UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington 11c 20520 RELEASED IN FULL January 24 1957 - I I fath7 r - Mr Si eimann 374 93 5 Mr Lowran PM - Mr Gelb i E3 Mr Bartholomew E - Mr_ Tice 7 Mr Kahan _Ee Mr Kalicki OES Mr Bengelsdorf Mr Hoyle Mr Devine NBA - Mr Dubs - - Mr Kux - EUR - Mr Smith - Mr Sens - - Mr Krump Le a - - ACDA - Mr Van_Doren Mr Boright NSC Dr Tuckman EIFROM - Louis V 'Attached is a possible approach to a general policy on would supplement the ideas presented in an earlier paper on a general framework for 'negotiating US agreements for cooperation Your comments would be appreciated - Attachment As stated PM NP02LVNosenzo ds 1 24 76 ext 21835 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONFIDENTIAL REWEW AUTHORITY GEHRON 06 DEC 2005 200502152 UNCLASSIFIED H wioff W66 9 fg af Rev mu 977 80 BIEJPLrec zvas fr35m r7 4-913 wz'iulm i w UNCLASSIFIED - RELEASED IN FULL fie 221 - 1 I - - 232 - - CONFIDENTIAL 1 US Policy on Foreign ResProcessing One of the key elements of the Octobe 28 policy state- I ep - ment was the decisiOn on reprocessing Ii dec1510ns_were '2 --that the United States sho uld no longer regard 3 12m i- repr-oces sing cf used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary andI inevitable step in the nuclear fuedI cycle Iand that we- should pursue reprocessing an'd recycling- in the' ifuture onl y'if they are- found to be consistent with our Ii 1 international Objectivesi si 29 feeto ensure that our programs 1 are compatible with our international position on- iiafjis 'by -d ferring the commercialization of chemical reprocessing has -- to_ define a reprocessing and recycleI evaluation _ programinvestigate alternatives to reprocessing and Ito accelerate programs for nuclear waIste management including ge gi a federally owned repository for long term Storage of nuclear '-wasees and' i I to expand fuel storage to assure Us utilities thai there need not be concerned about a fbecause of limited Spent fuel storage g r I I Internationally the statement calls for a-moratorium of at least three years on sensitiye transfers - I STATES DEPARTM ENT OF STATE HIREVIEW WILLIAM GEHRON UNCLASSIFIED I 2005 200502152 - Emir nus- 2 em-tire in ow w 2rv srnz- FL TTE-L CONFIDENTIAL - 2 nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers with fuel servicesr instead of sensitive technology_or facilities -- other nations to participate in designing and carry i ing out a-reprocessing and recycle evaluation program and 9- international discussions concerning establishing - 1' few centrally located multinational controlled waste reposi-- I h - _tories With regard to US recipients in particular jthe decisions were favor recipient nations that-are prepared to_ forego or postpone for a substantial period the est biish I ment of national reprocessing or enrichment activities or in certain cases prepared to shape and schedule their- re pro cess- ing and enrichment facilities to foster nonrproliferation needswhere appr0priate to provide consumer3nations with leither fresh low enriched uranium fuel or make otherDequitable arrangements in return for mutual agreement on the disposition i 1' of spent fuel where such disposition demonstrably fosters our common and cooperative non-proliferation objectives - General Considerations 1 The above policy which was designed in part to support our call for restraint in sensitive trans-fers in fact_ UNCLASSIFIED - aw rm groan - - - a 3 implies a much tougher US policy on reprocessing beyond simp-ly the denial of_ sensitive transfers to- developing co untries and to sensitive areas It implies a go srow attitude by the US toward a reproce551ng p1uton1um economy and a desire to have other key industralized states follow- similar coursewhile over time we -have successfully conV1nced other suppliers of the need to stop the transfer of sen31t1ve kw facilities and technology and the need to control _access a to plutonium our new negative attitude twoardwreproce531ng 35' and_recycling has taken these same countries by surprise Eff _it1 1 In particular Japan the EC countries and its neighbors such as Sweden Spain and Switz erland have based their 'nuclear energy plans on reprocessing both ingthe-near th term to compensate for limited Spent and in the long term to permit transition to breederxreactors'd as high grade uranium ore reserves b come depletedg' EL I Many of these countries are considerably mo_re dependent on nuclear energy than the US and unlike the -US have no I acceptable energy alternative _Thus the new US attitude 3W reflecting the need to reevaluate reprocessing- -and recycling more than any other US non-proliferation initiative is per '- ceived as-affecting the heart of their energy programs a and plans It has therefore met with considerable I disagreement and apprehension by other countr1es zboth in terms of their role as a supplier of serv1ces UNCLASSIFIED ain t-II'93 15 13 9 CONFIDENTIAL 4 the UK and France through United Reprpcessors and as xi key-recipients of US supply the EC andkgapan - 53 This is not to say that we should change-our basic approach'Of taking or urging others to take a more reasoned look at reprocessing and alternatives to reprocessing before mw- prematurely plunging into a reproce351ng pluton1um economy KEffl Rather it suggests that we take fully into account the current energy needs and the future energy plans of other gr countries in formulating the US approach to minimizing fe groliferation risks associated with foreign reprocessing recycle_and breeder programs In this regard the recent to allow specific shipments of Ustupplied -- Q'Spent fuel Ifrom Japan Switz_erland and Spain to be reprocessed devainhtherk and France with recovered plutonium to be retained 4'5 by these nuclear weapon states was important This decision oig' - 33 process served to- cle ar1y signal high level US concern over rhil i reprocessing while at the same time allaving concerns offthe countries involved that the US would implement its new-policy-direction without regard to its affect on recipients I ink-Q Us Policy Rationale - Hal-'31 1- 'v w z @Fb 3f $txf 'Qhe revised US policy on reprocessing and recycling Ei f jouEJined in the October statement flowed_from a reassessment the non-proliferation risks associated with the move -T and ukl toward a plutonium economy the recognition that there had been insufficient study of how to minimize these risks CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - -- - - me- ewe CONFIDENTIAL 5 awhi- xv including possible alternatives to a plutonium econcmy _ In addition the move toward reprOcessing a 9 u - c uou n -- - I is being driven by questionable economics Since the October statement a number of countries Japan-and- Sweden have asked for the rationale for our decision since there experts had reached different conclusions We have informally responded to these inquiries along the- following 3' lines Non4 roliferation Risks The popular assumption prior to two years ago was that sensitive operations like_ enrichment and repr ocessing can be carried on safely under international safeguards and are therefore safeguardable We-have _ques-tioned this premise arguing tha-t while we are obviously ahnx micn concerned about diversion the Greater concern or A of safeguards agreements and political commitments and also terrorist action which no system of technical safeguards s' can argues for minimizing the number of such I facilities and locating them in countries under political 3 economic and physical protection arrangements that maximize disincentives for abrogation and opportunity for successful -terrorist action We haye therefore strongly discouraged acquisition of addition sensitive facilities under national_ advocated a mratorimn'on' such transfers urged use of existing'services and encouraged study of future ways tof I minimite_rish such as_a multinational framework for sensitivew facilities involving_ supplier countries with constraints _on technology transfer FTC-VHF UHUEHUIHN UHBLASSIHHJ - 'With regard to the need for early reprocessing three arguments are generally used as justificat-ion Economics Reprocessing of Spen-t fuel allows _recovery of plutonium and uranium which can be recyc_led_ to yield economic benefits Our response_ has been that our recent 3 1 _storage of Spent fuel and purchase of new fuel Iratherii ' than reprocessing and recycle of spent fuel While the f'af -re1ative cost comparison could change as the cost of uranium fuel and enrichment services goes up some progections indicate a cross- over in the early to mid 80' SJG it should - be remembered that commercial reprocessing and recycling hj ' costs are paper estimates compared to real costs for enrich _ment and feed Thus it is unrealistic to assumefthat these estimates carry the same significance or that the 'same 'forces driving up the cost of hU will not operate to drive up the cost of reprocessing and reCycle In any event I 1 ereprocessing and recycle are not cost effective now_ ' Environmental'and Storage Problems A second argument for reprocessing which has been strongly put forth by the various US recipients and the French Germans Japaneseand Swedes in particular is the environmental problems and storage problems associated fth Spent fuel storage They argue that unlike the US they have 1imited_area CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - 61 F u f k - 3 - - raft LHUU I CONFIDENTIAL 7 available for storage under conditions be environ- mentally acceptable and that reprocessing allows separation of high_ level waste a few percent of the total Spent fuel assembly from low level waste the bulk of the assembly 11 The bulky low level waste can be disposed of wi_th minimum environmental problems buried while the low volume high level waste can be stored in special dep051tor1es Ennresponse we have argued that this is in fact -another gvaspectrof the economic argument Our studies _ind1cate that no u it is- -cheaper to build additional pool Storage- fort-spent 5 fuel ounder environmentally acceptable conditions than to I r - ieprocess Space limitations are a real problem only for countries like Luxemburg ' If you can bury the low Ievei - waste from reprocessing you can build capacity for the - original'spent fuel assemblies In addit10n the _long-term I environmental advantages of separating waste are not at all -c1ear since spent fuel in its original inert and less concentrated form decays to about the radioact1v1ty levels 0 'of uranium ore after about 300 years The high 1eVel waste _from present reprocessing methods will require 250 000 years to decay to this level Breeder Requirements The third argument advanced to support reprocessing is the centrality of reprocess1ng1tb breeder a reactors the logical and necessary follow-on to-current addition successful transition to plutonium breeders will require stores of plutonium obtainable CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - p a rrom reprocessing LWR fuel Our response has been that breeders are ten to fifteen years in the future and that it is noticlear that plutonium breeders are the only viable u-_alternative for future power generation In fact the 0 serious non-proliferation and physical protection risks 'I associated with the plutonium breeder MOX fuel concept dictate a go slow approach while we examine ways to make the cycle'safer and or pursue alternative concepts that- better'serve our non proli feration objectives For example the concept of a few mixed thoruim uranium breeders providinq' LEU - rather than MOX fuel to a large system of LWR reactors repres ents an attractive alternative because of its obvious non-proliferatien and physical security advantages and the t utilization-ofithorium with world reserves many times greater air in than uranium git With regard to the assertion that stockpiles of plutonium are needed early to support experimental breeder programs 'as well as for commercial breeder operations the counter to this is that experimental breeders currently utilize U235 rather than plutonium for start up and this will probably true of commercial breeder start-up operations -Thus there is little need to stockpile plutonium now for breeder operations While we have made these arguments verbally to some Us there is a strong need for a US position paper presenting the above rationale with supporting analysis This would of Value for example with other governments ans - - CONFIDENTIAL 9 nIuclea'r Isupp1iers context and more generally with regard to US Irecipients for use by sympathetic foreign ministries Ipattempting-to cope effectively with theirIministries If' I Qf energy of technology and of economics I I US Policy toward Recipients I1 While the above line of reasoning shou1d serveIto convince some of the rationality of the US position how we fbrmulateI this policy vis- a vis recipients in new agree-I Iments and in Irenegotiations is of paramount -importance -If the pelicy is to be useful as Stated in an earlier PM paperIon renegotiation of agreements it must apply generally any exceptions will make the policy increasingly difficult I a to apply l In addition it Imust take into account _theI energy needs programs and plans of US recipients and otIIlfzIer suppiiers so as 1 I InIot place' themI at a serious economic goal should be to formulate realistic requirements for- implementa- Ition so as to allow a reasonable chance of approaching our nonrproliferation objectives with respect to'all US recipients with few if any exceptions I One approach that has such potential is the folIlowing Ii The US would seek in new Iagreements and through -renIegotiation of-exi ting agreements to universally require US consent L for reprocessing of US supplied fuel or fuel processed in I US reactors with the following understanding in the near term CONFIDENTIAL I UNCLASSIFIED - u-h - r 3-13-3- -P - -- egg _ 77 7 ij smug - gel com-Massu'rm IO The US would seek to work with each US recipient to _attempt to solve itsspent fuel disposal pr_oblem through varieus techniques such as improved racks fer more efficient