Date

Dec 9, 1994

Description

The BDM interviews conducted with the Soviet military elite at the end of the Cold War provide a retrospective glimpse into the minds of the Soviets, whom some U.S. policy makers were trying to understand better in 1983.

Andrian Danilevich, a senior military strategist who reported to Marshal Akhromeyev and authored the three-volume Strategy of Deep Operations, “the basic reference document for Soviet strategic and operational nuclear and conventional planning,” told interviewer John Hines of a general fear of war. He recalled “vivid personal memories” and “frightening situations” during “the period of great tension” in 1983, but that there was never a sense of “an immediate threat” of attack within the general staff. The KGB, he said, may have “overstated the level of tension” because they “are generally incompetent in military affairs and exaggerate what they do not understand.”

While, according to Colonel General Yesin, the Soviet General Staff raised its level of nuclear alert during Able Archer 83, it appeared to be less fearful of an imminent American nuclear strike than its KGB counterparts.

Source

Defense Department Freedom of Information Act release.

Document published in following posting(s):

The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare

Nov 5, 2018