WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG 84 - Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State Box 00298 Withhold Box 0 Withhold Folder 0 Document 28 HMS REID Entry Series State Department Lot Files Total Pages 11 ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identi ed below has been withdrawn from this le Document Date 07-21-1967 Document Type Airgram Special Media File Number In the review of this le this item was removed because access to it is restricted This document is being withheld under Section 3 3b of EO 13526 and or NARA's discretionary withholdings outlined in 36 CFR 1256 NND 37770 Withdrawn 01-07-2005 RETRIEVAL 3m System 00910 1 A Q 0 5 38 A 86% 3' 1 or 31AM nd fA m7 V 1 5 A34 FOR RM USE ONLY 2 4 116 CIA NAVY 203 3 USIA NSA 3 o 3 we 6 COPYFLO-PBR A-12 SECRET PRIORITY- AMB no - HM INDICATOR DEPARTMENT or STATE 1 To INFO BANGKOK CANBERRA NP N MEDAN SINGAPORE SURABAYA TOKYO CINCPAC 264 7 1 12 FROM Amembassy DJAKARTA July 1 f SUBJECT Basic Problems in Our Dealings with Indonesians 1 1 g if 1 REF 3 23 1 0 7 l - '1 Introduction and Summary Indonesia now has a government which has assumed a generally pragmatic approach to its problems has shelved foreign adventurism in favor of a constructive role in the international community has dedicated itself to fighting domestic communism and has quietly moved away from state con- trol of the economy towards private enterprise These attributes espe-- cially when contrasted with past Indonesian regimes appear to make cow operation with the United States 'a natural and easily-accomplished goal Lurking behind these important points in common are however some basic cultural institutional and differences between the American and Indonesian societies which may spell trouble as the United States Government moves into operational and USIS programs For example Javanese behavior patterns which stress outward harmony rather than clear communications prevent thrashing out problems with Indonesian leaders and often impose the use of intermediaries The cus- tomary Indonesian practice of exacting a price for friendship does not sit well with Americans The bapak structural organization which stresses personal relationships at the expense of institutions and the corruption which it spawns tend to restrict the United States Government' ability to program its assm in maximum benefit for the economy An emotional all offended and as easily offensive lingers as an relations and Southeast Asian FOR DEPT USE ONLY BET In DOM Contents and Classmcanoa Approved by 67 SEQRET Djakarta s 2 Only through understanding this environment can the United States Govern- ment be in a position to help change it Indonesian social and political mores not only allow but often require a foreign government to choose its domestic associates Realizing that reform must come principally from within the United States should consequently identify and support mo dernizing elements within the national leadership often disregarding as Indonesians do their formally assigned governmental roles This aim will in instances outweigh purely economic rationale for an assistance program although the two criteria as in the case of the stabilization pro- gram often coincide While General Suharto himself cannot now be clearly typed as a modernizer our support may help cast him in this mold The alternatives to his leadership are nowhere near as promising and we should not let pass early opportunities to support and in uence him In this airgram I have attempted to define some of the and institutional differences between the two nations to point out the problems which they may cause and to suggest general approaches we might use in - dealing with them In each case we identify the problems and follow with recommendations 6 Most of these problems are not new to the Department We have dis- cussed some of them in greater detail in earlier airgrams and many are common to developing countries I believe however that they bear re- statement at this particular juncture when we are defining our programs and consequently our future relationships with the new Indonesian regime The Javanese Cultural Environment The Problems Despite their long subjection to colonialism and in part because of it Indonesians remain as distant from the West in culture and in mores as many less advanced people This is particularly true of the Javanese sub culturewhieh because it embraces the largest numbers and the key leader is 318159th in uence 1n Indonesia today The Javanese and Amer 5 55 5 4 instances call for exactly opposite courses of w 5 5 5 if 5 7 ample are commonly noted for their E r ng and resolving conflicts and their SECR ET Djakarta 3 emphasis on personal initiative in changing an environment The Javanese are famed for their indirectness their tendency to disguise and circum- vent con icts and their emphasis on adaptation to one s environment Indo- nesians in general and the Javanese in particular tend to build their official relationships on a family pattern emphasizing confidence affection and loyalty above ability Americans have on the other hand established common impersonal standards of conduct stressing efficiency and perfor mance When these cultures meet con icts are inevitable One does not have heart to heart talks or thrash out problems with a Javanese Outward harmony in personal relationships receives a much higher priority than clear communications In the case of Javanese leaders who must make decisions yet preserve face in personal relationships this means that intermediaries are usually employed to sort out areas of agreement and exclude conflicts before the principals meet Nowhere is this more evident than with General Suharto Indonesians of other sub cultures or other generations such as leaders of the Action Fronts have complained of the curtain of Generals isolating the Acting President from As