DECLASSIFIED Authority UEPAH i M em we 3 Mn Washington 20520 hC dll inlPL Japan OF ON April 14 1977 1 OO p m 8th lloor D1 ning Ro01 SUBJECT NonvProliferation and Reprocessing in Japan 4 Ryukichi Imai Consults m1t to The Ministry of Feieign Affa airs Hiroshi Ohta Ministry of Foreign Affairs United States oseph S Nye Deputy to the Under Societeiy for Security Assistance Lawrence Scheinman Senior Advis ser - DISTRIBUTION T D EA 033 PM ACDA The object ive of the meeting was to hear the b1oa d outline of a possible way in which to resolve issues related to the Tokai facilitj 'Fhe Japanese approach to the problem consisted of a numter of e 1ements 1 a belief that it would be difficult to solve the plutonius and spent fuel transfer problems at piesent for an extended period of time and the consequent desirability of seeki ng a solution that would contribute to managem nent of the problem for the shorte1 term 2 Japanese acceptance in the form of public support of the US View that there is a strong linkage between plutonium and the potential for nuclear weapons prolifer ation that there is no need at the present time for plutonium which in the present situation is not an economic fuel that the near term commercialization of plutonium technology is neither possible nor necessary In addition Japan could agree that the commercial utilization of plutonium would not be undertaken until such time as it may prove to be economically justified CONFIDENTIAL Authority DECLASSIFIED r611 cons 1 1117211 2 The United States participants expse essed appreciation for such a View pointing out that this conformed closely to the vi cw taken by the P1 es ident in his recent nuclear policy tcment and that the support of a country suc h as Japan for thcs-e conclusions reflected Jery fa 1v01 ably on what L1e nited States regarded a an important element ii the international effort to make nuclear poicr a continuing and safe component 3f the energy mix in many count1ies It was further no ed that in the bsence 3f nidespread agree ment on such points as those expressed above there was a risk of strong adverse public Opinion developing on the continu ed use of nuclear porer the result of whica would be trimental to our collective intere ts and to the ultimage role of nuclear poweii in future energy developmen c It was essential at this time to take stock of tie futuie development of nuclear technoloov and to eXplore alternative fuel cyzle technologies that would enhalce public support for tie continued develop ment of nuxlear energy - a commitmewt by the United States to sell Japan three years extra stockpile of enriched uranium The United States participants indicated a willingness to explore whether and in what ways such an assured additional supply of low enriched uranium might be made available to Japan The participants also noted the general imaortance of fuel assuranzes to achieving a favorable outcome in the present international discuS sions related to nuclear fuel cycle activities a US commitment to assist Japan in her efforts to acquire in-iependent enrichment capabilities as well as in her efforts to have assured supplies of natural uranium The United States participants acknowledged the importance to Japan of security of fuel supplies both in terms of enrichment capacity and feedstocks They indicated interest in exploring ways in which to enhance stabilize and assure uranium supplies and said that the United States hoped to enter serious discussions with major source countries in order to effectively address that sproblem They also expressed interest in helping Japan in her effort to secure greater access to enrichment capacity and services and mentioned among other things CONFIDENTIAL J DECLASSIFIED 1 Authority NN r-r E2 CONFIDENTIAL 3 such mechanisms as equity participa Lion and multinational facilities It was poi nted out that solutions entailing direct technology transfer would be iffiCult for the US in we nc car term becaus Oi the destrahility of avoiding p1 ccedents whic h wo oul w' idesprcad dcveloiament oi nationally conLrolled sensitive facilities but was a pcssihility ove r the longer tern a US agreement not to object to re 1ansfers of spent fuel from lapan on the assumpti011 that non military plutonium in the world would be under adequate inter national control The United States participants noted that there were two aspects to this question retransfers of supplied spent fuel for reprocessing or alteration outside Japan and retrans fers within Japan to the Tokai facility for similar disposition In the former case the issue related to countries other than Japan with whom We have agreements for cooperation It is currently before the President and there was obviously little they could say regarding such transfers until the President had made his decision It is clear hOwever the US would want to avoid long term commitment regarding the disposit on of US supplied fuels while at the same time doing whatever we could to alleviate problems of spent fuel storage In the latter cas involving Tokai the US participants stated that they heped the US would not be forced into invoking the legal provisions incorporate cd in article Ville of the Jap1n agreement for cooperation since if the US were now '1lled upon to make a safeguardability determina tion in or ier to permit the reprocessing of US- supplied fuels in that facility it would have extreme difficulty 1 making a positive finding Hence other solutions were I 0 'not only appropriate but necessary the Japanese woul d like recognition by the UnitedS tates that plutoiium technology remains important and that its extraction handling and burning should be the continued subject of Japanese research and development activities that the two countries would agree that such technology should he continc d to the US USSR EC and Japan and that within those areas countries would be free to pursue industrial technology related to plutonium CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED AuthorityML l 77 CONFIDLITIAI u- The Unite States participants noied that such an approach IcaLed a number of prob ems In the firsst instance Ie fel t it would be inLIppropriaLe to make a frankly di s scriminatory statement hat effectively 'excluded all cou1 tries not designtted in the agreement whether tlat agreement was public or private in nat uie More importantly the Japanese fozmulation Cleated both a domestic and an internatioral problem Domese tically the President has juSt dctermined that reproces sing would not talre pIace in the lnited States and it would be politically difficult for him to turn around and say tl at while US origin fuels coult not be re processed in the United States thcy c0uld be reprocessed unconditirnally abroad Internationally it would be detrimental to US non proliferaticn goals for the first major policy decision following tle Presidential policy tatement to be one where the LES saVI it is pe erfectly all right for a country to go aheId and to do so Ls sentially the US must take every reasonable step to avoid setting a precedent for the reprocessing of spent fuel for recycle purposes This did not mean that the United States reje ied the notion that the Japanese should ccntinue their RED pro grams for future reactor types evcn if they involved plutonium Indeed the United Sta tes WOLlld be willing to explore various possibilities cf enabling the Japanese advanced reactor pregrams to continue perhaps by finding some way in which to provide the required plutonium to those programs In addition the US participants felt that there were a number of ways to facilitate a usetul role for the Tokai plant In this regard the US participa Its suogested that it misht be useful to bring apprOpriate technical personnel tcgether to explore viable alternative modes of runnirg the Tokai plant e In particxlar it could be mutually beneficial if th plant could be run to explore alternative means of extracting value from spent fuel other than the separa tion of plutonium and the United States likely would welcome bringing the Tokai facility into the framework of our proposed international fuel cycle evaluation program to test some of those alternatives In any event the US participants were operating under instructions permitting them to explore various alterna Lives with the Japanese to hear their ideas and to report ba ck to the President They were not in a to make any commitments but only to hear and understand CONFIDENTIAL i DECLASSIFIED 1 1 Authority CONFIDENTIAL 5 the parameters of the problem and ways in which it could be rusolved to mutual satisfiction 'In terms of possible areas for a s tually acceptable solution all participants appearci to agree that a solution must emphasise USeJapaneSE cooperation must not prejudgce President Carter's nanwprolifcration policy and avoid setting unfavorable precedents and should respond to the Japanese political problems and short and long term energy needs In this context it appeared fruitful to explore means by which to make the Tokai facility an effective and constructive elemtnt in an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation to emphasize LES utility for experimental purposes and the opportunities it provides for exploring various methods of handling spent fuel In such a framework Japan could continue to explore for sites for spent fuel storage while maintaining a viable and operating program on- plutoniumwhased research and development The considereu tion of a larger reprocessing plant would in such a framework be confined for the presnnt to design studies with actual construction only taking place once commercialv ization of reprocessing would have been justified This decision in turn would be a function of assessment of the fuel cycle evaluation program itself 7 4 22 77 Ext 27888 I CONFIDENTIAL a DECLASSIFIED 1 Authority I CONFIDENTIAL 5 the parameters of the problem and ways in which it could be resolved to mutual In terms oE-possible areas for a ritually acceptable solution all participants appearei to agree that a solution must emphasise US Japanesz cooperation must not prejudice President Carter's nunuproliferation policy and_avoid setting unfavorable precedents and should respond to the Japanese political problems and short and long term energy needs -In this context it appeared fruitful to explore means by which to make the Tokai facility an effective and constructive element in an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation to emphasize LES utility for experimental purposes and th opportunities it provides for exploring various methods of handling spent fuel In such a framework Japan could continue to explore for sites for spent fuel storage Jhile maintaining a viable and operating program on- plutonium based research and development The considera tion Of a larger reprocessing plant would in such a framework be confined for the present to design studies with actual construction only-taking place once commercial ization of reprocessing would have been justified This decision in turn would be a function of assessment of the fuel cycle evaluation program itself 3 T LScheinman AES 4 22 77 Ext 27888 CONFIDENTIAL WM Authority NN OF UNJEESTANDING ON NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE April 15 1977 Both countries recognize that any understanding involving- nuclear fuel cycle should be based ones broad based co operative fornulation for the longntern benefit of the-two countries in this spirit the_following general principles are agreed upcn Japan agrees and supports the basic premises of the new US fuel cycle policy namely a Plutonium is very much related to the proliferation of the lone term weapons potent ials and that this is 1 he common concern of the azivanced industrial world b Plutorium is not immediately needed as fuel and cannot be used as economical fuel for the time being as long as enriched uranium is available as light water reactor fuel C Immediate commercialization of Plutonium technology is not possible nor is it necessary The United States agrees that technology of Plutonium extraction handling and burning fast breeder reactor is an important technology'option for Japan's energy strategy in the long term and therefore Japan has perfect right to pursue its development Both countries agree that such technology should not be allowed to proliferate outside of the advanced industrial world namely US USSR EC and Japan who are technically and economically qualified to pursue this term energy option 3 Japan agrees that commercial utilization Of Plutonium Will not be undertaken until such time as may be economically and otherwise justified 4 As an effort to emphasize the importance of uranium fuel for light water reactors the United States agrees to sell to Japan three years equivalent stockpile of enriched uranium in addition to the current arrangements 'The United States also agrees to assist Japan in her efforts to acquire uranium enrichment capabilities as well as in her efforts DECLASSIFIED 7 a r AuthoriWNM we to have assured supply of natural urarium These items are not only to give Japan assurance of supply but also in recognition oi the desirability to establish multiple sources of eniiched uranium supply to the rest of the world 5 The lnited States will not object to retransfer of' spent fuel from Japan as long as there is an undertaking that all non military Plutonium of the world will be placed under an adeqpate international The foregoing five items constitute the basic understanding between the-two countries and should remain secret Specific arrangements bout reprocessing will he guided by the following considerations i The United States will refrain from invoking Article 80 and not act in such a manner that might jeopardize Japan s nuclear power program taking into consideration political and public acceptance situation in Japan which is also relaxed to the past nuclear policies of the United States ii In View of the proposed International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program to which Japan is willing to participate when its scepe is -better defined in some multilateral forum it would not be adequate to spell out detailed understanding between the two countries beyond the general time frame of about three years Anything beyond such time frame may be guided by the outcome of the evaluation program Specifically the following steps will be taken 1 Japan announces that while Tokai reprocessing plant has completed construction -she is undertaking re evalua tion of the role of Plutonium and has determined that commercial recycle of Plutonium in light water reactors is not justified for the time being At the same time Japan regards Plutonium based fast breeder to be a very important long term energy option of the country Until such time as it is proven otherwise Japan intends to pursue FER related technology development until such time as her industrial technology level catches up with those of other advanced industrial countries DECLASSIFIED 1 punhor y - Tokai reprocessing plant will be operated as a technology development facility within such context In i addition will offer this plant for an international opportunity to i determine limits oi safeguards efficiency on Plutonoim facilities ii design Related considerations of physical protection and possible technology of fissionable material recycle without separating Plutonium in elementary form As Tokai plant will go into hot operation seen there will be a detailed technical consultation with the United States to incorporate the above programs so that their outcome may be properly reflected to an international evaluation program 2 The United States will issue to Japan's retransfer of spent fuej for the time being until domestic spent fuel storage pond can alleviate Japan's difficulties regarding nuclear power plant operation Such WB lO shall be con ditional on inequate storage of Plutonium under an intcr national conirol regime Regarding longer term contractual arrangements between Japan and European countries the United States shall refrain from invoking Article 8 of the Japan US bilateral agzeement as a means to persuade UK and France from expandirg their reprocessing capacities This is partly based on the recognition that US in such contracts will not take place until the actual time of retransfer which is beyond the postulated period of international fuel cycle evaluation program The United States is of course free to other methods of persuasion vis a vis these two countries This understanding however will not be announced 3 Japan will continue her efforts to look for sites for her central Spent fuel storage pond which in the event reprocessing technology development in much larger scale is determined to be feasible may be utilized for that purpose also Japan is of course free to pursue design study regarding larger reprocessing plant Japan however will make clear if so requested by the United States that actual construction of such larger plant will not take place until after the commercialization is justified for use of Plutonium in which the above-mentioned international evaluation program is expected to play an important role Ryukichi lmai                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu