S w - r S - Y n-rr - _ I w V - t - - 't-- - - W -S -F - - b S NPS55-86-013 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey California A- 1 985 TECHNICAL THE SOVIET THEORY OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL IN HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE A PRELIMINARY STUDY - by 0lDDiane UI Chotikul July 1986 Approved for public release distribution unlimited P epared for C CM Joint Test Force Kirtland Air Force Base NM 87117 w I q NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CALIFORNIA D A Schrady Provost Rear Admiral R H Shumaker Superintendent Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized This report was prepared for C3 CM Joint Test Force by Dian Ctiku Research Technician Department of Operations Research Reviewed by Released by WAHUNKNEALE Chairman Department of Operations Research V t ' - Q - - s ' - ' - - - T- RHL Dean of Informa and Policy Sciences - - - - - - r ' ' INQLA5_S TFT En fCjR rV1 C A15lietC-3 T1ON O -5 Ar AT PA S REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE MARKINGS 1t RESTRICTIVE la R ORT SZCURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFTFlD 3 Za SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DISTRtBUTION AVALAdLITY OF REPORT for public release distribution SApproved 2b DECLASSIFICATION D OW'NGRA iNG SCHEDULE unlimited S 4 ERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER S NPS55-86-013 7a NAME OF MONTORING ORGANIZATION bo OFFICE SYMBOL If applicable 04 NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Code 55 Naval Postaraduate School 7b ADDRESS City State and ZIP Code 6c AOORESS Cty State and ZIP Code 93943-5000_ Monterey CA 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION j8o OFFICE SYMBOL If applhcabl 8 NAME OF FUNDINGISPONSORING ORGANIZAT ONI K17 C 3 CM Joint Test Force 8c ADDRESS City Stare and ZIPCode irtland Air Fnrrp Raqp- NM rifLE InCuOe Securi't 1 # 3 70__ NUMBER 2980001 10 SOuRCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS TASK PROjECT PROGRAM WORK UNIT ELEMENT ACCESSION N NO NO 87117 ClaSi ftCation THE SOVIET THEORY OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL IN HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE A PRELIMINARY STUDY 2 PERSONAL AUTHOR S Diane Chatikul 14 DATE OF REPORT Year Month Day 13tb TIME COVERED 3a TYPE OF-REPORT FROM _NOQ Technical- JO _J IS 1986 July 61 PAGE COUNT 1 16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 18 SUBJECT TERMS Continue on reverse it necessary ad ntify by odockr numoer COSATI CODES 17 FIELD SUB-GROUP GROUP Reflexive Control Disinformation Propaganda Decision '3 ABSTRACT Continue on reverse of necessary and ioentify by block numoer In the ongoing information war between the United States and the Soviet Union a new method of exerting influence has captured the recent attention and interest of Western Sovietologists and military and political analysts This new method is the Soviet theory of reflexive control which briefly stated can be defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision Several authoritative studies have been published which describe in depth and in detail the scientific and mathematical components of reflexive control and its various military and technical applications However less attention has been devoted to an examination of the underlying historical and psychocultural factors which may have contributed to the development of this particular orientation toward decision making The present research effort represents an attempt to narrow this gap in our understanding of the evolution and significance of the theory of reflexive control and to develop a 20 12 0ISTRIfLuTIONIAVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT C SAME AS RPT UNCLASSIF'EOUNLIMITEO 21 OSrlC USERtS ae LIL i N AO ' ' ' 4 % % aRl -4i-26A G TavlF D FORM 1473 a4 - t3 00 V % iiN' ASS FIE 2 b TELEPNONk flr uoe Area NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL I ASSTRACT SECustirY C ASSiFtArION vaition MV %as uDo ini 1 er %qr All other tid t-otrI are coso-ete _Ar ' ' o 'i''- ' ' - - OeJ 22C OFFICE SYMBOL 'LASS Cndte 5517w C r N OC 'rw' _ PAGE ' '- - % Continued 719 ABSTRACT to be better psychohistorical framework within which the theory may come affairs understood by Western analysts of Soviet I Abstract In the ongoing information war between the United States and the Soviet Union a new method of exerting influence has captured the recent attention and interest of Western Sovietologists and military and political analysts This new method is the Soviet theory of reflexive control which briefly stated can be defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermi ned decision Several authoritative studies have been published which describe in depth and in detail the scientific and mathematical components of reflexive control arl its various military and technical applications However less attention has been devoted to an examination of the underlying historical and psychocultural factors which may have contributed to the development of this particular orientation toward decision making The present research effort represents an attempt to narrow this gap in our understanding of the evolution and significance of the theory of reflexive control and to develop a psychohistorical framework within which the theory may come to be better understood by Western analysts of Soviet affairs LT - -- 7 rV 9 9' o r' 2 r ' --o 1 Preface This research effort represents an attempt to tie together in a somewhat coherent and systematic manner a vast body of material--covering a variety of academic disciplines history psychology political science cybernetics command control communications C3 military affairs --which appears to this writer to bear some direct or indirect relationship on the development of reflexive control theory in the U S S R The purpose here has been to broaden the scope of interest away from its present narrow military technical focus to Vinclude psychocultural and historical factors which may potentially increase our present understanding of C3 a la Russe and specifically of the role of reflexive control Dr Roger Beaumont an historian at Texas A M University specializing in military affairs and defense analysis has suggested that What needs closer examination and sensitivity is the 3 extent to which the Soviet perspective on C2 and C includes a broader range the arts public information propaganda and indeed all forms of influence and persuasion including the application of various sophisticated psychological techniques 1 This study is ty no means intended as a final word or authoritative commentary on the subject It is basically exploratory and descriptive as opposed to scientific in nature The research method utilized has been primarily a review of the available open literature both Soviet and Western as well as material from interviews with two knowledgeable Soviet emigres which served to supplement and enhance the value of the literary sources The resulting work attempts to discover and draw attention to some potentially valuable relationships--a first cut as opposed to a conclusive stuay of this complex subject area This research has been undertaken in a dialectical spirit as is appropriate when attempting to approach the subject matter from the Soviet Z I mt r I Perspective That is to say it is expected and in fact desired that the material presented and tentative connections drawn will serve to stimulate interest dialogue differences of opinion and even controversy thesis presented here it is hoped that antitheses will emerge From the According to the Laws of Dialectics an eventual synthesis will result from this conflict and interaction of viewpoints thereby causing an evolution however - slight on the dialectical spiral in our understanding of reflexive control Diane Chotikul Naval Postgraduate School June 1986 - i7 I S w 4'2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 5 I INTRODUCTION II A CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW 8 A The Present State of Soviet-American Relations 8 B Terms of Reference and Semantics 12 C The Impact of Propaganda 19 D Ethical Systems 23 E The Emphasis on Control 28 35 F III Summary THE SOVIET THEORY OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL 39 39 A Origins 1 Environmental and Historical Factors 39 2 The Importance of Cognition and Reflection 43 3 Cognitive Arenas Influenced by Reflexive Control 46 4 Psychocultural Theories and Their Relation to the Development of Reflexive Control Theory 51 a b c d p The Swaddling Theory and Polarized Opposites 51 The Role of Projection and Related Defense Mechanisms 53 The Psychological Importance of The Leader 60 Lozh and Vranyo--The Russian Heritage of Prevarication 64 5 Looking Outward--The Concepts of Maskirovka Finlandization and Risk-Aversion Redundancy 69 6 From Past to Present The Evolution of The Theory 76 B Definition 78 C Formalization and Development of the Theory 84 IV CONCLUSION 92 A Summary of Key Points 92 B Implications for the Future 95 V FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES 99 VI APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 112 3 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 HEGEL'S PARADIGM 14 FIGURE 2 THE DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY 17 FIGURE 3 COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS 24 TABLE 1 TABLE 2 1 FIGURE 4 Ethical Compromise Compromise in Human Relations THE GENERAL SCHEME OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN IDEOLOGY MORALITY AND BEHAVIOR FIGURE 5 SOVIET MODEL OF GRAND STRATEGY 32 FIGURE 6 EMPHASIS ON SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT NAUCHNOE PREDVIDENIE 34 FIGURE 7 SOVIET HIERARCHY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS 34 FIGURE 8 EFFECTS OF THE UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL POWE7 IN TERMS OF MOVING TOWARD MOVING AWAY FROM 0 and MOVING AGAINST - THE AGENT - 25 42 FIGURE 9 MARXIST-LENINIST GNOSEOLOGY THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 44 FIGURE 10 TARGETS OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL 48 FIGURE 11 FIGURE 12 REFLEXIVE STRUCTURE OF THE TARGET OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL 48 DESCRIPTIONS OF THE TYPES OF NORMATIVE INDIVIDUALS IN s BOTH ETHICAL SYSTEMS 55 59 FIGURE 13 MULTIPLE-TIER AWARENESS FIGURE 14 THE IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP PERMEATES ALL LEVELS OF SOVIET SOCIETY 63 FIGURE 15 CLOSED CYBERNETIC CONTROL LOOP 87 FIGURE 16 RELATIONSHIP OF CYBERNETICS TO REFLEXIVE CONTROL THEORY 88 FIGURE 17 THE CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORMALIZED REFLEXIVE CONTROL THEORY 91 '- ' '- -- ' ' ' - - - - - - '- - ' v- ' - ---- - - - - - - - -- - - - - I Introduction The most effective way to prevent deception is to be continually aware 2 of one's vulnerabilities as a target the strategies and tactics described especially those concerning reflexive control should be of interest to our side and it behooves our operators supervisors and decision makers to 3 be cognizant of the Soviet viewpoint In recent years a new topic in the ongoing information war between the United States and the Soviet Union has come to the attention of Western Sovietologists The term given to this theory in the field of influence and disinformation is reflexive control It is a topic as yet little publicized or understood in the West which appears to have gained importance in the Soviet Union especially in the realm of military and possibly diplomatic affairs Briefly stated reflexive control means conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make '4 the predetermined decision A preliminary attempt will be made here to examine the development present status and usage and implications for the future of the theory of reflexive control in the Soviet Union The present contextual setting--both actual and perceptual--will be explored as well as the highly significant historical ideological and psychosociological factors which have contributed to the emergence of this theory In the course of discussion four basic hypotheses will be set forth and examined h 1 that reflexive control--although just recently formalized into a scientifically based theory--appears to have existed and been utilized in practice throughout Soviet history 5 -I% rq d 2 that reflexive control seems to represent an integral aspect of the Soviet C 3 decision-making process and as such is a reflection of the Soviet emphasis on purposeful control of the environment in order to increase predictability and create right conditions 3 that the advent of cybernetics theory in the late 1950s played an important role in the formalization of the theory of reflexive control 4 that reflexive control is more highly and scientifically developed than is realized and therefore deserves more serious national security This hypothesis has been attention than it presently receives suggested by certain key developments--in particular the interest shown in the theory by Colonel-General V V Druzhinin of the Soviet General Staff and the top secret classification afforded to it within the past few years The United States has traditionally had great difficulty in developing a sophisticated and discriminating understanding of Soviet motivations and of the inner workings of the Soviet system and this difficulty is still being experienced today The government of the U S S R sets a high premium on understanding American words actions and cognitive processes In the United States on the other hand there is no equivalent to the Soviet Institute of the United States and Canada with thousands of specialists devoted to studying the contemporary North American scene Our foreign correspondents likewise are neither career internationalists who have mastered the Russian language nor expert Sovietologists The American academic community focuses primarily on historical issues while government analysts concentrate on current news developments In short there is nothing to compare with the great depth and extensiveness of Soviet analysis of the United States 5 I' As a result the Soviet system in large part remains an abstraction to us and our popular thinking does not generally reflect the realities of the present situation Moreover we do not adequately and accurately understand the panoply of factors governing our 6 As claimed y Dr V A Lefebvre a key figure in the development of reflexive control theory by the Soviet military now residing and working in the U S - -- - - - - relationship with the Soviet Union According to Taylor and Powell it is particularly important for the analyst who is studying Soviet command and control to understand the Soviet perspective i e Soviet world view 6 With this key point in mind and ever aware of the great emphasis placed by the Soviets on understanding one's adversary the present discussion of reflexive control will commence with an overview of the context--that is present Soviet-American relations and common existing perceptions and misperceptions--within which this theory has taken root and is presently developing 0 - I d 7 - II A Contextual Overview A The Present State of Soviet-American Relations Well-publicized events--such as the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles President Reagan's remark about outlawing the Soviet Union forever by use of the atomic bomb followed by the condemnation of American foreign policy by the Kremlin 7 the takeover of the reins of power by the youthful and seemingly more Westernized Mikhail Gorbachev the renewal of arms negotiations in Geneva and most recently the Chernobyl accident--have served to create increased interest in and concern about the state of American and Soviet relations However as has been characteristic of previous incidents occurring in recent years e g the invasion of Afghanistan the downing of Korean Airlines 'I Flight 007 the involuntary detention and exile to Gorky of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov such interest among the general public will most likely flare up quickly and die down just as suddenly For American public opinion at this point in time appears to gravitate toward the belief that the threat to world peace posed by the Soviet Union is no longer severe and that there is little or no indication of a pattern of hostility or misunderstanding between the two superpowers in spite of isolated incidents of this nature With the achievement of relative nuclear parity and the U S S R s professed concern about avoidance of atomic warfare many Americans assert that in spite of lingering problems which need to be optimistically addressed new hope now exists for a rational and cooperative era in AmericanSoviet relations In fact many intelligent and well-informed Americans even in prominent government positions sincerely believe that at this point in time the United States is more of a threat and has taken a more aggressive stance in regard to nuclear weaponry than the Soviets 8 See Appendix All Supplemenal Information The Peace Movement and the Nuclear Freeze drive both often unilateral in focus as well as the continual debate between the hawks and the doves even the widespread usage of the terminology itself in Congress and the media over the military budget are indications of this pervasive trend in American society Taksar highlights this tendency among academicians by stating there are professors in America who teach us about CIA intrigues and wrongdoings and who are at the same time happy to host any Soviet Communist Party Bureau member especially while bloodshed in Afghanistan or turmoil in Poland sic '8 In reviewing the course of world events there are those who have bought into the belief that the Soviet Union is no longer interested in fostering the propagation of worldwide communism and promoting socialist revolution and is now willing to collaborate with the Western countries in the establishment of a cooperative peaceful world order Some observers have asserted that the Soviets no longer seek their traditional goal of world conquest through revolution Since the early 1970s and the advent of detente such views have been expressed quite forcefully and hopefully in the West But world history since 1918 demonstrates that Soviet foreign policy cannot be accepted at face value 9 Observers continue not only to take Soviet foreign policy at face value but also and more importantly to measure yardstick Soviet actions with a Western Despite Penkovskiy's well-known anecdote in which the French British and American generals reach the same or similar conclusions while the Soviet general arrives at something totally different I0 Westerners persist in seeing the Soviets through a Western cultural prism S There is a widely held illusion that when the Soviet Union is not openly engaging in revolution it is doing nothing about it In fact it is always pursuing the central aim 9 See Appendix A Z 'J 44N N V with all the apparatus at its disposal of creating the eventual revolutionary situation in which the organized Communist Party loyal to Moscow can take over 1 1 The major reason that statements such as this one continue to be forcefully expressed and yet still for the most part disregarded lies in basic Western ignorance of Soviet history doctrine values and goals as well as a pervasive tendency to attribute to the Soviet Union the same terms of reference as as those used by the Western world It is essential to recognize that all data released to the West by the Soviets has an inherent propaganda value as well and it is this material in -large part which shapes our understanding and perceptions of the U S S R The Soviets therefore encourage and propagate misperceptions of symmetry knowing it is to their advantage to do so As Lefebvre has stated The main condition for success in this propagandistic influence is masking the very fact of influence For example this could be done by suggesting the symmetry of Soviet and American societies You have red tape and we have red tape Way down deep we are all alike You want peace and we want peace As a result according to propagandists' plans the Western audience would not doubt the sincerity of the Soviet representatives or other sources of information 12 In games theory when all nonformulated aspects of the opponent are assumed to be equal or symmetric this is known as the concept of external symmetry Martin Shubik has stated that assuming external symmetry as Americans tend to do in their dealings with the Soviets can result in a state of vulnerability Important factors such as culture national character personality traits and skill level are omitted from consideration which ultimately leaves the player ill-prepared for unexpected eventualities which may arise in the game '1 3 Thus the Soviets--being astute players--may outwardly affirm the existence of symmetry and coexistence as an ideal to strive toward and we 10 See Appendix A U for an historical example of the concept of external symmetry as used to induce a condition of vulnerability J 14 willingly accept this projected image and Americanize the Bolsheviks In his valuable article On Creating an Enemy Robert Bathurst discusses the shortcuts we take through the lack of information in order to create the rational actor model of our imaginations a model who inevitably becomes an American look-alike 1 5 In the Soviet leaders' own minds however it is crystal clear that coexistence involves only the exclusion of war as an instrument of policy a temporary condition until victory can be guaranteed and that the struggle between communism and democracy or imperialist capitalism will continue by all means short of war in the field of ideology there is not and cannot be peaceful coexistence between socialism and imperialism 16 An in-depth study the Soviet system its ideological base in Marxist-Leninist theory and the o of modus operandi which has characterized the Communist Party since its inception reveals that Westerners underestimate Soviet intentions and abilities tendency to ignore the cultural context and terms of reference involved in Soviet theory and practice as well as an optimistic belief that we can and are influencing the Soviet stance have been pervasive aspects of U S policy vis-a-vis the U S S R Tendencies such as these are not only naive but in the long run may pose a serious threat to free world security ana stability for as R Judson Mitchell has pointed out No level of external pressure can induce the Soviets to scrap their fundamental approach to the inevitable conflict of systems such doctrinal surgery would remove the ideological underpinning of the Soviet system We can assume as certain the indefinite continuation of Soviet perceptions of zero-sum conflict 1 7 ' 1 k A B Terms of Reference and Semantics It is clear to Western Sovietologists--although less so or not at all to statesmen diplomats and the average citizen who lack the same extensive knowledge of the Soviet system--that in fact the United States and the U S S R operate under very different perceptions and terms of reference As Taylor and Powell have pointed out the Soviets live according to a completely different set of premises and preconceived ideas than Americans including 1 Marxian concepts of the structure of society and the course of history 2 a logical process based on Marxist dialectics as opposed to Western deductive reasoning 3 a different set of moral laws and 4 different aims 18 There seems to be unanimity of agreement among experts that Soviets do think differently than Americans and that Americans in general appear to have a propensity for ignoring or minimizing ' this most important fact Not only are the goals beliefs and practices of the two countries often diametrically opposed but even the meaning assigned to words or concepts which we would assume to be cognates are more often than not very different 19 These differences permeate and affect every aspect of society--the meanings ascribed to science and research human rights and o welfare various aspects of military affairs and peace and coexistence to name just a few vital areas of concern The basis for these fundamental differences lies in the fact that every aspect of life in the U S S R is explained through the laws of dialectical and historical materialism and there is no such formalized underlying and unifying concept operating in the United States This philosophical under- pinning serves as the basis for the Soviet world view mirosozertsanie its 12 theory of cognition and all actions resulting therefrom For a concise yet- comprehensive source book regarding all facets of dialectical materialism please see The ABCs of Dialectical and Historical Materialism 2 0 Some basic precepts of Marxism-Leninism which are of particular interest for our purposes include the belief that everything in the real world is cognizable and 5 scientifically explainable that events are purposeful and governed by laws that as the laws governing the nature of the world are realized through the process of thesis antithesis and synthesis Hegel's Paradigm see Figure 1 human knowledge grows and evolves accordingly and that theory must be applied to and proved through practice the primacy of practice 2 1 whereas our own approach tends to be more eclectic S A few examples will suffice to point out the impact of these differences on Soviet and American world views American defintions of science jobs to do For instance compare the Soviet and In the U S view any science has two main discovery and explanation By the first we judge whether it is a science by the second how successful a science it is '2 2 The pragmatic Soviet assertion that scientific theory must assist men in their activities in society in their social problems 23 illustrates their different viewpoint on the purpose and place of science in society It must contribute to social progress and the success of social programs in order to be considered legitimate and verifiable Primacy of practice which to Soviet thinkers is equivalent to primacy of immediate practical need '2 4 also distinguishes the Soviet from the Western definition of research this kind of research is different from what historians and political scientists in Western universities mean by research--an all-around objective examination not necessarily limited 13 NOD p - V y eW K f w eZ ' ' -' ' - FIGURE 1 HEGLL'S PARADIGM Cognizable %- antithesis thesis - World Material ' 5 patterns low-governed thesis sis antithesis thesisantithesis Marxian dialectics the doctrine of the unity of opposites developed from this source evolution of human knowledge brought about through the reflection of lawgoverned patterns in human consciousness through the dialectical process of thesis antithesis synthesis 14 by or geared to any particular practical political purpose 2 5 These examples are merely intended to provide evidence that the Soviet view of the world is much more pragmatic goal-oriented and perhaps most important of all unified than that of most Western cultures E T Hall would describe the Soviet Union as an example of a high-context culture whereas our own society can be categorized as low-context that is lacking uniform concepts and goals For an extensive overview of this interesting topic please see 26 E T Hall's book Beyond Culture To return again to the area of semantics probably the greatest single cause of misunderstanding and complacency in the West can be attributed to the Soviet and Western American concepts of peace Sovietologists who have con- ducted extensive research into the Leninist theory of war 2 7 are well aware that the terms war and peace are interchangeable ones which the communists use to fit the mood and the propaganda line of the moment The millions of words which have been expended by Soviet writers and speakers against war the various peace congresses campaigns against the warmongering imperialists and praise for the blessings of peace appear at face value to illustrate the fact that pacifism is extolled as a virtue by the official Communist Party line A closer examination of the Soviet attitude however shows that all this discussion about peace and pacifism has often been verbiage without substance used to delude the non-Communist world as to the true intentions and beliefs of the Soviet Communist Party 28 The Cominform Journal states The communist agitation programme sic is to be carried out by means of the 'peace' campaign and peace is to be used as the principal to justifywhatever local communist interests demand theme In particular all attempts to build up any organization to resist the possible use of force by the Soviet Union must be prevented 9 15 ----- - -- - -- '---Tw - 4r - w Tr - w - - 7 - r W - P- - - 2 -J 2 -w Revolution is viewed as the necessary catalyst to progress--that is the inevitable evolution of society from capitalist to communist--within the laws of historical materialism see Figure 2 Thus it is clear that a Soviet peace can only be achieved through war--war to destroy non-Soviet states It is interesting to note here a most convenient ambiguity in the Russian language regarding the word for peace Mir When Soviet pacifists shout or carry slogans reading Trebuyem Mira it is commonly translated as We demand peace '30 An equally accurate translation however is We demand the world Through the use of Lenin's distinction between just i e pro-Soviet and unjust i e anti-Soviet wars the Soviet Union is capable not only of justifying a war against the capitalists and imperialists in the cause of 1 peace but even of adopting a hostile stance toward a communist country which happens to reject Soviet leadership and assume revisionist tendencies - This justification was used to support the suppression of Tito in Yugoslavia and the invasion of Czechoslovakia and presently dictates the Kremlin's attitude about the direction the government of the People's Republic of China is pursuing to cite several examples Peace to the Soviet government seems to imply aggressive acts by the U S S R and its satellites In spite of all the v lip-service paid to the concept of peace it can hardly escape the notice of even the most sympathetic observer that the Soviet Union is the most militarized and militant nation on earth J' W The fact that the Soviet Union is the most highly militarized state in the world not merely in its armament but even more so in its propaganda atmosphere and its educational system is not accidental Occasional Soviet statements that Soviet aims are peaceful and solely defensive are merely propagandistic tactics Of course Stalin several times pointed out that true peace can only exist under 16 V 72 FIGURE 2 THE DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY COMMUNISM FNEW SYNTHESIS i REVOLUTION E THESIS CONFLICTBOREIE ANTITHESIS CAPITALISM causes the Leap from Quantity to Quality First Law of Dialectics 17 ' the conditions of a world U S S R and therefore when Stalin said he wanted peace he in effect was saying he 31 wanted war--war to establish Soviet type peace A logical extension of the ambiguity inherent in the Soviet concept of peace carries over into the domain of detente or as the Soviets prefer to refer to it peaceful coexistence The policy of detente resulted from a growing awareness of the catastrophic dangers of the Atomic Age and the resulting necessity to reach some sort of ratifiable agreement to forestall the eventuality of nuclear war The underlying motives for establishing a climate of detente however were fundamentally different for the West and the U S S R o Where the West saw a promise of stability and of terminating the condition of neither peace nor war that has plagued the world since 1945 the Soviet leaders discerned new ways and opportunities of expanding their country's power and 32 influence The Soviet readiness to adopt a position of detente was misconstrued by many as indicating a basic and hopeful change in Soviet doctrine and policy vis-avis world domination In reality this situation was brought about by the Kremlins realization that conditions in the world were not right for an aggressive communist stance and represents an attempt to buy precious time in order to prepare for the task of furthering communism This reaction does not conflict with basic Leninist doctrine but rather is a reflection of the principle of the necessity of 'revolutionary retreat' to ensure ultimate 4 victory As Lenin stated The strictest loyalty to the ideas of communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary promises to 'tack ' to make agreements zigzags retreats and so on in order to accelerate the rise to power of the communists '33 The contrast between the Soviet and American perception of the value of retreat in conflict has been well i 18 expressed by John Collins in his strategic analysis of the two nations He states Unlike the Russians who know when and how to retreat if necessary Americans favor a heroic interpretation of history 34 To highlight the flexibility of a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history it is particularly revealing to note that the U S S R publicized the signing of the detente treaty as a major victory stating that it demonstrated realization by the West of the superior power of the Soviet Union and an acceptance of the inevitability of a communist world takeover--obviously a far cry from the actual U S perception of the event 3 5 Because we tend to see world events through Western eyes these subtleties in the Soviet perception of the nature of detente have not been generally acknowledged In their Soviet connotation the terms detente and peaceful coexistence signify both an absence of war because victory cannot yet be guaranteed and an intensification of the struggle between competing systems by means other than war As Leonid Brezhnev so aptly stated to his colleague Fidel Castro we realize that successes in this important matter peaceful coexistence 36 in no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle C The Impact of Propaganda Open free societies are natural targets for propaganda campaigns and are exceedingly susceptible to Soviet divide and conquer methods V Labin states totalitarians have understood that where democracy reigns it gives considerable weight to public opinion That is why they who trample it underfoot in their own domain have no greater concern than to win it over in the other camp while the democracies who respect it abandon it to enemy propaganda without reacting totalitarianism moves ahead less on the conviction of its members than on the confusion of its opponents Communist parties are merely firebrands and the main effort of the Kremlin is to pervert or weaken the fabric it sticks them into 3' d 19 I' Countless attempts by the Soviet Union to exacerbate friction among various Western factions to encourage dissent and divisions among Western powers and within U S society and to give clandestine encouragement and financial aid to every organization with which it has influence--especially in advocating hostility to the U S --could be cited here to support the fact that the ideological struggle is and has been of utmost importance to the Soviet goal of transforming the correlation of forces between East and West to the benefit of communism The Soviets are keenly aware that in the present antagonism between the Soviet and Western worlds the political front is as decisive as the military front if not more so The Soviets thus apply a systems approach believing that armed force cannot prevail unless complemented by calcula ' d political economic social and psychological campaigns '38 It is abundantly clear that most Americans have not realized the fine distinction between absence of war and the intensification of the ideological struggle--contradictory terms to our way of thinking but not to the Soviets The optimism and complacency which has resulted in some circles due to our misunderstanding and Americanization of the Soviets has Sovietologists particularly concerned They feel that the relaxation of tensions and pre- cautions during the period of detente and still in evidence today in spite of the more hard-line stance of the present administration will enable the I Soviet authorities to make major advances toward extend ing their influence over the western half of the European continent the U S and ultimately the world Their goal is to make use of the West's great resources in technology and skilled manpower as present conditions are unfavorable to both spontaneous revolution and military conquest 39 20 L2J - ' - The latter part of this statement receives considerable attention from Soviet emigres to the U S In an essay addressed to the Stanford University community Michael Taksar explains the Soviet method of screening and selecting Soviet scientists many of whom are in reality KGB agents to be sent to conferences and meetings in the United States He then goes on to illustrate and criticize American academicians and researchers who willingly and trustingly share sensitive technological and even military data with these so-called scientists--information which he feels is destined to be adapted to Soviet needs and subsequently used against the U S Taksar states with American carelessness stealing technology is a simple exercise for novices The real problem is to find out what deserves attention In this respect the American universities are a real bonanza for Soviet specialists in civillian sic Concentration of research combined with an open atmosphere and willingness of cooperation makes work of Soviet agents relatively simple 4 0 Taksar also makes the point that The amount of stolen Western technology in the U S S R is immense 41 a situation that portends serious risk to national security And yet in spite of efforts to educate the public regarding this danger by Taksar and others it appears that technological subversion is being allowed to continue unabated It is evident that in addition to technological usurpation many of the same tactics and appeals used in previous decades with such effectiveness are still being used today These propaganda techniques are being used with equal efficacy to influence to Soviet benefit the neo-Pacifist and Nuclear Freeze movements and public opinion in general in Western Europe and the U S If anything it can be said that the Soviets have learned and profited from their propaganda mistakes of the past three decades and that their approach now is more highly refined scientific and effective thai ever 21 'i --- - - ' ' See Appendix A 4 for an historical example of an effective propaganda method still utilized today -- - ' - - - - - --- v - - - - - _ --- V'- TMM before 4 2 W'-s wvi -9hV- The obvious corollary to this fact is that the Western world has not made any significant progress in either understanding or counteracting Soviet propaganda A question which must be asked at this stage is what has prompted the evolution of this state of affairs 1been Why has the Soviet Union so successful in the perpetration of effective propaganda campaigns and why has the United States been so lax in counteracting harmful disinformation carrying with it the potential for destroying everything we stand for Extensive research has been conducted and much has been learned about the Communist propaganda network and the techniques it employs in creating the ideal conditions for the evolution of communist i e Soviet society The basic techniques and concepts of disinformation and deception are well documented and the Communist Front organizations have been analyzed at length Yet communist propaganda is still a powerful force in international affairs and in spite of the dangers inherent in ignoring such a potent weapon the West remains slow and inept in the field of propaganda measures and countermeasures John Clews an expert in the field of Soviet propaganda explains that among Western cultures there is a general distaste for the very concept of propaganda which is constantly working to our disadvantage when dealing with the Soviets He states In the more sophisticated societies we have become accustomed to dismiss communist propaganda--or what we conceive to be communist propaganda--with a shrug and forget all about it We prefer to ignore the lessons of history which have shown repeatedly the vital strategic and tactical function of propaganda at decisive periods in the progress of civilization This was realized by the Communist movement from 43 Lenin's earliest days To reiterate why does this fundamental difference exist between Soviet and Western in particular American societies 22 d In addition to the cultural and cognitive dissimilarities already mentioned it appears that the answer to this question can be found in two areas 1 the ethical systems which govern the value structure of the two societies and 2 the different emphasis placed on long-range planning strategy and maintenance of control by the two societies - D Ethical Systems It has been pointed out that there are many significant differences between the two societies in terms of semantics priorities and goals but some would argue that the difference is even more profound than this Communist society does not have a common ethos with the West It cannot be evaluated by the 44 cultural standards common to the West Vladimir Lefebvre in his seminal work The Algebra of Conscience takes this point even one step further stating the difference between Western and Soviet society is much deeper than usually assumed this difference touches upon the fundamental structure connecting the categories of good and evil 45 In other words his thesis is that the basic ethical and moral systems of the two societies are different He describes the first system as exemplified by the U S as one in which the compromise between good and evil is viewed as evil where ethical compromise is discouraged but c6mpromise in human relationships is encouraged In the second ethical system as represented by the U S S R just the opposite holds true There the compromise between good and evil is viewed as good ethical compromise is encouraged but compromise in human relations discouraged see Figure 3 Lefebvre states that the Soviet Soviet Union is the most developed society in the world whose culture is '4 6 based on this second ethical system Perhaps most importantly Lefebvre's book explains an apparent contradiction 23 %Olu FIGURE 3 COMPARISION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS TABLE 1 # Ethical Compromise _ ___AMERICANS SOVIETS Z-talled agreement confident interval 2-tailed in agreement confident interval in STATEMENTS for p 9 5%I for p 95% 11T T A criminal can be punished more severely than the law requires if this may serve as a deterrent to others I 4 A doctor should conceal from a patient that he has cancer in order to diminish the patient's suffering 6 65 4 1 - 78 3 6 8 - No Yes SOVIETS TABLE 2 Compromise in Human Relations __ _ No Ethical Compromise AMERICANS Ethical Compromise Results _ 80 6 No Yes SOVIETS _AMERICANS STATEMENT5 # 6 5 T A good person in a situation Z-taie % in agreement confident interval for 95 24 1 in 2-tailed agreement confident interval for p 95 % 7 48 70 0 of conflict with an insolent person would not seek compromise ___would seek compromise Two terrorists are hijacking a small plane There is a possibility of killing them without injury to the passengers Another possibility is to negotiate for surrender The head of the rescue group decides not to negotiate Did he act correctly SOVIETS 8 95 58 5 8 06 No Yes Results 24 No compromise in human relations AMERICANS Compromise in human relations Derived from Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conscience p 7 and class handout 24 pc 7' - cv% in terms which has helped to perpetuate belief in the external symmetry That is the fact that in Soviet ideology of the West and the Soviet Union there is no advocacy of evil On the contrary official Soviet documents are How does this lead to the establishment of imbued with declarations of good As Lefebvre explains it the second ethical system Christian ideology is based on prohibition of evil Soviet ideology is based on declaration of good The Moral Code contains a declaration of good a person is called to be 'honest truthful morally pure simple and modest ' Such formulations lead to ethical compromise since evil is not prohibited and may be used if it is necessary for the triumph of good the end justifies the means In the other part of the Moral Code there is a requirement to be ruthless toward an enemy We can see that the ethical demands of communism are also logically constructed but in the framework of the second ethical system Therefore prohibition of evil leads to the orality of the first ethical system and declarat on of good leads to the morality of the second ethical system 4 7 see Figure 4 FIGURE 4 THE GENERAL SCHEME OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN IDEOLOGY MORALITY AtJD BEHAV IOR prohibition of evil 4 ideology ideology _declaration of good morality confrontation of good and evil is good conf romise of good and evil is evil compromise of good and evil is good a person ready psychology to compromise and with a partner confrontation of good and evil is evil a person willing to conflict with behavior a partner From Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conscience p 86 Ii i ' ' '' _'- ' _'d W '- '''j' 4 25 w ' ' - o o - ' - This explains why an American studying the Constitution of the U S S R or other public pronouncements may be easily swayed to believe that the Soviets are highly moral and ethical people--we are interpreting their statements according to our own ethical system rather than theirs and thus are misled into feeling that they do not differ significantly from us nor is their system a threat to us To understand how dire a misinterpretation of reality this really is however it is necessary only to heed the following statement by Stalin--a classic example of the second ethical system in action A diplomat's words must have no relation to actions-otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it Words are one thing actions another Good words are a concealment is no more possible of bad deeds Sincere diplomacy 48 than dry water or iron wood Once again no group of people is more aware of this reality and concerned about he American tendency toward complacency with regard to the present world situation than the Soviet emigres including Dr Lefebvre himself and Dr Vladimir Ozernoy who spoke at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1984 on the topic of Soviet Operations Research 4 9 During his presentation Dr Ozernoy described his awe at American naivete regarding Soviet intentions and goals and at the vast number of people who truly feel that even a takeover by the Soviet Union would not adversely affect the American lifestyle and might in fact serve to bring about some welcome changes In his words and through the use of slides depicting the grimness and despair of everyday Soviet life Ozernoy emphatically discounted these thoughts and feelings as ridiculous based merely on ignorance and wishful thinking He recalled that prior to his emigration to the U S many of his Soviet colleagues tried to dissuade him with the argument What is the use eventually be communist It is inevitable that America too will At that time he vigorously rejected this line of 26 Ir- reasoning Now however five years after arrival he is beginning to fear that his friends may have been right after all--not as a result of the inherent inevitability of communism a belief he continues to reject but rather due to American ignorance and unfounded optimism He sees this tendency as resulting from the same sources which Bouscaren delineated thirty years ago The responsibility for the ignorance and prejudice about the nature and purposes of Soviet foreign policy is twofold First the Soviet Government maintains throughout the world an elaborate organization designed to present a plausible but distorted picture of Soviet policy as one designed to serve the interests of the working classes all over the world Secondly there continues to exist in some of the circles at which Soviet propaganda is chiefly directed a tendency based on wishful thinking or histbrical or theoretical5 0 preconceptions to accept the Soviet policy as credible Solzhenitsyn has expressed the problem in even blunter terms it is not any difficulties of perception that the West is suffering but a desire not to know an emotional preference for the pleasant over the unpleasant Such an attitude is governed by the spirit of Munich the spirit of complaisance and concession and by the cowardly self-deception of comfortable societies Although this approach has never helped preserve peace and justice and those who have followed it have always been crushed and abused human emotions have proved stronger than the most obvious lessons again and again an enfeebled world draws sentimental pictures of how violence will deign to assume a gentler nature and will readily abandon its superior strength so that meanwhile everyone can continue to live a carefree existence 5 1 - and This powerful and thought-provoking statement from one of the world's most eloquent authorities and spokesmen on the dangers of complacency and an underestimation of the enemy leads us directly into the second area of consideration explaining the vast superiority of Soviet propaganda and con t sequently its dangers for us 27 Vj _ ' - - - - - ' - ' ' E The Emphasis on Control The difference between the Soviet and American emphasis on control longrange planning and strategy is becoming a subject of increasing interest and importance in the eyes of Western Sovietologists This subject is crucial to our understanding of the theory of reflexive control and will thus be explored in greater depth in the next section of this paper Here it will suffice to highlight some of the major dissimilarities in the philosophies of the two nations regarding control 4S The Soviet Union is a society based on the principles of science and the belief that all phenomena are governed by unified dialectical laws Discovery of these laws i e truth and adherence to them are central aims of the state Marxist-Leninist philosophy is epitomized as the key to discovery of these law-governed patterns it is considered the only reliable basis for all scientific knowledge ' 5 2 Marxism-Leninism both fosters an emphasis on control and has an inherent and basic need for it Amvrosov et al have stated Socialism is characterized by the control of all spheres of the life of society which is carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party on the basis of science Scientific control of economic sociopolitical and spiritual life is an objective regularity of the building of communism Developed socialism creates new possibilities 53 for the expansion of the limits of scientific control In the Soviet view the development of communism is dependent on the directed scientific control of society and a great deal of the work and effort of societal leaders is devoted to this goal In addition there is a conscious effort to combine science with ideology in order to insure that science is 4 directed towards Communist Party goals '5 4 In the United States aside from the practical need for control to maintain law and order and ensure a viable economy and social structure such 28 considerations as individual freedom human rights and pursuit of happiness take precedence over control issues In a sense this country was founded by people in search of freedom from control and constraints--of a religious social or political nature--and hence the very concept of control often has a negative connotation Freedom of thought and expression supersedes adherence to a particular mindset and tolerance of diversity overshadows social conformity Control--especially when expressed in political or scientific terms--conjures up visions of Big Brother to the average American and outside of limited military applications is not a widely accepted value This very real and fundamental philosophical difference has far-reaching repercussions By definition an emphasis on control necessarily requires an emphasis on planning to assure that desired outcomes are achieved Well-focused goals such as establishing the ideal communist society lend themselves readily to--or more accurately demand--long-range planning and forecasting In Soviet economics we therefore see Five-Year and Ten-Year Plans in the Soviet military a trend toward a cybernetically based theory of troop control upravlenie voyskami silami and projections for the eventual total automation ASUV of the Command Control and Communications C3 System These subjects will be expanded upon in Section 1I1l Another important component of the Soviet emphasis on control and planning is the emphasis placed on a holistic systems approach to the subjects Just as all phenomena are believed to be governed by the same dialectic laws so all cognizable material phenomena are seen to impinge upon one another and interact to form the real world which is then reflected in human consciousness Because of the Soviet recognition of this interconnectedness they are advocates of a systems approach to planning and control While Americans tend to 42 29 4 - - - - - fragment a problem into smaller components and view each section in isolatio n the Soviet method is to examine the big picture and to take into account all components which have a direct or indirect bearing on the particular component being studied While rather a nebulous concept to the Western way of thinking to the Soviets the systems approach means perception and investigation of objects i e processes and phenomena as the totality of interconnected and interdependent elements parts of a definite integral formation--a system The systems approach is a concrete manifestation of dialecticalmaterialist teaching about the universal interconnection and processes of reality and is one facet of Marx's dialectics 5 5 For more detailed overviews of Soviet Systems Theory please see the works of N P Buslenko 5 6 and W S Powell and J G Taylor 5 7 This approach has proved to be of particular significance in the field of military affairs Collins has pointed out an important distinction between tactics strategy and what he terms grand strategy in military planning and execution He and others have pointed out that the Soviets concentrate on a consideration of both military and social factors in developing a master plan of combat in accordance with the objective laws of war and armed combat as defined dialectically In the U S on the other hand we exclude non- combatant factors and emphasize procedural considerations and the performance of hardware In other words the Soviets have a systems strategic orientation to military affairs in comparison to the technical tactical orientation of the U S Western belief dictates that warfare is stochastic in nature and cannot be scientifically quantified whereas the Soviets believe it is both deterministic and quantifiable Collins states that in American military affairs there has been a traditional discrepancy between the development of strategic thought and the development of technology In his words 30 l 17 This nation is unsurpassed at devising tactics It excels at military technology it adapted mass-production techniques to the needs of war But the allegation persists that over the years U S military professionals and their civilian colleagues have failed to do their homework in the field of grand strategy They are charged with winning battles but losing wars and with winning wars but failing to attain national security objectives by disregarding the lessons of history and thus duplicating past mistakes 5 8 The Soviets on the contrary due to their scientific systems orientation are experts in correlating political objectives with military aims in a manner which best serves their national interests--the approach known as Grand Strategy see Figure 5 As Collins describes it Grand strategy the art and science of employing national power and influence to attain national security objectives is the most important and least understood aspect of national defense If grand strategy is poorly conceived the life-blood of a nation's youth and billions in national treasure can be wasted on worthless causes 5 9 Numerous examples from the World Wars Korea and Vietnam are used consistently to illustrate situations in which America's strategic shortcomings have overshadowed her technological strengths in warfare and where omission of the influence of non-combatant factors has changed immediate successes into longterm failures The most glaring and probably most widely cited example to support this point is that if America had taken a more careful long-range and analytical approach to the treaty negotiations at Yalta after World War II the Soviets would never have been able to gain the concessions and brought about the right conditions necessary to catapult them to superpower status In other words our own intelligence weaknesses and lack of rigorous scrutiny of a critical situation actually played right into Soviet hands and aided them greatly in attaining their present status as our most powerful adversaries It appears that U S strategists suffer from a syndrome identified two hundred years ago by Marshal de Saxe who described the symptoms as -follows 31 4 GBP t e ' ' '' _ -' r ' ' FIGURE 5 SOVIET MODEL OF GRAND STRATEGY 'A GRAND STRATEGY 4 Military StrategyWarfare Economics Diplomacy Psychological 4I ' ' A2 TIME VALUE SCOPE short small small long large large GRAND STRATEGY longer larger larger GRAND TACTICS short largest largest TACTICS STRATEGY I -el roduct p' of then Snuclear era derived from Collins John M Grand Strategy 32 Principles and Practices in default of knowing what should be done they do what they know 6 0 For much of our history lack of concern for strategy has been interpreted as a virtue an essential element of the religious version of national destiny This belief persisted through World War II and failed to discern the deep ideological content of Soviet foreign policy and also deliberately divorced U S political and military objectives 6 1 This same criticism has been made of our shortsighted policies in the Korean and Vietnamese Wars in contrast see war as an extension of politics The Soviets Decision making and scienti- fic forecasting nauchnoe predvidenie are key elements in military planning see Figure 6 and military doctrine military science and military art are considered to form a hierarchy of integral complementary aspects under the umbrella of military affairs see Figure 7 The Soviets deride American and British reliance on native wit and intuition on the battlefield feeling that 62 these qualities are not substitutes for a scientifically formulated plan American strategic deficits can be summarized as follows 1 a lack of emphasis on the need for a master plan no Grand Strategy approach 2 a lack of understanding or misunderstanding of the opponent's cultural heritage perception of the situation motivation and goals his terms of reference 3 failure to learn and profit from the lessons of history no unified systematic philosophy of warfare 4 a tendency to concentrate on tactics and technology to the exclusion of related factors tactics versus strategy and 5 a reliance on the superiority of American technology and troops without basis in rigorous objective analysis an ethnocentric attitude Conversely the Soviets have a much greater appreciation of the import-ince of the above five points and have turned them into assets a fact which is enhanced by American deficiencies in these areas 33 FIGURE 6 EMPHASIS ON SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT NAUCHNOE PREDVIDENIE FORESIGHT - --NO FORECASTING --- EX PER IMENTATION-1 0DECISIONI Simultion MAKING Modeling Gain fuses theory and practice with an emphasis on theory FIGURE 7 SOVIET HIERARCHY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS MARXISM - LENINISM4 MILITARY SCIENCE 34 One final point must be addressed The Soviets are aware that surprise and deception compound and strengthen the effectiveness of control and have thus incorporated the concept of surprise maskirovka into their strategic planning both military and diplomatic Ulam has made the observation that secrecy and skill in timing its moves have often been the main ingredients of the Kremlin's diplomatic successes 63 Maskirovka has proved to be a great asset for the Soviets when dealing with Americans because Soviet strategy 64 like Soviet thinking has always been devious where American has been direct In other words it is much easier for the Soviets to read America's up-front policies analyze and model them for countermeasure development than it is for us to understand their more clandestine secretive approach and methodology As Sarbin has observed One's chances of gai ing or holding an advantage are proportional to one's ability to predict the conduct of the adversary To the extent that predictions are valid to that extent does the actor have the edge in any competitive situation His own strategic plans will6 5 take into account the predicted actions of the adversary F Summary At this point considering the myriad of factors discussed thus far which have an impact on the issue it appears that the Soviets have a distinct advantage over the West in terms of conducting well organized effective military and diplomatic campaigns We can learn and profit immensely from certain aspects of the Soviet orientation--in particular 1 their strong eemphasis on the importance of context and cognition in decision making 2 their adherence to the systems approach which affects and impinges upon every aspect of Soviet life from economic planning to their comprehensive theory of troop control and 3 their strategic orientation as opposed to our emphasis on technological and tactical considerations The better our understanding 35 Maskirovka and related subjects will be discussed in greater detail in mrtionITT A 5of thiS oaoer of the Soviet approach becomes the more we will be able to distill and utilize those aspects which will aid us in becoming more adept and effective in our own handling of military and foreign affairs In addition there is the more obvious and even more crucial goal of gaining knowledge in order to develop more effective countermeasures Being well informed is a prerequisite to any type of planning and particularly to military planning However due to our dissimilar ethical and philosophical approaches to life in general and to combat in particular it is important to use discrimi nation in determining which aspects of the Soviet approach we adopt for our %v own use There is evidence that there have been times when the U S government the CIA in particular has utilized some of the self-same devious tactics and subversive methodologies we prefer to attribute to the Soviet government These include the us of implicit terror creation of front organizations and cells of agitators inducement of food shortages and even neutralization of key persons we consider unfriendly to our cause 6 6 Actions such as these carry with them the danger of discrediting America's image as a bastion of freedom and justice in the eyes of the world and may serve to justify and reinforce criticisms expressed by our Soviet counterparts for the purpose of fostering anti-American perceptions and emotions There is no denying that the U S is not perfect in this regard and is capable of making errors and even occasional immoral decisions However these shortcomings in no way detract from the fact that when conducted by the Soviet Union these types of actions do not represent mere lapses in morality but are rather policy decisions in strict accordance with the Soviet moral code see Section 11 D Ethical Systems pages 23-27 As important as it is for America as a free just society to remain vigilant against infringements of 36 our deeply felt principles regarding human rights and the sovereignty of nations it is imperative that we maintain our perspective on the situation and not become overly self-critical Revel points out the danger inherent in this outlook by saying in non-Communist nations the faults of free societies are so magnified that freedom appears to mask an essentially totalitarian reality while the faults of totalitarian soccieties are so minimized that those societies appear to be free in essence if not in appearance Such societies are pictured as being fundamentally good though for the time being they do not honor the rights of man whereas free societies are evil in nature even though6 7 their subjects live in greater freedom and less misery Soviet propaganda experts are well aware of this tendency toward self-criticism and guilt in the democratic societies and take full advantage of it in their literature aimed at the Western audience For revealing illustrations of this often overlooked point please see the recent Soviet propaganda publications Whence the Threat to Peace 6 8 Grenada U S Terrorism in Action 6 9 Inter- 71 national Terrorism and the CIA 7 0 and Information Imperialism Most Sovietologists agree that the present world situation with the pervasive belief that the Soviets are just like us with similar standards and goals or in fact fundamentally better than us as Revel's statement implies has enabled them to lay the groundwork for a powerful well organized subversive network of Communist fronts peace movements and other deceptive elements Within this mighty arsenal a recently formalized and potentially powerful technique has caught the attention of those most concerned with the Soviet threat This is the theory of reflexive control The remainder of this paper will be devoted to an attempt to 1 trace the origin of reflexive control in the psychocultural and historical context of Soviet society 2 defline it as a formal concept 37 3 explain why it is V ' important and 4 discuss the implications of this formalized concept and its potential impact on American military and diplomatic policy Reflexive control appears to be a theory from which the United States could most assuredly derive a dual advantage - It is of utmost importance that we understand this powerful technique in order to focus on developing effective countermeasures At the same time it is a technique which may prove invaluable to our cause if we devote sufficient study and attention to it thereby enabling us to learn how to effectively adapt and utilize it for our own purposes and to our own advantage Roger Beaumont clearly defined the basic problem facing American military and intelligence specialists when he stated 2 What is needed is an extension of the view of Soviet C and C3 from the military realm to the broader context of the intellectual and cultural system from which it 72 derives -3 ' 38 o The theory of reflexive control can be classified under the general ofC rubrc III The Soviet Theory of Reflexive Control A Origins 1 Environmental and Historical Factors There is no conception more fundamental to Soviet Communism than that of man's perpetual struggle toward a greater command of 73 the universe in which he finds himself b Throughout Soviet history and even prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 control has been a key preoccupation of the people of Russia A major factor necessitating this mindset has to do with the harshness of the climate and environment which have constantly pitted the peasant man of traditional Russia against the relentless forces of nature on the desolate Russian steppes It appears that nature and history have combined to implant and develop in the Russian character certain traits that have helped their rulers establish and maintain a dictatorship over the people Vakar has pointed out that in discussing the development of Soviet communism we must not overlook the inescapable circumstance that the Soviet Union is a nation populated by Russians that most of these Russians were or still are peasant Russians that regardless of anything which Marx Engels Lenin Stalin Krushchev Suslov or anyone else has written or said they continue to be affected or even dominated by the indisputable facts of their peasant heritage their peasant environment their peasant tradition 7 4 Some of these traditional peasant traits include a capacity to endure hardship a readiness to bow to the inevitable and a willingness to submit to authority Vakar states that the most striking fact of Russian peasant life was its primary communism The basic social unit being not the person but the household the basic political unit the village To each of these an individual inextricably belonged and could not act or be thought of in his daily existence apart from them The peasant village was thus a totalitarian 39 society in miniature--legislative judicial executive and moral authority all merged in the head of the household and it was the duty of all members to obey Klaus Mehnert has succinctly described the underlying psychological factors which bolster and protect communist ideology the authority of the state in Russia is nourished by roots that go far deeper than police tyranny externally conditioned habit patterns and the influence of education and propaganda -' - The Byzantine theocratic tradition has helped to create the psychological climate for the present leaders' claim to be the embodiment of truth Both priest and Party functionary have in turn been credited with possession of the sole absolute indivisible truth--the former through the revelations of God the latter through the no less infallible medium of scientific knowledge this attitude is fostered by the Communists for when only one truth exists all that the leaders in the Kremlin need tao--o is convince their people that they alone hold the key to it thuscreating for themselves a sacrosanct position of authority 7 5 These tendencies have also been reinforced by what Berdiaev described as the characteristically Russian search for an integral outlook which would give an answer to all questions of life unite theoretical and practical reason and give a philosophical basis to the social idea 76 This search appears to be at the root of Soviet systems theory and cybernetics development as well as of their quest for unified totalitarian leadership A 'sacrosanct position of authority' naturally contributes greatly to the maintenance of the control required to allow the Communist Party to remain at the helm of the great scientific socialist experiment - However this position in itself is not enough to ensure that contamination of the populace's beliefs will not occur and means must also be developed and made available to prevent the possibility of such contamination There is no denying the fact that the use of forceful means to perpetuate control is prevalent in the U S S R Not only is the population subjected to constant surveillance but there are also severe penalties--imprisonment commitment to insane asylums 40 -V slander and loss of status and employment even death--for deviations from social regulations and norms From the purges of Stalin's regime to the Gulag Archipelago to the exile of Sakharov the injustices and human rights infringements of the Soviet regime have been well documented However there is also no escaping the fact that the percentage of active Jor - passive dissidents is counterbalancd by a much larger majority of the population who believe in and heartily endorse the Soviet system as embodied in the Communist Party The Soviet government has thus far been skillful in the way it has tied the fate of many individuals in the country to the fate of the regime This in spite of the fact that by and large it was not the down- trodden who were drawn to the Party by its ideals or its dialectics of class struggle it was the opportunistic who caught the promise of personal power and success 7 7 As H igh explains the situation The fact that the instruments of control in the Soviet Union have functioned so much more effectively over the years indicates that at some level the P ty has maintained 7the support of large segments of the population How has this been accomplished so thoroughly and effectively Obviously the threat of forceful retaliation for disobedience or dissent is effective but generally has the negative effect of lowering a person's respect for and loyalty toward the control agent Although the interrelationship between social power and reactions to the influencing agent is not yet entirely clear it has been suggested through numerous studies that coercion by a supervisor will lead to movement toward in public behavior change in overt behavior but movement against in private opinion and in identification personal rejection of the supervisor Legitimate power on the other hand will lead to movement toward in behavior private belief and most importantly in 41 r' - - - - ' - -'- - i i i ' i i - evaluation of the supervisor 7 9 In terms of effectiveness therefore it is evident that legitimate power would be the more desirable type to exercise and would be the form of power a well-informed knowledgeable control agent would choose to possess See Figure 8 below FIGURE 8 EFFECTS OF THE UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL POWER IN TERMS OF MOVING TOWARD MOVING AWAY FROM 0 AND MOVING AGAINST - THE AGENT Eftects on B's Source of A's power Overt behjviof Private beliefs Interaction with agent Identification with agent 0 0 - Expert Information Referent 0 0 0 0' Illegitimate 4 - ' Reward Coercion Lelitimacy 0 reward Information coupled with need for independence Unsuccessful 0 attempt to u e reward V From Raven B H and Kruglanski A W Conflict and Power in Swingle J The Structure of Conflict Academic Press Inc New York 1970 p 79 In the Soviet Union in spite of a less than desirable standard of living and a less than enviable record in terms of human rights somehow the regime has managed to capture the loyalty and fervor of the masses In a recent Newsweek article describing a Westerner's journey through the U S S R the writer observes In common with most foreigners who do manage to meet ordi- 4 nary Russians I had found everyone I met to be loyal communists who believe 'In our country all roads are open to the young ' 8 0 This attitude can be explained in part as due to ignorance of alternatives some to coercion and threat as previously mentioned and there is no doubt that there are many who have N 00 p ' ' 42 - 4 V o - ' - ' - ' - privately moved against the control agent or at least covertly disagree with certain aspects of the regime Yet the regime's remarkable success in instilling desired attitudes still cannot be denied and an attempt must be made by the West to understand how such powerful control has been established among and internalized by the Soviet people 2 The Importance of Cognition and Reflection It is the hypothesis presented here that much of the success of Soviet control can be explained in terms of the concepts underlying the theory of reflexive control Part of the reason that reflexive control and even the Soviet emphasis on control in general has been underemphasized by Western - observers for so long stems from our lack of familiarity with the importance given by Marxists to the concepts of consciousness cognition and reflection Kubalkova and Cruickshank have noted that although the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on consciousness social existence among other concepts brings with it its own uncertainties it has not gained the attention in the West that it deserves 81 Figure 9 shows in detail how consciousness is derived from social existence equivalent to objective reality through the process of reflection There is no comparable concept in Western philosophy and a little description here will serve to underscore this point Without a greater under- standing of the importance of reflection to Soviet thought the Western observer cannot hope to grasp the theory of reflexive control In the Soviet view as best expressed in the Marxist-Leninist paradigm cognition results from the reflection of the material world in the human mind which determines social consciousness Man's intelligence and cognitive processes are dependent on his sensory awareness of the outside world which in turn determines the content and the dimensions of his consciousness--in Lenin's 43 - - - - ' ' - EUR - - - FIGURE 9 MARXIST-LENINIST GNOSEOLOGY I THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Social reality in its totality marxist monism 0 SOCIAL SUPERSTRUCTURE 4rt Sc e SO 2an legal ide CONSCIOUNS REFLECTION SOCIAL EXISTENCE 1 cMTRA mcn Natural and environment re Biological pro4 M T A SUBSTRUCTURE Kubalkova V and Cruickshank A A Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations page 67 From 44 l - words Sensation is actually a direct link between consciousness and the out-Ode world the conversion of the energy of an external stimulus to a fact - of consciousness 8 2 As shown in Figure 9 this is a monistic construct in which influence flows in both directions from the substructure to the superstructure and vice versa Hence it is clear that in the Soviet view control over a human being would best be exercised by purposefully influencing - the inputs he receives from his environment i e through purposeful manipulation and management of perceptions 9- As E T Hall has stated deep cultural undercurrents structure life in subtle but highly consistent ways that are not consciously formulated Like the invisible jet streams in the skies that determine the course of a storm these hidden currents shape our lives yet their influence is only 83 beginning to be identified It stands to reason therefore that whoever has greater awareness of these jet streams and is able to influence the form that they take will have a very powerful tool in his hands indeed Soviet leaders believe that the - dialectical process of development can be accelerated scientifically by guiding man's sense perceptions to reflect objective reality as perceived and defined by the Communist Party the concept of Partiinost not corresponding to this image of reality are consequently denounced as Perceptions idealist subjectivist relativist or any of a number of other terms identified as regressive The more firmly beliefs such as these can be embedded in the cultural context within which decision making occurs the jgreater societal control becomes Herein lies the essence of reflexive control when it is directed at allies as opposed to at adversaries As a result of the great Marxist-Leninist emphasis on reflection it can almost be said that reflexive control represents a natural extension and refinement of the concept of reflection 45 zw vjr Rather than merely acknowledging ind accepting the basic influence of the environment on human thought processes the Marxist approach would be to take the process one step further and actively attempt to influence and control the arena of cognition or the cognitive map of one's ally or adversary in order to more predictably reach one's desired ends Generals Druzhinin and Kontorov appear to have hit upon a key principle behind the development of reflexive control when they state A leader should control not only the actions but the thinking of his subordinates directing it so that the collective participates in the formation and elaboration of ideas This is 84 one of the main functions of a leader 3 Cognitive Arenas Influenced by Reflexive Control There appear to be certain areas of belief in particular in which this method of conveying specially prepared information to influence the decisionmaking process toward predetermined desired ends has been of exceptional utility to the regime The first has been in reinforcing the feeling of need for authority and a craving for command by a father or father figure--what has been referred to as the Little Father System of government It is said that the Soviet Union represents the only developed country in the world today in which this form of government predominates - As Erich Fromm suggests in his book Escape from Freedom once the habit of subservience has been firmly established in the psyche responsibility for the self and individual choice can become almost unbearable burdens for a person who truly believes he is dependent on a control agent for his very survival 8 5 It has even been speculated that the return of Svetlana Stalin to her homeland after a seventeen year exile in the West contained elements of this desire to escape from freedom 86 46 The second area of belief which seems to carry the mark of reflexive control has to do with the inevitability of Communism Mehnert has made the following observation in this regard There are of course millions of people in Russia sic who are unhappy under the present system and there are some who hate it But since they have accepted that mankind must inevitably pass through a period of socialism they tend also to accept the inevitability of the conditions under which they live This attitude is invaluable to the Soviet authorities for who can fight with any prospect of success against the absolutely inevitable And who indeed would waste time complaining about it Man finds it easiest to 87 accept the things that seem immutable Those citizens who are not won over through the influence of sacrosanct authority and dependency on a Little Father are therefore captured on a slightly different more intellectual level by this dialectical argument in support of the inevitability of Communism This ideological precept appears also to have fulfilled the people's traditionally Russian desire and quest for simple explanations What could be more straightforward than the thesis that the evolution of society is governed by specific laws exactly as is the development of all forms of natural growth According to this Marxist theory has progressed and is progressing from its primitive origins to slave-owning society to feudalism to capitalism to socialism and ultimately to communism This belief has been widely accepted by the Soviets with the result that in the eyes of many even a poorly functioning socialism with all its subsidiary irritations appears higher than the smoothest running capitalist system Here is a practical example of reflexive control in action--it has influenced the cultural complex within which decisions are embedded hence setting up the arena of cognition or cognitive map in such a way that the decision the leaders want the people to reach is the decision which is reached in the vast majority of cases see Figure 10 and Figure 11 47 FIGURE 10 TARGETS OF REFLEXIVE FTargets 11 of Reflexive Control individuals Responsible 2 2 for Decision Making Decision Process or 1 System Of Decision Making FIGURE CONTROL 3 Cultural Complex Within Which Decision 'is Embedded REFLEXIVE STRUCTURE OF THE TARGET OF REFLEXIVE CONTROL DOCTRINE GOAL MAKERPERCEPTUAL agent of reflexive ________ 48 ARENA OF TARGET ' The third major area in which it appears that reflexive control has a- played a pa- in setting up the cognitive arena of the Soviet people has to do with the concept of threat Since its earliest days The Soviet regime has developed the exploitation of external danger to the level of an art capitalist encirclement has been much more than an occasional propaganda weapon in the armory of Soviet communism It has been a continuous theme in Soviet internal and external politics an invaluable means for whoever holds power in the U S S R to suppress opposition and dissent 88 Again pre-Bolshevik historical experience has been conducive to the development of a siege mentality --the flatr esq and openness of the Russsian landscape has since the beginning of history invited invasion and necessitated a state of hypervigilance and suspiciousness of outsiders among the inhabitants These predispositions have been exploited fully by the Soviet leaders who have always described the world as made up of two hostile camps the socialist camp holding the answers to humanity's problems and its irreconcilable enemy the capitalist system intent on the oppression and hope for the world destruction of the socialist From Stalin's vision of capitalist encirclement to the present regime's emphasis on Reagan the warmonger the Soviet people have - ' been inundated with the belief that the true threat to peace and to their very existence lies in the capitalist governments in the world with the United States maintaining the position as prime enemy of the Soviet people In this way every denial of internal freedom and each restriction of the citizens' liberties can be ultimately rationalized by this image of the ISoviet world divided into two hostile camps in which the forces of light--communism-are forever struggling with those of darkness--capitalism--in a battle that never abates even when relations between the two countries appear most cordial It is interesting to note how deeply and sincerely the average Soviet citizen 1 49 4 o - - ' ' ' - ' ' oo - v - - ' - - - - - - - o ' _U - - - J WY believed that his leader Chernenko represented peace and moderation in the world whereas the leader of the U S and other Western statesmen actively advocate war and injustice 8 9 X iithe WI ' I ' i while rid EUR In the publication Whence the Threat to Peace Soviets assert that The U S military strategy embodied in multioperational plans for waging aggressive war to attain the global goals of U S imperialism and the large scale preparations of the material facilities for war including one with unlimited use of nuclear weapons are a danger to peace and are pushing mankind to the brink of catastrophe 9 0 insisting simultaneously that The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are doing everything possible to preserve and strengthen peace to humanity of the threat of nuclear war to establish equal and mutually beheficial cooperation between countries 91 eIn thi a hs elsewhere Konstantin Chernenko is consistently cast as a man of goodwill striving for world peace whereas Ronald Reagan is portrayed as an aggressive warmonger inten t on the annihilation of the Soviet Union The importance of enemies and of dark and sinister forces is stressed both in traditional Russian folklore and in the Soviet view of historical gdevelopment which is amply illuminated and dramatized by the existence of Trotskyites fascists capitalists revisionists appear be deep psychocultural factors at work hereand which have set the There r for the to predominance of these feelings'by developing or inculcating distinctively personality TSoviettraits I q These personality traits in turn have played a neis ofnthef dr adsnitr ocs i trse major Throle mpraceo in the development Soviet emphasis on control in general and - the extension of control to include reflexive control in particular and for these reasons are worthy of more in-depth analysis at this time 50 InBased on more publications prior to Chernenko's death the emulation is attached to the leadership position held thaninto1985 a particular individual 4 Psychocultural Theories and Their Relation to The Development of Reflexive Control Theory Personality traits are generally regarded as arising from a combination of child-rearing experiences preadult learning hereditary factors and in the Soviet case the personal experiences of adult individuals within the regime 4 In an effort to explain the psychological development of Russian national character--in which guilt group pressure moral responsibility and destructive defense mechanisms are seen as playing key roles--several interesting psychocultural theories will be examined a The Swaddling Theory and Polarized Opposites One of the most controversial of these theories is based on the swaddling hypothesis espoused by Gorer an anthropologist psychologist and Dr Rickman who practiced medicine in the Soviet Union from 1911 to 1918 They concluded from firsthand observation that the common Russian peasant practice of swado dling infants during their first year of life provided some definite clues to Russian personality development -in According to this practice still employed the U S S R today the peasant infant is tightly swaddled with legs pulled straight and arms to his sides Although some degree of swaddling is often recommended to invest an infant with a sense of security and well-being this extreme Russian form engenders a condition of complete constraint and absence of gratification day--aside The infant is often swaddled for the greater part of the from short respites during feeding changing and bathing periods-and during this time he can express his emotions only by moving his eyes and if not inhibited by the presence of a pacifier by screaming The infant swaddled in such a way is said to experience intense and destructive rage as a result of this complete inhibition of movement 51 By means of the defense mechanism of projection as explained by Gorer and Rickman the infant is believed to attribute its own thoughts and wishes preverbal though they may be to vague figures in the environment and to 3 fear retaliation if it should attempt to gratify its own destructive urges The reality of swaddling makes it impossible for the infant to gratify these alleged destructive wishes and he is thereby spared from the retaliation he is believed to fear However the argument asserts that most Russians manifest diffuse unconscious feeling of guilt coupled with fear as a result of this early childhood experience characterized by the projection of infantile hostility This alleged presence of a free-floating unfocused hostility in the Russian people is said to have been reinforced by the Soviet regime in directing popular hatred toward various countries class enemies warmongers alleged aggressors and other adversaries as the occasion dictates 9 2 Swaddling is also believed by many to represent the prototype for the existence of polarized opposites or ambiguous traits in the Russian - national character In this view Russians are seen to be programmed for life to oscillate between emotional extremes due to the infantile experience of complete constraint alternating with gratification Hingley has poetically described this condition as that of a mummified infant periodically unwrapped for a delicious romp 9 3 Some of the dichotomous ambiguous traits most often noted in the Russian modal personality include H recklessness versus caution tolerance versus censoriousness love of freedom versus slavishness productive activity versus inactivity and kindness versus cruelty A British psychiatrist Dr Henry V Dicks contended that the less attractive features of the Soviet regime are made tolerable by means of backsliding and by V' 52 The defense mechanism of projection is defined as the attribution of one's own ideas feelings or attitudes to other people or to objects especially the externalization of blame guilt or responsibility as a defense against anxiety 94 The next subsection will cover projection in greater depth various forms of oral gratification particularly the abuse of alcohol S 95 Russian tendencies toward recklessness and addiction to extremes of sensation often referred to as the oral-anal conflict 96 find their most characteristic expression in the excess consumption of alcohol-- traditionally the besetting sin of the Russians 9 7 This is a problem of severity which has persisted throughout history and continues to plague the Soviet regime in spite of stringent attempts to counteract its tenacity Whether one attributes the existence of polarized opposites which has N been well documented to the swaddling hypothesis less scientifically accepted or to the traditional Russian patriarchal family structure or whatever other possible cause is not the essential issue It is clear that greater understanding of this aspect of the Russian and Soviet experience will undoubtedly aid the Westerner in better understanding Soviet behavior and decision making patterns especially in the area of recklessness-caution - and its relationship to combat situations For an interesting perspective on this topic please see the authoritative work Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis 98 Behavior by Hannes Adomeit 1 b The Role of Projection and Related Defense Mechanisms In light of the presence of polarized opposites in the Russo Soviet iexperience the prevalence and role of psychological defense mechanisms such as projection reaction formation and displacement becomes clearer It stands 53 Reaction formation is defined as going to the opposite extreme overcompensation for unacceptable impulses Example a person with strong antisocial impulses leads a crusade against vice Displacement is defined as a change in the object by which an instinctual drive Ts to be satisfied shifting the emotional component from one object to another Example a salesman is angered by his superior but is required to suppress his feelings upon returning home he vents his frustration on his children for misbehavior that would usually be tolerated Projection reaction formation and displacement are mechanisms which aid in repression-the removal of conflicting elements from consciousness i e reduction of cognitive dissonance 9 9 E to reason that such diametrically opposed character traits will lead to a feeling of discomfort among those possessing them In psychological terms this condition of psychic discomfort is known as cognitive dissonance Cognitive dissonance is defined as a psychological tension arising from discrepancies between aspects of the individual's self-concept both conscious and unconscious and his actual behavior or from incongruous beliefs and attitudes held simultaneously A Soviet example of a situation involving cognitive dissonance might be the case of a worker who has internalized the communistideals of hard work service and productivity and yet continues to report to work drunk on a regular basis The relationship between any two cognitive elements must be one of the following consonant--in agreement with expectations dissonant--opposed to expectations or irrelevant--having no bearing on expectations The magnitude of the dissonance experienced is seen to be directly dependent on the number - - and or importance of dissonant cognitions relative to the number and or importance of consonant cognitions The greater the number and or importance of positive attributes consonant cognitions associated with a chosen alternative the less the magnitude of dissonance resulting from a choice 1 00 the case of diametrically opposed tendencies such as kindness-cruelty and tolerance-censoriousness as found among Soviets it appears that the magnitude of cognitive dissonance would be quite high and some means of reducing it -r would become necessary for psychological well-being Festinger a pioneer in the study of cognitive dissonance surmised that one possible way probably the most common to reduce dissonance is by attributing the elements causing dissonance to others i e through the mechanism of projection He felt that the magnitude of dissonance and the consequent 54 Z % projection and paranoia resulting therefrom could be a function of the size of the discrepancy between the way a person behaves and feels i e his actions and emotions and what he thinks of himself i e his self-esteem It was discovered through experimentation that an identifiable projection effect tended to occur mainly when self-esteem was exceptionally high lO1 This finding correlates well with the presence of projection among Soviets who by virtue of the superiority of Marxism-Leninism are socialized and taught to believe in themselves as persons of worth connected with a valuable historical development and having a raison d'etre--the communist cause Thus hostility toward out-groups which the regime encourages by fostering a siege mentality see-pages 49-50 is further reinforced by ' natural culturally based tendencies toward a defensive posture involving projection In Algebra of Conscience Vladimir Lefebvre makes the point that a hero of the second ethical system is one who is aggressive tends toward conflict minimizes his guilt feelings and has a high self-evaluation see Figure 12 below He reinforces this point by explaining that the Moral Code of a Builder of Communism published in 1962 openly and obviously FIGURE 12 DESCRIPTIONS OF THE TYPES OF NORMATIVE INDIVIDUALS IN BOTH ETHICAL SYSTEMS Philosophy Saint Sacrificial individual Hero Phiblstin Non-sacrifical individual Dissembler First ethical system Second ethical system End does not justify means End justifies means Non- awesave tends toward comprormse with a partner has low self-evaluation Non-aweg sve tends toward compromise with a partner has high self-evaluatioa Aggressive tends toward conflict with a partner has low scif-e aluation Aggressivetends toward conflict with a partner has high seif-eialuation Aggressive tends toward conflict with a partner has low selfealuataou Aggressive tends toward connlt with a partner has high self eviluatiou Non-a ggp'saive tends toward compromi with a partner has lo% self-ealuation Non- ggressive tend% toward compromrue with a partner has high sell-evalua oo From Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conscience page 84 55 requires a good communist to be intolerant toward and irreconcilable with his enemy 10 2 Thus it can be seen that cognitive elements which threaten to lower self-esteem are much more likely to be rejected repressed or projected onto others among Soviets than among Westerners who--in accordance with the Christian moral tradition--have greater tendencies toward acceptance of selfdoubt repentance and guilt These tendencies become useful tools in the hands of Soviet propagandists who are well aware of this Soviet-Western distinction It is interesting to note in this regard that the Soviets accuse Americans of subversive tactics violations of human rights and aggressiveness while asserting exemplary moral behavior on their own part a lthough this assertion has clearly not been borne out in reality see pages 33 and 46 This provides a perfect example of the use of projection to protect against cognitive dissonance which threatens self-esteem Raven and Kruglanski highlight another important cognitive feature reinforcing the need for projection against the West by the Soviets when they state - a side endowed with destructive capacity may come to believe that he will actually employ it against the other party In the interest of cognitive consistency author's underline these beliefs may lead him to attribute negative to the other party The and characteristics intentions above psychologic may be represented by the cognitions j I have acquired the capacity to inflict damage on X therefore I shall probably use it against X because this is the only way it is possible to deal with a person 03 like X an obstinate unreasonable hostile individual 1 What is it in the Soviet experience which brings about a condition of cognitive dissonance to begin with Reshetar makes the point that many of the anal traits of the Soviet regime such as punctuality orderliness and discipline have not been congenial to the Russian cultural pattern with its 56 tendencies toward more oral characteristics impulsiveness emotionality inactivity These characteristics have had to be instilled in the population by control both in a reflexive sense--that is through the induction of correct behavioral traits cognitively--and through overt force and coercion In certain respects Bolshevism has waged war against the Russian modal personality but not entirely successfully To return to our example of the drunk worker it can be said that he is experiencing a conflict between his Russian cultural tendencies and the Bolshevik operational code This code advocates control of emotions and feelings condemns passivity and emotional incontinence such as abuse of alcohol and interestingly enough is itself viewed as a reaction formation by Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks who are said to have 'reacted in opposition - to certain qualities of the Russian intelligentsia that they regarded as harmful ' 10 4 dissonance This type of conflict brings about the condition of cognitive As was seen in the case of the swaddled infant see page 48 psychic conflict can be successfully diffused by attributing the elements causing conflict to others However the drawback of this mechanism is that it leads to an increase in anxiety due to fear of retaliation and consequently to an increase in paranoia and hostile feelings Because of the somewhat ambivalent nature of the relationship of the elite to the masses which will be discussed in greater detail in subsection d projection is often initially focused on the Soviet elite The major task for the leaders of the regime is therefore to effect a transfer of the we-they dichotomy which sometimes results onto external others as opposed to themselves and to foster an identification of the masses with the communist cause To illustrate the operationalization of this mechanism let us continue i 57 o rH - -pL studying the example of the drunk worker The worker has a cultural predisposition to abuse of alcohol which is enhanced by poor working conditions in his factory and a psychological predisposition toward the defense mechanism of projection He diffuses his psychic conflict by projecting it initially onto his supervisors the communist regime etc Through skillful political education combined with the worker's awareness of the realistic 1 ' danger of expressing hostile feelings toward those in power his projection becomes transferred from the communist leaders to for example the capitalist oppressors He may be told that conditions are poor for himself and all workers in the world because of imperialist exploitation and injustice or something to that effect The worker comes to project his hostility against these targeted outside forces and to identify more and more with his leaders although some remnants of hostility tend to remain thus reinforcing the need for constant surveillance and control For the most part however this mechanism appears to be quite successful in reinforcing loyalty toward the in-group the U S S R communist regime and hostility toward the out-group the outside world especially the West Niet As Goldman points out no one disputes the fierce chauvinism that the Russians in particular but even many minorities have for the SovUnion especially when it is the Soviet Union against some foreign country Few peoples of the world are so loyal in such circumstances 10 This follows the cognitive dissonance principle that when some dissonance remains and in the absence of refutation of the discrepant information one means of reduction is to try to see others as similar i e through identification 106 Cognitive dissonance is a very complex subject which is of great interest to those concerned with the psychological dynamics underlying reflexive control 58 ' The important point which is elucidated by viewing the subject from a cognitive dissonance perspective is that projection and related defense mechanisms induces and maximizes hypervigilance and a consequent emphasis on the importance of control as well as consciousness of the existence of reflection and multiple-tier awareness --a term Lefebvre utilizes to describe a person's direct awareness of his own inner world his awareness of his awareness of his inner world coupled with an image of someone else's inner world an image of someone else's image of his inner world etc as illustrated in Figure 13 107 Multiple-tier awareness is a key conce in reflexive control theory and also serves to emphasize why the systems approach--in which everything is seen to be related to and to effect everything else in this case the individual's interaction with and awareness of other individuals -is held in particularly high esteem in the Soviet Union FIGURE 13 MULTIPLE-TIER AWARENESS The cognitive arena is represented by the rectangle The 3 individuals X Y Z by the 3 circles X Y Z must construct a model of the situation 0 -' F 0 X O They will have an awareness of their own models In addition Y may also be aware that X has a model of the situation Z in turn may be aware that the inner worlds of X and Y are structured in a particular way--this is multiple-tier awareness Z In order to correctly interpret the actions of another one must take into account these reflexive constructions Derived from Lefebvre V A Reflexive Control The Soviet Concept of Influencing an Adversary's Decision Making Process pages 35-37 The Soviet regime has proven itself particularly adept at harnessing these different concepts including the projection mechanism inherent in the 59 Wy y vr -- - wr - - y 1 wI -W r W Russian mindset and using them to successfully further its own ends This fact seems to point out a lucid awareness of and ability to put to use the concept of multiple-tier awareness as well as showing the importance given by Marxists to the concept of consciousness --a thorough and rational knowledge and awareness of the role one is playing This knowledge has been applied with particular efficacy to further control by encouraging an identification with and an idealization of the leader vozhd a control mechanism of central importance which will now be discussed in greater detail c The Psychological Importance of The Leader This is a theme which reappears constantly and repeatedly across the board in literature dealing with the Russian mind or Soviet psychological m makeup and is - fact at the root of any study relating to the subject of control The subject of leadership has already been alluded to several times in this report but because of its extraordinarily pervasive influence it becomes necessary to once again emphasize its significance It appears that the existence of polarized opposites has also served to reinforce in the Russian consciousness this recognition of need for authority and a tendency to idealize their leadership whether that of the autocracy or 9 of the Communist Party today In Gorer's view Russian psychological well-being is dependent on the preservation of one figure or an elite group that is believed to be uncontaminated by suspicion fear and guilt An idealized and strong leadership even though often arbitrary and coercive has thus been acceptable to Russians as a necessary safeguard against anarchy and their own guilt and excesses-- a moral corset so to speak which no 60 See page 50 regarding the idealization of Chernenko N - 25 doubt has its historical roots in the heavily emphasized conditioning effect of the Tartar Yoke experience 1 08 The willingness to surrender personal freedom has thus been compounded by the infusion into Russian blood of what a few Russian intellectuals describe as the Mongol acceptance of brutality or the Mongol inheritance 1 0 9 Soviets are said to be highly cognizant of the need to control impulses and yet to rely less on self-control for this purpose and more on impulse control resulting from guidance and pressure exerted by a higher authority The principle of edinonachalniye one man control provides a military example of this concept of centralization of authority '1 1 0 Urie Bronfenbrenner in his landmark study comparing the upbringing of Soviet and American children 1 1 1 also stresses the important role played by leaders in inculcating the crucial trait of obedience poslushanie Soviet literature on child rearing sets forth the active guidance of parents in the home professionals in the day care centers and people in general society at large as the most effective method to instill traits of obedience and self-discipline referred to as internalized obedience As opposed to the West there is very little stress placed on the development of independence initiative or individuality He points out that the subject of correct upbringing vospitanie is virtually a national hobby in the U S S R so important is it believed to be to ensure the proper evolution of Soviet soCiety In the primary schools the process is continued as leadership is gradually and carefully transferred into the - hands of children who have proven themselves to be of good Soviet character capable of serving in the role of class monitors and Pioneer leaders These children provide leadership and guide the behavior of their peer group known as the children's collective in the proper socialist direction as 61 ' See Appendix A 5 Y - - @ ' illustrated in Figure 14 Reporting infractions by classmates is considered an integral and necessary aspect of the injunction to be truthful Vladimir Lefebvre also points out the importance of the leader's role in exercising reflexive control He states The reflexive concepts make it possible to describe the mechanism of leadership more precisely While all members of a collective are operating with a reality the leader operates with a special reality in addition--the collective He projects this special reality onto a special plotting board then he transforms this image into a certain plan and fulfills it The leader's plotting board must clearly show not only the special elements that reflect the activity of individual members of the collective but also the elements of his own activity The latter are the elements of planning the collective's activity we can say that the basis of any organizational activity is the organizer's mechanism of reflection 1 4 author's underline This quotation pointedly delineates the vast difference between the Western perspective of the leader as an influencer and moderator of group decision making--an example setter --as opposed to the Soviet view of the leader as sole formulator and controller of group decisions and actions Hingley claims that no other factor more sharply differentiates the generalized Russian experience from that of the West than this attitude toward authority coupled with a fear of freedom In his view the impact of authority has in fact grown ever more rigorous over the centuries almost in directly inverse proportion to the decline of centralized power in the West 1 1 3 This in turn has resulted in a high degree of submissiveness which it is safe to assume would greatly increase susceptibility to the influence of the control agent thereby further strengthening the authority - of the leadership However the question of which influence came first will more than likely remain an enigma As Hingley muses 62 M ' - - See Appendix A 6 - - 2 - - - - - - - - L s I n 2 2- IJI V - I 4 oll l A ma a I still tII 14 THE IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP PERMEATES ALL LEVELS OF SOVIET Laws of the Pioneers E'Trf's ljl dank A l umccr is an example to all om Bronfenbrenner Urie Two Worlds of an LA LR Laws of the Pioneers 4'5 - FOBOPMT HPABAY on nopoxmr 1 u' OTPHM A Pioneer tell the null and treasures the honor uf his unit Childhood U S and 8 Lin - h 1-r' wh w w j w- r- u 7er j wr- r ll' Must one then conclude that it was the Russian mind which molded the Authoritarian state Or is the Russian mind rather the outcome of that Authoritarian state All one can assert with confidence is that the two phenomena have4 interacted as intimately as any chicken and egg A similar paradox underlies and complicates much that is being examined in Most specifically it is of utmost difficulty to conclusively this paper determine whether reflexive control is a cause or an effect of the Soviet social environment Further research may bring us closer to a resolution of this paradoxical question In any case it can be seen that the psychological importance of the leader is an almost universally accepted principle in the U S S R and one that relates directly to concepts of control the control agent and to the development of reflexive control theory This is not to say however that the relationship between the leaders and the masses has been straightforward and nonproblematic and this complication will be expanded upon in the following subsection d Lozh and Vranyo The Russian Heritage of Prevarication A complete understanding of Soviet social and psychological dynamics is further undermined although the thesis of this paper is strengthened by the pervasive and historically documented Soviet tendency toward misrepresentation cover up and prevarication Hingley points out that the Russian language includes an extensive vocabulary of terminological inexactitude which he views as being grounded in the country's history of dealing with a harsh reality For ages the peasantry were exposed to the arbitrary power and ruthless exactions of those who were placed over them and as the law gave them no means of legally protecting themselves their only means of self-defense 64 -- --------- -- rr- - and deceit If ordinary Russians have for centuries lied to their authorities those authorities have been in no position to complain owing to the high degree of institutionalized mendacity which they them-selves have practiced and which has not been calculated to set a good example to the lower orders 115 He characterizes Russian civilization as containing an element of pure playacting stating that the very possibility of any human reaction not being dictated by deep-laid guile is an alien concept in the Russian mindset He adds that a delicate reciprocity of deviousness is almost the first of Russian societal interaction asserting for example that the condition Russians are much less interested in being civilized than in making us believe them so ''1 16 This notion would correlate well with the concept that the o - Soviets encourage a belief in external symmetry--that they are just like o Westerners --in order to further their goals in international relations see page 6 How did these unique conditions arise and what is their bearing on the concept of reflexive control Beaumont asserts that Most elemental is the fact that the predisposition to such practices and the defense of them constitutes a commitment by the Soviets albeit culturological or strategic to the widespread and systematic use of deceit as policy which makes appraisal of threat 117 difficult and arms control efforts uncertain The ambiguous complex structure of totalitarian government and the relationship it engenders between the leaders and the masses accounts for much of the unique developmental pattern of Soviet society As Hingley points out Russia has presented its sons and daughters with features markedly different from those conditioning their Western brothers and sisters 1 18 The totalitarian apparatus of rigorous censorship travel restrictions thought control and general surveillance of the citizenry has acquired the added obligation An 65 4 recent times to pretend that no such controls exist that the Soviet citizen is actually freer than his Western counterparts Since the establishment of Bolshevik rule there has resulted a dramatic upsurge in state authoritarianism partially due to the adoption of a political program with claims to universal The emotional force of preexisting Great Russian Messianism applicability has thus been incorporated into the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism This in turn has resulted in a two-compartment mentality in which the private - thoughts of an individual must necessarily be separated from the Party Line which is often nothing more than compulsory official mendacity to manipulate perceptions to correspond with the Party vision of reality 1 1 9 - The existence of doublethink dvoemyslie is thus a key concept Much has been written about the historical preconditions of this attitude in Russia its psychological mechanism and the deformation of character which may result from it Dvoemyslie refers to conscious conformity living contrary to one's convictions or adaptation out of necessity convenience or careerism Many consider doublethink combined with public immorality and the all-pervasive dialectic approach to be the true unshakeable foundation of the system a foundation deeply rooted in the mentality of the masses Solzhenitsyn sees dvoemyslie as an exclusively moral problem a problem of the second ethical 120 system on which the present Soviet system appears to be based To understand this development historically it is important to become o % familiar with the Russian terms lozh and vranyo two of the most common terms of inexactitude in the language Lozh refers to actual lies and total untruths whereas vranyo is a more subtle term referring to the dissemination of untruths which have some grounding in reality Lozh appears to be less commonly accepted and practiced now than is vranyo in spite of the centuries- 66 _ i p- -' See Appendix A 7 ' - - -- old belief held by many that Russians are hardened liars Leonid Andreyev a prerevolutionary short story writer and dramatist made the following distinction between the two terms the Russian is incapable of telling downright lies but seems equally incapable of telling the truth The intermediate phenomena for which he feels the utmost resembles neither truth nor lozh love and tenderness 12 1 It is vranyo Since the death of Stalin an era in which lozh played a dominant role vranyo has been a key element in totalitarian public posture Hingley claims that in no other state do political words stand in such contrast to reality as in Russia although it is common practice to dilute vranyo with injections of truth '1 2 2 He goes on to describe how citizens are drilled in the gentle art of manipulating the perceptions of foreigners who because they have tradi tionally been equated with authority have always activated the self-protective evasive tactics characterizing the peasant relationship with authority vranyo has evolved into an institutionalized aspect of Soviet society Thus the leaders deceive the masses in order to influence their cognitive maps to view Soviet reality as they wish it to appear the masses use subterfuge as a defensive measure when necessary in dealing with their leaders and society as a whole exercises vranyo in its dealings with the outside world The corollary to the successful execution of vranyo is the need to maintain censorship and secrecy in order that vranyo not be too obviously out of line with reality An emphasis on obsessive secretiveness has persisted throughout the centuries characterized by a strong tendency for all information about the country to be kept a closely guarded secret Thus Western analysts have been consistently frustrated in their efforts to better understand the Soviet mind by the elusiveness and deception inherent in this 67 See Appendix A 8 %'%o - r - J W d gV p' r cultural predisposition to employ lozh and vranyo y - f - - 7 i -T This results in a condition Hingley refers to as dubiety--the context of things not turning out as might expected be This of course is a central aim of reflexive control--to keep the adversary confused uncertain and lacking in knowledge thereby decreasing the effectiveness of his responses It appears that a concept such as reflexive control could most easily take root and flourish in an environment where such elements as lozh vranyo dubiety and secrecy are accepted natural features of social consciousness However if the relationship between the Soviet rulers and the masses was not fraught with ambiguities and complexities it is likely that reflexive control would not have developed as a means to maintain and reinforce societal control Soviet cultural dynamics Such is the paradox of on the one hand they foster and require authoritarianism fear of freedom submissiveness psychological importance of the leader On the other they require effective mechanisms such as doublethink censorship reflexive control in order to keep the authoritarian government afloat For the purpose of understanding the development of reflexive control theory vranyo in particular appears to be an important concept for two reasons 1 to be effective reflexive control like vranyo must have some grounding in reality so that it can enter and effect the target's cognitive arena without setting off his alarm systems and 2 vranyo as is true for reflexive control is a two-way process in which the relationship and interaction between the purveyor and the recipient is of the essence again touching upon the concept of multiple-tier awareness The greater the decision maker's understanding of his target's cognitive map the greater ' the effectiveness of both vranyo and reflexive control h 68 -- ' Y 5 Looking Outward--The Concepts of Maskirovka Finlandization and Risk-Aversion Redundancy Thus far the major focus of this study on Origins has been on control factors as they relate or have related internally to the Soviet people i e as they have been directed at allies or potential allies Our attention must now necessarily expand outwardly to consider the ultimately important question of how the Soviets have attempted to exercise control externally to influence and disrupt the goals and actions of adversaries In addition to the use of propaganda as a means of disseminating effective disinformation dezlnformatsiya as previously discussed in Section II C there appear to be three other factors which must be examined in an attempt to understand reflexive control directed against adversaries These are 1 Maskirovka-- a technique with predominantly military applications 2 Finlandization -in the realm of political and international relations and 3 the Soviet penchants for risk-aversion and reliance on redundancy These three concepts and their relation to reflexive control theory will now be discussed jj - '- tance Awareness of concealment camouflage and deception is rather higher and more pervasive with the Soviet military than in the U S defense system Maskirovka appears as an integral part of the strategies and doctrines as well as the tactics of the U S S R They believe in it they study and develop it and they use it therefore it is world 123 a subject of considerable importo the Western Maskirovka in the Soviet sense encompasses a broader spectrum than does the more straightforward American concept of camouflage in combat although the two terms are often mistakenly equated It is most accurately defined as camouflage concealment and deception C C 0 Soviet maskirovka is to warp the enemy's view of their combat missions 69 h oil p -C - The major purpose of positions and objectives as well as to alter perceptions of the reality of the battlefield situation by following the doctrinal tenets of maskirovka namely naturalness variety and unceasingness 12 4 One important aspect of the Soviet view of maskirovka which is also crucial to their perception of reflexive control is that in order to be effective whatever is done must appear as highly plausible to the enemy and conform to both his perspective on Soviet STdoctrine and to his strategic assumptions The concept of strategic assumptions is extremely important to developing an understanding of reflexive control control methodology As Gerald Hopple has pointed out strategic assumptions often emerge as genuine causal forces in a nontrivial way When strategic assumptions account for surprise attack they do so as necessary if not sufficient determinants Strategic assumptions are almost invariably plausible--at least before the fact They are also often reinforced by the other side's active deception People naturally become wedded to their basic beliefs and vigorously resist their elimination This unwillingness to look at evidence in the 12 5 light of alternative beliefs leads to warning disasters Maskirovka is thus used to gain advantage over an enemy by thwarting or distorting the accuracy of his perceptions thereby exercising control over A his cognitive arena Maskirovka can be performed on a tactical operational or strategic level depending on the needs and scale of the maneuver Although Western observers have noted a substantial increase of interest directed aT 0' the subject of maskirovka in Soviet military circles since the 1970s this subject has actually been of concern to the Soviets since the 1940s and more than likely even prior to that Two key military operations which had great impact on developing the Soviet mindset in regard to maskirovka were the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 and the Soviet invasion of Japaneseheld Manchuria in August 1945 Memoirs of Soviet World War II officers also contain numerous examples of the use of maskirovka particularly of a tactical 70 - or operational nature during their war experience see Konev I former Marshal of the U S S R Year of Victory 1 2 6 and Chuikov V I Marshal of the U S S R The End of the Third Reich 1 2 7 Since that time it appears that maskirovka has become a central theme of increasing significance and sophistication among Soviet military officials As Beaumont states Soviet military power has to be seen through the qualifying lenses of maskirovka-dezinformatsiya To accept that fact is not to generate a high sense of anxiety but prudence and above all to sensitize - policymakers commanders analysts and battle controllers to a broad and strange landscape of uncertainties 1 2 8 He also points out that a complete investigation of maskirovka should entail rigorous review of other disciplines viewed by the Soviets as related to it such as the psychology of attention and perception human factors physiol -y electronics and electrical 4 engineering and remote sensing incluaing optical It is clear that maskirovka and the broader concept of reflexive control are inextricably linked by many common features and are both worthy of greater attention from Western analysts It has been noted that adroitness and craftiness run against Western traditions of linear warfare and the Western search for solutions in technology and concentration of force In the Soviet Union on the other hand the very definitions of intervention and deployment are being altered in those areas which receive short shrift in American strategic deliberations and practices--psychology propaganda media analysis I and control techniques '12 9 Because the American style of intervention steers away from relatively subtle practices we tend to be less aware of these vital nuances in the Soviet perspective both on the military and the political front and hence more vulnerable to potential manipulation J 71 V w The political counterpart to maskirovka appears to lie in the concept of Finlandization Briefly stated Finlandization describes a process whereby the Soviet Union influences the domestic and foreign policy behavior of noncommunist countries in a way that leads them to follow policies congenial to or approved by the Soviet Union 13 0 The term itself was developed from the country which has proved itself most susceptible to Soviet influence of this type Totalitarian leaders enjoy an advantage in this regard due to their control over public opinion and sources of information Schapiro claims that No Soviet leader has failed to attach supreme importance to the battle for the minds of his opponents It is toward this end that the whole machinery of state propaganda is directed to neutralize or cast doubt on 13 1 information about Soviet life or policy unfavorable to the Soviet Union There are numerous exan'iles of the effectiveness of Soviet attempts at the Finlandization of the West Schapiro has made the interesting observation that the Western perception of threat in the 1960s and 1970s has been far less than in the 1940s and 1950s nothwithstanding the quantum growth of Soviet power including achievement of nuclear parity with the U S and even military superiority in some areas 13 2 It appears that public opinion in West Germany has been particularly targeted and influenced over the years It is there that the demands for complete unilateral Western disarmament and an increasing anti-American sentiment have become strident and popular stands An opinion poll conducted in 1984 to survey the views of 16- to 29-year-old West German youths revealed that only 25% felt democracy was worth defending if the choice were between communism and democracy and if avoidance of war meant the Soviet Union taking over Western Europe then 56% wanted to avoid war at all costs John Vinocur a journalist describes the situation thus 72 1 4' i ' -' i' ' i - - - In West Germany where three decades of U S officials thought their view of democracy had taken hold a group of intellectuals with a national audience and national impact were speaking in another tonality America as aggressor America as polluter nuclear as the force-keepingterrorist and profiteer America 133 us-from-the-way-we-want-to-be Of course it is very difficult to prove that the Soviet Union itself has played an active conscious role in altering or effecting perceptions in this way but as Rubinstein has pointed out as well as Beaumont see Appendix A 1 a visible Soviet presence is not necessarily a prerequisite to effective manipulation If the Finlandization of the West should come to pass it would be a consequence not just of Soviet strength but also of Western weakness--debilitating domestic policies intra-alliance bickering a contraction of power under the guise of advancing detente and a lack of commitment to professed ideals and institutions in Naturally Moscow will try to exploit the disarray 34 guard 1 its of lowering a induce and West the Most analysts who study strategic surprise and related subjects have concluded that governments are caught unprepared primarily because of the ways people both individually and collectively think Standard processes in perception and the formation of judgments are often responsible for cognitive defects when dealing with the unfamiliar It is for this reason that a greater understanding of as opposed to mere assumptions about Soviet motivations and strategies is of such crucial importance One final topic which may help us to better understand Soviet motivations is that of risk-aversion and redundancy Several studies have surveyed Soviet patterns of military and political intervention in cases which provided the country with either an opportunity to act in the interest of furthering its own foreign policy objectives or placed it in a position of being compelled to act The conclusion which was reached in these comprehensive but far from 73 See Appendix 9 conclusive studies was that for various reasons the Soviet Union tends to be a basically risk-averse society one which for the most part avoids risks which involve a great deal of uncertainty and in which a positive outcome cannot be guaranteed The main reasons for this risk-aversive stance appear to be as follows program l 1 Soviet decision makers believing in the ideological inevitability the victory of Marxism-Lenininsm in the world have tended to favor low of over high risks 2 Because of the considerable asymmetry between the strength and capabilities of the Soviet State and the underdeveloped and backward conditions existing in Soviet societ dysfunction has resulted This dysfunction makes the Soviet system more static protective defensive and cautious and less dynamic-offensive and aggresssive unless conditions are so favorable as to warrant a higher degree of risk taking 3 In a developmental socio-economic typology of political systems the U S S R is classified on Level E a political system still inspired by a of construction but which is achieving leisure and affluence '13 5 This stage tends to contain very l w risk takers thus placing the U S S R among the more cautious political systems in the world at its present stage of history and lastly 4 There is a hypothesis which states that the maximum risk a political system takes is a constant characteristic of that system The intrinsic riskiness of the action plus the preexisting threshold of tension will not exceed this constant It is believed as a consequence that if the intrinsic riskiness of the two independent variables--situation and threshold of tension-be to bring the exceeds the constant the objective of the decision maker 3will 37 6 riskiness within the limit of tolerance of the constant 1 1 In regard to point four this theory appears to be valid in view of our examination of Soviet practices where the tendencies favor reducing risk to an acceptable level In this sense it appears that one of the chief aims of reflexive control theory is to lower risk and increase the predictability of situations in order to allow Soviet decision makers to take more affirmative and decisive actions There is one seeming paradox which has arisen in recent years and requires closer examination If it is true that Soviet decision makers are not gamblers preferring a low level of investment and low odds how does the active development of a massive and modern war-machine correlate with such a low risk-taking profile 74 This important question leads us to a consideration of the subject of redundancy The natural corollary to the state of being risk-averse would seem to be a desire to bolster one's defenses and operate from a position of strength One way to guarantee a position of strength is to maintain reserves and reinforcements to cover any eventuality which may arise The Soviets accomplish this aim through a reliance on redundancy--the quality of exceeding what is considered by others to be necessary or normal Rubinstein succinctly cap- tures the essence of the Soviet viewpoint on military redundancy when he states 4 First massive military power is perceived as the best defense not only against any NATO attack or attempt to intervene in Eastern Europe but also against attempted national Communist defections or uprisings Second the Soviet leadership values redundancy As the saying goes Russians feel more comfortable with three armies too is many than three divisions too few Overinsurance 13 8 axiomatic in Soviet military doctrine Beaumont has brought to attention another aspect of redundancy which is not so commonly recognized but is of equal importance to the Soviet emphasis on keeping all bases covered That is the practice of non-repeating techniques so that in addition to being overwhelmed by sheer force and numbers the adversary is also kept disoriented by the inability to establish patterns within the redundancy itself This concept of gaining advantage through the use of variegated response appears to have been heavily influenced by two sources which states that only variety First W Ross Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety in R the Regulator can force down the variety due to D a set of disturbances in other words only variety can destroy variety Ashby's theories on requisite variety and cybernetics have had a much greater and more lasting impact in the Soviet Union than they have in the West 13 9 the Soviet study of the psychology of attention 75 And secondly by This academic discipline and in particular its research on the orienting reflex has convinced the Soviets of the value of inducing psychological strain and inability to cope through inhibition of the ability to establish patterns 14 0 These repeating techniques coupled with an emphasis on redundancy would thus appear to be very effective tools in the attempt to reduce risk and create right conditions to gain advantage and possibly even control over an adversary As Beaumont has noted The cross-links between Soviet psychology the military and engineering are far more well developed than in the West and have been since the Revolution 14 1 It is hoped that this discussion of the origins of reflexive control theory has helped to illuminate some of these cross-links and the more crucial elements contained within them which pertain to the theory's development 6 From Past to Present--The Evolution of the Theory Thus far we have seen that the concept of control is and has been of paramount importance to the Russian people and later to the Soviet state for environmental historical and social reasons It appears that under the general rubric of control the concepts underlying reflexive control have been exercised informally but effectively throughout Soviet history Prior to the early 1960s however the theory appears to have been applied intuitively or subconsciously and not as a formalized scientific method of ensuring greater control 4 Reflexive control appears to have been an outgrowth of the historical and cultural soil of Russia germinated by the emphasis on control nourished by psychological aspects of the Russian mindset such as dependence on a leader awarenesss of external others the importance placed on cognition and reflection 76 and a society characterized by vranyo and maskirovka and kept flourishing Reflexive by the social and political realities inherent in the Soviet system control was originally employed as a natural subconscious extension of these varied influences in much the same way as a chess player would attempt to keep one step ahead of his opponent and gain advantage over him by not only o observing his actions and interpreting likely moves but also by sending out specific signals of intention in an attempt to predetermine the opponent's view of the situation and subsequently his reactions The meaning and some of the uses of reflexive control have been alluded to throughout the paper It is hoped that at this juncture the reader has a basic feel for its concepts and operationalization--at least on a nonscientific basis At this point an attempt will be made to define reflexive control in a more technical exact sense s it has been developed in the U S S R primarily in the military sphere The formalization and scientific process leading up to its development will also be illustrated as we understand it Several authoritative studies have already been written explaining in depth and detail the technical mathematical aspects of the theory most notably the works of Dr Vladimir A Lefebvre Reflexive Control Making Process The Algebra of Conflict and more recently The Soviet Concept of Influencing an Adversary's Decision No attempt will be made here to duplicate or improve upon the work of the experts rather the reader will be presented with an overview of the major concepts and components of reflexive control as delineated by Lefebvre and others The serious student of reflexive control theory per se is therefore directed to these most comprehensive and authoritative reports for more extensive knowledge and understanding The major thrust of this particular research effort is to uncover some 77 %J r _W of the underlying factors which have influenced the development of reflexive h control This is an area of study which has been touched upon in most of the major studies but has received less detailed attention than the military and technical applications of reflexive control In keeping with this orientation therefore the primary concern here will be to give form and clarity to the many concepts and ideas introduced thus far in the body of the text as well as to substantiate the direction of the psychocultural and historical trends previously discussed and trace their connection to formal reflexive control theory 0 Definition One gains an advantage in conflict if one has an accurate image of the opponent's image of the situation 'nd of how the opponent applies a par- ticular d ctrine in an attempt to solve the problem as' he sees it above all if one is able to influence the opponent's perception of the situation or his goals or his doctrine and at the same time conceal from him the fact that one is influencing him 14 2 The above quotation captures the essence of reflexive control--the first part expresses in simple form the purpose of re-flexive control the laitter part the method It is clear that to the Soviets effective decision making is seer to necessitate a focus on the adversary's cognitive map or operational code This entails knowing how to reflect the object of control's internal world and knowing how to obtain an accurate reproduction of the basic components 104of v - his behavioral strategy Reflexive control is thus an identification of the reasoner's intellect with that of his opponent and an emulation of this reasoning with the objective of ultimately disrupting and controlling the opponent's 'decision algorithm ' Reflexive interaction can be exprossed by the polynomial Q T Qx Py where T represents the situation The decision to execute reflexive control can be represented as 0 I-F_ _ real stage j reflection of Iproblem solving' J doctrines opponent's goal j It is felt by the Soviets that reflexive control can be successfully executed independent of the quality of the opponent's reasoning so long as this reasoning is imitated thoroughly and accurately enough Reflexive control is constructed of two parts 1 reflection--a psychological concept and 2 control--a purely cybernetic concept which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section Reflexive control is used to influence the actions of the opponent and is accomplished by understanding his cognitive map thoroughly enough to shape his perceptions of the situation without evoking his awareness that his thoughts are not his own In this regard attention to psychological aspects and subjective factors is of decisive importance As Druzhinin and Kontorov have explained Control of the enemy assumes the influencing of the enemy's decisions by utilizing a profound knowledge of his politics ideology military doctrine objectives the state of his forces organization psychology the personal qualities of his executive personnel his 3 mutual relations and emotional state 14 The concept of strategy thus becomes important here because it refers to a plan for choosing individual moves which is complete in the sense that no event whether the action of opposing players or a random occurrence allowed by the conflict structure is not anticipated by the plan Iis Reflexive control an especially useful strategic tool because its unobtrusive and often undetectable nature allows the optimization of decisions by helping decision K makers identify and quantify the best alternative available strategies based on an accurate reflection of the opponent's frame of reference d 79 The flexibility and creativity allowed by the theory provides means of eliminating patterns and vulnerabilities and establishing randomness of actions As Lefebvre has stressed In contrast to a scholarly debate the most inventive liar wins in conflict 1 4 4 Thus a reflexive schematization of conflict results in immediate advantages 1 the logical ins and outs of decision making become clearer and 2 more favorable conditions are created for independent research on the social-ethical and psychological shell of conflict This brings us to a very important aspect of reflexive control which Lefebvre refers to as the rank of reflection As the Soviets see it different societies and different individuals within those societies operate on different levels of awareness of the existence of reflection or multiple-tier awareness Awareness of the existence of reflection in social interaction and of its importance will obviously result in a higher rank of reflection and in the Soviet view the advantage in a - conflict situation lies on the side having the highest rank of reflection When questioned Dr Lefebvre replied that he believed at the present time - the United States society as a whole has a rank of reflection of zero 0 -that is Americans tend to pay attention and give validity only to the real situation as they perceive it excluding the importance of the situation from the opponent's perspective whereas the Soviet Union society as a whole has a rank of reflection of one 1 which is being raised rapidly as a result of conscious educational efforts He perceives this reality as leaving the U S in a position of vulnerability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which explains why he is anxious to raise the American level of awareness of reflexive control in its many facets 14 5 Lefebvre's view in this regard correlates well with Beaumont's assertion that Americans think in a linear fashion and are at a 80 distinct disadvantage when called upon to compete with an opponent well-versed in subtle or devious techniques Reflexive control is thus misinformation or information dissemination which attempts to control a given situation in the broad context of psychological warfare--a type of warfare at which Americans have proved themselves traditionally weak In addition to the advantages already mentioned which can be derived from reflexive control the Soviets discovered another of major importance during their experiments with the theory It was demonstrated that reflexive control may be conducted effectively without a chain of feedback which prior to this realization was believed to be a necessary part of any type of control Feedback is useful in terms of measuring the effectiveness of the control and correcting mistakes but in cases where it would be difficult to organize or prohibitively expensive it can be omitted without adverse results Hence rank of reflection and the ability to operate without feedback appear to be concepts with the potential for serious consequences if not examined more rigorously by American military and political analysts In addition to being made up of two components--the psychological and the cybernetic--reflexive control theory has other dual aspects For one it can be conducted in two ways 1 reflexive control through transformation can bhe cnutdinomton ways 2 of the enemy's information processing nrltruhtasomto reflexive cognitive and trol by selecting the messages informational control can be of two types 2 reflexive con- Furthermore reflexive 1 constructive reflexive control in which the enemy is influenced to voluntarily make a decision favorable to the controlling side or 2 destructive reflexive control in which means are employed to destroy paralyze or neutralize the procedures and algorithms of the enemy's decision making processes 14 6 These varied aspects and applications of the 81 theory add to its range and potential effectiveness as well as to the -A difficulty of discerning it in use Reflexive control can be conducted in many different ways each of which are described in detail in Lefebvre's book on Reflexive Control Here an outline of these uses will be presented to give the reader an idea of the scope of its application 1 Reflexive control may be conducted by means of transferring false information about the real situation lTyx ny 2 creating a goal for the opponent yx 3 creating the doctrine for the opponent o yx y 4 transferring a decision Pyx Py 5 transferring an image of the stage x yx y 4 y When the rank reflection re-of 6 the transformation iTyxy yx t taf aoyability skill 7 the transformation yxy yx I 8 the transformation 9 the chain 10 yxy Ayxy flexive control is raised these more complicated transformation chains can be used Ayx Ityxy 'yx Pyx neutralization of an opponent's deductions Again the serious student is directed to Lefebvre's works for more substantial and detailed explanations Druzhinin and Kontorov have indicated that the main types of reflexive control over an opponent are camouflage disinformation demonstration--a special way to convey information about one's readiness to begin an action and stimulation--which is synonymous with conveying information to cause an adversary to act in a predetermined manner The enemy's perceptions of the situation and his goals appear to be most 82 - - i susceptible to the influence of reflexive control In combat the situation may include such aspects as physical environment size and characteristics of forces technological development and current evolution of events Goals may include timely accomplishment of operations preservation of force capabilities and control of geographic locations all of which may be influenced by such approaches as a show of force presentation of uncertainties or a threat which prompts inappropriate countermeasures Reflexive control of other aspects of the opponent's decision algorithm may be more difficult to exercise but with proper understanding and simulation of the adversary's perspective may also be effectively accomplished One essential aspect of effective reflexive control involves avoidance of an underestimation of the enemy's abilities and of his rank of reflection both of which can seriously undermine the potential for exercising control It is also important to apply non-repeating techniques to prevent the opponent from deducing what means and methods are being applied and thus allowing him the opportunity to develop appropriate countermeasures To summarize let us rely on the words of the experts 2' Control of an opponent's decision which in the end is a forcing of a certain behavioral strategy on him through reflexive interaction is not achieved directly not by blatant force but by means of providing him with the grounds by which he is able to logically derive his own decision but one that is predetermined by the other side The transfer of grounds is a switching of X into the process of reflection of the situation by Y it is by this that X begins to control the decision making process z0- 1I Y 83 The process of transferring grounds for making decisions from one opponent to the other we call reflexive control Any deceitful movements provocation intrigues disin general are achievements of reflexive guises deceit control 147 It is hoped that this brief and sketchy overview has helped the reader to better understand the theory and to draw some connections between its technical aspects and the psychological underpinnings from which they developed These include the importance of control the desire to be prepared for any eventuality risk-aversion hypervigilance and awareness of others reflection and multiple-tier awareness the importance of understanding the adversary and purposeful scientific influence on the environment in order to bring about 'right conditions ' - -cybernetic We will now go on to examine how the application of principles overlaid on the psychocultural framework provided by the Russo-Soviet mindset appears to have stimulated the formalization of reflexive control theory in the U S S R A C Formalization and Development of the Theory During the 1950s there was an upsurge of interest in the subjects of Computer Science and scientific decision making in the Soviet Union Prior to this time it was believed that decision making was an art based on the experience and intuition as well as ideological conviction and loyalty to Party However based on the experiences of World War II and increasing realization of the high cost of decision errors there was a gradual realization of the need for a quantitative approach to decision making and for an increase in automation in technology and industry 148 At this same time in the Western world activities in the development of Cybernetics--the science of control of complex dynamic systems--were attracting attention in particular 84 LA L the work of such men as Norbert Wiener and W Ross Ashby At first cyber- netics was rejected in the U S S R as a reactionary pseudoscience contrary to Marxist doctrine However by 1956 the necessity to improve technology and decrease decision errors resulted in the acceptance of cybernetics and the establishment of the Cybernetics Institute It is interesting to note that in spite of this inauspicious beginning cybernetics theory has come to be embraced much more enthusiastically by the Soviets than by decision makers in the West where it appears to have gone into decline In particular the work of Ashby which is not widely respected in the West has become the cornerstone of cybernetic development in the U S S R One cannot help but speculate whether Ashby's statement- the theories of games and cybernetics are simply the foundations of the theory of How to Get Your Own Way Few theories can be richer in applications than that 1 4 9 --did not play a significant role in awakening Soviet interest in -J the field of cybernetics After all is this theory not at the heart of the ' 1 Soviet emphasis on control and the Soviet mindset in general In any case cybernetics and the related academic discipline of operations research developed simultaneously from these considerations and it is clear that both have impinged upon and influenced the other under the Soviet injunction that control must be developed scientifically V Operations research is defined by the Soviets as the application of quantitative mathematical methods to prepare decisions bound to be made in all the fields of objective bound human activity It begins whenever one or another mathematical tech- nique is applied to substantiate the decisions being taken '15 0 Important considerations to the Soviets when attempting to optimize a decision are what is the nature of unknown factors what is their origin and who I85 - ' WflU controls them yr - '- WT r' W_ r -L- W_7' PL-r -J 'rJ-U % ry % I 7 Measures of effectivenss MOEs in Soviet operations research take these unknown factors into account in their algorithms and attempt to optimize effectiveness in spite of them W - - measures of effectiveness specifactors fied and known unknown factors beforehand 5-' controllable variables It appears that interest in the theory of reflexive control -- which seeks to make uncertain situations more certain and to increase predictability and therefore control of the situation--may have been an outgrowth of this major concern of operations research as well as of the Soviet acceptance of and their interest in the study of control processes and flow of 'cybernetics information in systems In addition reflexive control appears to be an attempt to decrease some of the shortcomings inherent in the rigid structure of game theory as a problem solving device and at the same time to enhance the effectiveness of decision making using a combination of game and reflexive control theory or reflexive control theory on its own see Figure 15 and -Figure 16 It is at this point that the work of Vladimir Lefebvre became instrumental in the development of reflexive control theory Cybernetics was initially developed by the Soviets at the First Computer Center of the Ministry of Defense One of the major tasks of the institute during the early 1960s was to develop methods of optimization of the decision making process Lefebvre worked in a sub-uit of the institute developing algorithms for the automation of computers under the leadership of Colonel 86 -47 Figure 15 CLOSED CYBERNETIC CONTROL LOOP COMMAND INFORMATION reflexive control would be exercised here CONTROL OBJECT CONTROL ELEMENT Y ' Sense Process Com pare Decide A ct FEEDBACK ' from Lifshits 1984 8 4 8 7 o % % % % % % % o % % o o o--i sis- %%' Figure 16 RELATIONSHIP OF CYBERNETICS TO REFLEXIVE CONTROL THEORY Developed within Operations Research but partially subsumed under the I C3 Making Decision of umbrella larger CYBERNETICS 3 DECISION MAKING I C OPERATIONS RESEARCH REFLEXIVE CONTROL 'a - 4 N % 4 N N N N Nt 88 a ' Tkachenko In 1963 Lefebvre proposed a different approach to the problem from the game theory methods being employed by the other scientists involved He proposed that there was a need to organize a special 'modeling system' consisting of three subsystems 1 a unit to simulate one's own decisions 2 a unit to simulate the adversary's decisions and 3 a decision making unit In response to criticisms that the principle of guaranteed results must be followed and that decisions must be independent of the decisions of the adversary he suggested the concept of reflexive control He argued that in making his decision the adversary uses information about the arena of conflict about his troops and the opposing force's and about combat ability Lefebvre set forth the concept of influencing the enemy's channels of information and actually shifting the flow of information in a way favorable to the decision maker by influencing the adversary to make a false 'optimal' decision--optimal in fact to the opposing side Thus reflexive control formalized a model of looking at conflict situations which included both objective and subjective factors In 1964 Lefebvre proposed a positional indexation for the elements involved in decision making Elements such as goal doctrine map and decision were assigned indices which allowed researchers to describe an iterative process of decision making in condensed form Using syn ols to represent these elements algebraic representation or algorithms can be used to model the process of decision making eliminating the difficulties and obscurities of graphics an natural language Lefebvre's ideas were followed by experiments which proved their efficacy and creativity and the newly labeled theory of reflexive control quickly began to attract interest and advocates especially in the military realm where its advantages and potential applications became readily appa-ent 1 5 1 - 89 In 1968 a KGB agent named Panov published a classified report of Lefebvre's work and it is rumored that the KGB organized its own laboratory reflexive studies 'of According to Lefebvre himself the theory of reflexive control became a classified subject shortly following the publication of Panov's report which lends support to the viewpoint that it is considered an extremely valuable concept by the Soviet leadership Military interest heightened with the publication of K V Tarakanov's book Mathematics and Armed Conflict in 1974 and particularly with Druzhinin and Kontorov's Problems of Military Systems Engineering in 1976 These highly ranked officers of the Soviet Army's General Headquarters claim that it is widely used in pedagogical political diplomatic and administrative activities In military affairs they discuss the excellent results reflexive control engenders in the training and control of troops and the development of effective leadership in addition to the obvious goal of control of the adversary 1 5 2 See Figure 17 for a graphical depiction of the development of reflexive control theory in the U S S R Reflexive control is treated as a well known topic among Soviet officers and is referred to quite often in officer directed publications and handbooks whereas in American military publications and in Western literature in general it is a topic which seldom confronts the researcher and when it does commonly only in reference to reflexive control as a relatively minor component of Soviet decision making It appears that it is past time for American analysts to realize that reflexive control is in fact an integral valuable and potentially very lethal part of the Soviet decision making process especially since the advent of cybernetics as an important science and as such is worthy of much greater attention and research--a viewpoint which the formalized theory's originator himself Dr Lefebvre has expressed very strongly -90 FIGURE 17 THE CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORMALIZED REFLEXIVE CONTROL THEORY- origin of the idea of reflexive control In u 01168 Lefebvre 1963-64 1 41 L 4 development of the main concepts of reflexive control In NIIAA Lefebvre's group 1965-67 Leebre Panv' Conflicting Structures 196967 classified report adeatnt 1969 Algdera of conflict araano Meatpematiand Armte Dcison 197 deeomnoftedvlpntfth Druzuni aLme reflnveii Connol i n fChitldt 1 iKcntorov eecio 72 Fro LeeveK A oelxvCnrl p ct taeoro rzii IV Conclusion A Summary of Key Points In this paper an attempt has been made to trace the development of the theory of reflexive control in the Soviet Union with particular emphasis on the possible psychocultural and historical factors which have contributed to its development The first section was devoted to an overview of the present state of Soviet-American relations especially to the existence of vast differences in world view and terms of reference between the two countries These differences have contributed to the development of misperceptions and often erroneous strategic assumptions within the American perspective on the Soviet Union and Sovietologists have long stressed the necessity of viewing events from the Soviet perspective and avoidance of the assumption of external symmetry Attention was also drawn to some of the crucial topics pertaining to the formation of decision making processes which differentiate the two countries These include different emphases on control and strategy issues and the direct linear decision patterns of Americans as opposed to a systems approach characterized by subtle and devious practices which typifies Soviet decision making The Soviet emphasis on the importance of cognition and reflection was also highlighted The next section concentrated on an examination of some of the factors in the Russo-Soviet historical experience and traditional psychocultural patterns which have contributed to the development of a distinctively Soviet mindset and world view These in turn have influenced the process of decision making Two hypotheses were presented in this discussion the first being that components of reflexive control have been utilized throughout Soviet K 92 history and the second being that reflexive control represents an integral aspect of Soviet decision making and as such reflects the Russo-Soviet emphasis on control and creation of 'right ' predictable conditions Due to the impossibility of scientifically validating these hypotheses it cannot be said that they have been proved as presented here However it is felt that there is strong evidence to support the belief that such trends and practices in Soviet decision making do indeed exist and have had solid grounding in historical and psychocultural predispositions several of which were discussed at length It cannot be denied that the Soviet historical experience has been not only unique in its own right but also diametrically -i different from the American one especially in regard to harshness of conditions predominantly authoritarian often ruthless government over the centuries -and These factors appear to have engendered a distinctively Soviet outlook on life 4 ' and methodology of dealing with the world which has over time exhibited tendencies toward hypervigilance multiple-tier awareness risk-aversion ambiguity and deviousness in relationships and behavior and a deep felt need for control often of a reflexive nature Marxism-Leninism in spite of its professed aim to create the new Soviet man has in many respects merely incorporated--although perhaps improving upon--some very traditionally Russian behavioral traits and ways of interfacing with society and the world It is interesting to note that Vladimir Lefebvre in a student seminar on reflexive control at the Naval Postgraduate School felt it was important to point out that in the Soviet Union guessing games utilizing the basic principles of reflexive control theory are as common and popular among elementary school children as jump rope is among American students This fact appears to support the thesis 93 44 4 4' 44 C' that reflection and control sometimes combined together as reflexive control are pervasive and integral aspects of the Soviet experience The consistently superior performance of Soviet players in international chess championships as well as the enormity and effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda network are two other factors which seem to lend credence to the validity of this viewpoint Further and more scientific research is of course required for substantiation and validation of these apparent trends In the next major section an attempt was made to show how the theory of reflexive control became transformed from a subconscious informal model of decision making into a formalized scientific and mathematically grounded science The hypothesis presented here was that the science of cybernetics played a major contributing role in this regard This hypothesis is much easier to substantiate if not to actually prove simply because the Soviets have been so open in expressing their interest and belief in cybernetics and due to their extensive research into its varied applications Not only is the closed cybernetic control loop without the necessity of feedback at the heart of reflexive control theory but also the major developer of the theory Dr Lefebvre was conducting research directly related to cybernetics and _ scientific decision making at the time of his presentation of reflexive control There is evidence to show that certain concepts of W Ross Ashby's such as requisite variety amplification and the theory of how to get your own way were instrumental in stimulating the development of nebulous concepts into a scientific theory of decision making as well The fact that research on reflexive control is now a classified endeavor in the Soviet Union also appears to support the hypothesis that it is a theory of far greater importance and value than currently realized 94 - --- - - - - - o Thus it appears although it cannot be scientifically proven at this point in the research that the Soviet Union has provided fertile soil-historically psychoculturally and scientifically--for the growth of a highly complex and potentially powerful method of decision making influence and control which can be termed reflexive control theory Let us now examine the importance of the reality of reflexive control to the Western world B Implications for the Future There are undoubtedly many who would argue that even if reflexive control does in fact exist and is in fact being practiced it is not a factor of much consequence in the broad spectrum of military and political affairs After all historian Hannah Arendt 153 economist John Kenneth Galbraith 154 and sociologists Raven and Kruglanski 155 have conclusively demonstrated that methods of gaining influence and power have existed in every society and have been utilized in conflict situations since the beginning of history These methods of influence from informational to referential to coercive have been 4 exhaustively studied and documented and their strengths and shortcomings illustrated American society is certainly not devoid of attempts to influence and control public opinion and mind control Many would point to the great coercive potential of the mass media and commercial advertising as an American example of reflexive control 'a However there are important differences which must be kept in mind when trying to equate Soviet reflexive control with other forms of influence intensity of the practices These include the cope purpose and Attempting to gain influence is qualitatively different from attempting to gain total control on the military and political front cannot be considered as adomination 95 'a7 Practices which aim to gain innocuous and harmless as practices designed to sell a particular brand of soap or toothpaste and this important distinction should not be overlooked In addition it appears that reflexive control has the flexibility and ability to incorporate thereby decreasing the shortcomings inherent in other forms of influence such as informational and referential and thus should be op considered a potentially much stronger and more foolproof method of exercising control than the majority of older and more widely understood methods Others will undoubtedly argue that reflexive control can never really be developed into a scientific method due to the impossibility of reducing thought processes and psychological functioning to quantitative exact objects of control and is therefore ineffectual This may be true but one distinct advantage of thinking in terms of reflexive control--whether or not it can ever be developed into a perfect science of control--is that it forces the potential user to develop a mindset in which understanding the enemy thinking through moves and countermoves and attempting to develop a rigorous methodological approach to analyzing strategic problems and making optimal decisions is of utmost importance This emphasis on formulating goals to work toward and gaining advantage through thorough knowledge of the thought processes and orientation of the opponent has been strikingly absent from U S historical experience--both military and diplomatic--and has in many instances given the Soviets a distinct advantage The orientation toward reflexive control may be as potentially dangerous as the execution of the theory itself One final important consideration must be addressed It is widely acknowledged that in addition to research into reflexive control the Soviet Union is supporting other psychic research at a much higher and more official 96 Lo ' ' c '' 'g ' ' g ' - ' ' level than is true of the United States Since the nineteenth century the Soviets have been interested in developing a means for hypnotic control of behavior at a distance This interest has been extended in recent years by potentially aggressive psychic experimentation having as its main goal the modification of the behavior and feelings of remote humans by psychic means Much official research in the U S S R appears to be directed toward developing psychic abilities as a means of control and manipulation therefore Targ and Harary have pointed out Reliable publicly available information about psi research can help protect us all from the damaging effects of misinformation Learning to discriminate our own psychic impressions from externally induced us suggestions by others may also ultimately protect 15 6 from the possibility- of psychic manipulation Here we are talking about a refinement and application of reflexive control at a highly developed level If American analysts continue to discount or minimize the potential importance of this theory and its applications a position of extreme vulnerability may be the result The critics and the skeptics may of course be right after all There may be very little threat to the Western world from the apparent Soviet orientation toward the use and development of reflexive control theory and other related methodologies Perhaps there is no threat at all Men like Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet correspondent Vladimir Pozner with their 9 sophistication skilled rhetoric and urbane Western manner have done much to reassure many Westerners that there has been a significant and deep rooted change in Soviet attitudes and goals and that the Soviets truly are becoming ' just like us Even Western statesmen as astute and discerning as Great Britain's Margaret Thatcher have been impressed with Gorbachev's charm and 97 ------------ rw r r-------- have expressed the optimistic belief that finally there is a Soviet leader in the Kremlin with whom the Western powers can negotiate without reed for obsessive suspicion and an overly defensive posture It is important to keep in mind however that the appearance of non-threat and non-influence is an important component in fact probably the principle element of reflexive control theory For this reason the present or future appearance of non-threat in superpower relations should not become cause for complacency As Knorr and Morgan have emphasized in their research into strategic surprise to be alert in threat perception is prudent even when conflict situations do not look alarmingly dangerous 157 - -p S V98 S FOOTNOTES 1 Beaumont Roger A The Soviet Command Structure The Three Headed Serpent Signal Journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics-As-sociation Burke Virginia Volume 39 Number 4 December 1984 p 40 2 Moose Paul H A Systems View if Deception in Daniel D C and Herbig K L Eds Strategic Military Deception Pergamon Press New York 1982 p 147 3 Burhans William A Opposing Views Radar Wars Journal of Electronic Defense Volume 6 Number 10 USPS 438-690 October 1983 pp 35-36 4 Lefebvre Vladimir A Reflexive Control The Soviet Concept of Influencing on Adversary's Decision Making Process Science Applications Inc SAI-84-UZ4-FSRC-E Englewood Colorado February 1984 p 4 5 Hough Jerry F Soviet Leadership in Transition The Brookings Institution Washington 0 Co 1980 pp 4-5 -and 6 Powell William S and Taylor James G The Soviet Perspective on the Nature Evaluation of Command and Control Alphatech Inc Burlington Massachusetts October 1983 p 3 7__ World Echoes Across the Gap Time 3 September 1984 p 48 8 Taksar Michael Notes to the Stanford Community Regarding Soviet Scientists informal report Stanford University 1984 p 32 9 London Kurt Ed The Soviet Union in World Politics Westview Press Boulder Colorado 1980 p ix 10 Penkovskiy 0 The Penskovskiy Papers Doubleday New York 1965 chap 3 11 Crozier Brian Ed The Peacetime Strategy of the Soviet Union Report of a Study Group of the Institute for the Study of Conflict London 1973 p 18 12 February March 12 Lefebvre Vladimir A op cit pp 125-126 13 Shubik Martin in an Honorarium on Gaming and Game Theory presented at the Naval Postgraduate School July 1984 14 Bathurst Robert On Creating an Enemy Naval War College Review 34 Number 6 1981 p 13 15 Ibid p 14 16 Editorial The Pressing Tasks of Ideological Work Pravda Moscow 8 July 1972 17 Mitchell R Judson Ideology of a Superpower Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations Hoover Press Publications Stanford University California 1982 p 131 W w'h % ' _w %T ' ' w -' % - 'T J ' o ' 00 - 18 Powell W S and Taylor J G op cit p 13 19 Ibid p 26 20 Boguslavsky B M et al ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism Progress Publishers Moscow 1975 21 Feuer Lewis S Dialectical Materialism and Soviet Science in Marsak Leonard M Ed The Rise of Science in Relation to Society The MacMillan Company New York 1964 p 109 22 Homans George C The Nature of Social Science Harcourt Brace and World Inc New York 1967 p 46 23 Feuer L S op cit pp 119-120 24 Ibid p 109 25 Schapiro Leonard Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy in London Kurt Ed op cit p 19 26 Hall Edward T Beyond Culture Anchor Books Anchor Press Doubleday Garden City New York 1976 pp 105-116 27 Byely B Col ret et al Marxism-Leninism On War and Army Progress Publishers Moscow 1972 28 Crozier Brian Ed op cit p 31 29 Clews John G Communist Propaganda Techniques Frederick A Praeger Publishers New York 1964 p 78 30 Bouscaren Anthony T Imperial Communism Public Affairs Press Washington D C 1953 p 32 31 Ibid p 6 32 Gibert Stephen P Soviet Images of America Crane Russak and Company Inc New York 1977 p 17 33 Lenin V What is to be Done in Clews J S op cit p 214 34 Collins John M Grand Strategy Principles and Practices Naval Institute Press Annapolis Maryland 1973 p 116 35 Gibert Stephen P op cit p 45 36 Brezhnev Leonid comments at a dinner in Moscow honoring Fidel Castro 27 June 1972 in Crozier B Ed op cit p 1 37 Labin Suzanne The Technique of Soviet Propaganda United States Government Printing Office Washington D C 1960 p 3 100 ' - - - - - -- - - - - - - - 38 Collins John M op cit p 288 39 Crozier B Ed op cit p 10 40 Taksar M op cit p 24 41 Ibid p 23 42 Dallin Alexander The United States in the Soviet Perspective in Bertram Christoph Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's The MacMillan Press Ltd London 1980 p 33 43 Clews John C op cit p 12 44 Fehrenbach T R op cit p 637 45 Lefebvre Vladimir A The Algebra of Conscience A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems D Reidel Publishing Company Dordrecht Holland 1982 p xiii 46 Ibid p xiii 47 Ibid pp 87-88 48 Stalin Josef in Fehrenbach T R op cit p 532 49 Ozernoy Vladimir M in a lecture on Operations Research in the U S S R Naval Postgraduate School Monterey California 19 September 1984 50 Bouscaren A T op cit p v 51 Solzhenitsyn Aleksandr I in Aftenposten Oslo Norway 11 September 1973 52 Powell W S and Taylor J G op cit p 11 53 Ibid p 47 54 Ibid p 31 0 55 Ibid p 51 56 Buslenko N P Modelirovaniye slozhnykh sistem Modeling of Complex Systems Nauka Moscow 1968 57 Powell W S and Taylor J G op cit 58 Collins John M op cit p 87 59 Ibid p 110 101 60 Ulam Adam B Dangerous Relations The Soviet Union in World Politics 1970-1982 Oxford University Press New York 1983 p 228 - 61 Ibid p 233 62 Hemsley J Soviet Troop Control Brassey's Publishers Limited Oxford 1982 p 9 63 Ulam op cit p 64 64 Fehrenbach op cit p 64 65 Sarbin Theodore R Prolegomenon to a Theory of Counter-Deception in Daniel D C and Herbig K L Strategic Military Deception Pergamon Press New York 1982 p 151 66 Greider William U S -Sponsored Terrorism Rolling Stone Vol 13 6 December 1984 pp 16-21 67 Revel Jean-Francois The Totalitarian Temptation Doubleday and Company Inc Garden City New York 1977 p 23 translated by David Hapgood 68 Whence the Threat to Peace 3rd Edition Military Publishing House Voyenizdat Moscow 1984 69 Gvozdev Y and Alexandrov Y Grenada U S Terrorism in Action Documents Facts Comments Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow I1983 70 International Terrorism and the CIA Documents Eyewitness Reports Facts Progress Publishers Moscow 1983 translated by Dmitry Belyavsky 71 Kashlev Yuri Information Imperialism Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow 1984 72 Beaumont Roger The Soviet Command Structure The Three Headed Serpent Si nal Journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics ssociation Burke Virginia Volume 39 Number 4 December 1984 p 40 73 Ashby Eric Scientist in Russia Penguin Books Middlesex England 1947 pp 117-118 74 Vakar Nicholas The Taproot of Soviet Society Harper and Brothers Publishers New York 1961 p ix 75 Mehnert Klaus Soviet Man and His World Frederick A Praeger Publishers New York 1962 p 54 76 Berdiaev Nikolai A The Origin of Russian Communism London 1937 p 38 102 I m - ' - 77 Vakar Nicholas op cit p 13 78 Hough Jerry F Soviet Leadership in Transition The Brookings Institution Washington 0 C 1980 p 7 79 Raven B H and Kruglanski A W Conflict and Power in Swingle J The Structure of Conflict Academic Press Inc New York 1970 p 80 80 Cullen Robert B Dispatches November 19 1984 p 26 A Journey in the Slow Lane Newsweek 81 Kubalkova V And Cruickshank A A Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations Routledge and Kegan Paul london 1980 pp 38-39 82 Lenin V I in Druzhinin V V and Kontorov D S Concept Algorithm Decision A Soviet View Soviet Military Thought Vol 6 translated and published under the auspices of the U S Air Force 1972 p 257 83 Hall E T op cit p 12 84 Druzhinin V V and Kontorov D S Problems of Military Systems Engineering Voprosy voyennoy sistemotekhniki Voyenizdat Moscow 1976 ' 85 Fromm Erich Escape from Freedom Holt Rinehart and Winston New York 1941 86 International Svetlana's Sad Odyssey Newsweek November 19 1984 p 69 87 Mehnert Klaus op cit p 197 88 Gibert Stephen P op cit p 28 89 Cullen Robert B op cit pp 22 26 90 Whence the Threat to Peace op cit p 68 91 Ibid p 4 92 Reshetar John S The Soviet Polity p 54 93 Hingley Ronald The Russian Mind Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1977 p 36 94- _ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary G C Merriam Company Springfield Massachusetts 1976 p 920 95 Reshetar John op cit p 53 96 Ibid 103 - - - - - - -- % - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - 97 Mehnert op cit p 35 98 Adomeit Hannes Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior George Allen and Unwin London 1982 99 Eaton Merrill T et al Psychiatry 3rd Edition Medical Examination Publishing Company Inc New York 1976 pp 12-15 100 Brehm Jack W and Cohen Arthur R Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance John Wiley and Sons Inc New York 1962 pp 160-162 101 Ibid p 170 102 Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conscience op cit pp 61-65 84 103 Raven Bertram H and Kruglanski Arie W Conflict and Power in Swingle Paul The Structure of Conflict Academic Press Inc New York 1970 p 719 104 Reshetar op cit p 53 105 Goldman Marshall I U S S R in Crisis The Failure of an Economic System W W Norton and Company New York 1983 p 115 106 Brehm J W and Cohen A R op cit p 163 107 Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conscience op cit p 76 108 Reshetar J op cit pp 52-53 109 Hingley op cit p 24 Headed Serpent 110 Beaumont Roger A The Soviet Command Structure The Three Signal Journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics s-sociation Volume 39 Number 4 Burke Virginia December 1984 p 38 111 Bronfenbrenner Urie Two Worlds of Childhood U S and U S S R Touchstone Books New York 1974 pp 40-46 112 Lefebvre V A and Smolyan G L Algebra of Conflict complete translation of Russian-language booklet Algebra konflikta 1968 translation available through JPRS 52700 1911 113 Hingley op cit p 206 114 Ibid p 108 115 Ibid p 89 116 Ibid p P5 117 Beaumont Roger A Maskirovka Soviet Camouflage Concealment and Deception Stratech Studies SS82-1 Center for Strategic Technolo'gy Texas 104 A M University College Station Texas November 1982 p 36 118 Hingley Ronald op cit p 108 119 Ibid p 98 120 Berner Wolfgang et al Eds The Soviet Union 1980-1981 Domestic Policy the Economy Foreign Policy Volume 6 Holmes and Meier Publishers New York 1983 pp 8Z-85 121 Hingley op cit p 91 122 Ibid p 97 123 Thomas Richard E Foreword in Beaumont Roger A Maskirovka op _cit p vii 124 Ibid p 9 125 Hopple Gerald W Intelli gence and Warning Lessons in Watson Bruce W and Dunn Peter M Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War Views from the United States Westview Press Boulder Colorado 1984 p 102 126 Konev I Year of Victory Progress Publishers Moscow 1969 127 Chuikov V I The End of the Third Reich Progress Publishers Moscow 1978 128 Beaumont R A op cit p 20 129 Beaumont Roger A Horizontal Escalation Patterns and Paradoxes Stratech Studies SS83-1 Center for Strategic Technology Texas A M University College Station Texas April 1983 pp 51-52 130 Rubinstein Alvin Z Western Europe in London Kurt Ed op cit p 99 131 Schapiro Leonard Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy in London Kurt Ed op cit p 13 132 Ibid p 83 133 Vinocur John Insights Intellectual Europe Changes Sides on U S as Hero or Ogre International Herald Tribune Wednesday 16 May 1984 134 Rubinstein Alvin V op cit p 103 135 Triska et al Pattern and Level of Risk in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making 1945-1963 The Studies of the Communist System Stanford University Press 1964 p 4 136 Ibid p 5 105 137 Adomeit Hannes op cit 138 Rubinstein A V op cit p 102 139 Ashby W Ross An Introduction to Cybernetics Science Editions John Wiley and Sons Inc New York 1963 140 Beaumont R A Maskirovka op cit pp 30 79 N ' 141 Beaumont R A The Soviet Command Structure op cit p 37 142 Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conflict op cit p 45 143 Druzhinin V A and Kontorov D S Voprosy voyennoy sistemotekhniki Problems of Military Systems Engineering Voyenizdat Moscow 1976 144 Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conflict op cit p 18 N145 Personal interview with Dr V A Lefebvre Naval Postgraduate School 12 September 1984 146 Lefebvre V A Reflexive Control op cit pp 144-145 147 Lefebvre V A Algebra of Conflict op cit p 34 148 Ozernoy Vladimir M in a lecture on Operations Research in the U S S R Naval Postgraduate School Monterey California 19 September 1984 149 Ashby W Ross op cit p 35 150 Wentzel Elena S Operations Research A Methodological Approach Mir Publishers Moscow 1983 translated by Michael G Edelev S151 Lefebvre V A Reflexive Control op cit pp 5-31 152 Druzhinin V A and Kontorov D S Problems of Military Systems Engineering op cit pp 334-348 153 Arendt Hannah The Origins of Totalitarianism Harcourt Brace and Company New York 1951 154 Galbraith John Kenneth The Anatomy of Power Houghton Mifflin Publishers Boston 1983 155 Raven B H and Kruglanski A W cit 156 Targ Russell and Harary Keith The-Mind Race Understanding and Using Psychic Abilities epilogue by Larissa Vilenskaya Villard Books New York 1984 p 9 157 Knorr Klaus and Morgan Patrick Eds Strategic Military Surprise Incentives and Opportunities Transaction Books New Brunswick New Jersey 196J pp i9U-19' 106 - r A REFERENCES International Terrorism and the CIA Documents Eyewitness Reports Facts Progress Publishers Moscow 1983 S_ _ _ Whence the Threat to Peace 3rd Edition Military Publishing HOuse Voyenizdat Moscow 1984 Adomeit Hannes Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior George Allen and Unwin London 198Z Arendt Hannah The Origins of Totalitarianism Harcourt Brace and Company New York 1951 Ashby Eric Scientist in Russia Penguin Books Ashby W Ross An Introduction to Cybernetics Science Editions John Wiley and Sons Inc New York 1956 Bathurst Robert B On Creating an Enemy Naval War College Review Vol 34 Number 6 Beaumont Roger A Horizontal Escalation 7atterns and Paradoxes Stratech Studies SS83-1 Center for StratEJic Technology Texas A M University College Station Texas April 1983 Beaumont Roger A Maskirovka Soviet Camouflage Concealment and Deception Stratech Studies SSZ-1 Center for Strategic Technology Texas A M University College Station Texas November 1982 Beaumont Roger A The Soviet Command Structure The Three-Headed Serpent Sinal Journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics AssocicTation Burke Virginia Vol 39 Number 4 December 1984 Berdiaev Nikolai A The Origin of Russian Communism London 1937 Berner Wolfgang et al Eds The Soviet Union 1980-1981 Domestic Policy The Economy Foreign Policy Volume 6 Holmes and Meier Publishers New York 1983 Bertram Christoph Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s Archon Books London 1980 Boguslavsky B M et al ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism Progress Publishers Moscow 1975 Bouscaren Anthony T Imperial Communism Public Affairs Press Washington 0 C 1953 Brehm Jack W and Cohen Arthur R Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance John Wiley and Sons Inc New York 1962 107 Bronfrenbrenner Urie Two Worlds of Childhood Books New York 1974 U S and U S S R Touchstone Burhans William A Opposing Views Radar Wars Part I and Part II Journal of Electronic Defense Arlington Virginia October November 1983 Buslenko N P Modelirovaniye slozhnykh sistem Modeling of Complex Systems Nauka Moscow 1968 ' S Byely B Col ret et al Marxism-Leninism Publishers Moscow 1972 On War and Army Progress Chepikov I The Integration of Science Progress Publishers Moscow 1978 Chuikov V I Marshal of the Soviet Union The End of the Third Reich Progress Publishers Moscow 1978 -ers Clews John C Communist Propaganda Techniques Frederick A Praeger PublishNew York 1964 Collins John 4 Grand Strategy Principles and Practices Naval Institute Press Annapolis Maryland 1973 Crozier Brian Ed The Peacet'pe Strategy of the Soviet Union Institute for the Study of Confllh t London 1973 Daniel Donald C and Herbig Katherine L Strategic Military Deception Pergamon Press New York 1982 DeGeorge Richard T Patterns of Soviet Thought The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor Michigan 1966 Druzhinin V V and Kontorov D S Ideya algoritm resheniye Concept Algorithm Decision Voyenizdat Moscow translation available from U S Government Printing Office 1975 Druzhinin V V and Kontorov D S Voprosy voyennoy sistemotekhniki Problems of Military Systems Engineering Voyenizdat Moscow 1976 Fehrenbach T R This Kind of War Korea A Study in Unpreparedness The MacMillan Company New York 1963 Fromm Erich Escape from Freedom Holt Rinehart and Winston New York 1948 _ S Galbraith John Kenneth The Anatomy of Power Houghton Mifflin Publishers Boston 1983 Gibert Stephen P Soviet Images of America Crane Russak and Company Inc New York 1977 Goldman Marshall I U S S R in Crisis The Failure of an Economic System W W Norton and Company New York 1983 108 Gvozdev Y and Alexandrov Y Grenada U S Terrorism in Action Documents Facts Comments Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow 1983 Hall Edward T Beyond Culture Anchor Press Doubleday Garden City New York 1976 Hemsley John Soviet Troop Control The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military system Brassey's Publishers Limited Oxford 1982 Hingley Ronald The Russian Mind Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1977 Hoffman Erik P and Fleron Frederic J Jr Eds The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy Aldine Publishing Company New York 1980 Homans George C The Nature of Social Science Harcourt Brace and World Inc New York 1967 Hough Jerry R Soviet Leadership in Transition The Brookings Institution Washington D C 1980 Jordan Zbigniew A The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis MacMillan and Company Limited London 1967 Kashlev Yuri Information Imperialism Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow 1984 Knorr Klaus and Morgan Patrick Strategic Military Surprise Incentives and Opportunities Transaction Books New Brunswick New Jersey 1983 Konev I Year of Victory Progress Publishers Moscow 1969 Kubalkova V and Cruickshank A A Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations Routledge and Kegan Paul London 1980 Labin Suzanne The Technique of Soviet Propaganda United States Government Printing Office Washington D C 1960 Lefebvre Vladimir A and Smolyan G L Algebra of Conflict complete translation of Russian-language booklet Algebra konflikta 1968 translation available through JPRS 52700 1971 2 Lefebvre Vladimir A Algebra of Conscience A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems D Reidel Publishing Company Dordrecht Holland 1982 Lefebvre Vladimir A and Batchelder William H The Nature of Soviet Mathematical Psychology Journal of Mathematical Psychology 23 1981 Lefebvre Vladimir A and Lefebvre Victorina D Reflexive Control The Soviet Concept of Influencing an Adversary s Decislon making rocess Science Applications Inc Englewood Colorado 1984 109 Lefebvre Vladimir A The Structure of Awareness Toward a Symbolic Language of Human Reflexion Sage Publications Inc Beverly Hills CA 1917 London Kurt Ed The Soviet Union in World Politics Westview Press Boulder Colorado 1780 Mager N H and Katel Jacques Conquest Without War A Trident Press Book Simon and Schuster New York 1961 Marsak Leonard M The Rise of Science in Relation to Society The MacMillan Company New York 1964 Mehnert Klaus Soviet Man and His World Praeger Publishers New York 1962 translated from the German Miller Wright Russians as People E P Dutton and Company Inc New York 1961 Mitchell R Judson Ideology of a Superpower Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations Stanford University cA Hoover Institu'tio Press 1982 Penkovskiy 0 The Penskoviy Papers Doubleday New York 1965 Piel Gerard Science in the Cause of Man Alfred A Knopf Publishers New York 1962 Powell William S and Taylor James G The Soviet Perspective on the Nature and Evaluation of Command and Control Alphatec' Inc Burlington Massachusetts 1983 Reshetar John S Jr The Soviet Polity Frederick A Praeger Publishers New York 1968 S Revel Jean-Francois The Totalitarian Temptation Doubleday and Company Garden City New York 1977 translated by David Hapgood Inc Shelyag V V et al Eds Military Psychology A Soviet View Soviet Military Thought Series translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force Moscow 1972 Shubik Martin Games for Society Business and War Towards a Theory of Gamin Yale University Press New Haven Connecticut 1975 Spiro Robert H Jr 'Neo-Paciflsm is Antl-Peace ' Army January 1984 Swingle Paul The Structure of Conflict Academic Press Inc New York 1970 I Targ Russell and Harary Keith The Mind Race Understanding and Using Psychi Abilities epilogue by Larissa Vilenskayi VilIard Books New York 110 --- -io - - - Taylor James G Initial Concept of Soviet C2 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey California 1985 Triska et al Pattern and Level of Risk in Soviet Foreign Policy-Making 1945-1963 The Studies of the Communist System Stanford University Press CA 1964 Tschebotarioff Gregory P Russia My Native Land McGraw-Hill Book Company New York 1964 Ulam Adam B Dangerous Relations The Soviet Union in World Politics 19701982 Oxford University Press New York 1983 Vakar Nicholas P The Taproot of Soviet Society Harper and Brothers Publishers New York 1961 Vinocur John Insights Intellectual Europe Changes Sides on U S as Hero or Ogre International Herald Tribune Wednesday May 16 1984 Watson Bruce W and Dunn Peter 4 Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War Views from the'United States Westview Press Boulder Colorado 1984 Wentzel Elena S Operations Research A Methodological Approach Mir Publishers Moscow 1983 translated by Michael G Edelev SP Wildavsky Aaron Ed Beyond Containment Alternative American Policies Toward the Soviet Union Institute for Contemporary Studies Press San Francisco California 1983 4_0 4 4 o 111 p % 'NW pP 4 d APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 1 Leonard Schapiro makes the important point that over a period of 20 years or so a combination of propaganda some intimidation and skillful foreign policy leadership has enabled the U S S R to consolidate a socialist gain He states in particular that Western perceptions of threat in the 1960s and 1970s has been far less than in the 1940s and 1950s notwithstanding evidence which should have led to a different conclusion see page 68 One must speculate whether such a widespread misperception could possibly be the result of some form of reflexive control on the Western cognitive arena in London Kurt Ed op cit pp 14 83 Beaumont also addresses this subject when he states Within the logic of maskirovka the Soviet threat long visible has not come to a crescendo in spite of small hot wars espionage propaganda and sabotage nor will it Therefore it becomes accepted by many that part or most or all of the threat is in the eye of the beholder or that there is no threat or that a clear decision or major clash may never come as it was with the Catholic-Protestant Wars Such an extreme extrapolation of the logic of maskirovka conforms to the Leninist aphorism about lulling the bourgeoisie and smashing with a clenched fist at the maximum moment of relaxation but if the mill grinds on successfully such a blow might never be needed One could after all have a struggle in which loss would only be seen in hindsight or in which it would never be seen or felt Maskirovka p 33 In professing the desire to avoid warfare between the two superpowers Mikhail Gorbachev as well as Ronald Reagan has been seen on American television expressing the hope that if our youth meet let it be on the playing field instead of on the battlefield advertisement for the Goodwill Games July 1986 2 Penkovskiy's anecdote runs as follows One thing must be clearly understood If someone were to hand to an American general an English general and a Soviet general the same set of objective facts and scientific data with instructions that these facts and data must be accepted as unimpeachable and an analysis made and conclusions drawn on the basis of them it is possible that the American and the Englishman would reach similar conclusions--I don't know But the Soviet general would arrive at conclusions which would be radically different from the other two This is because first of all he begins from a completely different set of basic premises and preconceived ideas namely the Marxian concepts of the structure of society and the course of history Second the logical process in his mind is totally unlike that of his Western counterparts because he uses Marxist dialectics whereas they will use some form of deductive reasoning Third a different set of moral laws governs and restricts the behavior-of the Soviet Fourth the Soviet general's aims will be radically different from those of the American and the Englishman 112 -laration cit 3 In Fehrenbach's study of the Korean War he highlights the effectiveness of external symmetry when discussing the great success of Korean brainwashing techniques used against American Prisoners of War This method involved the use of highly skilled Korean propaganda agents who were chosen and trained specifically for the task of winning the hearts and minds of the American POWs primarily captured Air Force officers These agents presented themselves to the prisoners possessing an excellent accentless and virtually faultless command of the English language as well as a solid grounding in American history and culture They were able to quote verbatim from the Decof Independence and the Constitution all the while pointing out the shortcomings of the reality of American society and the corruption and injustice inherent in the capitalist system of government By presenting this image of similarity and by discussing issues using the prisoners' own terms of reference and cognitive framework the propaganda agents were able to lower the prisoners' resistance to mind control processes and were extremely successful in attaining their goal of inducing submissiveness and even gaining converts to their cause This in spite of the fact that the majority of prisoners had undergone training in proper conduct for prisoners of war Fehrenbach op pp 180-214 I 4- 4 To cite an example even prior to the advent of detente in July 1951 during the height of the Korean War the Soviets introduced an English language publication entitled News In this journal the peace policy was given full play specifically for T-e-English speaking audience the theme being that peaceful coexistence between the Soviet and Western worlds was possible if only the U S would abandon its warmongering get out of Korea and recognize-oimmunist China A strenuous and markedly successful effort was made to appeal to the peace at any price advocates in the West and to amplify the timid yet building pressure on the U S government to make every necessary concession to the communists in order to keep the peace Bouscaren op cit p 36 5 The Tartar Yoke refers to that period in history characterized by the invasions of Russia by Mongol-Tartars beginning in 1223 and ending with the sack of Kiev in 1240 From this time until approximately 1480 when Ivan III and other Russian rulers finally rid themselves of Tartar rule and became masters of their own principalities the Tartar khans served as overlords of the Russian people They ruled in such an excessively bloodthirsty and arbitrary unpredictable manner that to this day the words 'Mongol-Tartar rule' elicit an image of brutality and ruthlessness Collier's Encyclopedia 1983 Vol 20 p 282 113 6 It is interesting to note that the poster on truthfulness contains a - portrait of Pioneer Pavlik Morozov During the period of collectivization Pavlik denounced his own father as a collaborator with the Kulaks testified against him in court leading to his father being sentenced to death and was subsequently killed by the people of the village to avenge his father's death He is now considered a martyr in the cause of communism and is revered for his high ethical principles Bronfenbrenner op cit p 47 This can be seen as a vivid example of the second ethical system at work As Lefebvre has stated a compromise between good and evil as reflected in the devotion to communism at the price of renouncing one's father is evaluated positively Algebra of Conscience p 85 7 Hingley has pinpointed a very successful and effective technique used by the Soviets to further this perception of freedom He states - human Aware as they are of Western urges to exaggerate Soviet liberalization and realizing that it is in their interests to foster the erroneous impression that Russia is moving toward the Western way of life and therefore constitutes far less of a menace than might otherwise be supposed the Moscow authorites have been known to make use of their own licensed liberals These are sanctioned to tour foreign countr4' s demonstrating that the Russians too are beings possessing the usual complement of eyes ears and limbs and that they are capable of baring their teeth in the rictus of simulated benevolence all of which purportedly proves that their 'system ' contrary to the claims of ill-wishers does tolerate political opposition To say this is not at all to suggest that such licensed liberals are insincere when they express their views merely that the authorities appear to tolerate or approve their activities as a device for further bemusing the Western brain already so pathetically ill-adapted to assess the nonWestern brain Licensed liberals in the above sense are a relatively new phenomenon for such refinements in public relations were beyond the range of the imperial Russian government The Soviet authorities derive considerable propaganda advantages from permitting dissidence to continue inasmuch as the befogged Western folk brain has long insisted on interpreting the phenomenon as proof of that blessed progressive 'liberalization' of the U S S R which it is wishfully expected will one day deliver the world from all its problems In a sense then the West has tended to feel that it can lie back and relax so long as Russia mairtains these dissidents whose 'movement' will one day peacefully transform the Kremlin into a source of international sweetness and light Hingley op cit p 253 He goes on to add that Soviet dissidents themselves are very distressed by these trends which serve to undermine their heartfelt efforts to bring about real changes in the system Both Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov have taken issue with Western politicians and Western public opinion for ignoring the menace of 114 4 the U S S R as an aggressive terroristic bureaucracy and for being willing to play the peaceful coexistence game by Russian rules In particular the policy of detente--that whereby Western states make tangible concessions to Moscow in return for soothing but meaningless and unenforceable assurances--has incurred the criticism of both Hingley op cit p 257 8 Many observers and writers including Dostoyevsky who is considered a great Russian patriot have played a major role in reinforcing this view of the Russian as a liar The following statements provide representative samples Russians simulate good will only in order to exploit another's benevolence for their own purposes and Among our Russian intellectual classes the very existence of a non-liar is an impossibility the reason being that in Russia even honest men can lie Hingley op cit p 105 9 Robert H Spiro Jr is one analyst among others who contrary to the general consensus of belief feels that the Soviet role in terms of influencing Western public opinion is both active and highly conscious He states for example The operational deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles is under way despite frantic Soviet resistance Its opposition ranges from ominous threats of counterdeployment in Warsaw Pact countries to waging massive propaganda campaigns in Western Europe to persuade parliaments and populations that U S deployment is war-mongering provocative and irresponsible Yet the Soviet buildup of SS 20 missiles deployed against the West since 1979 has almost trebled--from 126 to 360 Regrettably a sizable minority among people in NATO countries has for a variety of reasons fallen for the Soviet line and drifted into a modern version of traditional pacifism which may properly be styled neo-pacifism The greatest problem faced by the neo-pacifists is that their strongest ally is the Soviet Union openly committed to a campaign of manipulation and disinformation Spiro op cit pp 14-15 - 115 N % 7 DISTRIBUTION LIST NO OF COPIES - Library Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000 2 Library Code 55 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000 1 Office of Research 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