storage and constructing additional' spent fuel storage capacity -- A s a fallback procedure in cases where additional domes-tic storage is not available on a time basis or where c_ economic penalties to recipients- Iwould be severe we would eiEher permit transfer for reprocessing but only in nuclear weapqn_states the UK and France or transfer for f 8 ig ernational storage if and when such a regime is established with US right of approval over subsequent alteration If I matefial is reprocessed_ removed plutonium would be retained_ by nes-e nuclear weapOnwstates- with retransfer subject to US approval Alternatively where domestic _storage is not available 'I on a timely basis we would have the option to acquire the l- 'j fuel -for tranSport from the recipient to a _place of G 'l US choosing under financial arrangements similar to those assuming commercial reprocessing in the UK or France a s- Ove r the longer term if our evaluation prOgram should 3 g indicat ' the acceptability of commercialization bf repro- ceasing we would then sanction reprocessing in nuclear weapon states again with retention of reCOVered piu onium by the nuclear weapon states and with retransfer subject to US -approval 'and '5 - UNCLASSIFIED riff 1 -I-- f - I 1 I CONFIDENTIAL 117 wz v' -4 possible permit reprocessing in a few safe locations or groups_ of NNWS e the EC in NNWS with strong commitments to non-proliferation NPT and extensive dependence on nuclear power Ce g J50J_ Z -reactors provided there is direct involvement-of a nuclearweapons state in the reproces51ng operation and w1th recovered plutonium under the custody of the nuclear weapons state I i a I such locations might be Japan and possibly Europe ICII - The restriction of reprocessing in the nearvterm Ito I 3 - nuclear weapon states and in the longer term reproce551ng proves to be necessary a few additional locat1ons in nuclear_weapon states but with direct nuclear'weapon state attempts to solve the problem 'ability of reprocessing The non-proliferation ommitme t justifiable g _energy needsIand the direct involvement of a nuclear I In addition the placement of strategic amounts Ilgh' 5' plutonium under custody of the nuclear weapon states attempts- to make this situation with regard to weapons-usable material directly analogous to US forward deployed nuclear weappn-_ dispositions For example in Europe US weapons storage facilities are always under direct US onstody but_ perimeter security forces are generally under host country control This treatment is therefore consistent with the conCept that access to strategic amounts of weapons-usable material is equivalent to access to nuclear explosives In addition storage of plutonium under nuclear weapon state custody Tk'f with US approval required for retransfer is in- many 1 r I - I 1 'Ylways preferable to international control e-g-r as PrOVidEd for under Article 12 of the IAEA statute where necessary I negotiation-and approyal of release conditions by the IAEA - memberShip could result in less than adequate release conditions in the US View However the _question of 15- I could be left flexible to permit the possibility of international control at U S choice in the future Spent Fuel Stor_ge Tig kijr 7-3 The above approach attempts in the near term to slow i gajgr- down the general move toward early reprocessing by working 2 With recipients to solve their Ispent' fuel storage problems I but_ without creating ebonomic difficulties for them Clearly the SUccess of this policy aspect will depend on our ability - - solve their storage problems economically and on a timely basis 'lhe recent urgeht requests by Japan Spain and switzerland in fact may foreshadow a significant storage 'problem'for US recipients We and ERDA need to determine -as soon as pesSible through direct requests to recipients I available information the extent of the problem we may be'facingJ weawill needvt -focus US capabilities and_resources to attempt to c0pe with itCONF IDENT IAL - - UNCLASSIFIED 1 -- - _rr nr mpe -- - wH- 07 - - - - - - - 9 1 I - a '7 13 3 Japanese Reprocessing -Plans In addition to stor_age problems other aspects -of Ehe nuclear programs of _certain US-frecipients present difficulties The Japanese plans to put thei_r experimental I reproceSSing facility _a-t Tokai into Operation this spring i such a situation They are currently requesting a US safeguardability determination on TOkai to permit a hot I run in May of 1-977 Clearly the US cannot make an affirmative determination at this time in View of its oWn p011cy dec151on__ to reevaluate reprocessing and recycle Howeveny use-of - Tokai _as a joint US Japanese test bed for evaluating repro-g9 cess ingl wOuld be consistent with both the above export policy and the US policy statement Such a joint experiement would It be a logical step toward implementing the polrcy 1n1tiat1ve h a _to evaluate reprocessing and waste management and also to '1 '14 include other countries in these experiments con91stent i with US non-Proliferation objectives - It wouId- Qe con31stent 3' with the export policy outlined above sin'ce_ reprocessing experi I'ments would take place in a NNWS under identical conditions specif ied for a possible future commercial reproce551ng cent'er i a_ state with a significant commitment toc non-prol1feration a major nuclear energy-program over 30_ reactors by 1980 and with direct involvement -of a nuclear US It would be understood that strategic quantities of UNCLASSIFIED - - - 14 'produced plutonium would be placed under US custody This combination of conditions should ensure the con tinned safeguardability of the experimental operation The Japanese are also beginning planning of a large scale commercial reprocessing plant to handle the future spent fuel problems We will need to convince them to delay these plans pending the results of the US evaluation program Joint US Japanese involvement in Tokai would show -a US desire to take Japanese energy needs and programs into consideration in US planning and should make acceptance of a delay or reorientation of their follow on reprocessing pl-ans considerably more palatable It also would be visible evidence_of the special relationship between our two cOuntries in the civil nuclear energy area I _The Japanese have asked for bilateralialks last fall and winter to discuss Japanese plans for reprocessing to Ilearn US attitudes in detail and to jointly explore ways to satisfy Japanese energy needs consistent with common non- broliferation objectives we have hesitated to do so first D-because of the Ford policy review and later because of the hange in Administration However we need to respond as ' soon as our policy is sufficiently formulated to allow mean ingful'discussion of US Japanese planning UNCLASSIFIED -r I 'I'ur-ur-nny - CONFIDENTIAL 15' i The above policy is also readily adaptabl to Tarapur are currently faced with a situation of either approving -th reprocessing of spent fuel at Prefere_ or finding al_terna- 'n tive ways to diSpose of the spent fuel from Tarapur this 'Lff is addressed in detail in a paper being prepared 15 3h the subject The lending contenders for Such disposition is either US buyback as provided for in the_ US India bilateral -arrangement or to rerack the fuel Ifor more efficient storage ERDh_preliminary analysis indicates the first alternative is ekpensive that casks to move the fuel are in short supply and th_e operation to take care of current Spent fuel inventories would take many years The second alternative appears Ito be a r'easonable short term fix A third possibility which Ho - the above policy would offer would be transfer tB-the-UK or France for reprocessing but with recovered plutonium withheld The solution to the problem also hinges on whether our intent is to continue to provide nuclear fuel-to 'Tarapur Assuming that our goal is to attempt to bring India back PM into the fold as a responsible nation a previous paper Joutlined a_ _general concept for getting the Indians as well feu' 5 as Israel and South Africa to place their existing unsafeguarded 6 ' facilities under safeguards One possible additional incentive I f_to the Indians to accept such a regime_ would be to offer - them the opportunity for a joint US Indian experimental - 'program at Prefere to do tandem' fuel fabricatiOn rather UNCLASSIFIED Lu if a e1'16 than Ireprocessing -as part _of the evaluating' program of- alternatives to reprocessing India with its mix of LWRs and CANDU reac_tors i-s an ideal test_ bed l1 for sudh a concept In addition the utilization of 1 ygefef j which the US has refused to and which therefore will not otherwise _Ie sake u v remove a significant source of embarrassment to _th-e- India '5vh Thus such a preposal as a quid Edr putting all fac111t1es under sa fe- 2 3 3 57 possibly in the long- guards srb151d be attractive both in the short term Prefere and 9 25'11't tm to help solve India' reactor fueling and _spent fue1' disposal problems - uclear WEapon States I The UK France and Soviet Union The above policy of using_ reprocessing in the UK and France-_ as Ia stoprgap to handle near term spent uel storage 11f prob1ems should not raise particular difficulty with- either the UK or France as member of United Repr ocessors or with he' gnew French policy to supply services instead of sen31t1ve t hnologies There appear to be sufficient storage problemS ft wFCCipientIcountriesl and reprocessing startup andl Iexpansioni proglems in the UK and France so that the US go slow' poliCy I'on reprocessing should not present a real commerc1al problem a - o h-u II con-_- - in'the near term - -- - a a- r The concept of physical custody of recovered plutoniumt - by the nuclear weapons state should also present no problem and-in fact parallels the ideas put forth by the 'British UNCLASSIFIED - a CONFIDENTIAL 17 at the nuclear suppliers meeting on international storage ' that recmgued plutonium should be stored near the reprocessing site and the reprocessing state should maintain physical control over storage 1- The difficulty with the UK and France willvarise more over the philosophy of the US policy and what'it_portends for'the future than the near-term implications ' -'Hsees reprocessing services as its major nuclear export France on the other hand 'has just changed i ts-pOlicy at US urging from one of sensitive tr-ansfers to one of supplying services They as well as others will feel that obj ection to or denial of possible reprocess1ng services 1n safe locat1ons _like nuclear weapon states- -is not In I -I s respon'sive to the needs of other coun_tries with muCh greater a- dependence on nuclear energy than the US In adgltion in the particular case of France much of their future planning - for- domestic power generation and reactor has centered around their plutonium breeder development The new US policy is seen as a threat to these plans we will uxe m need to consult and work very closely with France as our policy and_ _evaluation programs progress in order tol ensure a Zthat we take account of their concerns and jointly shape future -programs to balance energy needs and non proliferation risks we should attempt to 51gn1f1cantly expand burzjoint cooperation on breeder development perhaps in the I content of our current evaluation program to try to shape UNCLASSIFIED - lwr-I 1 CONFIDENTIAL 13 breeder development-toward cycles that better meet our non proliferation objectiVes financial involvement ' in these programS'should serve to relieve pressure for french breeder exports to finance their internal programs 1 Use of the Soviet Union for reprocessing US fuel would '_present a large national security issue and in any event is probab ly unnecessary 0n the other hand the Soviet Unioniturrently providEs in all of its agreements with its _frecipientsi i e Eastern European countries for reproceSSing' Ionly in the Soviet Union Thus the proposed US policy would'be consistent with Soviet policy The retention of - recovered plutonium in nuclear veapms ostate under physical contro l v state-s is _also consisten_t with Soviet policy j The EC I - _The primary difficulties with the above policy will be 1-within the EC community Currently the agreement L'does-not require the community to_seek US approval for repro ceSSing or internal storage movement or use of plutonium community Although no large reprocessing I effort g ggide of the UK and France there are ongoing t'pilot-operations in a number of states with plans for com- mercial'operations For example 'the FRG has joined the UK and France in United Reprocessors It apparently doesn't int nd to reprocess foreign fuel but does have plans for ja plant for domestic use Belgium and Italy have similar 'plansffor national reprocessing In addition like the UNCLASSIFIEP 'p I I up w r u -- - were 3w 11IH CONFIDENTIAL I French many of these stateIS believe the future of nuclear pOWer is Ithe plutonium breeder and therefor rany policies an that would deny them access to stockpiles of _plutoniumI represent a threat to their future energy 1ndependence ' 4 For these reasons and in view of the significant riSk of 5 -endangIering broader security andI political relationships - In - - - with_ our European Allies we will need to move carefully f'cy 1n implemenIting any new policy _on reprocessing of fuel 1hrthe BC One possibility is to attempt to integrate 5 lj g_ 1 the EC _community into the US evaluation program perhaps through a joint experimental reprocessing effort in ii 5 Europe similar to or cOmplementary to the proposed Toka1 y -i 1 program The EC as a whole would qualify in the same Sense_ as Japan with its significant -commitment to non- - proliferation all NPT parties and its large_ dependence on nuclear energy approximatley- 40 reactors by 1980 excludang L5H Fra-nceI and the UK This would need to be explored IinI detail before we attempted any renegotiation of_ the agreement in order to implement the pr0posed raprocessingI H 'policy - I CONFIDENTIAL gg gf - UNCLASSIFIED 1 7 1                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu