Date

Sep 8, 1981

Description

During 1979 and 1980, U.S. intelligence was learning more about Pakistan’s secret program to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, in part by using purloined gas centrifuge technology. That development amplified concern in Washington about nuclear proliferation and the implications for stability in South Asia. Necessarily India was monitoring the Pakistan nuclear situation even more closely because the potential threat it posed during the years ahead. By 1981, with Pakistani nuclear capabilities moving ahead, U.S. government officials wondered whether Pakistan’s nuclear activities would motivate preventive action by India. Evidently, that concern led to the commissioning of a national intelligence estimate assessing possible Indian reactions. The National Intelligence Council had approved a proposal for an intelligence estimate on the topic in the spring of 1981, although it had been under discussion for some months. By November 1981, the result was Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 31/31-81, “India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan.”

The version of the SNIE published here was the result of a mandatory declassification review request by the National Security Archive. When the document appeared on the CIA’s FOIA website around 2015, it received much attention in the Indian mass media under dramatic headlines, for example, “Indira Gandhi planned attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities,” (India Today, 1 September 2015). In fact, no such claim appears in the estimate (although Document 3, below, indicates the preparation of contingency plans).

The SNIE’s exposition consisted largely of “ifs” and possibilities, although it drew on some factual reporting on internal discussions in Indira Ghandi’s government. India had staged a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 but it had not made decisions to produce nuclear weapons, much less stockpile them. Thus, a Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons could pose a significant security threat. The estimate pointed to recent detailed internal recommendations circulating within the government for “exercising the nuclear weapons option,” but analysts added that “we do not know whether the Prime Minister favors that course.”

With all the uncertainties, the estimate found that India would probably take a “wait and see” approach “based on whether Pakistan produced nuclear weapons or stockpiled them, which would then lead New Delhi to face a choice of accepting the high probability of a nuclear arms race or destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.” If the Indian government was determined to uphold its non-weapons status, it would have to decide whether the threat of a nuclear-armed Pakistan was severe enough to make it necessary to destroy that country’s nuclear facilities. Yet, such action could risk Chinese intervention on behalf of Pakistan. Thus, a “final Indian decision is likely to depend critically on political and strategic circumstances prevailing at that time.”

The report closes with an annex on how Indian leaders might think about the development of a small nuclear arsenal, both the pros and the cons. On the positive side was to need to improve the military balance with China and to encourage the “superpowers to accord India greater respect.” On the negative side was that India did not yet have “unsafeguarded” stocks of plutonium, and the fact that a weapons stockpile would add to military expenditures, especially when considering the costs of delivery systems and “hidden costs,” such as for early warning systems.

Source

MDR release to National Security Archive

Document published in following posting(s):

U.S. Intelligence on South Asian Conflict Scenarios

Apr 22, 2025

Memorandum from Deputy Director John N. McMahon to Richard T. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, 21 September 1981, enclosing Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 31/31-81, “India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan,” 8 September 1981, Secret, excised copy