HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO 96601 SECRET October 23 1965 Dear Marshall Now that Colonel Untung is undone I have been interested in following the developing confrontation between the Army and the PKI Chuck Flowerree and I were particularly interested in your telegram no 1098 to the Department which reviewed the resources which the PKI might be able to mobilize in a major insurgency effort against the Army As you say there is no real evidence that the PKI has decided or will decide to go into insur- gency but they do have contingency plans The question that arises in our minds is whether we should accordingly be doing some con- tingency thinking about the possibility that if the PKI should go into insurgency the Indonesian Army might at some point request U S assistance I have read your message 1160 in which you replied to the Department's 491 by saying that if the military authorities ever really need our help in this matter they would let us know I certainly agree with your advice against taking soundings at this time However I wonder how we could respond if the Indonesian military really would ask us for help I suppose it would depend to a large extent on the way in which the insurgency developed i e whether it followed the pattern of guerrilla warfare and terrorism and whether it produced some rough front line with the PKI in control of certain large identifiable areas It would also depend on the role of Sukarno as well as many other factors Nevertheless it is interesting to speculate on the possibility that either with or without Sukarno as their front man the Indonesian Army being hard pressed in a war with the PKI might request our help I The Honorable Marshall Green American Ambassador Djakarta SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority mm 22 97 SECRET -2- suppose a request for help might include anything from covert opera- tions and assistance on up through the spectrum including transport money communications equipment or arms Perhaps it is premature to raise this question and perhaps the situation is so uid that it is almost impossible to estimate the future course Nevertheless if there is a reasonable possibility that the Indonesian Army might request our help against a PKI insurgency then I suppose it would not hurt to consider how we would respond am sure all of these things are in your mind but if there is anything you or someone on your staff could tell me on this score then I would certainly be appreciative Sincerely Nogman B Hannah Political Adviser to CINCPAC                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu