JAIL - -8013743 UNCLASSIFIED xv Boi3 4 25 nouss 3635 owls- June 18 1930 QSQS AC'ti0n RELEASED IN FULL moms ron - THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exglorations by Gerry mt Attaqhed is a capy cf warren Christopher' to the President and inf telegram on pest 2 exploraticns the that the President has apprv d 1 Garry Smith go ahead with explc q icns new ta also Ema E'z'esident s instrucnia'r er the draft telegram let's let Gerry do this galoration of the idea or his can and report bad-x I may act lush to 9'6 forward vita it- I'll discuss same i Iegice The Resident has also -L la ed the info a dxessees 2 32 the draft teleg a1 - 2 I Zbigniev 3 2eziaski - 3 I 1' wail-I Ly rage - M1599 Writ Mamas t 3 -UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY WILLIAM GEHRON ID 06 DEC 2005 200502152 53535 UNCLASSIFIED Rever Or 332 24 2 3 7 3-29459- own-ear USS-IS #qu UNCLASSIFIED If iz iss 1 ruff 5 a riff I - 1 45 'i 1 00 l3 7 ly WwwAw' w 1 214-ll - 0 Ziir mam vr 13 varT-r- I huh-h 1 all ax 31 1s Ufa - - at 8 30 '4 13 mg Jagcig-g y r I - in silk gh'kmum u'Ir' 8 I - 1 ind a t 31 a 3n a ab e Other Benar ants v-a Seczata5511 1 11 1 5211 4 II 0 a'fr' a II I a r Q'tllEgg-5 - - uJ-3 t-J n 41 31 ah_ e I nor 33In 359 D an 0 know 3 3- cw RELEASED IN FULL e s-no l -Aw4 cw- t6 - - a opg' ram J- no 1 I 5 $4 0 jjt '-3-371 00 'b a or'd 'o 01 53 91 on1 under t2 acumen 331 l wmu n93 T le- J'r a - - 4-51 $0194 235 9 'l3 1 at - Ann 11 I zr- air-91 1_ 4w- UNCLASSIFIED 1' UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILLIAM GEHRON ID 06 200502152 a - REVIEW AUTHORITY Cav- I-g-nr Q o - UNCLASSIFIED 3013425 5 RELEASED INFULL DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON 3' - '9 Eon THE 5 Warren Christopher Acting SUBJECT Explorations At the Friday foreign policy breakfast I promised to send you an analysis of advantages and risks to Gerry Smith's proceeding with explorations now as' opposed to after Tarapur is resolved by the Congress Reasons-for Not'Going Ahead Now Movement on this approach now-could create public perceptions that the Carter Administration is proposing to weaken its non-proliferation policy or the Carter Administration is changing signals on breeder reactor programs -- The Tarapur decision complicates our moving for- ward now with in two ways First both decisions will be characterized by some as U S none proliferation retreats Tarapur as a fall off of our commitment and as a retreat from our opposition to premature reprocessing and plutonium use Second it could be argued that our Tarapur decision is inconsistent with our explorations That is the Tarapur decision is based on the rationale of preserving controls over U S -origin material to prevent its reprocessing in India whereas our explorations are designed to relax such controls where we have them in Europe and Japan outside of EURATOM The approach could be characterized as helping European and Japanese nuclear programs in particular breeder advanced reactor and reprocessing programs that might otherwise our approach may not in fact achieve greater allied cooperation in improving the non proliferatiOn regime cata- UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STAT 3 5 4 0 REVIEW AUTHORITY WILLIAM GEHR ID 06 DEC 2005 200502152 - Sac - - - 311 v w UNCLASSIFIED a -- The precedent of this approach could undercut our effort to prevent the spread of sensitive technology and material to countries outside Europe and Japan or result in charges of discrimination by countries which we assert do not meet the necessary criteria- Reasons for Going Ahead Now -- Other countries expect us to take INFCE results into account and key Allies have already approached us on harmonizing policies If we- do not move soon the _-Austra1ians who are actively negotiating with EURATOM and Japan could make agreements which would undercut our-ability to limit reprocessing and plutonium use We also need greater fuel supply asSurances to meet'antici pated criticism at the NPT Review Conference Our supply leverage is diminishing and our-relia bility is in question Failure to commence explorations now would risk our Allies' going their own way in their nuclear programs and making the issue an even greater irritant in our relations We couldfalso lose their cooperation in improving the non proliferation regime in particular deterring commercial thermal recycle Going ahead with Tarapur and the explorations is entirely consistent Both actions are designed to support the non- proliferation regime -in the case of Tarapur to preserve safeguards and controls over U S -origin material in-India in the case of to obtain limits and controls on U S -origin material in EURATOM which we currently do not have and greater non proliferation cooperation generally including full scope safeguards as a condition of future supply Both deci sions also serve broader foreign policy objectives explorations will be less sensitive politically than Tarapur especially since they will be low key non-committal and confidential and would be only with Allies who are either NPT parties with full-scope '3 safeguards or in the case of France a nuclear weapons state consideration of options has already had some press play particularly in the trade press We have had extensive consultations with those most concerned in Congress and no one has objected to further explorations lt- UNCLASSIFIED f A copy of proposed instructions for Ge UNCLASSIFIED Let Gerry Smithlgo ahead with explorations now Postpone Gerry Smith's explorations until after Congress acts on Tarapur 5 7 attached for your conveniencegait zr' - r u_ anrry Smith UNCLASSIFIED - on UNCLASSIFIED GTE H 134 13 - RELEASED IN FULL ACTION VIENNA 0 INFO PARIS BONN- TOKYO - I USIAEA FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH PROM SECRETARY- DECAPTIONED NODIS Pos'r mses I SECRET ENTIRE The President authorizes you on an absolutely non committal S basis and in a_ low key and confidential manner to explore I with the major European governments and Japan arrangements by 'which they would agree to cooperate in strengthening the non Proliferation regime and limit- the reprocessing of spent fuel and-use 6f plutonium Your purpose is to clarify what 1 e might - erpect from our allies in return for greater predictability in the exercise of conSent rights over the use oi US-origin bspent fuel Based on these explorations we would be better able to develop positions for the statutorily mandated renegotiation of our agreements with EURATOM Japan and 'certain other countries 3y In your explorations you should be guided by the following el ments What we would SEek -xDeferral by the involved countries of commitments to commercial thermal recycle for a specified period SECRET UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE ur- ID 06 DEC 2005 200502152 REVIEW WILLIAM GEHRON - -2 - ii'- 3 ag new reprocessing capacity to that required for Breeder and advanced reactors and restraint in the separation of plutonium to avoid unnecessary stockpiling and pressures for thermal recycle I - Support for development of an effective avoidance zof-e cess national stockpiles of plutonium 4 Agreement by and Japan- to US consent rights called for in the NNPA - - Continuing limits over US-origin material Iafter nse in breeder and advanced reactor programs - Increased commitments to spent fuel storage as our alternative Ito reprocessing Improved cooperation in dealing with countries of proliferation concern including concrete steps to strengthen restraints on of sensitive technology and material to such countries rCommitments to condition significant new nuclear supply commitments on NPT type safeguards on futnre facilities Cooperation to make reprocessing assOciated Ireactors morevproliferation resistant e-GooperatiOn on improving the once-through 4 Dedication of future enrichment capacity to enriched uranium only as well'as existing with breeder cycle produce low - Greater commitments of financial and technical resources and political support for development and implementation of improved IAEA safeguards SECRET UNCLASSIFIED - Ilout-v SECPE 5 the exercise of US consent rights and control over reprocessing Ff'm andnuse of plutonium in certain programs for breeder and - a an d thermal reactors ISp cifically you may Iexplore advance f5 4M5 hi i agreement to reprocessing of US origdin mater_i a1 in mutually I agreed faoi1itie fer use of the resulting separated plutonium tr a in certain agreed breeder and advanced- reactor-RDED programs in I edvaneed NPT or equivalent countries that meet certain criteria o r 3 a You may indicate willingnes_s to consider generic agreement I I I 1- to reprocessing in the United Kingdom and France for other -3 i cogntr1es that have good non proliferation credentials or no spent fuel storage alternatives or where it is in our im 1 non-proliferation interest to remove spent fuel You should also indicate the US is reviewing in the context of preparations for the- NPT Review Conference licensing of export f5 ' 0f low enriched fuel for a longer term than now as well as 'backup h-ass rances and increased technical assistance to NPT parties Iwith good non-proliferation cred-entials I - 4 You should-make clear that in return for flexibility on reproCessing and plutonium use we would-expect agreement to improvements in'the'present non proliferatiOn regime parricularly more helpful active role in dealing nith problem countries 'You should stress that no final policy decisions have as yet been madeu SECRET UNCLASSIFIED                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu