Secretary Rusk Nov 22 1962 eff Record D55 0 On Cuba The exchange of letters on 27 28 were such that there were all sorts of impressions There was no time for sys- tematic and detailed negotiations There was no basis for a law suit We had our own theory They had their theory The public exchanges were in themselves a reflection of the urgency of the situation Communications simply could not take place through private channels at the rate events were moving One of most damaging reports that came out implied that more violent action was advocated- that we were oursevles urging es- calation The fact that answer of 28th was given in public was in large part due to urgency of the tirw factor Situation was so tight that a complete meeting of minds was not possible We did not know whether understood what the President said in his telephonen address Wewere talkingabout both missiles and bombers As far as we were concerned offensive weapons included bombers They were not all that obsolete that they were not dangerous es pecially in low level attack For first few days we did not make much of an issue overishe bombers as long as the missiles were moving out we did not make an issue When we sawt hat they were on ship board and saw them from the air we could turn again to the bombers The fact that we had a slow reaction to the bombers was not an accident has agreed to take the bombers out and we will be able tosaee if they are leaving The President said that some difficult problems remain yet Are a great many involved Some may not be resolved for some time yet Until there are some safeguards about what is going on in Cuba we will have to get in formation by our own methods The Sov U has made a considerable effort to get safe uards It is our impression there ha been real differences between Mikoyan and Castro and Sov U has not been able to get Castro would go Castro has forces on island which make it difficult for Sov to say what he must do or else Castro has 50 000 militia There was a limit on what Sov Un could produce in Cuba Catro has not come trough on safeguards and we must keep our freedom of action As to invasion pledge- we are not going to give any assurances that modify our responsibility for hemispheric defense under the Rio Pact Anything we dovcill be conditioned by the security requirements of hemisphere We will not guarantee the Castro government We do not guarantee any our own Not going tagguarantee Castro Not going to guarantee a haven fromwwhich Castro can launch an attack on the rest of hemisphere aim-w One of troubles in making this clear at the timevvas that by the timevve go through putting reservations on anywmatement of our position it would sound as thoughwe were declarinngar We cannot leave the door open for the Soviet Union to build abase in Cuba We cannot acknowledge the right of extra hemisphereic country to haie a foothold Cannot sanction Castro putting into other countries agents of suversion But insurance against in vastion ig tbg only think K_gets_out_of the whole affair What comes next is Of a lower Order of danger but is stickin inizerms of negotiating out anything that has remotest chance oftaeing sat isfactory to'both sides had to make a case out that he is a man of peace We willing to go along with the gag He did pull missiles out He has gotten himself committed to the idea of a or necessity of a detente We have been unwiling to talk about anything else until Cuba and Berlinvcere settled But is flying flag of detente Hints are that there may be some important develooment fairly important agreement on some other subject Maybe disarmament and nuclear testing Not much we can negotiate in Berlin But seems to be interested in creating the impression that there is adetente- a ause for rearming maybe Until they build up their ballistic ssiles It may'be he has been sobered Maybe has economic problems Maybe defenses in bloc worry them Maybe differences in bloc worry them But maybe he reallywants detente for a period 3 been sket cial ofbgiffeggnces between Moscow and Peking ee Hne thericoulduaccapt the i ea of easing the other ser 1 split is worrse' than we had suppoed Believe Mosoow noW worried about China and India About China becomingnuclearpowerL About danger that China will get involved in War with West that will drag Sov Union in Worried about having to at into China's were or denounce its re lations with China My imp ession Russia has been trying tozestrain China on Ihdian affair Pointed out 1 3 of oil comes from Russia Will be to see if Stalanists are checked in Est Germany and Czechoslovakia as in Bulgaria We must always bear in mind that we maybe set up for a draw play by the impression of detente May be serious action in some other point We must not generalize about Cuban experience Soviet has enormous military pow er and nuclear potential Enough to inflict n1assive damage on U 3 They can bring enormous power totear on other parts of world Unless they had been prepared to use nuclear power they were at enormous disadvantages in Cuba Great mistake to think measures we found useful inCuba would work in some other sitution Was there Soviet miscaluclation inCuba Will be long time before we know I am convinced they surprised by our reaction to Cuba by NATO and OAS reaction Alsb by f bt tat Afro-Agian block gave them no support They made a were able to correct itL _Dne_elemantiinlnur_ction was that they had and we on to to correct it beforewi ie be concerned from preventing them from making such miscalculation again 0n Nate Only the US has really met its Nate goals fully If you were in Moscow the action of Nato countries might put you in doubt about what the reaction of Nato would be Have been13rying for years tovget Nato countries to maintain force levels in Nato agreed on in Eisenhower administration- not must because of real military require ments but because of the kind of signals this gives to Moscow We must avoid tempting thieves Question You said in speech yesterday we might be onthresh hold of great events etc What I had in mind was that almost all or problems have been wffected by Cuba--Kh is not the Same the loc is not the same Nato is not the same etc Kh has some serizus problems So have we but I would rather have our problems than theirs thought hitherto I think there has been a new spirit in Nato Nato allfes saw two things--that USIaas able to look into the cannon's mouth without flinching that Russians are not 12 foot tall Also the left in SA has abandoned Castro Was notable serentiy in our Allies -governments were as steady as could be Kennedy was calmest man in Washington This is such a lonely reaponsibility that this was a terriblet esting period Question If there have been these are we 3hang ing any of our policies tot ake advantage of the shifts Well we have totze careful about overdoing the doctrine of hot pursuit Cuba has not destroyed the power of theSoviet Union Have to be careful about a too eager follow up Patience is called for we might find ourselves int he embrace of a wounded bear Question What isyour appraisal of internal conflict in Sov Union in Kremlin We have no indication of any major conflict around Think he is personally responsible for policy--including Cuba Sometime in early summer he evidently bcided to soft--no Berlin_issue_until_aftar elections etc to suppgse that he intended to arrive at UN in NQIsmbercand_taIE_ggput missiles inCuba to bagg_upifereign poiicy7 - Quection May we adopt a softer policy to encrage detente-- missiles in Turkey etc R I dependently of the Russians or the Cuban affair we have beenxseview'ng our defense arrangements abread and it is possible we might alter them--have a Nato deterrent etc We are talking ab out new forces in NATO 0n Berlin not much we could get soft about- we have sort of run out of margins on our side Not much we can give on Two points our presence and access Never got to second because Russian never conceded first Question What about the unpublished letter of 26th R I have said you couldn't build a law suit on these letters when President replied in his press conference that there hadtaeen a constant flow of letters it was a slip of tongue--he meant of communications There was a long letter on Oct 26 Before we could reply to it the letter of the 27th was broadcast including ref to Turkish bases We elected to reply to letter of 26th because there was in it more ossibility of agreement than in the letter of 27th The letter of 2 th--our letter--you will find does not fit snugly with the letter of the 27th On Cuba Two aspects of Cuban situation First is the military threat to the hemisphere When it is solved will still have the problem of penetration of this hemisphere by a power from outside the hemis phere We are we were before the middle of Sept We are rid of the immedite offensive mena but still have to deal with Castro Q What type of mil action did we intend to take inCuba A Better not go into that We had two strike or ground invasion Q How much known in Russia about letters Have no info about how many in Kremlin knew about letter of 26th We feel it impor tant for us not to publish letter of th in it vs a ituation It will be out in 25 years On China If this a major attack on I die it is something the entire free world have to do something about We would hope first that India would take all possible steps to help itself 2 that the commonwealth nations would be mobilized to help and we would support India and the commonwealth Better we not be point of the spear from etandpoint of Sov Un This might force Moscow to back up Peking Q The President said nuclear weapons were taken out Cuba Were there nucl ear warheads there R An point We never have seendany warheads for the missil 7 Hazg never about_presence_tpere We had sume that are no missiles Jeri- We know ha have left _ Irlabsence of look see can't guarantee are not some more On Me Mahon clear than Ladakh area We have never had an official view about line Have recognized Mo Mahon line a long time How can Castro defy Sov Un A The way Phoumi could defy us etc Q What about India-Pak detente A Some developments on Kashmir in a few days if Chin advance Q Is it our policy in long run that Castro must go Was a portion of Pres press conf had on this Weapons removal not final solution A regime like that in Cub may not be a direct threat to US but it is a threat to other countries and a threat of penetration which we have to oppose OAS has this in mind Will have to turn back tothat questiomhenwe get offensive weapons set tled We cannot consent to any Marxist-Leninist regime tied into the Communist bloc in this hemisphere Situation of Castro at moment unpredictable More fluid than heretofore Q Who gets creditf'or OAS response A Ed Martin did great job Q What effect of India an other SE Asia ctrs A Have impression thatM ed ettlement in Laos and may1e Viet but Mim ressionishat Pekin has moved int power position of inluence in Hanoi Q Are you going to stay on the job awhile A Have heard nothing to contrary Q How badly I dia defeated A Said not to understimate long run strengt of India Most forces not committeed Many reserves Still good fighting forces Q Anything more on China Russia split a A Split is real bu_t_ hard to say_ if can be patched up Dont think so deep it could not be repaired but reports from Europe show it very deep and might'be difficult to patch up XXIX                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu