II DEPARTMENT or STATE I i MEMORANDUM 515 RELEASED IN FULL March 1977 The Deputy Secretary - err THROUGH Lucy Wilson Benson DesignateLwG - 5 - Joseph S Nye-75 OES - Patsy T Mink Designate 9199 4 PRC Meeting on Response 1- You will be chairing the PRC meeting at 3 00 p m 1 March 16 on the responSe This memorandum provides for your use brief background material keyed to the pro posed agenda Tab 1 Suggested talking Points are also provided for your use as Chairman and for you presenting the Department' views Purpose of Meeting l The purpose of the meeting is to review the response - J - to PRbi l and define agency differences on certain key issu s to enable the President to make necessery choices These iSSues relate to the emphasis on domestfc reproces sing in the international fuel cycle evaluation program ii -I g options- 011 the scope of safeguards and the legislIating 32 of export criteria also if there- is time the a COREDIF purchase the international plutonium storage issue and discussion of the and cons of the Adminis tr tion developing its own non-proliferation legislative e a package The PRC also needs to address the role of the interagensy Group in follow on studies -- We Spggest you Open the meeting by reviewing the proposed Agenda 12 - 'Talleing Points dl- - zr-ja f - -- we need to resolve differences or define positions on three major issues for Presidential determination - STATES DEPARTMENTOF STATE I - 2005_ 200502152 CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED GDS _ yff-r_ 19 Review 97 30 was cairn - 1m lw c These issues deal with 1 the role of reprocessing in the international evaluation program 2 the scope-safeguards to be required and 3 options for legislating export criteria We need to review the role of a continuing Interagency Group IG in follow on studies Finally if we have time we should address four additional issues on which there are differences 1 the possible purchase by the USG of shares in EURODIF and or 2 international plutonium storage 3 the proposed open season for ERDA enrich ment contracts and 4i the legislative package II opening Remarks on Overall Policy Direction n You may wish to make some Opening remarks --on the over- all strategy proposed in the PRM response and the foreign policy context in which we will be pursuing our non- - prol-iferation goals Alternatively you may'wish Joe Nye to give a brief overview Talking Points General - -- The President has given high priority to non- proliferation policy The Interagency Working Group chaired by Joe Nye has produced a comprehensive report with specific and interrelated recommendations to the President on how best -to pursue our non proliferation goals The report recognizes the need to deal with political and security motivatiOns behind nuclear weapons acquisition but emphasizes avoiding the further spread n I - CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - --smilt r k'b-I - - - - ghal uni-n 31 333 of under national control of materials and facilities capable use for _ nuclear explosives -- Conceptually the report develops a four prohged ategy involving controls including effective safeguards political assurances and other export controls 2 restraint and or denials of further transfer sensitive technologies - 3 incentives particularly guarantees of long- term supply of low-enriched reactor fuel at economical prices to countries accepting non-proliferation con straints and - an internatiOnal fuel cycle evaluation program including other suppliers and'recipients exploring fuel cycle alternatives with a'view toward reducing fuel'cycle proliferation risks Non proliferation is a priority goal and'the US - must be prepared to apply our influence to achieve progress in this area but We need to also recognize the broader f0reign policy context Talking Points State Views The PRM report strikes an appropriate balance purs poIi risk uing non proliferation efforts while minimizing adverse tical consequences -- Even so adoption of these policies is not without and may place strains on overall relations with our major industrialized partners and with important developing states is particularly so in connection with our efforts deter or at leasttdelay further reprocessing -- Our policies must be designed to meet nuclear lenergy needs we may-need flexibility to permit access to fuel cycle activities by non nuclear weapons states with clear economic need and strong non proliferation cred ntials over the long term or CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED u t- - I I H - In develoPing long-term strategies and fuel cycle _alternatives we must try to avoid oz minimize discrimina- tio'n between nuclear weapons states an- non-nuclear sweapons states and between industrialized 53nd- developing countries A major tactical point we should consult with l'ge y states before issuance of a Presidential statement ion non proliferation tz'n' H - - E I til 1 CONFIDENTIAL '1 UNCLASSIFIED I 1 name-ur I I1 In I r mussm First- Issue International Evaluation and Reprocessing Options There is consensus among agencies that the US should undertake in consultation with other concerned nations a fuel cycle evaluation program to investigate ways of avoiding or minimizing the problems associated with the presence of separated plutonium There are- differences however among agencies over the emphasis to be placed on domestic reproces- sing in contrast to technical alternatives in such an evaluation program There are two options 1 that we include as a part of the international evaluation program a domestic program for design develoPment and safeguards evaluation work on conventional reprocessing ERDA and per haps others favor this option - and 2 that the US give almost exclusive technical focus in its domestic program to alternatives to reprocessing supported by State ACDA CEQ and The Department view in favor of Option 2 is based'on the belief that our domestic program more than any other element will convey a signal to other countries concerning our intent to avoid or proceed with reprocessing that there 'is no economic need for the US to proceed now and while not foreclosing some reprocessing evaluation in the US in small- scale' facilities but not Barnwell that we should utilize primarily foreign reprocessing facilities for evaluating safeguards and non proliferation aspects of reprocessing Talking_lPoints Chairman -- We all seem to be agreed on the need for an inter national fuel cycle evaluation program and to get other countries involved in various parts of the evaluation There are apparently differences over the relative emphasis which we should give to domestic reprocessing in such a program -- I understand that State ACDA and-others share the view that the domestic aspects of the program should focus almost entirely on alternative fuel cycles I welcome a further exposition of these agencies' views CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED u- - Iq- qq-H - - I understand that BRDA'believes thaEi the Pidministra- tion should pursue an evaluation program a-s'isesses alternatives but which also includes researgs' z development and design efforts to assess and improve nonfi-proliferatiOn and safeguards aspects of reprocessing I welcome further comments from ERDA on their views - Talking Points State' Views -- The State Department believes the international fuel cycle evaluation program should emphasize ways off avoiding or minimizing the problems associated with presence of separated plutonium while including studies of- institutional on logistical arrangements such as use of suppIier services or multinational centers whereby the risk associated with reprocessing could be minimized We strongly concur that the US should inv ite other countries to establish con sultive arrangement of supplier and recipient countries to participate in the evaluation Lead be identified in each area to meet non-proliferation tiv s - ifWe are concerned however that if the US were go forward with a major reprocessing activity other tountries would perceive this as a decision to proceed wit cgmercial reprocessing deSpite efforts to describe this program as- experimental - -- -Th'is would be seen as contrary to our international call for a pause in such fuel cycle decisions there - fore support Option 3 b calling for a domesticd evaluation program with heavy emphasis on' alternatives not requiring separation of plutonium - - In stating this view we do not foreCIQSe the possibility of US participation in experimental evaluation -work using conventional reprocessing technology at foreign facilities and or small scale facilities in the US _In particular in terms of activities in the US we oppose efforts leading to reprocessing capabilities at major facilities such as Barnwell UNCLASSIFIED -- -- a - 1- - - 3 1 -- - - vn tram $2 51 - a I 4 53IV Seccnd Issue Comprehensive Safeguards Options 7 1 The 185116 is what US policy should be a pted for application in new and amended agreements win regard to comprehensive safeguards on the nuclear ao ties of There is general USG agreement that we should seek to persuade all other suppliers to agree to full- -scope dsafeguards as a condition of supply and that we should re luire them ourselves if supplier agreement is achieved However there _are differing views in the USG on what We Should adOpt with respect to safeguards in the 0f Supplier agreement There are four options 3 2 x - - 1 Even in the absence of supplier agreement the could require full-scope safeguards as a condition of Supply under new and amended agreements favored by ACDAEven in the absence of supplier agreement we 5011151 a modified form of full scope safeguards DgOVering existing facilities and subsequently acquired imateri agl coupled with supply termination in the event a IEGiPieht acquires an unsafeguarded facility or explodes a nuclear explosive device - 1 we could seek supplier agreement and customer acceptance of the above modified form of full-SCOPe safeguards but require it only when acceptance by major suppliers is achieved in the meantime continue present pol 1 cy of safeguards on U S -supply only We could seek customer acceptance of full-scope safeguards but continue our present policy of requiring 3 Safeguards on U S - supply pending supplier consensus on approach_ favors this Option _ - The Department favors option 2 modified full- SCQPesSE-feguards however - while adopting this policy we walla-ltd also vigorously pursue supplier agreement to this same policy We would review U S policy after one year We believe this position would be more widely acceptable to keY- h'on NPT recipients 9 Brazil Pakistan Spain and 90531131 ISrael _and South Africa _g up II the French who are the key to supplier acceptance a ppear interested in this formulation We further believe 1 it 1-5 Probably the minimum position acceptable to Congress -5 _o -CONFIDENTIAL I 5 I - on 1% UNCLASSIFIED gdi 99 a I 3-Talking Points Chairman -- We all agree that we should seek su$iolier agree- ment to full scope safeguards and if successful - apply that policy ourselves on all new or amended agreements - this does not appear likely in the near-termThe issue is the extent of safeguards we should require in the absence of supplier agreement on full- a f scope - - -- I understand that ACDA favors application of safeguards unilaterally by the U S even in w 3 the absence of supplier agreement I would welcome 5 views -- State I believe supports Option form of full scope safeguards which they proPose to apply _in new and amended agreements even in the absence of supplier agreement although a strong effort would be made - - to achieve such agreement Mr Nye may wish to expand on this Are there any other agencies which prefer- this option A third option is to apply this modified form - of full- -scope safeguards only when we achieve supplier-11 n- 'ff'L-Zu- acceptance and in the meantime continue our games-ant policy of requiring Safeguards only on U Sw-supplled materials and equipment Finally I understand that ERDA considers the - - above Options undesirable in present circumstances and would prefer to continue present policy whilet seeking - customer acceptance and supplier consensus on full scope -- safeguards ERDA may wish to expand on its views 5 -Talking Points State Views -- Until we achieve agreement among suppliers to full- -sc0pe safeguards the- Department believes Ithat we 4 should adopt Option 14 b -- Under this Option we would _req__uire in new or amended agreements as a condition of supprI that all facilities and subsequently acquired materials in recipient_states be subject to IAEA safeguards CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - - -- --1 Unlike full scOpe safeguards ' it would require - no international commitment to place future facilities under safeguards or in the case of countries that may currently have unsafeguarded materials to place these under safeguards - 0' However this approach would be coupled with a supplier-recipient understanding that if the c0untry 814 intends to acquire an unsafeguarded facility the I recipient must notify the supplier in advance and sup- ply would be terminated - additionally suppl y would be terminated if the recipient subsequently detonates a - nuclear explosive We believe that the US must'adOF t more 99m 4' we alIs_o__ regommend_ that -prehensive safeguards conditions on our nuclear supply I-Ibut weIdo not believe that adoption of full scope safe- at this time would be in our interest -- -- The modified approach however would be a major 3 step in that direction without running as great a ri Ik of driving customers away from US nuclear- cooperation -- Moreover this approach would place reliance on -b$ lateral supply arrangements to deter unsafeguarded activities rather than on obtaining international commit- ments 'this shOuld be more acceptable to recipients The French who are the key-to supplier agree- wment appear to be interested in this modified safeguards formulation and we believe it would probably be accept- able to_ countries such as Brazil Pakistan and Spain and might even be acceptable to South Africa and Israel We believe however it is doubtful that India would accept even this formulation I Finally in orde_r_ to the __political_ risk_ __ - - the US Vigorously urge adoption by all suppliers of the modified full scope condition as an interim policy and we review the effectiveness of our policy on comprehensive safeguards after one year CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED In- - 1- riser 2353 313 L Third Issue Options for Legislating xgort In all likelihood we will be presentingza comprehensive legislative package to the Congress on various a'spects of non-proliferation policy It will contain Administration - recommendatiOns of Us export criteria to be applied not only to new agreements but also to existing agreements We have also recommended in the PRM reSponse that we should 5 sex to negotiate new conditions for exports under- existing agrkeeInents The issue here is whether- new us export criteria - should - become applicable to exports under existing agreements automatically after a specified time period _ regardless of usu cesS or lack of success of our efforts to renegotiate 1- There are three Options - - - up That the Executive Branch propose e r agzgee to legislation that would make new NRC export licenSing criteria a requirement for all exports after a speCified time period are as 41 ctr 252 - I - 2 That we prepose legislative language which would require a PreSidential' determination as to whet ens-- export-s not meeting new criteria would be permitted after a Specified time period StatePa h driA cmL-r esition - 3 tip- 1 3 That we make the new criteria negotiating goals for 1 revision of existing agreements but not requirements export unless supplier consensus is achieved1a E BA favors 3 I this option - I 43 53 39 State prefers Option 2 Presidential determination on -t_-he grounds that it effectively signals our intent to achieve stricter controls and is probably the minimum formulation acceptable to Congress However it would not palace 1153 191 the o sition of unilaterally ins i s - termugga n con 1551 so determines Talking Points Chairman l There is general agreement I understandj that we Ishq ld seek to negotiate new conditions for exports under existing agreements 4 - Moreover we will- -be developing a legislative - package on non-preliferation or perhaps modifying existing - hills which will contain NRC export criteria - The issue here is to what extent these criteria should be applicable auto- matically to exports under existing agreements i ACDA I believe favors an option which would make new criteria automatically applicable after a Specified time period Would the ACDA representative care to expand on this View - -- option 2 would allow for Presidential exceptions in cases where a country did not accept the new criteria Within a specified time frame State position Mr Nye might wish to speak on this option The third o_ption would make the new criteria negotiating goals for revision_of existing agreements but not requirements until supplier consensus is achieved ERDA'might wish to comment further on this Option Talking Points State Views The Department fully supports the report recommendation that we seek to negotiate new conditions for exports under existing_agreements 'r 'Various Congressional bills have Specified that new - export criteria should be applied automatically by law after a specified time period perhaps 18 the Option of a Presidential_ de1ay e- We believe a policy of insisting on such sWeeping changes could result in charges that we were breaking existing agreements and could be used by recipients as an excuse for terminating safeguards endorse Option 19 b that is rather than an automatic requirement the President after a specified time should be required to formally determine whether supply under existing agreements could continue in the absence of one or more specified-criteria - We believe that it would effectively signal US intent to achieve stricter controls and it is probably the minimum formulation acceptable to Congress It also would reduce the risk noted above While favoring inclusion of this requi-rement for a formal Presidential determination with regard to new nuclear export' criteria in the proposed Administration's legislative package We do not favor legislation of a Congressional override of such determination 1mm -12 We believe that the Executive Branch should accept a override only as a fal iback'r Eat-pd in- the context 323' of gaining Congressional acceptance of our oVIerall non - proliferation proposal 17 t 1 5 '1 CONFIDENTIAL I UNCLASSIFIED I31 V13 Inter s ncy Follow-on -Studies - The PRM re5ponse recommends that an Interagency Group chaired by the Department of State Joe Nye con- 1 tinue to function to 1 coordinate impleme ntation of US j- non proliferation policy and the necessary continuing evaluations and studies 2 report- to the President on _the status of the effort and 3 identify further issues 513 an which Presidential decisions will be required The shoL-11d give urgent attention among many other follow- US budgetary allocations for the on issues to _ -ins't'e_rnational evaluation' program and the non- We need p'roii ration aspects of breeder deve10pment Presidential confirmation of the continuing role of the on Jthese and other issues and _a decision that the 1516- sheu1d report to the PRC on a continuing basis Talking Points 9'51 --The final recommendation in the PRM report pro- poses that _the Interagency Group chaired by State con- tin'he to function in coordinating policy implementation 3' major issues requiring urgent attention by the IG in follow on studies concern budgetary allocations for the international evaluation program and non- prolifera- tiqn- aspects of breeder development '4 would welcome any views on these and other matters that the IG needs to address Talking Points State Views strongly support the PM report recommendation to set- up a task force under the 16 on non proliferation 33339 as be headed by ERDA 'and tasked to'- some up with US budget ailocat-ions in support of the evaluation program 535 understand these budget recommendations must be to OMB by early April Therefore there is Dead to get mp this ef_fo rt started nrgent1Y- bee-On the breeder development we understand that is conducting a study to reassess technical aspects 'of the breeder development program - I CONFIDENTIAL 3 UNCLASSIFIED an - - vv- -4-- comm - We believe it is essential to consider ndn pro lifetation aspects as well We also need to consider foreign breeder programs and determine our attitude Ur- ward making weapons- -usable material available for Hume programs '1 -We therefore _urge that we undertake a special study of- Inon proliferation aspects- of the breeder in parallel with the on- going technical assessment_ CONFIDENTIAL 3' UNCLASSIFIED -- 5- 1-- - i 'mtu 4 4' t - I -15VII Other Time Permitting Purchase of shares in In order to assure enriched uranium fuel supply to countries accepting non-proliferation