Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part I, 1960-1976

January 6, 1960:

Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur meet to finalize details of the new U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. (Kosaka, et al.; p.81)

January 12, 1960:

The Ministry of Finance announces trade statistics for FY 1959 indicating that exports reached a post-war high of $3.457 billion, while imports were at the lowest level since 1945 at $3.598 billion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.81)

January 14, 1960:

The GOJ announces its decision to establish Kaigai Keizai Kyoryoku Kikin (the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, or OECF), with a base capital of 50 billion yen. (Kosaka, et al.; p.81)

January 17-21, 1960:

Japanese Prime Minister Kishi visits Washington, D.C. for talks with President Eisenhower. On January 19, the two leaders sign the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty at a White House ceremony. Both leaders pledge to regard an attack on Japan or U.S. bases there as a threat to the security of both nations. They also sign minutes to the treaty and a new administrative accord governing the use of bases by the United States and the conduct of U.S. personnel. Eisenhower pledges the United States will not intentionally act contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government in the use of bases or on questions of the weapons it will base there. (Kosaka, et al.; p.81; NYT January 20,1:2.; Document Nos. 00021-00032)

February 8, 1960:

Prime Minister Kishi tells the Budget Committee of the Diet's lower house (House of Representatives) that the "'Far East' clause under the New Security Treaty is defined as areas surrounding Japan north of the Philippines and does not include Mainland China or coastal areas." (Kosaka, et al.; p.81)

April 7, 1960:

The Ministry of Finance announces that exports for FY 1959 reached a post-war high of $34 billion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.82)

April 15, 1960:

Foreign Minister Fujiyama testifies before the Diet Special Committee for National Security that the "Three elements requiring pre-consultation [under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty] are introduction of nuclear warheads, introduction of long-range missiles, and construction of a missile launch base." He also says that "Pre-consultation is required if the Seventh Fleet engages in strategic combat using Japan as its base." (Kosaka, et al.; p.82)

May 19, 1960:

The Japanese government's Economic Deliberation Group approves the national Income Doubling Plan. The Japanese government submits the "Long-Term Outlook of the Japanese Economy" to the Diet. (Kosaka, et al.; p.81)

May 24, 1960:

1,500 stone-throwing members of Zengakuren clash with police outside Kishi's residence, leaving 128 injured. Prime Minister Kishi says he will not resign or call for new elections until the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty is ratified. (NYT May 24, 1:5)

May 26, 1960:

Hundreds of thousands demonstrate in Tokyo, demanding Prime Minister Kishi's resignation, new elections and cancellation of the upcoming Eisenhower state visit to Japan. The Upper House of the Diet extends its current session to approve the new U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty. (NYT May 27, 1:4)

June 7, 1960:

Secretary of State Christian Herter testifies before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on ratification of the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty. Herter holds that Japanese opponents to the treaty are in the minority; he explains the new pact's provisions, and details why the Japanese Government considered the 1951 pact obsolete and inadequate. (NYT June 8, 20:3; Document Nos. 00046-00047)

June 10, 1960:

Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty and Appointments Secretary Stephens, in Japan to prepare for Eisenhower's visit to commemorate the centennial anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Friendship and Commerce Treaty, are mobbed at Haneda Airport by some 60,000 stone-throwing anti-American demonstrators. Along with Ambassador MacArthur, they are besieged in their car for an hour and 20 minutes, then rescued by a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter. No one is hurt, although the car was damaged. Ambassador MacArthur later receives an apology from the Japanese government. (NYT Je 11, 1:8; Kosaka, et al.; p.83)

June 16, 1960:

The Japanese Government asks Eisenhower to postpone his visit in view of recent demonstrations. While Japanese leftists declare plans to intensify the protests, Prime Minister Kishi moves to spur ratification of the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty. (NYT Je 17, 1:8; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals; Document Nos. 00050, 00053, 00056)

June 22/23, 1960:

The new U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty comes into effect, as the U.S. Senate ratifies the treaty 90-2, and the instruments of ratification are exchanged by Ambassador MacArthur and Foreign Minister Fujiyama in Tokyo, while Zengakuren demonstrators surround the Japanese Foreign Ministry. (Kosaka, et al.; p.83, NYT June 23, 1:6,8)

June 24, 1960:

The Japanese cabinet approves basic guidelines for the new Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.83)

July 15, 1960:

The second Kishi cabinet resigns. (Kosaka, et al.; p.83)

July 19, 1960:

The first Ikeda cabinet is established. Its main members include Zentaro Kosaka as foreign minister, Mikio Mizuta as finance minister, Kojiro Ishii as MITI minister, and Masumi Esaki as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.83)

September 6, 1960:

The Ikeda cabinet approves new policies emphasizing economic programs. The core objectives consist of rapid growth and doubling income, with Japan using the three pillars of tax reduction, public investment and social security to aim for a "prosperous national economy" and "realization of [the] welfare nation." The goal is to achieve 9 percent growth for three years after FY 1961and to attain a GNP of 17.5 trillion yen and per capita GNP of 150,0000 yen in 1963. (Kosaka, et al.; p.83)

September 8, 1960:

The first meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held. The committee is based on the Kishi-Herter letters dealing with Article 4 of the Security Treaty. Participants include Foreign Minister Kosaka, JDA Director General Esaki and CINCPAC Admiral Felt. (Kosaka, et al.; p.83-84; Document No. 00074, 00076)

September 27, 1960:

The Japanese crown prince and princess meet President Eisenhower at the White House. (Kosaka, et al.; p.84)

December 2, 1960:

The EPA calculates national income statistics for FY 1959. GNP is 12.5 trillion yen and the growth rate is 20.6 percent (17.7 percent real growth rate). (Kosaka, et al.; p.84)

December 5, 1960:

The first Ikeda cabinet resigns. (Kosaka, et al.; p.84)

December 8, 1960:

The second Ikeda cabinet is established. Its main members include Zentaro Kosaka as foreign minister, Mikio Mizuta as finance minister, Etsusaburo Shiina as MITI minister, and Naomi Nishimura as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.84)

December 9, 1960:

The JDA convenes a meeting among Defense-related officials to discuss amendments to the Second Defense Maintenance Plan. The focus is on revising the expected MAP assistance due to the possibility that the United States might reduce its military assistance to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.84)

December 27, 1960:

At a cabinet meeting, the Japanese government officially approves the National Income Doubling Plan. This is based on the draft proposal submitted by the Economic Deliberation Group on November 1, with slight revisions. (Kosaka, et al.; p.84)

January 6, 1961:

The Japanese Ministry of Finance announces that foreign reserves at the end of 1960 were $1.824 billion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.89)

January 12, 1961:

The Japanese Ministry of Finance announces that exports for CY 1960 were $4.055 billion (a 17.3 percent increase from 1959) and imports were $4.492 billion (a 24.8 percent increase). (Kosaka, et al.; p.89)

January 28, 1961:

The Japanese Finance Ministry announces Japan's 1960 trade balance showed a favorable margin of $552 million, or $92 million more than in 1959. (FOF 6/15-6/21 p. 227)

January 30, 1961:

Prime Minister Ikeda announces to the Diet that "Japan welcomes any improvement in relations, particularly expansion of trade" with China. (FOF 3/30-4/5 p. 122)

February 16, 1961:

Maj. Gen. Paul Caraway becomes high commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands. (Kosaka, et al.; p.89)

March 12, 1961:

Douglas MacArthur II resigns as ambassador to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.89)

March 14, 1961:

Edwin O. Reischauer is appointed ambassador to Japan. (FOF 3/16-3/22 p. 99)

April 1, 1961:

MITI expands the number of items included in Japan's import liberalization list to 310 items, including raw cotton. (Kosaka, et al.; p.89)

May 10, 1961:

Foreign Minister Kosaka tells Ambassador Reischauer that Japan would like to resume negotiations for a GARIOA settlement. The Japanese propose to pay back $430 million (out of $1.8 billion) over 20 years at 2.5 percent interest. (Kosaka, et al.; p.90)

May 16, 1961:

An Army coup in the Republic of Korea brings a military junta into control of the country. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

May 19, 1961:

The United States provides a counterproposal for a GARIOA settlement, under which Japan would pay back $580 million. (Kosaka, et al.; p.90)

June 10, 1961:

Foreign Minister Kosaka and Ambassador Reischauer sign an agreement on the GARIOA settlement, under which Japan agrees to repay the U.S. $490 million in debts incurred during the U.S. post-war occupation of Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.90; NYT Je 10, 4:5; FOF 6/15-6/21 p. 227)

June 20-23, 1961:

The first Ikeda-Kennedy summit meeting is held in Washington. A joint communiqué expresses both sides' desire to build a new cooperative structure (equal partnership) between the two countries. President Kennedy agrees to create a commission that will examine the economic and social situation in Okinawa. The two governments also agree to establish a Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.90; NYT Je 21,1:7; Je 23,4:1-3; Document Nos. 00121-00124; FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XXII, Document No. 338)

June 25, 1961:

The U.S. Air Force completes a development plan for Mace B missiles, and announces that the missiles will be deployed in Okinawa by the end of 1961. (Kosaka, et al.; p.90)

July 18, 1961:

The second Ikeda cabinet is reshuffled, with Eikasu Sato becoming MITI minister, and Sosuke Fujieda becoming JDA director general. Nine new ministers in all are appointed, four of whom are members of rival factions in the LDP. (Kosaka, et al.; p.90; FOF 9/14-9/20 p. 347)

July 18, 1961:

Japan's National Defense Council adopts the Second Defense Buildup Plan, approving a 5 year, $53 billion plan to expand Japanese armed forces. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals; FOF 9/28-10/4 p.366)

August 11, 1961:

President Kennedy approves National Security Memorandum 69, "Task Force on the Ryukyus," establishing a task force under Carl Kaysen to examine the present situation and U.S. programs in the Ryukyu (Okinawan) Islands. (FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XXII, Document No. 340)

August 14, 1961:

Soviet deputy Prime Minister A. Mikoyan visits Japan, the first high Russian official to visit Japan in 70 years. Mikoyan warns Japan that in the event of war, Japan would face Soviet attack because of U.S. military bases in Japan. (FOF 9/28-10/4 p. 365)

September 1, 1961:

President Kennedy, in an annual report on America's reciprocal trade program, describes Japan's import control system as "quite restrictive." (FOF 8/31-9/6 p. 328)

September 6, 1961:

Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka delivers to Ambassador Reischauer a Japanese government protest against U.S. nuclear testing. (FOF 9/21-9/27 p. 350)

September 19, 1961:

The U.S. military begins training exercises involving firearms at a base facility in North Fuji. These exercises had been postponed before because of opposition protests. (Kosaka, et al.; p.91)

October 5, 1961:

The Kaysen Task Force on the Ryukyus arrives in Okinawa to conduct investigations on island economic and social conditions. (Okinawa Chronology, 1945-1972, URL--faculty.tamu-commerce.edu/sarantakes/Time.html)

November 2, 1961:

The first meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held at Hakone. Japanese participants included foreign, finance, MITI, agriculture, labor and economic planning ministers. U.S. participants included secretaries from State, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce Departments as well as the president's economic advisor. The committee discusses various issues including policies surrounding U.S.-Japan economic relations. (Kosaka, et al.; p.91; NYT N 1,4:5; Document No. 00134)

December 13, 1961:

The State Department says the U.S. will fully support the Japanese government's position on the Northern Territories. (Kosaka, et al.; p.91)

December 26, 1961:

A U.S.-Japan agreement is reached on a $490-million settlement of Japan's post-war foreign-aid debt covering costs to the U.S. for government services, rehabilitation, and relief. (NYT, Dec 27,1:6)

January 9, 1962:

The U.S. and Japan sign an agreement on the GARIOA settlement in Tokyo. Japan will pay back $490 million over 15 years at 2.5 percent interest effective September 11. The money will be used for economic assistance to developing countries as well as for U.S.-Japan educational and cultural exchange activities. (Kosaka, et al.; p.93)

January 12, 1962:

The Ministry of Finance announces trade figures between January and December 1961. Exports were $4.237 billion (4.5 percent increase from year before) and imports were $5.81 billion (29.4 percent increase). (Kosaka, et al.; p.93)

February 2, 1962:

The U.S. and Japan sign an agreement on mutual tariff reductions in Geneva. (Kosaka, et al.; p.93)

February 4-10, 1962:

U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy and wife visit Japan. Extending greetings from President Kennedy to the Japanese people, Kennedy meets with Prime Minister Ikeda and other Japanese government officials, visits the Diet, debates opposition party leaders and speaks out in defense of the U.S. against leftist demonstrators. (FOF 3/1-3/7 p. 75; NYT F 6,1:4; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and his Times, pp. 607-610)

March 5, 1962:

Japan formally protests the resumption of atmospheric atomic testing by the U.S. (FOF 3/1-3/7 p. 74)

March 5, 1962:

President Kennedy approves National Security Action Memorandum 122, "Ryukyus Action Program," endorsing recommendations of the Kaysen Task Force on the Ryukyus for actions to improve political, economic and social conditions on Okinawa. (Okinawa Chronology, 1945-1972, URL: faculty.tamu-commerce.edu/ sarantakes/Time.html; FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XXII, Document No. 352)

March 14, 1962:

The U.S. government proposes a reform plan for Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.93; Document No. 00151)

March 15, 1962:

The lower house of the Diet passes legislation banning nuclear weapons tests. (Kosaka, et al.; p.93)

March 19, 1962:

President Kennedy issues an Executive Order designed to give U.S.-protected Ryukyu Islanders a "greater voice in management of their own affairs." (FOF 3/15-3/21 p. 93)

April 27, 1962:

Two thousand students protest near the U.S. embassy, while 3,000 people march through the streets of Tokyo in protest of U.S. nuclear tests in the Pacific. (FOF 4/26-5/2 p. 137)

June 12, 1962:

Foreign Minister Kosaka and Ambassador Reischauer begin negotiations on assistance to Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.94)

June 26, 1962:

The State Department comments on the deployment of the Seventh Fleet from Yokosuka to the Taiwan Straits, saying that while this was a regular deployment which did not involve the consultation clauses of the Security Treaty, the U.S. unofficially notified the Japanese government as a courtesy. (Kosaka, et al.; p.94)

July 18, 1962:

The second Ikeda cabinet is reshuffled for the second time. Masayoshi Ohira becomes the foreign minister, Kakuei Tanaka becomes the finance minister, Hajime Fukuda becomes the MITI minister, and Kenjiro Shiga becomes the JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.94)

August 1, 1962:

The second meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, including Ambassador Reischauer, Foreign Minister Ohira, Admiral Felt and other government and military officials, is held in Tokyo. It is agreed that the meeting will be held twice a year. (Kosaka, et al.; p.94; NYT Ag 2,6:3; Document Nos. 00165-00167)

September 13, 1962:

Foreign Minister Ohira and Ambassador Reischauer resume negotiations on economic assistance for Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95)

September 16, 1962:

Japan sends a team to the U.S. in preparation for adopting the BADGE system. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95)

September 21, 1962:

The U.S. Senate approves a plan to greatly decrease aid to Okinawa. The House of Representatives also passes similar legislation on the 26th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95)

September 24, 1962:

Foreign Minister Ohira and Secretary of State Dean Rusk discuss Okinawa and Japan-South Korean relations in New York. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95; Document No. 00172)

October 4, 1962:

An amendment to the Price Act dealing with assistance to Okinawa passes Congress. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95)

October 18, 1962:

President Kennedy meets with Eisaku Sato, the younger brother of ex-Prime Minister Kishi. Sato is a possible future prime minister. (FOF 11/1-11/7 p. 389)

October 23, 1962:

Japanese Foreign Minister M. Ohira announces Japanese support of U.S. efforts to end the crisis in Cuba. Action was taken in response to an appeal sent by Kennedy to Prime Minister Ikeda for Japanese support. (FOF 10/18-10/24 p. 364)

November 2, 1962:

Ambassador Reischauer meets with Foreign Minister Ohira. Reischauer proposes to establish bilateral consultative committee and a technical committee to discuss Okinawa issues. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95)

November 7, 1962:

Commerce Secretary Luther L. Hodges visits Japan and meets with Foreign Minister Ohira and MITI Minister Fukuda on the 8th to explain the U.S. Trade Expansion Act. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95)

November 13, 1962:

JDA Director General Shiga meets with Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Assistant Secretary of State Harriman and explains that the Second Defense Buildup Plan will balance increases in defense capability with national income. (Kosaka, et al.; p.95; Document No. 00180)

December 3, 1962:

Japanese and U.S. cabinet delegations meet in Washington to discuss growing economic conflicts between the two nations, including the U.S. desire for Japan to expand trade in countries other than the U.S. (FOF 12/6-12/12 p. 442; NYT D 4,21:1; Document No. 00188)

January 9, 1963:

Ambassador Reischauer tells the Japanese government that the U.S. wants nuclear-powered submarines to make port calls in Japan. The Japanese government basically agrees. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

January 19, 1963:

The third meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held. The U.S. tells Japan not to "underestimate Chinese military capability." Japan expresses determination for greater self-defense efforts. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96; Document Nos. 00197-00198)

January 26, 1963:

The State Department releases a statement regarding port calls by nuclear-powered submarines at Japanese ports. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

January 29, 1963:

Prime Minister Ikeda basically approves U.S. proposals for nuclear-powered submarines to call at Japanese ports. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96; Document No. 00200)

February 6, 1963:

The IMF Board adopts a resolution urging Japan to be covered under Article 8 of Articles of Agreement. Japan begins preparations to accept obligations as stated in Article 8. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

February 6, 1963:

Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric visits Japan. He meets with Prime Minister Ikeda and other officials on the 7th to urge the Japanese government to expand its defense expenditures, as part of an overall U.S. effort to cut overseas expense spending. Gilpatric also discusses U.S. views on the growing Communist Chinese threat. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96; NYT F 7,4:6; Document Nos. 00202-00206, 00216, 00220)

February 20, 1963:

Japan notifies GATT Board of Members that it will move to be covered under Article 11 of GATT. Japan also protests U.S. restrictions on Japanese cotton-product exports to the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

March 6, 1963:

Ambassador Asakai gives a letter to Undersecretary George Ball protesting market confusion as a result of export restrictions. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

April 4, 1963:

Member Federations of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) approve Japanese accession to the committee. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

April 8, 1963:

Ryuji Takeuchi becomes ambassador to the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

April 11, 1963:

Special Envoy Herter comes to Japan to discuss negotiations over GATT tariff reductions. He also meets with Prime Minister Ikeda. He leaves on the 13th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

April 16, 1963:

At a news conference, Foreign Minister Ohira says that the "Japanese government cannot refuse port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered submarines." (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

May 6, 1963:

The Treasury Department rejects dumping claims made against Japanese steel companies. (Kosaka, et al.; p.96)

May 26, 1963:

The head of U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Shannon McCune, visits Japan. He meets Director of General Affairs at the Prime Minister's Office Jitsuzo Tokuyasu to discuss assistance to Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97)

June 5, 1963:

The Japanese government reassures the nation that U.S. nuclear submarine visits to Japanese ports will not lead to allowing nuclear weapons in the country. (NYT Je 6, 9:1)

June 15, 1963:

Thirty protesters are injured in riots in Tokyo and Kobe over proposed visits by U.S. SSN's to Japanese ports. (NYT Je 16, 15:3)

July 1, 1963:

The JDA decides that Japan will use equipment from the Hughes Corporation for its BADGE system which will be included in the Second Defense Buildup Plan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97)

July 10, 1963:

JDA Director General Shiga says Japan will start to produce weapons domestically in 1964. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97)

July 18, 1963:

Prime Minister Ikeda reshuffles his 16-member cabinet for a third time and appoints 9 new ministers in a shift aimed at strengthening the government by including factions of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Main members include Masayoshi Ohira as foreign minister, Kakuei Tanaka as finance minister, Hajime Fukuda as MITI minister, and Tokuyasu Fukuda as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97; FOF 8/8-8/14 p. 286)

July 26, 1963:

The OCED Board of Governors decides to ask Japan to join the organization. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97)

July 31, 1963:

The Japanese government decides to send Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira to the U.S. to seek exemption from a proposed tax on American purchases of foreign securities, fearing the tax will harm Japanese plans to raise investment capital abroad. (NYT Jl 31,33:2; Document No. 00255)

August 2-3, 1963:

Foreign Minister Ohira meets with President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk. Following the meetings, a communiqué on the interest equalization tax issue is released. They also decide to establish a Joint United States-Japan Special Committee on Economic Consultation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97; Document Nos. 00254, 00256)

August 13, 1963:

The first meeting of the Joint Special Committee on Economic Consultation is held in Washington to discuss Japanese exemption to the interest equalization tax. (Kosaka, et al.; p.97)

August 14, 1963:

Japan signs the Partial Test Ban Treaty. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

September 1, 1963:

Nearly 100,000 Japanese participate in rallies at U.S. naval base sites to protest planned berthing of U.S. nuclear submarines in Japan. (FOF 9/12-9/18 p. 323)

September 19, 1963:

Foreign Minister Ohira meets with Secretary of State Rusk. Rusk expresses hope that Ikeda-Sukarno talks will bring progress on Malaysia. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98)

October 10, 1963:

The fourth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held in Tokyo. Japanese participants include Foreign Minister Ohira and JDA Director General Fukuda. The Japanese emphasize voluntary self-defense. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98; Document No. 00275)

October 23, 1963:

Prime Minister Ikeda dissolves the Diet and calls for an election to test public support of his economic programs and pro-western foreign policies. (FOF 11/28-12/4 p. 426)

November 21, 1963:

'The ruling Liberal Democratic Party suffers a reduced majority in the lower house of the Diet as a result of national elections. (FOF 11/28-12/4 p. 426)

November 22, 1963:

President Kennedy is assassinated and Lyndon Johnson is sworn in as president.

November 24, 1963:

Prime Minister Ikeda leaves for the U.S. to attend President Kennedy's funeral on the 25th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98)

November 25, 1963:

The third meeting of the Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is postponed because of Kennedy's assassination. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98)

November 26, 1963:

Prime Minister Ikeda meets Secretary Rusk in Washington, D.C. following the funeral of President Kennedy. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98; Document No. 00284)

December 2, 1963:

U.S.-Japan negotiations on tariffs are held in Geneva. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98)

December 9, 1963:

Ikeda is re-elected Prime Minister by the Diet. The main members of the new Ikeda cabinet include Masayoshi Ohira as foreign minister, Kakuei Tanaka as finance minister, Hajime Fukuda as MITI minister, Tokuyasu Fukuda as JDA director general. (FOF 12/12-12/18 p. 443; Kosaka, et al.; p.98)

December 31, 1963:

The U.S. and Japan announce that U.S. forces in Japan will be cut. (Kosaka, et al.; p.98)

January 16, 1964:

Attorney General Robert Kennedy visits Japan. He participates in a U.S.-Japan-Indonesian trilateral summit on January 17-18 to discuss the Malaysian issue (Tokyo Talks). (Kosaka, et al.; p.99)

January 26-28, 1964:

The third U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Tokyo. Secretary of State Rusk heads the U.S. delegation. In political talks, Foreign Minister Ohira and Rusk discuss China and reach an agreement on the two counties' positions on communist Chinese recognition and trade. It is also decided that a committee on U.S.-Japan technological cooperation will be established. (NYT Ja 26,8:1;Kosaka, et al.; p.99; FOF 1/23-1/29 p. 26; Document Nos. 00301-00310)

January 27-28, 1964:

During a meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in Tokyo, Japan says it will expand its defense capability. Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Ohira stress close Japanese-U.S. ties, weigh French recognition of Communist China and report accord on China policy. (NYT Ja 27,9:5; Ja 29,3:1)

March 11, 1964:

The IMF Board of Governors approve Japan's request to be covered under Article 8 starting April 1. (Kosaka, et al.; p.99)

March 24, 1964:

Ambassador Reischauer is stabbed by a mentally unstable young man. After his full recovery in July, the ambassador says that "this small incident will not hurt the deep friendly relationship between the two countries." Home Affairs Minister Hayakawa; chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, assumes responsibility for the stabbing and resigns. (Kosaka, et al.; p.99; FOF 3/19-3/25 p. 95; Document No. 00316)

April 1, 1964:

Japan becomes an Article 8 member in the IMF, and convertibility of the yen is restored. In other economic developments, Japan liberalizes trade for eight items including color televisions and VCRs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.99)

April 6, 1964:

Special Envoy Shigeru Yoshida is dispatched to the U.S. to attend General Douglas MacArthur's funeral. He meets with President Johnson on the 9th, and attends the funeral on the 11th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.99)

April 25, 1964:

Foreign Minister Ohira and Acting Ambassador John Emmerson sign an agreement on establishing two committees dealing with Okinawa (a bilateral committee and a U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee). The first meeting of the bilateral U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held. (Kosaka, et al.; p.99)

April 27, 1964:

The Ryukyus' legislature unanimously approves two resolutions on reversion to Japan and the return of administrative rights. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

April 28, 1964:

Japan is admitted as the 21st member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (OECD), becoming the first Asian nation to join OECD. (FOF 12/17-12/23 p. 442; Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

May 11, 1964:

Acting Ambassador Emmerson asks Foreign Minister Ohira for aid for South Vietnam.

May 12, 1964:

The Japanese cabinet agrees to consider a cooperative reply to the U.S. request for aid to South Vietnam. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

May 15, 1964:

The lower house of the Japanese Diet approves the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The upper house approves the treaty on May 25.

June 15, 1964:

MITI announces a new export restrictions list for COCOM. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

June 30, 1964:

During his visit to the U.S., JDA Director General Fukuda meets with Defense Secretary McNamara and says Japan will cooperate in the Vietnam War in a way allowed by the Japanese constitution. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100; Document No. 00335)

July 10, 1964:

Ikeda is re-elected as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, assuring that he will continue as prime minister for 2 more years. (FOF 7/16-7/22 p. 238)

July 15, 1964:

The first meeting of the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee is held in Naha. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

July 18, 1964:

Ikeda reshuffles his cabinet again. Main members include Etsusaburo Shiina as foreign minister, Kakuei Tanaka as finance minister, Yoshio Sakurauchi as MITI minister, and Junya Koizumi as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

July 30, 1964:

Prime Minister Ikeda discusses Okinawa with the new high commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands, Lt. Gen. Albert Watson II. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100; Document No. 00344)

August 10, 1964:

Foreign Minister Shiina tells the Lower House Foreign Relations Committee that even if the Seventh Fleet based in Japan is deployed near the Gulf of Tonkin, it would not require pre-consultation under the Security Treaty. (Kosaka, et al.; p.100)

August 12, 1964:

Japan announces a non-military assistance grant to help South Vietnam fight the Viet Cong. (FOF 8/13-8/19 p. 266; Document No. 00345)

August 28, 1964:

At a cabinet meeting, the Japanese government formally approves port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered submarines. As a result, the first port call is made by USS Sea Dragon to Sasebo on November 12. Polaris missiles are not allowed, and it was agreed that mines containing nuclear weapons would also not be allowed. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

August 31, 1964:

The fifth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held in Tokyo. Participants include Foreign Minister Shiina, JDA Director General Koizumi, Ambassador Reischauer, and CINCPAC Sharp. The focus of attention is on the situation in South Vietnam, Chinese military capability, and strengthening Japanese defense capability. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101; Document No. 00349)

September 2, 1964:

The Japanese government says "sublock" missiles are nuclear weapons, and therefore any port calls made by nuclear-powered submarines carrying such weapons are subject to prior consultation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

September 16, 1964:

The second meeting of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held in Tokyo. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

September 16, 1964:

Foreign Minister Shiina asks Ambassador Reischauer to prevent U.S. soldiers in Okinawa from destroying Japanese flags again. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

October 16, 1964:

China announces that it has successfully conducted its first nuclear weapons tests. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101; Document No. 00372)

October 25, 1964:

Ikeda resigns as prime minister due to ill health; ex-Finance Minister Eisaku Sato is elected the new Prime Minister on November 9. (FOF 11/5-11/11 p. 391; Document Nos. 00358, 00361)

November 7, 1964:

At an anti-U.S. port calls demonstration in Yokosuka, Zengakuren and police clash, and 135 are injured. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

November 9, 1964:

The Ikeda cabinet resigns, and first Eisaku Sato cabinet is established. Main members include Etsusaburo Shiina as foreign minister, Kakuei Tanaka as finance minister, Yoshio Sakurauchi as MITI minister, and Junya Koizumi as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

November 12-14, 1964:

The USS Sea Dragon makes a port call at Sasebo, marking the first entry by a U.S. SSN into a Japanese port. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101; Document Nos. 00362-00363)

November 17, 1964:

The third meeting of U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held in Tokyo. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

November 17, 1964:

The "Kennedy Round" of GATT talks open in Geneva in an effort to cut tariffs. (FOF 12/17-12/23 p. 441)

December 1, 1964:

A special Liberal Democratic Party convention names Prime Minister Sato as party president. (FOF 12/3-12/9 p. 428)

December 3-5, 1964:

Foreign Minister Shiina visits the U.S. and meets with Secretary of State Rusk. They discuss China, Vietnam, and plans for the upcoming Sato visit to the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101; Document Nos. 00370-00371)

December 3, 1964:

The U.S. and Japan sign agreement on the BADGE system, under which the U.S. will pay 25 percent of the total amount. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

December 14, 1964:

Ryukyus High Commissioner Watson meets with Prime Minister Sato to discuss U.S.-Japan cooperation on Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101; Document No. 00375)

December 19, 1964:

Hawk missiles are deployed in Chitose. (Kosaka, et al.; p.101)

January 11-14, 1965:

Prime Minister Sato meets with President Johnson in Washington, D.C. Sato and Johnson fail to agree on policy toward China. Sato explains that Japan will maintain diplomatic ties with Nationalist China but promote private contact with Communist China, while Johnson restates the U.S. position. The U.S. and Japan issue a joint communiqué after the summit reaffirming their partnership and noting their differences over China. The U.S. also agrees to improvements regarding the Okinawa issue, but not to Sato's request that the U.S. return all of the Ryukyu Islands except Okinawa. (NYT Ja 13,1:2; NYT Ja 14,5:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.102; Document Nos. 00435-00456)

February 2, 1965:

The USS Sea Dragon makes a port call to Sasebo. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

March 15, 1965:

During bilateral negotiations on revision of the U.S.-Japan Cotton Agreement, the U.S. rejects Japanese demands. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

March 16, 1965:

An inspection team in Okinawa led by the prime minister's General Affairs Director Soichi Usui arrives in Naha. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

April 2, 1965:

The U.S. and Japan exchange documents regarding expansion of functions of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

April 7, 1965:

Foreign Minister Shiina tells the Lower House Foreign Relations Committee that "Vietnam is considered as part of the Far East. U.S. bombing of North Vietnam is an act of self-defense and therefore applicable to clauses under Article 1 of the Security Treaty." (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

April 14, 1965:

Foreign Minister Shiina says before the Lower House Foreign Relations Committee that "While Japan has no intention of intervening in the Vietnam War, it will carry out the duties as stated in the Security Treaty. Vietnam is not included in the 'areas surrounding the Far East' as defined in the Security Treaty." (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

April 21, 1965:

Japan ends negotiations with the U.S. on cotton products. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

April 24, 1965:

Presidential envoy Lodge arrives in Tokyo and in a meeting with Prime Minister Sato asks for Japanese cooperation and understanding on the Vietnam War. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102; Document Nos. 00469-00471)

April 26, 1965:

The Japanese government decides to apply its tariff rebates program for raw materials used for export goods to all exports including automobiles and machinery. This policy becomes effective October 1. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

April 27, 1965:

During a meeting of the Lower House Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Minister Shiina expresses support for U.S. policy toward Vietnam, especially its bombings of North Vietnam, (Kosaka, et al.; p.102; Document No. 00472)

April 27, 1965:

The U.S. Tariff Commission says Japan is dumping its plastic products in the U.S. and is causing harm to the U.S. domestic industry. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

May 7, 1965:

Prime Minister Sato expresses his support of U.S. bombings in North Vietnam. (Kosaka, et al.; p.102)

May 31, 1965:

Prime Minister Sato says at a Lower House Budget Committee meeting that Japan will send the Self Defense Forces if Okinawa is attacked. (Kosaka, et al.; p.103)

June 3, 1965:

The first Sato cabinet is reshuffled. Main members now include Etsusaburo Shiina as foreign minister, Takeo Fukuda as finance minister, Takeo Miki as MITI minister, and Raizo Matsuno as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.103)

June 22, 1965:

Japan and the Republic of Korea sign the Basic Treaty establishing diplomatic relations (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

July 12-14, 1965:

The fourth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Washington. During the meeting, more attention is devoted to Vietnam than to economic issues. Cooperation in economic aid for Asia is also emphasized. (Kosaka, et al.; p.103; Document Nos. 00489-00490, 00494-00495, 00497)

July 16, 1965:

Ambassador Reischauer, Robert Fearey, the State Department's director for East Asian affairs, and Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, among others, discuss a secret plan to funnel money to the Okinawan LDP. They agree that the best method is to channel the funds through the mainland LDP in order to avoid having the United States be caught with its hand "in the cookie jar," as one participant puts it. The purpose of the covert aid is to help ensure that the island's legislature is controlled by forces sympathetic to an agreement to preserve U.S. military rights on the island. (Document No. 00498)

July 29, 1965:

USAF B-52s are dispatched from Okinawa to attack the Viet Cong. They are usually sent from bases in Guam but are sent from Okinawa for the first time because they had been evacuated to Okinawa due to weather. The Japanese government announces that this does not require pre-consultation under the Security Treaty. Opposition parties protest, and the Ryukyu legislature passes a resolution condemning the bombings on July 30th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.103; Document No. 00503)

August 2, 1965:

Prime Minister Sato tells the lower house that he is "surprised at [the] dispatch of B-52s from Okinawa. I remain unconvinced at the nature of this, even though the U.S. has administrative rights over Okinawa." (Kosaka, et al.; p.103)

August 19-21, 1965:

Prime Minister Sato visits Okinawa, making him the first prime minister since 1945 to do so. He meets with Ryukyu High Commissioner Watson and asks for greater U.S. effort to return administrative rights to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.103; Document No. 00509)

August 24, 1965:

The Japanese cabinet decides to establish a Cabinet Consultative Group on the Okinawa issue. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

August 27, 1965:

Prime Minister Sato tells his cabinet to increase aid to Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

September 1, 1965:

The fifth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held in Tokyo. The focus is on Vietnam, with the U.S. expressing displeasure at Japanese domestic opinion on the war and Japan urging the U.S. to be considerate about its use of bases in Japan. (NYT S 2,2:7; Kosaka, et al.; p.104; Document No. 00526)

September 7, 1965:

The Japanese Cabinet Consultative Group on Okinawa decides it is inappropriate to take the Okinawa issue to the United Nations. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

September 20, 1965:

The sixth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held in Tokyo. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 104)

October 20, 1965:

The seventh meeting of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held in Tokyo. Economic aid to the island is one of the issues discussed. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

October 30, 1965:

Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy makes a speech criticizing Japanese public opinion toward Vietnam. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

November 2, 1965:

The eighth meeting of U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held in Tokyo, where it is decided that Japan will contribute 5.8 billion yen in aid to the island. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

November 19, 1965:

The Japanese government decides to issue government bonds to cover a national budget deficit--the first in the post-war period. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

November 26, 1965:

The U.S. Navy announces that it will assign the USS Enterprise to be part of the Seventh Fleet. It also unofficially notifies the Japanese government that it may be necessary for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to make port calls in Japan in the future. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104)

December 10, 1965:

The U.N. General Assembly selects Japan and six other countries as non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, effective January 1, 1966. (Kosaka, et al.; p.104-105; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

December 14, 1965:

Japan becomes a permanent member of the OECD Executive Committee. (Kosaka, et al.; p.105)

December 18, 1965:

The Japan-South Korea Treaty comes into effect, and the two countries establish diplomatic relations. (Kosaka, et al.; p.105)

December 28, 1965:

Vice President Hubert Humphrey visits Japan to ask for Japanese cooperation in U.S. efforts to bring peace in Vietnam. (Kosaka, et al.; p.105; Document Nos. 00539, 00540)

January 6-7, 1966:

U.S. Special Envoy W. Averell Harriman visits Japan. Harriman meets with Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina on the 7th and expresses hope about Japanese involvement in the Vietnam peace negotiations. (Kosaka, et al.; p.106; Document Nos. 00542-00543)

January 14, 1966:

The U.S. and Japan sign an agreement extending a bilateral cotton product agreement for two years until 1967. (Kosaka, et al.; p.106)

February 14, 1966:

Prime Minister Sato says he supports port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. (Kosaka, et al.; p.106)

February 22-23, 1966:

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy visits Japan. In his meeting with Vice Minister Takezo Shimoda on the 23rd, they exchange views on nuclear policy under the Security Treaty and agree to prevent nuclear proliferation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.106)

March 8, 1966:

Prime Minister Sato tells the Upper House (House of Councilors) Budget Committee that Japan should consider long-term maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty after 1970. (Kosaka, et al.; p.106)

March 10, 1966:

Prime Minister Sato tells the Upper House Budget Committee that the "U.S. has the primary responsibility of defending Okinawa since it has the administrative rights, but Japan will also defend Okinawa in consultation with the U.S." (Kosaka, et al.; p.106)

April 16, 1966:

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs releases "Problems in U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," a compilation of the government's statements on the issue. (Kosaka, et al.; p.106)

April 18, 1966:

Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda asserts that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty will be necessary even after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is signed. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

May 9, 1966:

At the ninth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa in Tokyo, both sides agree on expanding autonomy in Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

June 18-20, 1966:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Department begin holding informal discussions in Tokyo and Hakone. A U.S. policy planning team headed by Assistant Secretary Berger and Ambassador Reischauer confers with Japanese diplomats on their policies toward Communist China. (NYT Je 19,4:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

June 27, 1966:

The Japanese Export-Import Bank approves loans in the amount of 3.6 billion yen to the U.S. Development Bank. It is the first time that a loan is provided to an international financial institution. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

July 4-7, 1966:

The fifth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Kyoto. Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Shiina head their delegation as they discuss Sino-Japanese trade, reform of the international monetary system, and textiles. Japan and the U.S. reaffirm unity in the communiqué, but the conference fails to resolve policy differences because the Americans, impressed by Japan's economic gains, were disappointed by Japan's refusal to make concessions on foreign investments. (NYT Jl 7,3:2; Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

July 7, 1966:

Prime Minister Sato meets with Secretary of State Rusk and asks for early resolution of the Vietnam conflict. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107; Document No. 00587-00589)

July 22, 1966:

The lower house of the Japanese Diet approves legislation establishing the Asian Development Bank. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

July 25, 1966:

Ambassador Reischauer resigns and is replaced by Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

August 1, 1966:

The Sato cabinet undergoes its second cabinet reshuffle, and now includes Etsusaburo Shiina as foreign minister, Takeo Fukuda as finance minister, Takeo Miki as MITI minister, and Eikichi Kannbayashiyama as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

August 19, 1966:

Director of General Affairs of the Prime Minister's Office Kiyoshi Mori and Ryukyu High Commissioner Watson release a communiqué on increases in Japanese aid to Okinawa and an expansion of autonomy in Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

September 5, 1966:

The USS Sea Dragon makes a port call at Yokosuka, departing on the 9th. It is the first time U.S. nuclear-powered submarines called at both Yokosuka and Sasebo simultaneously. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

September 28, 1966:

The U.S. government announces that High Commissioner for the Ryukyus Lt. Gen. Albert Watson II is resigning, to be succeeded by General Ferdinand Unger. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

October 7, 1966:

Prime Minister Sato sends President Johnson a message expressing the hope that Japan will continue to cooperate using non-military means in working toward peace in Vietnam. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

October 18, 1966:

The tenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held discussing topics including the use of Japanese flags on Okinawan ships. (Kosaka, et al.; p.107)

October 27, 1966:

China announces that it has successfully conducted a nuclear missile test. The Japanese government says it will protest this Chinese action. (Kosaka, et al.; p.108)

November 8, 1966:

U. Alexis Johnson becomes the new U.S. ambassador to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.108; Document No. 00609)

November 24-26, 1966:

The Asian Development Bank holds its inaugural meeting in Tokyo. Takeshi Watanbane is elected as the first president. (Kosaka, et al.; p.108)

November 29, 1966:

The National Defense Council decides on the main structure of the Third Defense Buildup Plan, which had been delayed. (Kosaka, et al.; p.108)

December 3, 1966:

The Sato cabinet reshuffles for the third time, as Takeo Miki becomes the foreign minister, Mikio Mizuta the finance minister, Wataro Kanno the MITI minister, and Kaneshichi Masuda the JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.108)

December 5-6, 1966:

Secretary of State Rusk visits Japan and meets with Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Miki on the 6th to discuss the Chinese UN representation issue and other matters. (Kosaka, et al.; p.108; Document Nos. 00620-00624)

January 19, 1967:

Prime Minister Sato, commenting on administrative rights over Okinawa, says that total reversion, rather then partial reversion involving only education rights, is preferable. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

January 25, 1967:

The eleventh meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

January 31, 1967:

Senator Michael Mansfield argues at a congressional hearing that Okinawa and the Bonins should be returned to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

February 9, 1967:

The Japanese government decides to ask for total reversion of Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

February 9, 1967:

Commenting on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vice Minister Shimoda says Japan has the right to conduct nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

February 17, 1967:

The second Sato cabinet is formed. Its main members include Takeo Miki as foreign minister, Mikio Mizuta as finance minister, Wataro Kanno as MITI minister, and Kaneschichi Masuda as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

March 1, 1967:

The twelfth meeting of Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held. It is decided that Okinawan ships will use both Japanese flags and flags with "Ryukyu" on it. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

March 13, 1967:

The Third Defense Buildup Plan is approved by the National Defense Council. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

April 7, 1967:

Prime Minister Sato says that it is possible from for Japan to export weapons. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109)

April 14, 1967:

Vice Minister Takezo Shimoda is named the next Japanese ambassador to the U.S., effective June 20. (Kosaka, et al.; p.109, 110)

May 15, 1967:

The seventh meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee convenes. During the meeting, the U.S. states it will remain in the Vietnam War until the end, and Japan explains the domestic mood surrounding the Security Treaty, which is facing revision in 1970. (Kosaka, et al.; p.110; Document No. 00677)

June 17, 1967:

The People's Republic of China announces the test of its first hydrogen bomb. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

June 29, 1967:

The Japanese government approves details of the Kennedy Round GATT agreement at a cabinet meeting. Japan joins the U.S. and 47 other countries in signing the agreement in Geneva on June 30. (Kosaka, et al.; p.110)

July 10, 1967:

Ambassador Shimoda discusses Okinawa and Bonins issues with Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. (Kosaka, et al.; p.110; Document No. 00690)

July 15, 1967:

Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer makes a statement that it would be wise to return Okinawa to Japan by 1970. (Kosaka, et al.; p.110)

August 4, 1967:

Director of General Affairs at the Prime Minister's Office Toshio Tsukahara and Ryukyu High Commissioner General Ferdinand Unger meet. (Kosaka, et al.; p.110)

August 8, 1967:

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is formed. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

September 7, 1967:

Acting Ambassador David Osborn asks director general of North American Affairs Fumihiko Togo for permission for port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered ships such as the aircraft carrier Enterprise. (Kosaka, et al.; p.110)

September 13-15, 1967:

The sixth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Washington. The discussions emphasize the U.S.-Japan partnership in strengthening regional cooperation in Asia-Pacific region. During the meeting, several side meetings are held to discuss diplomatic and security issues of mutual interest. A joint communiqué calling for stable expansion of bilateral trade and economic relations is released on the 15th. (NYT S 14,27:1; NYT S 18,6:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.110; Document Nos. 00721-00729, 00732, 00734-00758)

October 11, 1967:

Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson hold their first meeting of negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins. (Kosaka, et al.; p.111; Document Nos. 00770-00771)

October 24, 1967:

The U.S. Senate passes an amendment to the Price Act, under which aid to Okinawa is increased to $17.5 million. The amendment passes the House on October 26th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.111)

October 27-November 12, 1967:

In a move designed to bypass Sato's foreign minister and political rival, Takeo Miki, Prime Minister Sato's secret envoy Professor Kei Wakaizumi meets with National Security Advisor W.W. Rostow in Washington, D.C. to discuss Okinawa. (Okinawa Chronology, 1945-1972, URL: faculty.tamu-commerce.edu/sarantakes/Time.html)

November 2, 1967:

The Japanese cabinet approves port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered ships such as the aircraft carrier Enterprise. (Kosaka, et al.; p.111)

November 6, 1967:

Ambassador Johnson tells Foreign Minister Miki about U.S. policy on the reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins. (Kosaka, et al.; p.111; Document No. 00806)

November 14-15, 1967:

Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson meet in Washington for a summit meeting. A joint communiqué is issued on the 15th indicating that the Bonin Islands will be returned within a year, but no clear date is set for the reversion of Okinawa. (NYT N 15,1:5; NYT N 16,1:3; Kosaka, et al.; p.111; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals; Document Nos. 00840-00849)

November 25, 1967:

The second Sato cabinet undergoes its first reshuffle. Its main members now include Takeo Miki as foreign minister, Mikio Mizuta as finance minister, Etsusaburo Shiina as MITI minister, and Kaneshichi Masuda as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.111)

November 29, 1967:

Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson meet for the first time since the Johnson-Sato summit meeting, and agree that the Bonin Islands reversion will follow the example of the Reversion Agreement for the Amami Islands. (Kosaka, et al.; p.111)

December 28, 1967:

Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson meet and agree on basic principles for the Draft Reversion Agreement for the Reversion of Bonin Islands. (Kosaka, et al.; p.112)

January 3, 1968:

Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow visits Japan as a special envoy of President Johnson to explain U.S. policy to defend the dollar. Rostow meets with Prime Minister Sato and asks for $300 million in Japanese aid to Southeast Asia. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

January 11, 1968:

The thirteenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held. The committee decides to provide 15.2 billion yen worth of aid to Okinawa in 1968. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

January 15, 1968:

Zengakuren protesters protesting port calls by USS Enterprise clash with police in Tokyo, as 131 are arrested. The USS Enterprise arrives for its first port call in Japan on January 19th and departs on the 23rd. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113; Document Nos. 00876-00877, 00879)

January 19, 1968:

In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson exchange documents related to establishing the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner. The committee is also officially established. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

January 27, 1968:

Prime Minister Sato says that Japan will not allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan and will work toward using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

January 30, 1968:

Prime Minister Sato announces to the Diet the government's Three Non-nuclear Principles (not to develop, introduce, or possess nuclear weapons). These principles are one part of a four point nuclear policy committing Japan to work for nuclear disarmament, rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for defense, and focus on solely civilian nuclear power development. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113; Okinawa Chronology, 1945-1972, URL: faculty.tamu-commerce.edu/sarantakes/Time.html)

January 31, 1968:

In remarks to the Diet, Prime Minister Sato says that any visit to Japan by a nuclear armed submarine will be subject to the prior consultation clause in the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and indicates that he would ban such a visit in line with his opposition to introducing nuclear weapons into Japan. Sato also clarifies the Government's position on American forces' use of bases in Japan to respond to Socialist members opposition, and he rejects the view that the USS Enterprise carried nuclear weapons when it visited Sasebo. (NYT F 1,1:5)

February 1, 1968:

Ryukyu High Commissioner Unger announces that President Johnson has signed an executive order authorizing direct election of the chief executive of the Okinawa government. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

February 7, 1968:

Vice Minister Nobuhiko Ushiba says Japan should approach negotiations for Okinawa reversion with a flexible attitude, including on the issue of nuclear matters. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

February 29, 1968:

Before the U.S. House of Representatives, former U.S. Ambassador Edwin Reischauer says that it would be desirable to return Okinawa soon and without nuclear weapons. (Kosaka, et al.; p.113)

March 1, 1968:

The U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner holds its first meeting in Naha. (Kosaka, et al.; p.114)

April 5, 1968:

The U.S. and Japan sign the Agreement for Reversion of the Bonin Islands. The islands were returned on June 26th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.114)

April 25, 1968:

Three agreements produced by the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations (the GATT Geneva Agreement, an agreement on anti-dumping taxes, and an international grain agreement) pass the lower house of the Diet. (Kosaka, et al.; p.114)

May 2, 1968:

The USS Swordfish makes a port call at Sasebo for the first time in 15 months, departing on the 11th. On May 6th, abnormal levels of radiation are discovered near Sasebo waters. (Kosaka, et al.; p.115)

May 13, 1968:

The eighth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held in Tokyo.

May 14, 1968:

Following a report that increased radioactivity was found in waters of Sasebo harbor during the recent visit of the USS Swordfish, Prime Minister Sato informs Ambassador Johnson and Admiral Sharp that Japan can no longer let American nuclear ships call at her ports unless their safety is guaranteed. U.S. naval authorities say the radiation could not have come from the submarine but agree to join in a study of possible causes. (NYT My 15,5:1)

May 27, 1968:

Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson hold the first continuous discussions on Okinawa reversion, during which Johnson emphasizes the importance of Okinawa to U.S. Far East strategy. (Kosaka, et al.; p.115)

June 2, 1968:

A U.S. military plane crashes on the Kyushyu University campus. At a joint committee four days later, the U.S. says it will not make unnecessary takeoffs and landings at Itazuke Air Base during the night until the cause of the crash is clear. (Kosaka, et al.; p.115)

June 15, 1968:

Prime Minister Sato indicates that he favors automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. (Kosaka, et al.; p.115)

June 20, 1968:

The U.S. and Japan agree on relocation of Itazuke Air Base. (Kosaka, et al.; p.115)

June 26, 1968:

The Bonin Islands revert to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.115)

July 1, 1968:

At the fourteenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa, the U.S. indicates difficulty in allowing Okinawa to participate in Japanese government affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.116)

July 14, 1968:

The U.S. House of Representatives releases State Department Japan Country Director Richard Sneider's testimony that the U.S. did not promise reversion of Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.116)

October 5, 1968:

During his visit to the U.S., Foreign Minister Miki discusses security and Okinawa reversion with Secretary of State Rusk. (Kosaka, et al.; p.116; Document No. 01003)

October 9, 1968:

The fifteenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa approves Okinawa residents' participation in Japanese government affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.116)

November 1, 1968:

The Japan Defense Agency says it will use McDonnell-Douglas' F-4E Phantoms as the Air Self Defense Force's next generation of fighters. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 116)

November 10, 1968:

Elections for the Okinawa legislature and Chief Executive are held in Okinawa. The Progressive unified candidate Chobyo Yara is elected as chief executive, while the conservative Okinawan LDP maintains its power in the legislature. The State Department says it will respect decisions by Okinawa residents. (Kosaka, et al.; p.117; Document Nos. 01012, 01015-01016, 01019)

November 20, 1968:

Lt. Gen. Ferdinand Unger is removed as Ryukyus high commissioner. Lt. Gen. James Lampert is named as his successor. (Kosaka, et al.; p.117; Document No. 01018)

November 30, 1968:

The second Sato cabinet reshuffles for a second time. Its main members now include Kiichi Aichi as foreign minister, Takeo Fukuda as finance minister, Masayoshi Ohira as MITI minister, and Kiichi Arita as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.117)

December 9, 1968:

Japan Country Director Richard Sneider says the U.S. cannot remove B-52 bomber aircraft from Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.117)

December 23, 1968:

The ninth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held in Tokyo. The Committee discusses problems surrounding U.S. base facilities and areas, and the U.S. presents a proposal for consolidation and reduction of its military bases in Japan. Under the proposal, the U.S. would return, agree to joint use or re-locate 50 military facilities and areas now held by U.S. forces. The proposed changes would affect one-third of the 148 military bases in country, and half of the land now used by U.S. forces. The American move is prompted by the desire to ease growing strains in relations arising from the location of bases in congested and high-value urban areas, and is expected to ease political pressures on Sato's conservative government, which was under attack because of a number of incidents involving the bases. (NYT D 24,1:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.117; Document Nos. 01030, 01040)

January 6, 1969:

Ambassador Shimoda says demanding "hondonami" (homeland status under the U.S.-Security Treaty, i.e., with no U.S. nuclear weapons based on the island) reversion during negotiations on Okinawa is naive. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

January 10, 1969:

Japan's National Defense Council approves domestic production of 104 F-4Es. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals.)

January 15, 1969:

U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson resigns. (Document No. 01039).

January 20, 1969:

Richard Nixon becomes president of the United States. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

January 21, 1969:

Foreign Minister Aichi indicates that the idea of maintaining present U.S. base arrangements even after reversion of Okinawa is open to consideration. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

January 28, 1969:

Discussions between the U.S. and Japan on Japanese import restrictions are resumed in Tokyo. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

January 30, 1969:

The Japanese government indicates it will ask for Okinawa reversion using a "hondonami, early, and no nuclear weapons" formula. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

February 4, 1969:

Japanese Ambassador Shimoda meets Secretary of State William Rogers for the first time, and expresses hope for the early reversion of Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

February 4, 1969:

Prime Minister Sato tells the Lower House Budget Committee that the "'not to introduce' phrase in the three non-nuclear principles is a policy issue." Foreign Minister Aichi also says before the same committee that Japan will "permit port calls by nuclear-powered submarines carrying Polaris missiles in case of emergency evacuation." (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

March 10, 1969:

Prime Minister Sato lays out before the Upper House Budget Committee the policy of "non-nuclear" reversion of Okinawa, and says Japan will not even allow port calls by ships loaded with Polaris missiles. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

April 4, 1969:

The U.S. and Japan sign a joint communiqué on Japanese domestic production of F-4EJs . (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

April 9, 1969:

Ambassador Shimoda meets with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

April 11, 1969:

Prime Minister Sato tells the Lower House Budget Committee that "non-nuclear, hondonami" will be Japan's basic position in negotiating with the U.S. on reversion of Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.118)

April 29, 1969:

Fumihiko Togo, the director general of North American Affairs Bureau, goes to the U.S. for Okinawa reversion negotiations, where he asks U.S. officials for "hondonami" and non-nuclear reversion. Togo tells the press afterward that "the American attitudes toward nuclear weapons in Okinawa and free use of bases are firm." (Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

May 10-13, 1969:

During a visit to Tokyo, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans asks the Japanese government for a voluntary quota on textile exports, but the Japanese cabinet objects strongly to any curbs. The Japanese reportedly claim that the proposed quotas were politically and not economically motivated. Stans also urges the Japanese government to ease curbs on foreign capital investment, but, upon leaving Tokyo, he expresses disappointment with the talks and criticizes Japan's restrictive policies. (FOF June 5-11 Vol. 19 no. 1493; NYT My 13,66:3; NYT My 14,59:2; Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

May 21, 1969:

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee releases confirmation hearing testimony by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Armin Meyer, in which Meyer says that the "timing of Okinawa reversion depends on the military situation and security situation in the Far East." (Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

May 28, 1969:

President Nixon approves National Security Decision Memorandum 13, "Policy toward Japan," which authorizes negotiations with Japan on the reversion of Okinawa, including the possible removal of U.S. nuclear weapons based on the island. (Document No. 01074)

June 1, 1969:

Foreign Minister Aichi meets with President Nixon and asks for Okinawa's "non-nuclear, hondonami, and 1972" reversion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.119; Document No. 01080)

June 3, 1969:

Foreign Minister Aichi meets with Secretary of State Rogers. Aichi emphasizes that Okinawa reversion will contribute to stability in Asia, and also proposes automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 119; Document No. 01082)

June 26, 1969:

The U.S. decides to send Special Assistant Richard Sneider to Japan as special ambassador for Okinawa affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

July 3, 1969:

Armin Meyer becomes the new U.S. ambassador to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

July 9, 1969:

The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meets in Tokyo, where Ambassador Meyer, Admiral McCain and their Japanese counterparts exchange views on the Chinese nuclear program. (NYT Jl 10,7:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

July 22, 1969:

The Department of Defense announces that it will remove certain types of chemical weapons including nerve gas from its bases in Okinawa. Foreign Minister Aichi says the introduction of biological or chemical weapons onto the island after reversion will require "pre-consultation." (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

July 25, 1969:

President Nixon announces the Nixon Doctrine (Guam Doctrine). (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

July 29-30, 1969:

The Seventh meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Tokyo, with Secretary of State Rogers leading the American cabinet delegation. During the talks, the U.S. asks Japan to end its restrictions on foreign capital investment. Both sides agree to a fall meeting to discuss further trade liberalization in Japan. During the meetings, Secretary Rogers also holds a private meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi to discuss bilateral foreign policy issues. (NYT Jl 29,10:1; NYT Jl 31,9:1; NYT Ag 1,45:4; Kosaka, et al.; p.120; Document No. 01109)

July 31, 1969:

Prime Minister Sato and Secretary of State Rogers meet to discuss Okinawa reversion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.120; Document No. 01108)

August 25, 1969:

The Japanese Ministry of Finance decides to liberalize non-trade transactions. (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

August 31, 1969:

The OECD finds that Japan has moved to a position of 'chronic' surplus in its balance of payments, even at times of vigorous domestic boom. The OECD report says that the outlook is for Japan to remain an important surplus nation for some time but is cautious in assessing the future course of Japan's balance-of-payments. While citing some steps Japan might take to moderate its surplus, the report is seen to reinforce the privately held belief that the yen is undervalued. (NYT S 1,26:4)

September 15, 1969:

Foreign Minister Aichi and Secretary of State Rogers discuss America's combat strategy for military action from Okinawa in the post-reversion period. (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

September 26, 1969:

The Diet Lower House Arms Committee releases testimony records from the FY 1970 defense budget deliberations, which point out insufficiency in Japanese defense efforts. (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

October 2, 1969:

The U.S., in a message sent to the Japanese Embassy, asks Japan to restrict textile imports. (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

October 4, 1969:

JDA Director General Arita says that the four main policy objectives under the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan are 1) improving naval defense capabilities, 2) encouraging domestic production of weapons, 3) firming up the idea of defending Okinawa, and 4) strengthening the unified force of the three Self Defense Force branches. (Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

October 6-9, 1969:

The U.S. and Japan resume discussions in Tokyo on Japanese import restrictions. The Japanese side promises to liberalize six items including grapefruits and helicopters. Assistant Secretary of State Trezise, head of the U.S. delegation, repeatedly warns that if current talks fail to produce accelerated efforts by Japan, the U.S. will bar further bilateral talks. (NYT O 7,61:3;Kosaka, et al.; p.120)

November 10, 1969:

Okinawa Chief Executive Yara asks Prime Minister Sato to demand immediate and unconditional total reversion of Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.121)

November 17, 1969:

Preparatory negotiations between the U.S. and Japan on voluntary export restraints of textiles are held in Geneva. (Kosaka, et al.; p.121)

November 19-21, 1969:

Following three days of meetings in Washington, President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato issue a communiqué on November 21 announcing the return of Okinawa and other U.S. held Ryukyu Islands on a non-nuclear, "hondonami" basis to Japan in 1972. As part of the agreement U.S. forces in Japan would have greater flexibility to fulfill their security commitment in the Far East (based upon a secret agreement under which the U.S. would be able to return nuclear weapons to the island in the event of a military emergency in the Far East). The communiqué affirms both governments' intentions to renew the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1970, and also discusses economic matters. According to later accounts, Prime Minister Sato promised President Nixon that he would obtain reductions in Japanese textile exports to the U.S. in exchange for the U.S. agreement to return Okinawa. Mr. Nixon termed the talks "the most significant" between the U.S. and Japan since WWII. Sato said they signified the start of a "new Pacific age" in which "a new order will be created by Japan and the U.S." (FOF November 20-26 Vol. 19 no. 1517; NYT N 22,14:7; Kosaka, et al.; p.121; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals; Destler, et al., The Textile Wrangle; Document Nos. 01169, 01173-01174)

November 26, 1969:

Prime Minister Sato returns to Japan after his meetings with President Nixon and says Japan will maintain the three non-nuclear principles and refuse introduction of nuclear weapons. (Kosaka, et al.; p.121)

December 15, 1969:

The U.S. Air Force announces that it will remove its Mace B strategic missiles based in Okinawa by the end of 1969. (Kosaka, et al.; p.121)

December 22, 1969:

Negotiations on voluntary textile export restraints resume in Geneva. After Japan rejects a U.S. proposal, the U.S. proposes putting negotiations on hold, which is agreed. (Kosaka, et al.; p.121)

December 31, 1969:

U.S. Air Force Mace B missiles in Okinawa are removed. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 121)

January 2, 1970:

The U.S. government submits a second proposal on voluntary textile export restraints to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

January 9, 1970:

Ambassador Shimoda discusses Japanese voluntary export restraints on textiles with Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

January 10, 1970:

A bilateral conference on Japanese voluntary export restraints on textiles is held in Washington, at which Japan rejects the second proposal advanced by the U.S. earlier in the month. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

January 13, 1970:

Japan refuses to propose an alternative plan to the U.S. request for restraint on textile imports, and also asks for proof of adverse affects of Japanese imports on the U.S. textile industry. (FOF, 1/8-1/14, 1970)

January 14, 1970:

The third Sato cabinet is formed. Its main members include Kiichi Aichi as foreign minister, Takeo Fukuda as finance minister, Kiichi Miyazawa as MITI minister, and Yasuhiro Nakasone as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

January 16, 1970:

Foreign Minister Aichi discusses the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and textile negotiations with Ambassador Meyer. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126; Document No. 01183)

January 20, 1970:

The U.S. claims that Japan exceeded the ceiling on steel imports to the U.S. in 1969 by nearly 10,000 tons. (FOF 1/29-2/4)

February 2, 1970:

The U.S. cancels Japan's $100 million a year exemption from the U.S. interest equalization tax, due to Japan's balance of payments surplus over the previous two years. (FOF 2/5-2/11)

February 3, 1970:

Japan formally signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (FOF 2/5-2/11; Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

February 13, 1970:

The eighteenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Okinawa is held. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

February 13, 1970:

Reports appear in the press that JDA Director General Yasuhiro Nakasone recently discussed his proposal for the joint use of American bases in Japan with U.S. Ambassador Meyer. Nakasone first made this proposal in a speech on February 4th to the Japanese Defense College in Yokohama. American and Japanese officials view the proposal as politically attractive to the Japanese and economically attractive to the U.S. but stress formidable legal obstacles. (NYT F 14,9:4)

February 26, 1970:

JDA Director General Nakasone tells the Lower House Budget Committee that he is considering spending 0.8 percent to 1 percent of GNP on defense during the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

March 3, 1970:

Foreign Minister Aichi and Ambassador Meyer exchange documents related to preparations for Okinawa reversion. In a related move, the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner is reorganized into the Preparatory Commission for Okinawa Reversion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.126)

March 17, 1970:

Following a request by Prime Minister Sato for early settlement of the textile dispute, Japan says it will respect the findings of the U.S. tariff commission on the question of injury to U.S. industry. (FOF 3/26-4/1)

May 19, 1970:

A meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee takes place. (Document Nos. 01250, 01252)

June 10, 1970:

Japan's Economic Planning Agency announces that Japan's GNP for 1968 was $51 trillion yen (second in Free World). (Kosaka, et al.; p.119)

June 22, 1970:

Japan formally announces plans to allow automatic extension of security treaty with U.S. (FOF 6/18-6/24)

June 22-25, 1970:

U.S.-Japan negotiations on voluntary Japanese limitations of textile exports to the U.S. market collapse, and U.S. Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans announces on June 25 that the Nixon administration will now give "reluctant" support to legislation limiting textile imports. (FOF 6/25-7/1; Document Nos. 01278-01283)

July 10, 1970:

Nobuhiko Ushida is appointed Japanese ambassador to the U.S. to succeed the retiring Ambassador Shimoda. (NYT Jl 11,17:5)

August 4, 1970:

JDA Secretary-General Nakasone, in an interview the previous week, announces that Japan will shortly start sharing control of many of the 123 bases and facilities now under U.S. control. Nakasone says that a cost-sharing formula has been included in this agreement, but that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) will not be modified. (NYT Ag 5,8:3)

August 23, 1970:

A Senate Armed Services subcommittee chaired by Senator Stuart Symington[RW1] says that the U.S. has turned over responsibility to Japan for defending herself against conventional military attack. In making this statement, the subcommittee makes public the transcript of Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson's testimony in January. In his testimony, Johnson said the U.S. had no commitment to defend Japan unless Japan contributed to its own defense as well, and asserted this step was in line with the Nixon Doctrine of stimulating Asian nations to do more for themselves and for the U.S. to do less. Johnson further testified that the primary justification for maintaining American bases and forces in Japan was to fulfill U.S. security commitments elsewhere. (NYT Ag 24,1:6)

September 10, 1970:

During a news conference on talks with U.S. officials in Washington, Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yasuhiro Nakasone urges the U.S. to close or turn over to joint use all of its military bases in Japan,. Nakasone says he is certain that in an emergency Japan would permit American troops to return to the bases. (NYT S 11,10:5; Document Nos. 01315, 01320)

October 23, 1970:

Japanese textile industry leaders announce that they have agreed to accept the U.S. demand for voluntary quotas and that they believe that such a move should avert a trade war between the two countries. After completing three days of meetings with top U.S. officials in Washington, Uemura says he would oppose any moves in Japan to retaliate if a U.S. trade bill targeting Japan is passed. He also notes that Japan has already eased restrictions on many imports. (NYT O 24,1:6)

October 24, 1970:

President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato confer and agree to resume negotiations on voluntary restraints on textile exports. (NYT O 25,19:1; Document Nos. 01341, 01344)

November 19, 1970:

The U.S. House of Representatives passes a bill setting import quotas on textiles. (FOF 12/24-12/31)

December 23, 1970:

Commerce Secretary Stans announces that White House negotiations with Japan over curbing textile imports would be postponed until early 1971. (FOF 12/24-12/31)

January 1, 1971:

Japan becomes a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129)

March 3, 1971:

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force conducts joint exercises with a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine in Chiba. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129)

March 4, 1971:

The U.S. Tariff Commission rules that Japanese T.V. imports are damaging the U.S. domestic industry, finding that they are being sold at less than fair value as defined by the Anti-dumping Act. This decision opens the way for the Treasury Department to place special dumping duties on all Japanese T.V. imports. (FOF 3/4-3/10, 1971 p. 183)

March 8, 1971:

The Japanese Textile Federation announces it will voluntarily restrict exports of textiles to the U.S. for a three-year period beginning July 1. (FOF 3/4-3/10 p. 165)

March 10, 1971:

Following a U.S. Tariff Commission ruling earlier in the month, the Treasury Department says that Japan has dumped televisions in the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129)

March 11, 1971:

President Nixon refuses a Japanese industry proposal for voluntary textile export restraints, noting that the Japanese government's apparent ratification of a plan precluded bilateral government negotiations that he favored. The president also expresses support for import allocation legislation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129; FOF 3/11-3/17 p.183)

April 25, 1971:

The New York Times reports that a secret agreement exists between the U.S. and Japan on introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129)

April 28, 1971:

The U.S.-Japan Economic Consultative Committee is formed. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129)

May 31, 1971:

Japanese currency reserves at the end of May reach $6.916 billion, making Japan the third largest currency reserve holder in the Free World after West Germany and the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.129)

June 9, 1971:

Foreign Minister Aichi discusses the Okinawa Reversion Agreement with Secretary Rogers in Paris, where they agree that the Agreement will be signed on June 17. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

June 17, 1971:

The Okinawa Reversion Agreement is signed in both Tokyo and Washington. The treaty becomes effective in May 1972. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

June 25, 1971:

A U.S.-Japan joint committee decides to either partially return or jointly use the following bases: Itazuke, Atsugi, Tachikawa, Zama, and Misawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

June 29, 1971:

The thirteenth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held in Tokyo. Both sides agree on arrangements for Japan's defense of Okinawa (the Kubo-Curtis Agreement). Under the terms of the agreement, Japan will assume a major defense role in Okinawa by July 1, 1973. It is also agreed that Japanese F-104 jet fighters will be ready for action on Okinawa within six months after reversion, that Japan will purchase the U.S. Hawk and Nike-Hercules defense missiles currently deployed on Okinawa under the accord, and complete take-over of air defense missile responsibilities by July 1, 1973. (FOF 7/8-14 Vol. 31 no. 1602; Kosaka, et al.; p.130; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals; Document No. 01403)

June 29, 1971:

In Washington, Ambassador Ushiba and Secretary Rogers agree to extend the agreement on textile trade for one year. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

July 1, 1971:

Voluntary Japanese restraints on textile exports to the U.S. begin. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

July 1, 1971:

The OECD announces statistics for aid to developing countries. The reports show that Japan is the second largest contributor at $1.82 billion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

July 4-11, 1971:

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird visits Japan and South Korea. Arriving in Japan July 4, Laird hails the U.S.-Japan agreement on Okinawa reversion and urges that the U.S. and Japan work together for future economic development of the Pacific area. Conferring with JDA Secretary General Nakasone on July 5, Laird expresses his hope that Japan would do more to strengthen Asian security, but he avoids specific suggestions. According to reports, top U.S. defense officials in Tokyo gave background briefings to the effect that Laird was discussing with Japanese defense officials the possibility that Japan might acquire nuclear weapons. According to a Washington Post report on July 7, Laird believed that because of constraints on the U.S. nuclear position due to agreements with the USSR, and China's progress on missiles, Japan might be forced to deploy defensive nuclear weapons. The same day, the New York Times reported that Laird's message to Japan was that the U.S. could no longer afford to bear the responsibility for both nuclear deterrence and conventional defense against the Communists, so Japan would have to contribute much more, especially in conventional defense. In July 9 talks with Prime Minister Sato, Laird says "it is solely for Japan itself to decide" whether or not to improve its defenses. He also says that the U.S. would continue to fulfill its security commitments in Asia within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, including the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear shield. In a news conference that same day, Sato's Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Takeshita states that Laird had indicated his full awareness of the no-war clause of the Japanese constitution, which rules out the dispatch of troops abroad and provides for the non-nuclear policy of the Sato government. Laird makes the same pledge to the new defense minister, Keikichi Masuhara, in talks July 10. At a press conference on July 10, Laird stresses the need for higher priorities in the upgrading of Japanese conventional forces and unequivocally denies reports that suggested there was support in the United States for Japanese development of defensive nuclear weapons. (FOF 7/8-14 Vol. 31 no. 1602; Kosaka, et al.; p.130; Document No. 01400)

July 5, 1971:

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato appoints a new cabinet. Its main members include Takeo Fukuda as foreign minister, Mikio Mizuta as finance minister, Kakuei Tanaka as MITI minister, and Eikichi Masuhara as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

July 15, 1971:

President Nixon announces his plans to visit China. The absence of a prior warning to Japan presents the Sato government with the first "Nixon Shock." (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

July 19, 1971:

The Japanese Diet holds debates on the response of the Sato government to the announcement of Nixon's planned visit to China. On July 21, Sato criticizes Nixon for keeping his plans to visit Beijing secret until the public announcement on July 15, stating that there should have been full consideration in advance. (FOF 7/22-28 Vol. 21 no. 1604)

August 5, 1971:

The Japanese Foreign Ministry distributes the English translation of a government document entitled "A Listing of Recent U.S. Criticisms Against Japan," part of a new government program aimed at improving Japan's relations with Americans in the wake of criticisms of Tokyo's economic and political policies. Ten of the document's fourteen pages deal with economic complaints relating to aspects of U.S./Japan relations. (FOF 8/5-11 Vol. 31 no. 1606.)

August 15, 1971:

Following a weekend meeting with his senior economic advisors at Camp David, President Nixon announces emergency economic measures, which stop gold-dollar exchanges and impose a surcharge on imports (the second "Nixon Shock"). (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

August 16, 1971:

The Tokyo Stock Exchange's Dow Industrial Average tumbles 210.50 yen in response to the announcement of Nixon's new economic policies. (Kosaka, et al.; p.130)

August 18, 1971:

Ambassador Ushiba meets with Treasury Secretary Connally to discuss the monetary situation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

August 18, 1971:

Yasuke Kushiwagi, special adviser to the Japanese Finance Minister[RW2], departs for Paris and Washington with instructions to discuss the yen's valuation with top European and U.S. fiscal authorities. (FOF 8/12-18 Vol. 31 no. 1607)

August 20, 1971:

Japan asks for dollar devaluation, in a parry of U.S. demands for revaluation of the yen. The Japanese proposal to devalue the dollar by a 5 percent rise in gold is reportedly made by Japanese Finance Ministry envoy Yasuke Kushiwagi in a meeting with Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Paul Vol.cker during his trip to Washington on August 20-21. (FOF 8/19-25)

August 28, 1971:

Following an emergency meeting at the Finance Ministry, the Japanese government announces it will float the yen within disclosed parity bands against the U.S. dollar. (FOF 8/26-9/1 Vol. 31 no. 1609; Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

September 2, 1971:

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda announces that Japan is prepared to enter preliminary negotiations with the U.S. on a final agreement to replace the voluntary textile export program that went into effect July 1. (FOF 9/2-8 Vol. 31 no. 1610)

September 6, 1971:

On the Chinese representation issue, the Japanese government notifies the U.S. that it will support both the "Counter Important Question Resolution" and "Dual Representation" resolutions. The first resolution would deem Taiwan's ouster from the UN General Assembly an important question, requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly. (FOF 9/2-8 Vol. 31 no. 1610; Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

September 9-10, 1971:

The eighth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Washington. Two days of talks led by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and Japanese Foreign Minister Fukuda fail to produce acceptance of the others' trade and monetary demands. On a separate matter, at a joint press conference with Fukuda Rogers declares that Japan's failure to cosponsor a U.S. resolution to retain a UN General Assembly seat for Nationalist China might have a "detrimental effect" on that effort. Commenting on this issue later, Yasuhiro Nakasone, chairman of the executive board of the LDP, states on September 12 that he is absolutely opposed to co-sponsorship of this resolution in the UN. (FOF 9/9-15 Vol. 31 no. 1611; Kosaka, et al.; p.131; Document Nos. 01433-01442 )

September 21, 1971:

President Nixon sends a letter to the Senate urging early ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

September 22, 1971:

Prime Minister Sato expresses support for the U.S. position on Chinese representation at the U.N. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

September 27, 1971:

President Nixon greets Emperor Hirohito during a stopover at Anchorage en route to visit Europe. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

October 11, 1971:

Japan plans to double its purchase of U.S. military equipment to help reduce the deficit in the American balance of payments with Japan, Defense Agency Director Naomi Nishimura announces. Nishimura says that Tokyo is prepared to buy up to $1 billion worth of American arms in its fourth five year defense program, scheduled to start April 1, 1972. Nishimura also reaffirms Japan's pledge not to acquire nuclear arms despite the recent changes in the international climate. (FOF 10/28-11/3 Vol. 31 no. 1618)

October 15, 1971:

The U.S. and Japan sign a three-year agreement on textiles, under which Japan agrees to limit its exports of man-made and woolen textiles to the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131; FOF 10/14-20 Vol. 31 no. 1616)

October 25, 1971:

The U.N. General Assembly passes the Albanian Resolution, which will admit China and expel Taiwan. The Counter Important Question Resolution submitted by the U.S., Japan, and others is rejected. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

October 27, 1971:

At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, Secretary of State Rogers says the U.S. will remove its nuclear weapons from Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

November 2, 1971:

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approves the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

November 9-11, 1971:

Treasury Secretary Connally visits Japan where he meets with Prime Minister Sato and other officials to discuss Japan's role in helping the U.S. reverse its balance of payments deficit. Secretary Connally also discusses international monetary issues in preparation for the G-10 finance minister's meeting in Rome later in the month. (FOF 11/11-17/71 Vol. 31 no. 1620;Kosaka, et al.; p.131; Document Nos. 01457-01458, 01466)

November 10, 1971:

The U.S. Senate approves the Okinawa Reversion Agreement by an 84-6 vote. Under the terms of the treaty, control of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands, in the hands of the U.S. since the end of WWII, will revert to Japan. The U.S. will retain its military bases in Okinawa, where it has some 50,000 troops, but use of the bases will be governed by the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan, which requires prior consultation before the U.S. can initiate direct combat operations from Okinawa, store nuclear weapons there, engage in substantial build-up of forces on the island or make major changes in military equipment. (FOF 11/11-17 Vol. 31 no. 1620; Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

November 22, 1971:

Government-level negotiations on textiles begin between the U.S. and Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

November 27, 1971:

The Japanese Diet's lower house approves the treaty under which the U.S. was to return Okinawa to Japan by a 285-73 vote. Socialist and Communist Party members boycott the session to protest the pact. (FOF 11/25-12/1 Vol. 31 no. 1622)

November 29, 1971:

The U.S. and China announce that President Nixon will visit China beginning February 21, 1972. (Kosaka, et al.; p.131)

December 11-13, 1971:

Following talks by U.S. and Japanese officials during the U.S.-Japan Trade conference in Honolulu on December 11-12, Japan announces on December 13 that it will remove its import quotas on four agricultural items and cut its tariffs on 30 industrial items, 27 of which were on a list of 28 agricultural and 12 industrial products the U.S. had demanded concessions on in return for lifting its 10 percent import surtax. Japanese Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba and U.S. Special Trade Representative William Eberle led the discussions. (FOF 12/9-15 Vol. 31 no. 1624; Kosaka, et al.; p.132; Document No. 01477)

December 13-15, 1971:

The fourteenth U.S.-Japan Policy Planning Meeting is held in Williamsburg, Virginia. (Kosaka, et al.; p.132)

December 16, 1971:

Japanese Finance Minister Mikio Mizuta meets with Treasury Secretary Connally to continue ongoing discussions about international monetary policies. (Kosaka, et al.; p.132)

December 17-18, 1971:

At the G-10 meeting of finance ministers in Washington, the ministers agree to realign currency exchange rates, including an 8.57 percent devaluation of the dollar (the Smithsonian Agreement). (Kosaka, et al.; p.132; FOF 12/16-22/71 Vol. 31 no. 1625)

December 18, 1971:

U.S. and Japan trade consultations begin in a follow-up to the Honolulu meeting earlier in December. These talks will last until February 9, 1972. (Kosaka, et al.; p.132)

December 19, 1971:

The Japanese government indicates that the new exchange rate will be $1=308 yen. (Kosaka, et al.; p.132)

December 29, 1971:

White House releases its report on the "Outlook for the Foreign Economic Situation" (Peterson Report), which criticizes Japan's discriminatory trade policies. (Kosaka, et al.; p.132)

January 3, 1972:

The U.S. and Japan formalize a three-year accord under which Japan agrees to limit its exports of man-made and woolen textiles to the U.S. For three years beginning in October 1971, Japan will limit growth rate in exports of woolen and man-made textiles to the U.S. to 1 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. (FOF Ja 16-22 p.41; Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

January 6-7, 1972:

Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato hold two days of talks in San Clemente, California. The talks are also attended by Henry Kissinger, presidential assistant for national security affairs, and Japanese ambassador Ushiba, while Secretary of State Rogers confers with Foreign Minister Fukuda, and Secretaries Connally and Stans meet with Ministers Mizuta and Tanaka. The discussions focus on future steps in relations with the People's Republic of China, final arrangements for the return of Okinawa on May 15, and U.S.-Japan security cooperation in Asia. (NYT Ja 7,4:3; NYT Ja 8,1:4; FOF Ja 1-8 p.4; Kosaka, et al.; p.133; Document Nos. 01499-01501)

January 26, 1972:

President Nixon removes Armin Meyer as U.S. ambassador to Japan, and appoints Robert S. Ingersoll as Meyer's successor. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

January 28, 1972:

The U.S. and Japan sign an agreement on cotton textile exports in Washington. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

February 7, 1972:

The Japanese government holds a National Defense Council meeting and decides on the basic elements of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

February 9, 1972:

U.S.-Japan trade consultations between Japanese Ambassador Ushiba and Special Trade Representative Eberle conclude with an announcement by the Nixon administration of a major trade agreement for the significant reduction of import barriers by Japan. The agreement includes a commitment by the two countries to major international trade negotiations, and a joint communiqué notes that the two countries recognize the need for a comprehensive review of international economic relations with a view to negotiating improvements in light of the structural changes of recent years; the review was to cover all elements of trade, including measures impeding or distorting agricultural, raw materials, and industrial trade. The two countries agreed to communicate this declaration to the director-general of GATT and to hold future trade negotiations at the GATT level as much as possible. (NYT F 10,1:3; Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

February 9, 1972:

In his third annual foreign affairs report to Congress, Nixon says that, "Japan is our most important ally in Asia." (FOF F 6-12 p. 82)

February 21, 1972:

Nixon arrives in China. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

February 27, 1972:

The Shanghai Communiqué, summarizing discussions between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China, is released at end of Nixon's visit to China. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

February 28, 1972:

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green visits Japan to brief the Sato government on President Nixon's meetings with the Communist Chinese leadership. Nixon also sends a message to Sato about his talks in Beijing and reassures him that the U.S. will maintain its commitments to its allies. (NYT F 29,1:7;Kosaka, et al.; p.133; Document No. 01518)

March 2, 1972:

Secretary of State Rogers confers with Japanese Ambassador Ushiba on Nixon's visit to Beijing. Ushiba later says the briefing he received resembled the account presented to Prime Minister Sato by Assistant Secretary Green in Tokyo. (NYT Mr 3,3:1)

March 8, 1972:

Ambassador Ushiba meets with National Security Advisor Kissinger. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

April 12, 1972:

Robert Ingersoll becomes the U.S. ambassador to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 133)

April 17, 1972:

Japan's National Defense Council approves the deployment of Self Defense Forces in Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.133)

April 27, 1972:

The U.S. and Japan open a two-day conference under U.S. Treasury auspices to consider stiff new U.S. anti-dumping procedures and their effect on trade. (NYT Ap 28,65:6; Kosaka, et. al, p. 133)

May 6, 1972:

The White House announces an agreement by Japanese and European steel producers to limit steel exports to U.S. in 1972-1974 following 18 months of negotiations. (FOF My 7-13 p. 345)

May 12-15, 1972:

Vice President Agnew arrives in Tokyo for a state visit to attend the Okinawa Reversion ceremony as the U.S. representative. (NYT My 13,2:4; Kosaka, et al.; p.134)

May 20, 1972:

The Japanese government adopts a seven-point foreign economic emergency plan to deal with the new yen policy and the associated problems of the increasing payments surplus, Japan's large accumulation of dollars, and its sagging economy. Under this plan, the Japanese government will encourage exporters to establish orderly marketing of goods abroad, restrict exports, and encourage imports into Japan by easing import quotas. (FOF My 21-27 p. 391;Kosaka, et al.; p.134)

June 9-12, 1972:

Nixon's National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger makes a private visit to Tokyo as the guest of Yoshizane Iwasa, a banker and chairman of the private U.S.-Japan Economic Council. Major concerns for Kissinger on this visit are addressing the differences and tensions that have arisen over the past year with Japan regarding the lack of consultation about Nixon's trip to China and Japan's fears of secret U.S. deals with Beijing, the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its role in Asian security under the Nixon Doctrine, and economic relations. During his visit, Kissinger meets with the Japan-U.S. Economic Council, the Komeito business group, and Japan Socialist Party leaders, as well as LDP political leaders and Japanese government officials, including Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda, whom he seeks to reassure about future U.S. actions with regard to China. (NYT Je 11,11:1; NYT Je 12,1:4;FOF Je 11-17 p. 445; Kosaka, et al.; p.134; Documents 01555-01561)

June 17, 1972:

Japanese Prime Minister Sato announces his retirement. (FOF My 18-24 p. 471; Kosaka, et al.; p.134)

July 5, 1972:

Kakuei Tanaka is elected Prime Minister of Japan, succeeding Eisaku Sato. (FOF Jl 2-8 p. 512)

July 7, 1972:

The first Tanaka cabinet is formed. Its main members include Masayoshi Ohira as foreign minister, Koshiro Ueki as finance minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone as MITI minister, and Eikichi Masuhara as JDA director-general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.134)

July 26, 1972:

Tanaka announces a plan to expand trade with China, as part of which Japan's Export-Import Bank will finance a $150 million synthetic fiber manufacturing plant in China. (FOF Ag 6-12 p. 616)

July 28, 1972:

U.S. Special Trade Representative Eberle says he is disappointed in the outcome of a 4-day trade conference in Hakone with the Japanese, and states that measures agreed to so far will not be effective in correcting 1972's projected $3.8-billion Japanese trade surplus with the U.S. (NYT Jl 29,30:7; Document No. 01579)

August 3, 1972:

8 B-52 bomber aircraft fly to Okinawa. The U.S. cites bad weather in Guam as the reason. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 134)

August 9, 1972:

Japan's Finance Ministry announces cuts in high import duties starting April 1, 1973; the reductions will apply to steel products, clothing, home appliances, automobiles, and farm products. (FOF Ag 13-19 p. 637)

August 11, 1972:

Prime Minister Tanaka formally accepts Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's invitation to visit China. Taiwan criticizes the decision, while South Korea expresses alarm at the speed of Japan's moves toward China. (FOF Ag 13-19 p. 637)

August 19, 1972:

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger meets with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira in Tokyo to discuss trade imbalance and China-Japan normalization, in preparation for the upcoming Nixon-Tanaka summit in Honolulu. (NYT S 19,3:4; NYT S 20,1:4); Kosaka, et al.; p.134; Documents 01612, 01613 and 01623)

August 31, 1972:

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka arrive in Honolulu to begin talks on revitalizing U.S.-Japanese relations. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, tells reporters during the flight to Hawaii that he fails to understand why it is thought that U.S.-Japan relations "are in a bad way", asserting that the U.S. has intimately discussed with Japan every move it has taken, that he himself has been to Japan twice, and that the U.S. thinks it has a "creative relationship" with Japan. (NYT S 1,1:8)

September 1, 1972:

President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka complete their summit meeting in Honolulu, issuing a final communiqué and joint economic announcement on their talks. They reaffirm their countries' intentions to maintain the Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation. It is announced that Japan plans to buy $1.1-billion worth of American goods to reduce the expected imbalance in trade between U.S. and Japan. It is also reported that Nixon has given his blessing to Tanaka's planned visit to China. Nixon also invites Emperor Hirohito to visit the U.S. Topics of discussion during the meetings also included Japan's future role in Asia, the Korean situation, and possible Japanese purchases of U.S. aircraft from U.S. companies. (FOF S 3-9 p. 696; NYT S 2,1:8, 3:2; Kosaka, et al., p. 135; Document Nos. 01630, 01635, 01637)

September 11-12, 1972:

A second U.S.-Japan meeting on anti-dumping is held in Washington, in which U.S. Treasury and Japanese economic officials discuss Treasury plans for enforcement of U.S. anti-dumping laws. (NYT S 12,67:6;Kosaka, et al.; p.135)

September 25, 1972:

The Commerce Department announces that the U.S. trade deficit with Japan in August has increased, producing an estimated year-end total deficit of $3.9 billion. (Kosaka, et al.; p.135)

September 25-29, 1972:

At the end of Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Beijing, a joint statement is issued on the China-Japan agreement normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 135; FOF S 24-30 p. 753; Document Nos. 01647-01648, 01651)

October 2, 1972:

The Japanese Self Defense Forces begin to move into Okinawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.135)

October 9, 1972:

At a meeting of the National Defense Council, the Japanese government officially decides on the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.135)

October 18, 1972:

Foreign Minister Ohira meets with President Nixon and Secretary Rogers, whom Ohira briefs on Prime Minister Tanaka's recent trip to Beijing and the agreement to normalize China-Japan relations. (NYT O 19,28:1;Kosaka, et al.; p.135; Document Nos. 01660 and 01661)

November 6, 1972:

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira announces that Japan and Taiwan have agreed to establish a liaison office in Tokyo to maintain trade and other non-diplomatic ties. (FOF N 5-11 p. 902)

November 16, 1972:

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs notifies the mayor of Yokosuka that the U.S. and Japan have agreed to relocate families of U.S. Seventh Fleet crews to Yokosuka, and also have decided to make the Yokosuka naval repair facilities a joint facility to be used by both the U.S. and Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.135)

November 21, 1972:

Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira and U.S. Ambassador Ingersoll exchange documents on Japan's import and production of U.S. F-4 fighter aircraft. Japan will also import equipment and materials needed for their production and receive necessary technical data from U.S. (NYT N 22,10:6)

December 15, 1972:

The Department of Defense announces that it will homeport the USS Midway at Yokosuka. (Kosaka, et al.; p.136)

December 22, 1972:

The second Tanaka cabinet is established. Its main members include Masayoshi Ohira as foreign minister, Kiichi Aichi [stet]as finance minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone as MITI minister, and Eikichi Masuhara as JDA director-general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.136)

January 11, 1973:

Japan formally opens an embassy in Beijing. (FOF 1/14-1/20 p. 37)

January 18, 1973:

U.S. Ambassador Robert Ingersoll warns Japan that if its growing trade surplus with the U.S. is not reduced within two or three months, Congress might adopt protectionist measures against Japan. (NYT Ja 19,41:4; FOF 1/28-2/3 p. 91)

January 19, 1973:

Foreign Minister Ohira and Ambassador Ingersoll agree to establish a Security Treaty Working Group. The Group's main purposes are to prevent disputes involving U.S. bases in Japan and to ensure the effective application of the Security Treaty. (Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

January 23, 1973:

The fourteenth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee is held, with U.S. Ambassador Ingersoll, Admiral Gayler, Foreign Minister Ohira, and JDA Director-General Masuhara taking part. The main topics of discussion are consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan and pre-consultation arrangements. Agreement is reached during the meeting on the Kanto Program to consolidate U.S. bases in Japan. Under the plan, the U.S. will reduce its armed forced in Japan by 10 percent and return several major bases over the next three years, with the capital investment costs of relocating some of the facilities to be borne by the Japanese government. (NYT Ja 24,2:4; FOF 1/28-2/3 p. 90; Kosaka, et al.; p. 137; Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals; Document No. 01694)

January 24, 1973:

The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. trade deficit reached a record $6.439 billion in 1972, of which $4.1 billion reflected the trade deficit with Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

January 27, 1973:

The Vietnam peace agreement is signed, with a cease-fire taking effect January 28th. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

February 6, 1973:

A wave of speculative assaults on the U.S. dollar in Europe and Japan leads to a dollar crisis, as the Nixon administration warns that unilateral protective actions by the U.S. could become necessary. (NYT F 7,52:8; FOF 2/4-2/10 p. 95)

February 7, 1973:

U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz testifies before Congress that the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance is the largest cause of the present currency crisis. (Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

February 8, 1973:

U.S. Trade Representative William Eberle meets with Japanese Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, beginning three days of talks in an attempt to reduce Japan's trade surplus with the U.S. Warning that America's trade deficit with Japan could reach $4 billion at the current rate, Eberle reportedly asks Japan to increase its imports of U.S. goods and to liberalize its foreign capital investment regulations. Japanese officials tell Eberle that measures to address these problems are under study. (NYT F 9,45:1)

February 9, 1973:

Officials of Japan's Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan begin a tense watch following reports that speculators in Europe were beginning to shift from buying marks to yen. This latest action by Japan represents a quick shift in policy previously announced by Tokyo to follow West Germany's lead in tactics to defend the yen against speculative attack. Trading on the Tokyo foreign exchange market on February 9th totals $246 million, and the Bank of Japan is reported to have bought about $200 million to prevent the dollar from falling below the legal floor of 301 yen to the dollar. The possible shift of dollar speculation from West Germany to Japan is seen as a critical test of the foreign exchange controls adopted in 1972 to ward off any sudden inflow of dollars. Meanwhile, U.S. Special Trade Representative Eberle continues talks with Japanese officials in an effort to rectify Japan's continuing large surplus in trade with the U.S., which America sees as a basic cause of the monetary turbulence. Japanese officials reportedly stress to Eberle the need for more time to see results of Japan's November 1972 program to reduce exports and increase imports, and the need to await Diet deliberations on the currency crisis. (NYT F 10,39:5, 45:4 )

February 10, 1973:

Japan's Ministry of Finance announces that it has closed Tokyo's foreign exchange market in order to avoid spillover effects of intense speculation of dollar selling in the West German currency market. The same day, U.S. Special Trade Representative Eberle concludes three days of apparently fruitless negotiations with Japanese trade officials. Though reportedly encouraged by signs that Tokyo recognizes the urgent need for action, Eberle also warns the Japanese several times that without reductions in Japan's trade surplus, the U.S. may have to impose a significant surcharge, such as Nixon imposed in 1971. Among the actions the U.S. is pressing are enlarged import quotas, lower tariffs, and liberalization of Japanese foreign investment regulations, with strong hints that reevaluation of the yen would help redress the trade imbalance. (NYT F 10,39:5, NYT F 11,50:5; Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

February 12, 1973:

Most foreign exchange markets in Western Europe and Japan are ordered closed as the major industrial powers enter a phase of intense bargaining over new patterns of determining currency values. U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury Paul Vol.cker holds talks in Paris with French Prime Minister Giscard d'Estaing and meets with Italian Minister Malagodi in Rome, with whom he flies back to Paris. They are joined by West German Prime Minister Schmidt and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Barber as part of an intensive round of consultations. The U.S. has been putting heavy pressure on Japan and Europe to liberalize trade or revalue currencies, but the Japanese have refused to revalue the yen unless West Germany acts, and the Germans have said they will not change the value of the mark at all and instead have reinforced their foreign exchange controls. (NYT Feb 12,1:1)

February 12, 1973:

U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz announces that the U.S. will devalue the dollar by 10 percent effective immediately. The same day, Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Aichi, following negotiations with Paul Vol.cker, makes the administrative decision to float the yen starting February 13th. Shultz reports that President Nixon, in a related move, has decided to submit to Congress comprehensive trade legislation with the goal of lowering trade barriers but with unspecified provisions for "safeguards" against disruption of domestic industries as the result of imports. Shultz also says he does not anticipate any changes in exchange rates by other leading countries apart from the float of the Japanese yen, and indicates he expects the Canadian dollar, the British pound, and the Swiss franc, all of which are now floating, would continue to do so. (NYT F 13,1:8 ; FOF Feb 11-17 Vol. 33 no. 1685; Kosaka, et al.; p.137; Document No. 01700)

February 14, 1973:

The December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement on international exchange rates collapses. The Tokyo foreign exchange market reopens, and trading volume reaches near-record levels as the yen is floated the previous day and the dollar drops in value. The opposition in the Diet demands the resignation of Prime Minister Tanaka and his cabinet, but Tanaka, provoking an uproar, promptly denies responsibility for the decision to float the yen, placing the blame directly on the U.S. and pleading ignorance of pre-devaluation conversations between Finance Minister Kiichi Aichi and U.S. Treasury Under Secretary Paul Vol.cker. Tanaka says he believes the two officials talked about international currency issues in a secret February 8th meeting but notes he has not been informed of the details. Aichi declines to give details of his conversation with Vol.cker but notes that he met Vol.cker on "very short notice" and did not have time to prepare for meeting. Aichi states that he and Vol.cker exchanged views about the political and economic situations in the U.S. and Europe, but notes no agreement was made between Japan and the U.S. during the meeting, appearing to confirm earlier reports that Aichi had been taken by surprise by Vol.cker's proposal that the U.S. devalue the dollar, and that the Japanese government did not decide what to do until Vol.cker conferred with European financial authorities. The same day, theBank of Japan intervenes to prevent the price of the dollar from plunging, buying to hold the dollar at 270 yen. But the dollar falls to 266 yen the next day. (NYT F 15,1:1; NYT F 15,72:6 ; Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

February 19-20, 1973:

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger visits Japan after his visit to China. While in Tokyo, Kissinger, along with U.S. Ambassador Ingersoll, briefs Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira on North Vietnam and the results of his visit to China. (NYT F 20,6:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.137; Document Nos. 01705, 01707, 01710)

February 20, 1973:

Prime Minister Tanaka, responding to political pressure from opposition parties, says his government "feels a grave regret that [the] Yen was floated," and made every effort to avoid revaluation of the yen. Still, Tanaka says the government accepts full responsibility for the decision. (NYT F 21,55:4;FOF 2/18-2/24 p. 138)

February 26, 1973:

The Liberal Democratic Party's secretary-general asserts that Japan was placed "outside" during negotiations that led to devaluation of the dollar and floating of the yen, in a speech to a luncheon sponsored by the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun. In the same speech the LDP official deplores Japan's exclusion from a major role in international affairs, and blames world powers for denying Japan a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council and for excluding Japan from the international conference on Vietnam. (NYT F 27,2:8; FOF 3/4-3/10 p. 197; Document No. 01706)

March 1, 1973:

A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman formally denies that the Japanese government plans any retaliation against the U.S. for the economic and diplomatic "shocks" to Tokyo that resulted from Nixon's initiatives in 1971. A written Foreign Ministry statement says that Japan is "fully satisfied" with the dialog set up during U.S.-Japan meetings in 1972 and, while conceding that Nixon's overtures to communist China and his surcharge on imports had "come as a surprise" to Japan, he asserts that Japan now feels that mutual understanding has been reaffirmed. (NYT Mr 2,12:3)

March 1, 1973:

A new monetary crisis sweeps across Europe, bringing heavy selling of the weakened dollar. (NYT Mr 2,1:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

March 6-10, 1973:

Peter Peterson, President Nixon's special envoy, meets in Tokyo with Japanese officials, whom he calls upon to take drastic steps to reduce Japan's trade surplus with the U.S. (NYT Mr 8,57:5; Kosaka, et al., p.137; NYT Mr 10,42:3)

March 16, 1973:

Representatives of the U.S., the EEC, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan meet in Paris to reach an agreement on a package settlement to the recent monetary crisis. The final accord is based on two principles: the greatest possible freedom for international trade and investment, and avoidance of competitive changes in exchange rates, with the goals of easing problems caused by excess dollars abroad and assuring the reopening of official currency dealings under orderly conditions on March 19th. Other planned actions include more controls on short-term capital flows, more action to bring dollars back to the U.S., and intervention by the U.S. and other nations if necessary to seek to stabilize the present exchange rates. (NYT Mr 17,1:1; FOF 3/18-3/24 /73, p. 224)

March 18, 1973:

Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee Wilbur Mills says imposing a discriminatory surcharge against Japanese imports is unavoidable. (Kosaka, et al.; p.137)

March 19, 1973:

Tokyo's foreign exchange market reopens after a two-week suspension in trading during the recent international monetary crisis. The dollar is surprisingly strong in heavy trading, opening at 262 yen before rising to 264 yen in spot trading. Bankers and economists expect the dollar to fall to about 250 yen, which would be an effective devaluation of 23 percent over the rate when the yen was floated on February 12; this level would also represent an effective upward shift of the yen by about 44 percent over the rate that prevailed before August 1971, when President Nixon announced his new economic policies. The reaction to the monetary agreements recently reached in Paris is generally "calm but wary," as few bankers or businessmen think that agreement is more than the beginning to stabilization of the international monetary situation. The continued rise of the yen is expected to be one more mark against Prime Minister Tanaka, who had pledged that there would be no second upward revaluation of the yen, and who had formally expressed his "regrets" to Parliament for having failed to head off the dollar devaluation and yen float in February. (NYT Mr 19,1:2)

March 22, 1973:

Nixon outlines general trade proposals he will present to Congress in forthcoming legislation. His remarks include criticism of EEC and Japanese trade restrictions. (FOF 3/25-3/31 p. 247)

March 23, 1973:

Japanese have a "cool" reaction to President Nixon's first annual international economic report. The Japanese are disturbed by Nixon's call for authority to impose surcharges or quotas on imports from countries running persistent balance of payments surpluses, believing this proposal is aimed at Japan. (NYT Mr 24,47:1)

April 13, 1973:

The Japanese government adopts a seven-point program designed to contain spiraling prices brought about by inflationary speculation and excessive money supply in recent months. (NYT Ap 14,43:4)

April 23, 1973:

The first meeting of the Security Treaty Consultative Group is held. Both sides agree to revise the roles of each U.S. base to prepare for base consolidation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; Document No. 01725)

April 23, 1973:

In a major policy address in New York City, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger proposes a "New Atlantic Charter" to provide the framework for a new relationship between the U.S., Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138)

April 24, 1973:

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira announces the Japanese government has declined President Nixon's invitation to Emperor Hirohito to make a state visit to the U.S. Ohira later tells Japanese newsmen that "circumstances, including the imperial household schedule" do not permit a visit this year, though reports indicate that political opposition to the visit produced the decision. Apparently the invitation aroused public protests from opposition parties, which charged that a visit would involve the Emperor in politics at a time when there are issues outstanding between the U.S. and Japan. The Imperial Household Agency, led by Grand Steward Takeshi Usami, was alarmed by this charge, and balked at Prime Minister Tanaka's request that the Emperor accept the invitation. (NYT Ap 25,1:2; Document No. 01722)

April 27, 1973:

Japan agrees to lift restrictions on foreign investments, opening almost all domestic industries to full foreign ownership. (FOF 4/29-5/5 p. 363; Document No. 01729)

May 3, 1973:

President Nixon says in statement of administration foreign policy that unless Japan fulfills its duties as a superpower, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty cannot be the basis of maintaining good U.S.-Japan relations. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138)

May 7, 1973:

The U.S.-Japan Trade Conference is held in Washington. During the talks, the U.S. admits that the bilateral trade imbalance has reached its peak and has begun to decrease. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; Document No. 01732)

June 6, 1973:

A U.S.-Japan Policy Planning Committee meeting is held in Kyoto. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; Document No. 01740)

June 15, 1973:

Takeshi Yasukawa is appointed Japanese ambassador to the U.S., replacing Naruhiko Ushiba. Yasukawa, currently director of the Foreign Ministry American Affairs Bureau, assumes the post on July 13th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; FOF June 17-23, 1973 Vol. 33 no. 1703; NYT Je 16,8:8)

June 26, 1973:

The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) says in a white paper that Japan should take a "fresh look" at its foreign aid and trade polices to avoid friction with other countries and to attain harmony in the world economy. The paper notes that Japan should play a leading role in introducing new order in the world economy, recommends diversification of Japan's export markets, and suggests steps be taken to prevent flooding of specific markets with Japanese goods. (NYT Je 27,10:3)

July 8, 1973:

Representatives of the central banks of the U.S., Japan, Western Europe, and Canada announce that "necessary technical arrangements are in place" for central bank intervention to support currencies in foreign exchanges. (FOF 7/1-7/7, 1973, p. 569)

July 16-17, 1973:

The Ninth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs is held in Tokyo. The meeting takes place against a backdrop of Japanese irritation that the Nixon administration has not taken Japan's needs into account in recent steps to shore up the U.S. economy, especially with regard to Nixon's recent ban on the export of soybeans. In the Japanese view, the U.S. has become an unpredictable trading partner given to sudden action without fully considering the vital interests of others. On the final day of discussions the gathering adopts a joint communiqué in which the U.S. pledges to make its "best effort" to continue the supply of soybeans, wheat, scrap iron, and steel to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; FOF 7/22-7-28 p. 630; NYT Jl 14,21:4 ;NYT Jl 15,3:4; NYT Jl 16,2:5; NYT Jl 17,62:1; Document No. 01780)

July 29, 1973:

Finance Minister Kiichi Aichi and Bank of Japan Governor Sasaki meet with Treasury Secretary George Shultz and Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns to discuss monetary issues. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; Document No. 01784)

July 31, 1973:

President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka begin two days of summit talks in Washington, D.C. During the summit, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira confer on the energy crisis, the economic reconstruction of Indochina, and the forthcoming U.N. debate on Korea. (NYT A 1,1:4; Document Nos. 01788-01791)

August 1, 1973:

At the close of the Nixon-Tanaka summit talks, an 18-point joint communiqué is released. Emphasizing the need for "continuous dialogue" between the two nations, the communiqué states that Nixon supports Japan's efforts to gain permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council, that both nations would consider sharing oil in times of emergency, that Nixon had accepted Tanaka's invitation to visit Japan before the end of 1974, and Nixon's invitation to Emperor Hirohito to visit the U.S. (FOF 7/29-8/4 p. 644; Kosaka, et al.; p.138; Document No. 1792)

August 8, 1973:

South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung is kidnapped in Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. (Kosaka, et al.; p.138; Document Nos. 01794-01802, 01804)

September 21, 1973:

Japan establishes diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

September 22, 1973:

Henry Kissinger becomes U.S. secretary of state. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

September 24, 1973:

Secretary of State Kissinger meets at the U.N. with Foreign Minister Ohira. During the General Assembly meeting, Kissinger proposes that Japan be made a permanent member of the Security Council. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139; NYT S 25,18:8; Document Nos. 01805-01806)

October 5, 1973:

The USS Midway enters Yokosuka harbor, where it will be home-ported. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

October 6, 1973:

The Israeli-Arab War (Yom Kippur War) begins. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

October 12, 1973:

Ambassador to Japan Ingersoll becomes assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

October 17, 1973:

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announces a 21 percent increase in the price of crude oil. The same day, a ministerial meeting of ten Arab oil-producing nations announces a 5 percent monthly reduction in oil production. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

October 21, 1973:

Exxon and Shell Oil Companies tell Japanese oil companies that they will raise oil prices by 30 percent. Gulf and France announce a 30 percent price increase on October 24th. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

October 25, 1973:

A cease fire is reached in the Middle East, ending the Israeli-Arab War. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

November 2, 1973:

A surge of dollar-buying on the Tokyo foreign exchange market continues for a second day. Massive demand for dollars drops the value of the Japanese yen to 275 yen to the dollar, the lowest since the yen was floated in February. There are strong signs that the current chaos in the international oil situation is a major cause. (NYT N 2,57:6; NYT N 3,35:5)

November 8, 1973:

Global oil companies tell the Japanese oil industry that they will decrease their oil supply to Japan by 25 percent. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

November 14-15, 1973:

Secretary of State Kissinger visits Japan to meet with Prime Minister Tanaka, Foreign Minister Ohira, and MITI Minister Nakasone and discusses the Middle East situation and Japanese economic problems resulting from the Arab reduction in oil supplies. (NYT N 15,7:1; NYT N 16,12:4; Kosaka, et al.; p.139; Document Nos. 01832-01833)

November 22, 1973:

Prime Minister Tanaka's Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido announces a pro-Arab Middle East policy to end the oil crisis. Japan sends Vice Prime Minister Miki as special envoy to the Middle East. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 139; Document No. 01837)

November 23, 1973:

The State Department expresses regret at Japan's new pro-Arab Middle East policy. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

November 24-26, 1973:

Key finance officials from the U.S., U.K., France, West Germany and Japan meet secretly near Tours, France to discuss long-term reform of the world monetary system, in light of the current energy crisis and the recent rise of the dollar on the international exchange market. Attending for the U.S. are Treasury Secretary George Shultz, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Paul Vol.cker, and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns. Japan is represented by Deputy Finance Minister Inamura, who had to step in at the last minute when, on November 23rd, Finance Minister Kiichi Aichi died. The meeting ends with no formal statements, while non-participating countries protest the secrecy and their exclusion from the talks. (NYT N 24,43:7; NYT N 26,49:7; NYT N 27,57:3 ; FOF Nov 25-Dec 1, 1973 Vol. 33 no. 172611/25-12/1 p. 987)

November 25, 1973:

The second Tanaka cabinet reshuffles for the first time. Main members include Masayoshi Ohira as foreign minister, Takeo Fukuda as finance minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone as MITI minister, and Sadanori Yamanaka as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

December 10, 1973:

Special Japanese envoy Takeo Miki leaves for the Middle East. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139; Document No. 01846)

December 16, 1973:

Japan's Finance Ministry announces a series of measures designed to prevent rapid deterioration of its balance of payments. The measures, which the Ministry says became necessary in view of a record deficit of $1.7 billion in Japan's balance of payments for November, will become effective on December 17th and will include a $3,000 limit for the amount a Japanese traveler will be allowed to take overseas. (NYT D 17,65:2)

December 22, 1973:

The Japanese government declares an "oil emergency," and decides to cut oil and electricity supplies by 20 percent beginning January 1. (Kosaka, et al.; p.139)

January 5, 1974:

The Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement is signed. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

January 7-17, 1974:

Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visits Southeast Asia. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

January 7-8, 1974:

The Bank of Japan decides to suspend its intervention in support of the yen's value, at 280 yen to the dollar. This results in an immediate de facto devaluation of 6.7 percent as the yen goes to 299 to the dollar. On January 8th, Prime Minister Tanaka asserts that the drop in value of the yen tended to bring its value back to "normal," adding that he was happy to see the dollar become stronger because of its importance as an international currency. Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda also states on January 8th that the government would seek to hold the rate at around 300 yen to the dollar, registering a reversal of the earlier policy of non-intervention. The dollar also registers sharp gains on the European exchange market as a result, according to most analysts, of the widespread belief that the U.S. would be the country least affected by increases in Middle East oil prices and disruptions in fuel supplies. (NYT Ja 8,45:8; NYT Ja 9,2:6; NYT Ja 9,52:6; FOF 1/1-12/74 Vol. 34 no. 1731)

January 11, 1974:

The Japanese government implements the second phase of restrictions on oil and electricity consumption. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

January 14, 1974:

The IMF's Committee of 20 begins discussion on reform of the international monetary system in Rome, as the recent drastic increases in the price of Middle East oil create a crisis in global monetary markets. These talks will be followed by an IMF ministerial-level conference on January 17-18 to address these problems. (NYT Jan 15,49:2; FOF 1/26/74 Vol. 34 no.1733)

January 18, 1974:

IMF finance ministers representing the Committee of 20 issue a communiqué in Rome agreeing to cooperate on financial polices to ease the impact of sharply higher oil prices on their economies. The communiqué further notes agreement that countries must not adopt policies affecting their international payments (which would merely aggravate the problems of other countries), and stresses the importance of avoiding competitive depreciation and escalation of restrictions on trade and payments. (NYT Jan 19,45:1)

January 21, 1974:

Japanese Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda warns Japan to brace for a "year of ordeal" in fighting inflation and trying to reverse balance-of-payments deficits in a speech to the Diet, which also announces that Japan's balance-of-payments deficit totaled $10.1-billion in 1973--the first deficit in 6 years. In a related development, the Japanese Government closes the Tokyo foreign-exchange market in the wake of France's decision to float the franc. (NYT Ja 22,1:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

January 21, 1974:

The ninth meeting of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Consultation Group is held in Tokyo. The representatives discuss the Okinawa base consolidation plan but fail to reach an agreement. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

January 30, 1974:

At the fifteenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee in Tokyo, the U.S. agrees to reduce its military presence on Okinawa by relinquishing five Army and two Marine Corps bases and abandoning twelve other bases after relocation of its personnel and facilities. The seven bases to be turned over to Japan immediately cover 660 acres. The twelve others, including the big port at Naha, total 1,048 acres. Abandonment of the bases will reduce U.S. land holdings on the island by nearly 10 percent. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140; FOF 2/9/74 Vol.34 no.1735; Document No. 01848)

February 8, 1974:

Foreign Minister Ohira leaves for the U.S. to attend the Washington Energy Conference. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

February 13, 1974:

Foreign Minister Ohira meets with Secretary of State Kissinger during the Washington Energy Conference. At the close of the conference, the U.S. and eleven other major oil-consuming nations agree on the need for a "comprehensive action program" to deal with the energy crisis, despite strong objections by France to the agreement on financial and monetary measures to avoid competitive depreciation of currencies. (NYT F 14,1:4; Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

March 1, 1974:

U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, testifying before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, says that he expects Japan to increase its military spending and join China in opposition to the Soviet Union. Schlesinger also stresses that Japan is critical to American interests in Asia and the essential alternative to more American military forces in area. (NYT Mar 2,29:1; FOF 3/22/74 Vol. 34 no. 1742)

April 7, 1974:

President Nixon, attending funeral services for Georges Pompidou in Paris, meets with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to discuss his future trip to Japan, East-West relations and role of Japan in the Atlantic community. (NYT Apr 8,1:4; Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

May 18-23, 1974:

Foreign Minister Ohira visits the U.S., where he meets with President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

May 21, 1974:

Foreign Minister Ohira delivers a speech at the Japan Society in New York, in which he says that the "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is the basis for Japanese diplomacy. Japan will never remilitarize on a large scale nor will it develop nuclear weapons." (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

June 3, 1974:

The thirteenth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultation Group is held, at which the Japanese government notifies the U.S. that it will accept port calls by nuclear-powered submarines. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

June 27, 1974:

The Department of Defense announces that it will shrink the size of the Army Headquarters on Okinawa, eliminate Pacific Army Headquarters in Hawaii, and plans to reduce U.S. Army personnel in Okinawa by 40 percent. (Kosaka, et al.; p.140)

July 1, 1974:

A memorandum is signed by the U.S. and Japan in Honolulu providing for a 6 percent annual increase in Japanese textile exports to the U.S. (FOF 09/24/74 Vol. 34 no.1763)

July 19, 1974:

James Hodgson (former vice president of Lockheed Corporation) becomes the U.S. ambassador to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.141)

August 9, 1974:

Facing impeachment over the Watergate scandals, President Nixon resigns and Gerald Ford is sworn in as U.S. president. The same day, President Ford, assisted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, meets in Washington, D.C. with Japanese Ambassador Takeshi Yakusawa to discuss the Ford administration's foreign policy. (NYT Ag 10,6:8)

August 10, 1974:

President Ford sends a letter to Prime Minister Tanaka promising that the U.S. will maintain close ties with Tokyo. (NYT Ag 11,43:2)

August 24, 1974:

The Japanese Finance Ministry announces a series of measures to ease foreign-exchange controls and facilitate the inflow of U.S. dollars into the Tokyo foreign-exchange market, beginning August 26. Under the new regulations, non-residents will be permitted to acquire short-term government bonds and unlisted private bonds and debentures that mature within a year of acquisition. Foreign banks in Japan will be allowed to convert additional amounts of dollars into yen for use in Japan. (NYT Ag 24,35:3)

September 7, 1974:

The financial ministers of the U.S., U.K., France, West Germany, and Japan meet in Champs-sur-Marne, France for a round of far-reaching talks on worsening world financial problems, including the recycling of surplus funds of oil-producing states. (NYT S 8,6:1)

September 21, 1974:

Prime Minister Tanaka meets with President Ford in Washington, where they discuss Ford's planned trip to Japan. (NYT S 22,10; Kosaka, et al.; p.141; Document No. 01877)

September 27, 1974:

Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura meets with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Washington, where they discuss oil and the Korean peninsula. (Kosaka, et al.; p.141)

September 28, 1974:

Foreign and financial ministers gather for a 2-day Washington session on the world crisis caused by rising oil prices. (NYT S 29,53:1)

October 6, 1974:

The U.S. Congress releases Admiral Gene LaRocque's September 10th testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy subcommittee in which he states that the U.S. Seventh Fleet made port calls in Japan with nuclear weapons on board. (NYT O 7,7:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.141) [See also entry below at October 26]

October 7, 1974:

Reports that retired U.S. Rear Admiral LaRocque told Congress in September that U.S. Navy warships had not unloaded nuclear arms before entering Japanese ports causes a stir in Japan. Prime Minister Tanaka, Defense Agency head Sadanori Yamanaka and other government leaders meet to discuss the reports, which contradict pledges by Japanese officials that there are no U.S. nuclear arms in Japan. Concerned that, if the reports are true, the U.S. may have violated the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan by introducing nuclear arms without consulting Japan, Japanese officials express their worries to senior U.S. officials at the regular monthly Security Consultative Group session. Japanese officials also reportedly fear the controversy might lead to demonstrations during President Ford's November visit to Japan. UPI reports that Prime Minister Tanaka has ordered the Japanese embassy in Washington to ask the U.S. for an explanation. (NYT O 8,7:1)

October 8, 1974:

The Nobel Prize Committee in Norway announces that the Nobel Peace Prize will be awarded to former Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and former Irish Foreign Minister McBride. (Kosaka, et al.; p. 141)

October 10, 1974:

Japan Defense Agency Director General Sadanori Yamanaka visits the U.S. for meetings with U.S. defense officials. (Kosaka, et al.; p.141; Document No. 01883)

October 12, 1974:

Political tensions mount in Japan as an official statement from Washington fails to quell suspicions and charges that U.S. warships have come to Japan without unloading their nuclear weapons. The statement, delivered by acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll to Japanese Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa on October 10th, neither confirms nor denies the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan. Japanese officials say the statement is the "maximum" that Japan can expect, but leftist opposition in Japan pledges to make a major issue out of the controversy. Meanwhile, Tokyo Governor Ryokichi Minobe, Yokohama Mayor Ichiro Asukata and Sasebo Mayor Ichizo Tsuji all demand that Japan's ports be closed to American warships until the U.S. gives assurances that no nuclear weapons are being brought into Japan. (NYT O 13,9:1)

October 14, 1974:

Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura, in a heated session of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Japanese parliament's lower house, holds that there is no written or oral agreement allowing the U.S. to bring nuclear weapons into Japan without permission of the Japanese Government, and insists U.S. ships do not carry nuclear weapons into Japan. This denial is contradicted by reports of a U.S. National Security Study Memorandum prepared for circulation within the U.S. government in 1969 which clearly states that there is a "transit agreement" between the U.S. and Japan permitting the U.S. to bring nuclear weapons into Japan temporarily, but not to deploy them there. The State Department will neither confirm nor deny the existence of this agreement. Meanwhile, crewmen of the aircraft carrier Midway, now based in Yokosuka, say the ship carries nuclear weapons. A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman, when confronted with this evidence, denies the existence of a transit agreement. (NYT O 15,9:1)

October 21, 1974:

Nationwide rallies are held in Japan to protest President Ford's scheduled visit to Japan in November and to demand the removal of American nuclear weapons from the country. (FOF 10/26/74 Vol. 34 no.1772; Document No. 01884)

October 26, 1974:

Authoritative Japanese sources reveal that a secret agreement permitting the U.S. to move nuclear weapons through Japan was concluded in 1960, without Japanese text so that it could be denied in Japan. These sources say the agreement was made by then-Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Douglas MacArthur II. Fujiyama, who is still a member of the Japanese Diet, and U.S. embassy officials in Tokyo both decline comment. Japanese officials say they can find no written record of such an understanding, but a record of the agreement can be found in a 1969 National Security Council memorandum. (NYT O 27,1:7; also see Document Nos. 01053 and 01061 for the NSC memorandum in question. )

November 11, 1974:

The second Tanaka cabinet reshuffles for the second time. Main members include Toshio Kimura as foreign minister, Masayoshi Ohira as finance minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone as MITI minister, and Sosuke Uno as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.141)

November 19-20, 1974:

President Ford visits Japan, becoming the first sitting U.S. president to travel to that country, where he meets with Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Tanaka. Tanaka and Ford reaffirm U.S.-Japan cooperation. President Ford, joined by Secretary of State Kissinger and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura, discusses energy, trade, monetary reform and inflation with Tanaka. When the mayor of Tokyo asks Ford about the recent controversy over reports that U.S. forces have brought nuclear weapons into Japan, Ford refuses to discuss the issue, and Kissinger repeats the U.S. position that such matters would be dealt with within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Following a visit to Kyoto, Ford returns to Tokyo to take his leave of the Emperor and to sign a joint communiqué with Tanaka that stresses the need for new initiatives on trade, energy and food, and the importance of U.S.-Japan cooperation for Asian stability. (Kosaka, et al.; p.141; NYT N 19,1:1; NYT N 20,2:4; NYT N 21,18:2; Document Nos. 01885-01918 )

November 24-25, 1974:

Returning from the Vladivostok conference involving President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary Kissinger stops in Tokyo to brief Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura on talks before flying to Beijing. (NYT N 25,14:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.142)

November 26, 1974:

Prime Minister Tanaka resigns because of a money scandal related to the Lockheed bribery scandal. President Ford voices optimism that Tanaka's resignation will not jeopardize U.S.-Japanese cooperation or affect the results of his visit to Japan the previous week. (Kosaka, et al.; p.142; NYT N 27,2:6)

November 29-30, 1974:

Secretary of State Kissinger meets with Foreign Minister Fukuda in Tokyo to brief the Japanese official on his talks with Chinese officials in Beijing. (Kosaka, et al.; p.142; NYT D 1,1:1)

December 9, 1974:

The Miki cabinet is established. Main members include Kiichi Miyazawa as foreign minister, Masayoshi Ohira as finance minister, Toshio Komoto as MITI minister, and Michita Sakata as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.142)

December 25, 1974:

Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa restates the Japanese government's opposition to allowing nuclear-armed vessels to pass through Japanese waters, but is ambiguous about whether this applies to American warships calling at Japanese ports. Miyazawa reiterates that under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, prior consultations are required for the U.S. to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. However, in making his statement to the upper house of the Diet, he does not refer to reports of a secret understanding permitting U.S. ships and planes to "transit" Japan while carrying nuclear arms. (NYT D 26,6:1)

January 16, 1975:

Finance Minister Ohira meets with Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington. It is the first high-level meeting since Prime Minister Miki came to power. Japan says there is no change in Japan's policy toward the U.S., while the U.S. says it wishes to hold regular meetings between the Japanese foreign minister and the secretary of state. (Kosaka, et al.; p.143)

January 24, 1975:

Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki, in an address to the Diet reflecting his governments anxieties over oil prices and supplies, discloses a stronger pro-Arab policy and appeals to Arab oil producers to realize that oil prices have brought about "confusion" in the world economic order, particularly in Japan. However, he says that he understands their complaints about the low oil prices that prevailed before the recent sharp increases. Japanese officials suggest that Japan would side with Arab oil producers in any diplomatic maneuvering and, politically at least, in the event of renewed hostilities in the Middle East. Against reports that Miki opposes Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts to separate Middle Eastern diplomatic and oil questions, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa says Tokyo will expand economic cooperation with Middle Eastern nations, which reportedly means providing technology assistance and gearing Japanese industrial production to Arab needs. (NYT Ja 25,3:1)

February 5, 1975:

The U.S. Air Force in Okinawa admits that F-4 fighters based at Kadena Air Base are assigned to defend Taiwan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.143)

March 21, 1975:

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger testifies before Congress that a reduction of U.S. troops in Korea will trigger Japanese nuclear armament. (Kosaka, et al.; p.143)

March 24, 1975:

The State Department strongly denies reports that the U.S. government does not consider the oral agreement between Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II--reached as part of the negotiations on the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty--as an official agreement on pre-consultation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.143)

April 9, 1975:

Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa leaves for the U.S. to discuss the situation in Indochina with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Gerald Ford. This visit comes against the backdrop of reports that Japanese leaders are disturbed and divided by the failure of the U.S. to help South Vietnam and Cambodia during the current crises, and that Miyazawa will seek a renewed pledge from the U.S. to maintain its nuclear umbrella over Japan. In related actions, Tokyo withdrew its last diplomats from Cambodia on April 5 as it prepared to recognize the new government in Phnom Penh, and announced plans to lend South Vietnam $30 million for refugee aid. (Kosaka, et al.; p.143; NYT Ap 4,11:1; Document Nos. 01924, 01926-01930)

April 23, 1975:

President Gerald Ford proclaims an end to the Vietnam War. One week later, the South Vietnamese government surrenders unilaterally to North Vietnamese forces. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

May 27, 1975:

Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa discusses the Indochina situation with Secretary of State Kissinger. (Kosaka, et al.; p.144)

May 29, 1975:

JDA Director General Sakata tells Prime Minister Miki that he wants to reach agreement with the U.S. on the division of roles in defending areas surrounding Japan during an emergency situation. Miki also instructs Sakata to discuss the chain of command between U.S. forces and the Self Defense Forces during emergencies. (Kosaka, et al.; p.144)

June 2, 1975:

Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping, meeting with a delegation of American newspaper editors in Beijing, says that China understands that U.S. troops cannot be immediately withdrawn from Japan. (NYT Je 3,12:4)

June 18, 1975:

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a major policy speech on Asia before the Japan Society of New York City, pledges that despite recent setbacks in Indochina, the U.S. "will not turn away from Asia" and will continue to oppose efforts by any country to impose its will by force on Asian continent. This speech is seen as responding in particular to Japanese concern over American policy in the post-Vietnam era. Kissinger says that the U.S. will allow no question to arise about the firmness of its security treaty with Japan and other Asian countries, stressing specifically that the U.S. is resolved to maintain the peace and security of Korea, as this is of crucial importance to Japan and to all of Asia. (NYT Je 19,1:1)

June 18, 1975:

The Japan Defense Agency's director of defense tells the Diet that it is necessary to create a mechanism whereby U.S. forces and the Self Defense Forces can coordinate strategies to prepare for emergencies. (Kosaka, et al.; p.144)

June 21, 1975:

At the seventeenth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Group , the U.S. and Japan exchange views on JDA Director General Sakata's ideas on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.144; Document No. 01936)

July 24, 1975:

The eighteenth meeting of the Security Consultative Group is held. Both sides agree on the establishment of a consultative mechanism for strategic cooperation below the Security Consultative Group, to be part of emergency U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. (Kosaka, et al.; p.144)

August 2, 1975:

As Prime Minister Miki leaves Tokyo for a visit to the U.S. to meet with President Gerald Ford, nearly 4,000 leftist demonstrators at the airport protest what they term an intensification of the military alliance by Japan, the U.S. and South Korea. (NYT Ag 3,7:1)

August 4, 1975:

Japanese terrorists, alleged members of the Red Army of Japan, take hostage employees of the U.S. Consulate, including the consul himself, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Reportedly threatening to kill the hostages, the terrorists demand that Japan release seven Red Army prisoners and that the prisoners be flown out of the country aboard a Japanese airliner. (NYT Ag 4,3:3)

August 5, 1975:

Prime Minister Miki, in Washington, yields to the demands of Japanese Red Army terrorists holding hostages in the U.S. consulate in Kuala Lumpur and authorizes the release of Red Army prisoners in Japan (although two of the prisoners refuse to go). (NYT Ag 5,1:1)

August 5-6, 1975:

President Ford and Prime Minister Miki hold a summit meeting in Washington, D.C. The two leaders issue statements stressing that the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula is vital to peace and security in East Asia, stressing that U.S. troops will not be withdrawn from Korea, reiterating both nations' support for the Mutual Security Treaty, and announcing that Defense Secretary James Schlesinger will visit Japan later in the month for talks on security, while Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Miyazawa will meet twice yearly to review issues of mutual interest. (NYT Ag 7,1:4; NYT Ag 7,5:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.144; Document No. 01940)

August 29, 1975:

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger visits Tokyo for defense talks with the Japanese government, as an estimated 18,000 leftists demonstrate at the airport and in central Tokyo. In a meeting with JDA Director General Sakata, Schlesinger agrees to establish a new committee under the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee which will work on defense cooperation. They also agree to hold meetings involving top U.S.-Japan defense officials once a year. Following his meeting with Prime Minister Miki and other officials, Schlesinger chides Japan for being too passive on security matters and urges it to assume a more active role, particularly in improving their armed forces. Schlesinger emphasizes, however, that the U.S. is not encouraging the Japanese to assume a military role outside of Japan. (NYT Ag 29,3:6; NYT Ag 30,2:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.144; Document No. 01946)

September 14, 1975:

Deputy Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announces that his government will soon launch an urgent $6-billion effort to lift the economy out of recession, with the specific objective of increasing economic growth from a current 1.8 percent to 6 percent during the next 6-month period. He denies that external pressures motivated these drastic changes in policy, despite urging by the U.S. and Western Europe that Japan stimulate its economy to increase imports and lessen the drive to export. Fukuda also warns that an increase in oil prices by OPEC nations could jeopardize Japan's recovery since the nation is totally dependent on imported oil. (NYT S 15,27:6)

September 30, 1975:

Emperor Hirohito and the empress begin a visit to the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.145)

October 18-19, 1975:

Secretary of State Kissinger visits Japan on his way to China and holds discussions with Foreign Minister Miyazawa. (Kosaka, et al.; p.145; Document Nos. 01950-01952)

October 21, 1975:

The U.S. forces in Japan notify the Japanese government that they will return 30 percent of U.S. naval facilities in Sasebo to Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.145)

October 23-24, 1975:

Secretary Kissinger visits Japan after his four-day visit to China. He holds meetings with Foreign Minister Miyazawa and Prime Minister Miki. (NYT O 24,6:1; NYT O 25,4:4; Kosaka, et al.; p.145; Document Nos. 01953-01959)

November 15-17, 1975:

The first economic summit meeting among the developed countries is held in Rambouillet, France. Prime Minister Miki, President Ford, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Italian Prime Minister Moro, and French President Giscard d'Estaing participate. (Kosaka, et al.; p.145; Document No. 01961, 01968)

November 17, 1975:

The twenty-first meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Group is held.

December 7, 1975:

Secretary of State Kissinger meets with Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki and Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in Tokyo to brief them on President Ford's recent visit to Beijing and efforts at normalizing Sino-U.S. relations. (NYT D 8,13:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.145; Document Nos. 01963-01966)

December 7, 1975:

President Ford, in a speech at the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, announces his New Pacific Doctrine, and stresses that partnership with Japan is one of the pillars for U.S. strategy in Asia. (NYT D 8,15:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.145)

January 19, 1976:

The twenty-second meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Group is held. During the discussions, the U.S. denies that it is pulling back its defense lines in Asia. (Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

January 27, 1976:

In his report to the House Arms Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Brown says that America's military policy toward Japan is designed to prevent Japan's nuclear armament and its large-scale rearmament, which would undermine stability in Asia. (Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

February 4, 1976:

Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations reveal that the Lockheed Corporation has given large sums of money (reportedly amounting to $7 million) to high-level officials in the Japanese government as well as to Japanese rightists with political and underworld ties, as part of the company's efforts to promote sales of Tristar and P3C aircraft. In Japan, this also causes controversy in the Lower House Budget Committee. (NYT F 5,1:5; Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

February 6, 1976:

Lockheed Corporation President A. C. Kotchian, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, says that his company paid about $2 million (3 billion yen) to Japanese government officials to promote sales of Lockheed aircraft to Japan. (NYT F 7,1:3; Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

February 10, 1976:

Fumihiko Togo becomes the Japanese ambassador to the U.S. (Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

February 13, 1976:

Former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who had denied all connection with the Lockheed bribe scandal, acknowledges meeting with Lockheed President A. C. Kotchian in 1972. Tanaka, who said the meeting was to discuss joint Japanese-American development of a passenger airliner, was in office at the time All Nippon Airways decided to purchase the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar jetliner. Tanaka issues his statement after news reports that Kotchian had informed Japanese Socialist Party members of the meeting with Tanaka. Kotchian reportedly indicated that he met Tanaka through right-wing lobbyist Yoshio Kodama, who was working for Lockheed. This same date, Japanese Home Affairs Minister Hajime Fukuda demands public disclosure of bribe recipients by the U.S. government. (NYT F 14,35:5)

February 19, 1976:

During a news conference, Prime Minister Miki warns that Japan will suffer a "fatal wound" if the Lockheed bribery scandal is left unresolved, and forms a new cabinet-level committee to oversee the investigation into the scandal. Miki also says the names of those involved should be disclosed by the U.S. (NYT F 20,50:4)

February 24, 1976:

Japanese police and tax officials raid the offices and homes of executives of Lockheed, Marubeni Company and Yoshio Kodoma, Lockheed's lobbyist, in the first major investigation of the unfolding bribery scandal. Both houses of the Japanese Diet unanimously adopt resolutions calling on the U.S. to make available all documents relating to the scandal. (NYT F 24,1:5)

February 25, 1976:

Prime Minister Miki, making an official plea for the release of information from the United States relating to the Lockheed bribery scandal, warns President Ford that democracy in Japan may suffer a fatal blow if the scandal is not cleared up. (NYT F 26,45:7)

March 11, 1976:

President Ford sends a letter, its contents not released, to Japanese Prime Minister Miki outlining U.S. policy for turning over information concerning the Lockheed scandal. The question of whether the U.S. will disclose such information to Japan is a major point of contention between the two governments. (NYT Mr 12,47:8; Document No. 01980)

March 23, 1976:

The U.S. and Japan sign an agreement in Washington D.C., stating which information on the Lockheed bribery scandal will be provided to Japanese investigators. (NYT Mr 24,23:2)

March 30, 1976:

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes to turn over Lockheed bribery scandal information to Japan, and to make this information available to the State Department and the SEC. (NYT Mr 31,61:5)

April 6, 1976:

SEC Chairman Roderick Hills says the SEC has uncovered no evidence to confirm reports of CIA knowledge of the Lockheed bribes to Japanese officials. (NYT Ap 7,71:6)

April 21, 1976:

Prime Minister Miki bows to the demands of opposition parties and announces that he will send a special envoy to Washington, D.C. to try to clear up the Lockheed bribery scandal. (NYT Ap 22,30:1)

May 1, 1976:

Japan completes the process of liberalizing foreign investment regulations. Except for certain industries, such as agriculture and forestry, there are now no official restrictions in foreign investments in Japan. (Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

May 14, 1976:

The Japanese cabinet approves a new five-year economic plan, which aims for a balanced budget by 1979-80, balanced global transactions in 1980, and a real growth rate of 6 percent-plus. (Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

May 15, 1976:

A delegation of thirteen members of the Japanese Diet leave for Washington, D.C. to meet with Congressional leaders and U.S. government officials for discussions on the Lockheed bribery scandal. (NYT My 16,5:8)

May 24, 1976:

The Japanese Diet approves the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

May 26, 1976:

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld intercedes on the behalf of the Lockheed Corporation in an attempt to salvage the company's sale of $250 million worth of P-3C Orion patrol planes to Japan. In attempting to overcome Japanese reluctance to buy planes from Lockheed in light of the recent bribery scandal, Rumsfeld proposes a government-to-government arrangement under which the Defense Department would become the contracting agent for the sale. Rumsfeld also suggests that the Defense Department might be prepared to give the Japanese government guarantees on the financial ability of Lockheed to sell the planes. (NYT My 27,1:1)

June 4, 1976:

The JDA releases its second Defense White Paper, the first one in six years. The paper indicates that Japan intends to continue to rely on the U.S. for its primary military security and plans no major arms buildup of its own, despite U.S. urging that Japan increase its military spending and assume more responsibility for its own regional security. (NYT My 28,I,2:1; Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

June 7-10, 1976:

U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Frederick Dent visits Japan to hold informal talks on the new round of multilateral trade negotiations. (Kosaka, et al.; p.146)

June 27-28, 1976:

The second economic summit meeting among the developed countries is held in Puerto Rico. Canada participates for the first time, and the G-7 structure is established. The summit adopts the San Juan Declaration on the 28th, and reaffirms the members' cooperation toward the common goal of "economic expansion without inflation." (Kosaka, et al.; p.147; Document No. 01989)

June 30, 1976:

Prime Minister Miki visits Washington to meet with President Ford before the U.S. bicentennial anniversary. The two leaders exchange views on the 200-nautical mile limit, bilateral civil aviation negotiations, Asian developments, and the Middle East. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147; Document No. 01997)

July 8, 1976:

The sixteenth meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee is held. The two sides agree to establish the U.S.-Japan Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, which will deal with joint strategy; it is established on the same day. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147; Document No. 01987)

July 8, 1976:

Japan's Supreme Court dispatches two officials to Los Angeles as part of unusual trans-Pacific judicial negotiations over the continuing Lockheed bribery scandal. The envoys will meet with U.S. Federal District Court judges in an effort to speed release of depositions being made in Los Angeles by Lockheed officials. (NYT Jl 9,I,2:7)

July 27, 1976:

Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka is arrested in connection with the Lockheed bribery scandal. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

August 30, 1976:

The first meeting of the U.S.-Japan Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation is held at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

September 6, 1976:

A Soviet MIG-25 makes a forced landing at Hakodate Airport in Japan. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

September 13, 1976:

Dr. Thomas B Cheatham, former head of Grumman International, tells the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations that White House aide Richard V. Allen urged Grumman to donate $1 million to the 1972 Republican re-election campaign in return for President Nixon's "assistance" in arranging sales of aircraft to Japan. Cheatham says that Allen made this recommendation during a meeting in April 1972, four months before Nixon held a summit meeting in Honolulu with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, at which Cheatham says Marshall Green and his Japanese counterpart formally discussed the proposed Grumman aircraft sales to Japan. Cheatham added that he did not know whether any contributions were made to Nixon's re-election campaign. The current Grumman chairman denies Cheatham's allegations. (NYT S 14,1:5; NYT S 14,63:2)

September 15, 1976:

Prime Minister Miki reshuffles his cabinet. The primary members now include Zentaro Kosaka as foreign minister, Masayoshi Ohira as finance minister, Toshio Komoto as MITI minister and Michita Sakata as JDA director general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

October 13, 1976:

Japan's National Defense Council, discussing the main elements of the defense plan in the post-Fourth Buildup Plan period (after 1977), approves the idea of "basic defense" to replace "necessary defense capability theory," and provides instructions for developing a proposal to implement this concept. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

October 29, 1976:

Japan's National Defense Council agrees on the basic elements of the defense plan in the post-Fourth Defense Plan period. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

November 5, 1976:

Japan's National Defense Council decides that Japan will try to limit defense spending to around 1 percent of GNP (the so-called "1 percent of GNP" limit). (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

November 14, 1976:

The Soviet MIG-25 which made a forced landing in Japan on September 6th is returned to Russia. (Defense of Japan 1977, Defense Annals)

December 9, 1976:

The JDA decides to use F-15s as its new fighter aircraft. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147; Document No. 02011)

December 17, 1976:

Prime Minister Miki announces he will resign. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147; Document No. 02013)

December 24, 1976:

Takeo Fukuda forms a cabinet. The main members include Iichiro Hatoyama as foreign minister, Hideo Bo as finance minister, Tatsuo Tanaka as MITI minister, and Asao Mihara as JDA director-general. (Kosaka, et al.; p.147)

December 27, 1976:

President-elect Carter, commenting on campaign statements that he favored American troop withdrawals from South Korea, says he wants to assure Japan and South Korea that the U.S. will continue to play a legitimate security role in the Western Pacific. (NYT D 28,6:4)