WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG 84 - Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State Box 00299 Withhold Box 0 Withhold Folder 0 Document 18 HMS REID Entry Series State Department Lot Files Total Pages 4 ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file Document Date 01-10-1967 Document Type Telegram Special Media File Number In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted This document is being withheld under Section 3 3b of EO 13526 and or NARA's discretionary withholdings outlined in 36 CFR 1256 NND 37770 Withdrawn 01-07-2005 by RETRIEVAL 37770 00299 0 0 18 System 24096634 NO STATE OBJECTION T0 DE LASSIFICATI BY TELEGR '3 3 33 0 UT 3 0 DJAKARTA a t RNO AMB Charge CIassif'cafion Conirol DJAKARTA 3143 POL Date Jan 9 1957 mm ACTION SecState WASHINGTON DC 1626 1725 0115 US 00 INFO Amconsul MEDAN 450 II-IRON Amconsul SURABAYA 34 RF Auxembassy SINGAPORE 180 FILE Amembassy Kuala Lumpur 198 Amembassy MANILA 292 Amembassy CANBERRA 141' - CINCPAC BUN 1 In talk with Political Counselor January 7 Maj Gen Sjarif Thajeb said Suharto is definitely committed to ousting Sukarno but will not be pushed and insists on doing things his slow and deliberate own way Since attempts to persuade Suharto to move km more rapidly have failed Sjarif and other hawks are attempting to I create situation which will force Suharto to act and thereby i 3 precipitate final showdown They believe this can be done by March Next 2 mat major event according to Sjarif will be Sukarno's report to MP3 which other sources say now due tomorrow Sjarif said statement till criticize FRI role in Gestapu but will place real'blame on Nekoli and its local Army friends who deceived and induced it to act as it did Statement will by implication KSE ADcuzmuernpy 1 9 67 3 173% Sacks um nonhuman Classnficahon no cm I mum-o 13% Aumomyri 531220 Ere mm 2- 12 it 1 3 SECRET 2 Charge Classi ca on Con rrol Da te also place blame for events of October 1 1965 on Nasution Sjarif said statement will not mention CIA by name but implication will be clear that this is what is meant by m use of term Nekoli 3 Sjarif said statement will please no one and will certainly not not be acceptable to Army It will in fact be useful to hawks to heighten anti-Sukarno feeling and pave way for two major actions planned during next several weeks First effort will be coordinated move to mobilize public opinion against Sukarno This apparently already underway - Djakarta 3120 Second will be expansion in membership of Parliament DPR in order to make this body and also MPRS which includes all DPR members more manageable vr 3 4 Parliament will convene January 23 Sjarif said and will serve as prosecutor in move against Sukarno Sjarif indicated he himself would spearhead attack After airing Sukarno's misdeeds Parliament will call for MPRS session to deal coup de grace 5 MPRS is expected to meet in late February or early march SECRET Classification 3335' Authority In l fmig 8mm 01th TELWM Initgl Sitates of Annie OUTGOING SECRET 3 Charge Clossi ca on Dafe at which time it will suspend Sukarno pending a full investigation of his regime Sjarif was vague on what would follow suSpension decree but he and hawks apparently hope this action by MPRS will suffice and will either induce Sukarno to retire gracefully or precipitate military forcegully remove him from office Sjarif seemed to think latter was man more likely possibility and said bloodshed likely before problem solved Sjarif and also Abu Baker Lubis in subsequent talk said trip abroad by Sukarno definitely out Sukarno refuses to go voluntarily and Suharto and others prefer to deal with him within Indonesia rather than taking what they regard as undesirable step from standpoint of world public opinion of forcibly exiling president Timetable similar to that given by Sjarif Thajeb has been f outlined to us by other knowledgeable sources There no question but that this that hawks hope to achieve but exact way scenario will unfold cannot be predicted at this time with any degree of certainty Suharto is still calling shots and has not tipped his hand Additional uncertainty is fact MPRS may prove difficult to control unless Suharto permits Army to exert alumnus lasagna DEC on 3335 cow 3 Authontv ifb Hunt- II Inn- Hm F0 So In TELEGR illnitrellI Sltaters' If Amari a OUTGOING SECRET 4 Charge Classi ca on Confrolz Dafe real pressure on members 7 Our guess is that Suharto definitely wants to remove or neutralize Sukarno but is committed to no firm timetable or exact method beyond fact he wants to stick to constitutional means and avoid bloodshed if possible As a result he is resisting efforts to force him into what he regards as premature action but is taking no steps to prevent situation from ripening to point where more direct move against Sukarno may be feasible or in fact inevitable When and if that happens Suharto will act as forcefully as he did in March 1966 8 Following Lebaran holidays Jan 12 and 13 we will again be entering period of tension which likely to build for month or 311% Net effect will probably be to reduce Sukarno's position further but there no certainty now that this tense period any more likely to result in Sukarno's final ouster then those which preceded it LYDMAN WC SECRET autumnal IUWCI i meant DECL Classification non nus n I nor Authomyj b zza as m - 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