 16
Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary manuscript donated by author to the National Security Archive
This entry, written two days after the events, is a highly emotional reflection of the developments of February 23. He calls the phone conversations that day “a swan song” of the new policy and the new vision for the world. Chernyaev was with Gorbachev all that day and shared all his incredible frustration at the unwillingness of the Western allies to give his peace plan another chance. Chernyaev has very harsh words for allies who “played games” with Gorbachev. He calls his leader “a dreamer-idealist” who “believed that humanity will become the core of world politics.” And in his own frustration, Chernyaev comes to a tough conclusion that in the situation the Soviet Union finds itself, “We are doomed to be friends with America, no matter what it does,” because doing otherwise would mean the end of perestroika.
[1] Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs, (New York: Doubleday, 1996) p. 564.
[2] Memorandum from Condoleeza Rice to Robert Gates, November 18, 1990, Bush Presidential Library.
[3] “Responding to the Toughening Line in Moscow,” Memorandum to the President from Brent Scowcroft, December 21, 1990, Bush Presidential Library.
[4] See Bush-Gorbachev telcons on February 21, 22 and 23, Documents 9, 11, 12.
[5] George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998) p. 470.
[6] Anatoly Chernyaev's diary, January 25, 1991.
[7] Gorbachev-Gandhi memcon, February 23, 1991, Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1.
[8] Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku: pochemu eto vazhno seichas (Moscow: Alpina books, 2006) p. 287.
[9] Jeffrey Engel, When The World Seemed New: George Bush and the End of the Cold War (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), p. 414.
[10] Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 563.