Date

Jan 29, 1971

Description

Prepared only a few days after the GAC discussion, this significant document shows that State Department intelligence officials recognized that a capability for launch-on-warning existed. They gave it relatively uncritical support, although one of the officials, Frank Perez, observed that he was "not advocating [its] adoption."

Both Perez and his superior officer, Leonard Weiss, constructed the discussion of launch-on-warning around the logic of deterrence: because the Soviets could detect a U.S. capability to get the Minutemen "off the ground in time," that could deter them from the "possibility of undertaking a first strike." Even if Moscow struck first, launch-on-warning would enable the United States to inflict "intolerable damage" on the Soviet Union.

According to Perez, a launch-on-warning capability would depend on the availability of "unambiguous warning," which could be provided by systems that were becoming available. The 440-L Over-the-Horizon system and the 647 early warning satellite, also known as the Defense Support Program, could detect mass missile launches.[22] Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PAR), a type of phased array radar, could provide "absolute certainty as to the size of the attack and ... where [it] originated and to where it was directed," for example, whether Minuteman fields were a target.

While Perez was overoptimistic about the extent to which new warning systems like PAR could quickly provide actionable information, he believed that they would give a President a choice other than "rid[ing] out the attack and then respond[ing] with what residual [forces] remained." Instead, the president could "respond to a Soviet attack based on his assessment of the situation." For example, in response to a Soviet attack, Perez suggested that escalation and mass civilian casualties could be avoided with a controlled response of some 200-300 Minutemen against high-value Soviet military targets away from urban-industrial centers. Whether an attack by 250 Minuteman could actually limit escalation looks questionable in retrospect.

Source

RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Def 12 USSR; also published in DNSA, Nuclear History II, 1969-1976

Document published in following posting(s):

The “Launch on Warning” Nuclear Strategy and Its Insider Critics

Jun 11, 2019