restraints and as a step toward supplier cooperation it has been proposed that the US purchase approximately one million separative work units SWUs from EURODIF and or QOREDIF the multinational enrichment enterprises operated by France This fuel would be available to the US as a supplement to our indigenous capacity and also as insurance- to US recipients who were complying with our non proliferatiOn constraints if we de- faulted en a long term supply contract due to licensing or other problems The PRM response contains two options on -this issue That the Executi re Branch enter into negotiations sand seek legislative authorization to purchase shares in EURODIF and or COREDIF State position 2 That the Interagency- Group explore further the m'erits of such an investment supported by ERDA ACDA and LE 0MB The State Department supports option 1 believing that this mechanism would significantly enhance US credibility as a reliable supplier as well as improve US French nuclear relationships and secure a US voice in European enrichment sex-vices Moreover it would be a significant step toward cooperative international fuel assurance arrangements which - may in -fact ' be the long- -term solution to the fuel supply problems I falking-Points Chairman understand there are differences over the pro- posed purchase of shares in EURODIF and or COREDIF in order to supplement our indigenous capacity and insure fuel supplaes to countries complying with now-proliferation con-_ Straints -- The State Department wishes to move ahead to negotiate with the French and to seek legislative authorization Mr Nye can expand on this position EWRDA ACDA and OMB wish to have the idea studied further before we commit ourselves _ I would welcome their CONFIDENTIAL _'I_'alking Points State Views 5313 Under this proposal the US would puichase approxi- if mately one million separative work units egga valent to - one-ninth of the- Portsmouth add on capacity from EURODIP and or the multinational enrichment enterprises Operated by France This capacity would fuel approximately ten reactOrs over' their lifetime Enriched uranium from these enterprises would be emailable to the US as- a supplement to our indigenous ca'p' bity but also as insurance to US recipient's iwho were Complying with our non-proliferation we meet delivery under long-term supply contracts afo'r other- reasons In such an event this capadity would be made available perhaps through some type of arbitration mechan_1sm Congressional approval for commitment of this capacity would of course be obtained 3'in authori ing a case by- case basis via approva1 of the Agreement for COOperation with designated rec1p1ents - The Department believes this preposedl mechanism would 1' i'sigmaificantly enhance US credibility as a reliable supplier- well as improve French nuclear relationships - and 3 secure a Voice in European enrichment serv1ces e- In addition it would be a Sign1f1cant step- toward cooperative multilateral fuel assurance arrangements which may in- fact be the long- -term solution to the fuel supply problem 11 i -- -We- believe that the small amount of capacity envisaged wbuld not present difficulties either' in terms of budgetary considerations or total enrichment capacity and would be a small price to pay to reestablish the US as a re1 1yable supplied I 1312 International Plutonium gtorage President Ford's October 28 nuclear policy statement directed the Secretary of State to purshe the establishment of an international storage regime for both- Spent fuel and civil plutonium and announced that we would be prepared 0 CONF IDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - hum g 1'1 gig -I 1 '5 once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in operation fuel under its control to place our own excess civil plutonium and spent There is interagency consensus on encouraging international spent fuel storage but differences among-Agehcies over the merits of the international plu- The two options on this issue simply stated are that we pursue the concept of international plutonium stor'age- or deemphasize efforts to establish such a regime ton ium regime Our position on' this issue is that we should deemphasize to create an international plutonium storage regime The concern here is that such a regime while perhaps ap propriate in the future in connection with establishing a - few 'carefully sited multinational plants offers little security against diversion or 'abrOgation and can be used as in the ease of Brazil and Pakistan to legitimize current efforts to acquire reprocessing conditions for separated plutonium would very likely fall short of U S conditions for approval net be able to accept such conditions on U S -supplied fuel Talking Points Chairman In addition release and we would probably President Ford preposed that we pursue the concept ofh-an international plutonium storage regime as well as a spent fuel storage regime All agencies favor the latter but some would prefer to deemphasize the former Mr Nye can speak for those who wish to deemphasize international plutonium storage ERDA may wish to suggest the advantages it sees in pursuing the concept Talking Points State Views In With regard to an IAEA storage regime for separated plutonium the Department favors Option --that we - deemphasize establishment of such a regime but continue to actiVel'Y Pursue an IAEA Spent fuel storage regime- The Department agrees that as pointed out in the OPRM study spent fuel storage regime 1 - UNCLASSIFIED there would be substantial advantages to an IAEA - - - - 1- j - - also note that some other countries believe- the IAEA Statute provision for IAEA storage applies only to'separated plutonium and that in any case it could not be interpreted to apply only to spent fuel - - However a storage regime for separated p1utonium- while perhaps approPriate in the future 'in connection with establishing a few carefully sited multinational plants- offers little security against diversion or ljabrogation and can be used as in the case of Brazil and Pakistan to legitimize current effort to acquire reprocessing In addition release conditions for separated plutonium and definitions of excess would very likely fall short of US conditions for approval 3e therefore believe we should deemphasize international st-orage of separated plutonium - - it UNCLASSIFIED 1 I 9 El 2 1 r 63 331v 'xx - I - 11 119 Season 1' US credibility as a reliable supplier has been seriously eroded in recent years partly duezf to ERDA- contracting policies which led it to S JSpend' enrich hient Service contracts in 1 974 because of short capacity In the short term -we believe that we could make avail able additional SWUs and thereby enhance Us credibility as a supplier if ERDA were authorized to conduct an - T -open seaSO- n allow present customers to terminate con- 1 tracts without penalty to increase the enrichment ear-- I vice available to foreign and domes-tic customers The PRM response contains a recommendation favoring an open season State supports this recommendation - T a lkimng Points 1 - - -There is general agreement that the US must re establish its credentials as a reliable supplier and the - PBM response recomfnends that ERDA hold an open season during which present customers could terminate contracts without penalty This could free up additional SWUs for other recipients both domestic and foreign - and ERDA may wish to comment further on this recommendation which I understand is supported _Leg'i s l a tive Package 4 1 In its early days the 95th Congress has devoted con- filth-z siderable attention to nuclear eXport legislation A dozen bills have already been introduced and numerous com- mittees and Congressmen in both Houses are involved making they intend to enact strong measures early - in this session Some of the measures before the Congress 1 913% would it enacted create situations which would make it di f'icult if not impossible for the US to continue many 1' of its nuclear cooperative efforts The position of the _Administration is anxiously awaited We need to address the question of whether the Execu- tiVe Branch should present a legislative package or seek to obtain the desired legislative results by trying to influence the major bills which have already been introduced CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - - - t can aky mun - I'll I HIJ- 20- 5 5 OMB takes the View that the latter foster cooperation and better working relationgitjzgetwe en the Congress and the Executive Branch and encouragetompro- mises on the part of Congress The State Department and-most-Iother Agencies believe that a comprehensive pack- age' could unify the Administration's non-precliferatiOn reduce the Chances that conflicting- iegislation might be passed and facilitate international understand -'ing and acceptance of US policies In anY EVent we need to move rapidly'to develop legislafcive striater and if we propose a comprehensive we 511011 14 work 2105qu _with Congress and seek to_ incorporate important aspects Of existing bills -- Elking Points Chairman are all aware of the intense Congressional in- terest in this area and we need to on - the legislation needed to implement the various recommen- dations There are already a dozen billsti'n the hepper and hearings have been scheduled in the near fut-Lire on some of them - --I note that most Agencies appear of presenting Congress with a comprehensive Ie'gi s latiVe age incorporating the major initiatives piopo ed by the Administration - - has suggested that we'might do b tter-if we sought to- influence the major bills alreadfii g z troduced rather than propose 'an Administration sponsored bill would OMB like to comment further 1 u Attachment 1 Proposed 'Agenda 1 _Drafted ' o l'mt' Ext '24812 3 15 77 Concurrences Mr Kahan Mr Oplinger Mr Bettauer CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED - Eff UNCLASSIFIED amen PRC Meeting on PEN-15 RELEASED IN FULL 1 Opening Remarks on Overail Policy Dir qtion 2 International Evaiua tioh 'and' Reyrooessing 0ptions 1- so Cooprehensive Safeguards Optioas 4 Options for Legislating Expogt Criteria 5 EG Follow On Studies - Budgetary Aliocations for Inteinational Evaluation - Non-Proliferation Aspects of Breeder Development 6 Other Issues Time Permitting 9 Purchase Inter ational Plutonium Storage -Open Season _ Legislative Package UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORITY WILLIAM GEHRON DATEFCASE ID 06 DEC 2005 200502152 UNCLASSIFIED -                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu