Coup leaders Admiral Massera and General Videla.
U.S. had ample forewarning of coup plotting, documents show
Officials maintained channel of communications with plotters
Ford Administration knew Argentine military planned to commit human rights violations
U.S. Ambassador aborted pre-coup visit by a former CIA deputy director
Washington, D.C., March 23, 2021 - On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the military coup in Argentina, the National Security Archive is today posting declassified documents revealing what the U.S. government knew, and when it knew it, in the weeks preceding the March 24, 1976, overthrow of Isabel Peron’s government. The documents provide evidence of multiple contacts between the coup plotters and U.S. officials. “[Admiral] Massera sought opportunity to speak privately with me,” U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Robert Hill reported in a cable sent one week before the putsch after meeting with a leading coup plotter. “[H]e said that it was no secret that military might have to step into political vacuum very soon.”
The documents posted today record the U.S. government knowledge of the plotters, their preparations for the coup, and their potential plans for what State Department officials described as “military rule for an extended duration and of unprecedented severity.” They show that the U.S. “discreetly” advised the military more than a month before the actual coup that Washington would recognize the new regime, and that then CIA director George H.W. Bush briefed President Gerald Ford on a "possible" coup in Argentina almost two weeks before the military deposed Isabel Peron.
In the first substantive report to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on a “Possible Coup in Argentina,” in mid-February 1976, Assistant Secretary of State William Rogers flagged the likelihood of human rights violations after a military takeover. “We would expect [the military government] to be friendly toward the United States,” he apprised Kissinger. “However, in stepping up the fight against the guerrillas, an Argentine military government would be almost certain to engage in human rights violations such as to engender international criticism. This could lead to U.S. public and Congressional pressures which would complicate our relations with the new regime.” Anticipating problems with the United States over the repression against subversion they would implement, the Argentine “military planning group” approached officials in their own foreign ministry to advise “as to how the future military govt can avoid or minimize the sort of problems the Chilean and Uruguayan govts were having with the U.S. over [the] human rights issue.”
Perhaps to discuss that very issue, the documents show that the Argentine military sought to meet with Kissinger in advance of the coup—an idea discouraged by Ambassador Hill. On February 13, 1976, Hill met with an Argentine-born U.S. businessman named “Mr. Carnicero” who informed him that “several high-ranking military officers have asked him to arrange a meeting between an appropriate military representative and Secretary Kissinger” so that they could explain why they needed to take power and seek assurances of prompt recognition. The ambassador rejected that idea on the grounds that “Such a meeting, should it become public knowledge, could be misinterpreted to the detriment of the officers themselves as well as of Secretary Kissinger.” In a revealing passage, Hill reminded the emissary that “the embassy has discreetly and through third parties already indicated to the military that the USG will recognize a new government in Argentina….”
As D-Day for the coup approached, the Argentine military appeared to reach out to other influential policy actors. In a mission that remains imbued with mystery, FBI and State Department cables revealed that the retired director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, arrived in Buenos Aires just 12 days before the putsch, accompanied by arch-conservative Senator Jesse Helms and his aides. Fearing that the presence of Graham (who had served as CIA deputy director before assuming command of the DIA) would spark rumors of U.S. involvement in coup preparations, Ambassador Hill urged him to quickly leave the country. “I hope this problem has been put behind us,” Hill cabled Washington later. “It could have been extremely embarrassing at the least, however, and at most very damaging to our relations.” FBI sources reported that the top coup plotter, General Jorge Videla, had hoped to have an emissary meet with Graham “in order to explore in detail the General’s recommendations concerning the public relations aspect of the Argentine Armed Forces projected coup d’état against the government….”
According to the documents, Ambassador Hill himself decided to leave the country on March 17th before the coup, to counter the expected accusations of U.S. knowledge and involvement. “I therefore, believe that it is in the best interest of the USG that I proceed with my plans as though we had no forewarning,” Hill cabled the State Department as he prepared for his departure. “The fact that I would be out of the country when the blow actually falls would be, I believe, a fact in our favor indicating noninvolvement of Embassy and USG.”
Just one day before the coup took place, Ambassador Hill reported to the National Security Council that Washington needed to be ready to engage the Argentine military. “As [this document] is being written, Argentina is in a state of flux,” Hill advised the NSC. “Argentina has been one of our principal interlocutors and this is not likely to change even under a new government… for no matter who might immediately replace Mrs. Peron (if and when she is replaced), the fact is that Argentina needs the U.S. certainly as much as we need her… [eventually] she will probably come back to political normalcy in desperate need of investment. The U.S. can expect to be the first country to which the Argentines will turn.”
“There is no evidence that the U.S. instigated the coup,” said Carlos Osorio, Director of the National Security Archive Southern Cone Documentation Project. “But the United States accepted, and tacitly supported, regime change because Washington shared the military’s position that the putsch was the only alternative to chaos in Argentina.” The documents, Osorio noted, “indicate that U.S. officials wanted to believe that General Videla, the coup leader, was a moderate. The military dictatorship that followed killed and disappeared more than 20,000 people.”
Document 1
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
Since December 1975, U.S. agencies had received an increasing number of reports about a possible military coup against the shaky presidency of Isabel Peron in Argentina. This CIA bulletin reports:
“Recent events in Argentina suggest that the military is getting in a position to take over the government, but there is no firm evidence that they have made a decision to move yet. Reported discussions in the high command no longer focus on whether a coup is necessary or feasible, but on how and when it should be undertaken.”
The bulletin identifies top-level military officers placed in strategic positions for the coup: the Army chief in Buenos Aires, General Suarez Mason; the head of the Federal Police, General Harguindeguy; Navy commander Admiral Massera; and Army commander-in-chief General Videla. Their names today evoke memories of a seven-year dictatorship characterized by disappearances, torture, and murder. All of them were eventually indicted and three convicted. Harguindeguy passed away before being brought to trial.
Document 2
Department of State Virtual Reading Room
“The chances of a military coup in Argentina seem greater now than at any time since the return to civilian rule in 1973 … We would expect [the military government] to be friendly toward the United States ... However, in stepping up the fight against the guerrillas, an Argentine military government would be almost certain to engage in human rights violations such as to engender international criticism. This could lead to U.S. public and Congressional pressures which would complicate our relations with the new regime.”
Document 3
Digital National Security Archive
In a highly restricted cable for Acting Assistant Secretary of State Hewson Ryan (Assistant Secretary William Roger was traveling to Caracas), Ambassador Robert Hill reports that an American-Argentine citizen named “Carnicero” is trying to arrange a meeting between an Argentine military representative and Secretary Kissinger, “… so that they can explain the political situation in Argentina.”
“I discouraged Carnicero from going forward with this idea,” the Ambassador writes, for “Such a meeting, should it become public knowledge, could be misinterpreted to the detriment of the officers themselves as well as of Secretary Kissinger. Further, I said, it seemed to me unnecessary. The embassy has discreetly and through third parties already indicated to the military that the USG will recognize a new govt in Argentina ...”
Document 4
Department of State Virtual Reading Room
Ambassador Hill sends another cable to Acting Assistant Secretary Hewson Ryan reporting that the Argentine “military planning group” approached officials in their own foreign ministry to advise “as to how the future military govt can avoid or minimize the sort of problems the Chilean and Uruguayan govts were having with the U.S. over [the] human rights issue… The officers [said] that they intend to carry forward an all-out war on the terrorists and that some executions would therefore probably be necessary.”
Document 5
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
This CIA bulletin reports that “A number of key [Argentine] congressmen have told the US embassy in Buenos Aires that a military coup against President Peron is now inevitable.”
“It appears likely that, in the event of a coup, army Commander in Chief General Videla would be named president by a military junta. Civilians probably prefer Videla because he resisted early calls for a military take-over and is widely considered a man of moderate political views.”
Document 6
Digital National Security Archive
In this memorandum of a meeting with President Gerald Ford covering multiple issues, CIA Director George H.W. Bush notes for the record: “I mentioned possible coups in Thailand, Argentina and Peru.”
Document 7
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
In a cable to the director of the FBI, the legal attaché in Buenos Aires, Robert Scherrer, reports that an American citizen, Raymond Molina, has gathered information from an Argentine military source:
“The Argentine armed forces would oust President Peron between Wednesday, March 17, 1976 and Thursday, March 18, 1976 … The Argentine military desire close cooperation with the United States.”
Scherrer continues: “Molina was contacted by the legal attaché at the specific request of Ambassador Hill. Molina arrived in Buenos Aires 3/12/76, accompanied by General Graham, former CIA Deputy Director, and several other individuals from Washington connected with U.S. senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond.” (Both senators were Republicans and known for their conservatism. Helms was from North Carolina and Thurmond from South Carolina.)
Document 8
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill describes his Tuesday, March 16, 1976, meeting with Argentine Navy chief Admiral Emilio Massera: “Political Counselor and I had distinct impression that Massera was talking about a coup which will probably come within the next few days, possibly before the weekend.” Hill concludes that “every newspaper and magazine is now speculating that the golpe [coup] may come shortly, but that is only hearsay. The fact that I would be out of the country when the blow actually falls would be, I believe, a fact in our favor indicating noninvolvement of Embassy and USG. Hence, I intend to depart on schedule …”
Document 9
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
In this cable, legal attaché Scherrer informs the FBI director that sources indicate that Argentine Army Commander-in-Chief Jorge Rafael Videla seeks to contact Former CIA deputy director and former DIA director Daniel O. Graham, “in order to explore in detail the General’s recommendations concerning the public relations aspect of the Argentine Armed Forces projected coup d’état against the government … ”
Document 10
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
Ambassador Robert Hill addresses this highly restricted cable to Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, William Rogers: “I was called on Mar 11 by aides to Senators Thurmond and Helms and told they would arrive in Argentina the next day. I urged them not to come when they told me Gen Graham (retired Dep Dir of CIA and Dir of DIA) was coming with them.”
“I further advised General Graham and his associates that they would do well to get out of Argentina as soon as possible. If press found out they were here or had any inkling as to why, all hell could break loose.”
Relieved that he has persuaded the group to leave the same day they arrived, on March 12, the ambassador adds: “I hope this problem has been put behind us. It could have been extremely embarrassing at the least, however, and at most very damaging to our relations.
Document 11
Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
An FBI Liaison reports having contacted retired General Daniel O. Graham who reports that “he traveled there [Argentina] with U.S. Senator Jesse Helms. He stated that he departed Argentina in view of the rumored coup d’état and felt his presence there would be unwise and added that he has no intention of establishing any contact with Argentine Generals or their representatives either here in the U. S. or abroad.”
Document 12
U.S. National Archives AAD Diplomatic Records
The subject line in this broken reference to cable “1976BUENOS01789” in the National Archives’ AAD Diplomatic Records database confirms Ambassador Hill left Argentina as planned on March 17, 1976.
Document 13
Digital National Security Archive
While Ambassador Hill is in Washington, Chargé D’affaires Williaml Beal commends the Department of State’s intelligence bureau, INR, for an analysis paper on Argentina. He goes on to say that the embassy disagrees with the conclusion that “senior military commanders” who “at this point appear to be planning a moderate coup and a caretaker government,” will be able to see the plan through. Instead, “while the caretaker government seems the most likely to emerge initially, the dynamics of the situation are such that it may very well give way to the second option indicated in the paper -- that of military rule for an extended duration and of unprecedented severity.”
Document 14
Digital National Security Archive
The day before the military coup, Ambassador Hill knew it was underwayand was of the view that the U.S. had to engage the Argentine military. In this item prepared for the National Security Council, he writes: “As the CASP [Country & Strategy Paper] is being written, Argentina is in a state of flux … Argentina has been one of our principal interlocutors and this is not likely to change even under a new government … for no matter who might immediately replace Mrs. Peron (if and when she is replaced), the fact is that Argentina needs the U.S. certainly as much as we need her … [Eventually] she will probably come back to political normalcy in desperate need of investment. The U.S. can expect to be the first country to which the Argentines will turn.”