Suharto s and other Javanese leaders' intermediaries are most often chosen on the basis of personal relationships rather than general ability or knowledge of the matter at hand they are not always reliable channels of communication The results of one young Batak's efforts to penetrate this curtain by confronting Suharto directly however argue against fighting the Javanese system Djakarta 6354 Political intrigue thrives in the Javanese environment and some of the back-stabbing rumor mongering and general skulduggery surrounding Sukarno's palaces have now moved to Suharto's headquarters One of Suharto's associates Colonel Ali Murtopo may in fact have the makings of a little Subandrio and 'like Sukarno's Foreign Minister possesses an 1 intelligence apparatus to serve his intrigues Suharto himself remained singularly aloof from the intrigues of the Sukarno era and there is thus some possibility that he will eventually check those now form mg around him The key problem ya ecting American Indonesian relations perhaps stems less from of Javanese working patterns than from a surpris- SECRET Djakarta A-12 4 indicated that American insistence on detailed justification for aid requests is received as a gesture of mistrust and suspicion The Acting President may also be miffed when some of his personal agents are not favored over official channels such as the Foreign Ministry Failure to recognize these difficulties as a con ict in operating patterns has perhaps led some ava- nese leaders to personalize the problem in a typically Javanese fashion concluding that the United States Government or its representatives have no faith in' their personal leadership Many Javanese generals also take it for granted that USG representatives indulge in the same sort of secret political intrigue as the Javanese Suspicions have for example been voiced that the United States is working clandestinely to assist such figures as Adam Malik General Kemal ldris or even General Nasution whose Sumatran rather than Javanese origins bring them more closely into line with the American culture Recommendations We cannot of course dovetail our operations to the Javanese working pattern The best we can hope to do is to try to live with it while encouraging changes in the system As it will often be neces- sary to work through intermediaries in communicating with Suharto and other Javanese officials care must be taken to choose intermediaries who best understand the United States and who are least likely to use their posi- tion as go-between to further personal and con icting aims Similarly our refusal to use such intermediaries as Ali Murtopo will perhaps contri- bute to th'eir eventual decline in in uence We must take advantage of every opportunity to educate General Suharto and his principal Javanese aides on the advantages of a modern impersonal administration As a by-product we would hope that they could learn to in understand why Americans act as they do I think we have already made some progress in educating the top Generals on the aid process and we will keep plugging on this topic Visits to the United States and other coun- tries Where they could be exposed to honesty and principle in government would of course be the best teaching aids We should seek opportunities to send more of Suharto's principal aides to the U S As I have suggested previously we should sooninitiate planning for a visit to the United States by Suharto in the context of a world tour Wei-v54 5 tenstrate in a way understandable to Javanese em Indonesian leadership This can profitably our sympathy if not our support for projects - to have an interest His personal requests must SECRET SECRET Dial rta - 5 be given very careft attention as an uncushioned negative response can cause loss of face and long-lasting resentment The problems we face here should not be over difficult as Suharto seems to have developed during the past few months a much more balanced concept of priorities The way in which we give help is as important as how much we give Too many administrative strings on our aid will be taken as signs of a lack of confidence It is important that our administrative requirements be reduced to the minimum needed to prevent abuses which could redound to the harm Of our aid program and its Congressional support that these unavoidable administrative requirements be applied that they be fully explained to the GOI officials who must defend and explain them to others We should make a particular effort within the multi- lateral framework of aid to which we are committed to impose no more onerous administrative requirements than do the other donors - The Price of Indonesian Friendship The Problem If American directness and candor sometimes offend Indo- nesian sensitivity Indonesians cause an equally unfavorable reaction among Americans by labelling human relationships with clearly marked prices This practice is especially noticeable among the Sumatrans and other outer-islanders where virtually every relationship outside the ex- tended family is carefully weighed for the material benefits it brings On the individual plane this means that most courtesies shown an American will eventually be followed by a request for repayment in goods or services On the government-to-government level Indonesia will attempt to exact a good price for every move thought to benefit the United States regardless of whether it was so intended Many Indonesians for example have at- tempted to get some mr t of American post-payment for the destruction of the internal Waste-movement Indonesians often complain of strings Loni W games are prone to attach towropes to their 59 on fibre trait when translated into our frame of $8 squeeze plays intimidation or outright avoid the emotional reaction which these selves for padded bills for every service matters as a favorable United Nations vote SECR ET r snore ET Djakarta 8 While we cannot and should not enter the television and refrigerator game as other foreign governments and private firms have seen fit to do we must recognize that our aid programs will fall on this cultural terrain We should take care that credit for our aid is not entered on the wrong ledger In this respect timing of 01139 33 announcementgis gf_the_utmost importance as Indonesians ascribing to us motivations simil ar t'oitheir own will tend to find a causative factor in the immediate setting of events - - The u Bapak Organizational Structure The Problems The Indonesian cultural heritage discussed above com bined with Sukarno's legacy in personalized rule and in economic disorder has greatly inhibited the growth of governmental institutions in the Western sense of the word Society and the governmenta re instead organized around small fragmented groupings centered on a provider or bapak The Embassy s dated November 30 1966 provides a detailed description of the causes and nature of bapakism Suharto himself recognizes the deficiencies in this system and as late as July 5 committed his govern ment once again to the task of building true institutions Although some progress has been made this is decidedly a long-range process In the meantime bapakism continues as the dominant system at all levels of the gover'hment and society including quite clearly the Acting Presidency Bapakism severly hampers a foreign government's ability to insert its aid in a specified sector of the Indonesian economy The present free market system for import of essential commodities the system under which the use of a major portion of our foreign aid and that of other donors is determined by market forces represents a means of reducing bapakism in the allocation of aid to a minimum Where however aid must be channeled through bapaks --as tends to be the case with MAP some assistance and technical assistance- there is the risk that unless very closely monitored the aid may be deflected to quite different uses than those attained by the donor In such cases it is the minister t the'banker and not the bank who determines the ulti- dr within his reach It is also the bapak SECR ET 1 Djakarta A-12 7 Recommendations Once again we are faced with living with a system which we would wish to see changed The best answer to this dilemma is to make certain that any operational program falls under the purview and to the credit of a modernizing bapak who shares our economic aims The nature of a particular bapak may thus figure higher on the criteria of an aid program than its theoretical economic impact United States support for the government's current stabilization program scores under The program is economically sound in theory and its for mulators and executors whose position will be strengthened by our sup port are the mochapable and dedicated modernizers Indonesia has to pffer Other programs will not offer such a clear choice Assistance in some fields such as education should be carefully conceived so that specific Ministers and or Secretaries General who oppose the modern izers play a small role in the programs and draw no benefit therefrom Requests from Suharto's own office must be carefully screened with re- gard to the intermediary conveying them as it is now obvious that several f Generals of widely varying merit are attempting to bring home American bacon to enhance their positions with Suharto We can and should choose among them Corruption The Problem The Javanese habit of employing personal agents and inter- mediaries and bapakism s reliance on hidden resources encourage influence peddling and undercover deals The rather primitive state of 7 Indonesia's economic organization precludes the application of American 5321 concepts of propriety Commissions rake-offs and pay offs will remain an enduring feature of Indonesian business and government although a successful stabilization and liberalization program will hopefully re- move some of the stimulus and some of the opportunities for financial manipulations At the present time however corruption exceeds even the high toleration level of Indonesian society It is especially harmful I in the eld of private investment where the size of the commission paid by a foreign orwmagttc enterprise to its political broker has too often R investor's ability to do the job a i 17 - tv ri k all controls are not the real answer to be solved by cultural changes Indonesians 11 evading administrative restraints than Americans Inposition of administrative controls also tends SECR ET 1 1 sagas-r Djakarta 8 to strengthen the cumbersome Indonesian bureaucracy which imbued with the clerk- like mentality of ex-colonial regions is a stifling and paralyzing influence The test of a successful entrepreneur in Indo nesia has in fact often been the ability to circumvent the bureaucracy The answer again seems to center on choosing wisely among these entre preneurs who will gain credit from our aid There are many good bapaks both in government and in private enterprise whose recourse to corrupt practices in the Western sense is limited and aimed more at efficiency than _p_e_1 sona1 enrichment The Ali Murtopo's Alamsjah's andINidjatmika's on the other hand are clearly not our men despite Eheir close relation to the power center and we should stay clear of them and warn American investors to do the same Eventually their failure to produce anything beyond commissions may discredit them as the bapak system tends to reward only producers Living With Our Past The Problem Many of the Indonesian suspicions and misconceptions concerning American aid stem from a tendency to interpret our present attitudes in light of our past actions in Indonesia TWO principal factors make up this equation our clandestine support to the 1958 PRRI rebellion on which every Indonesian with a primary education has been well briefed and our later assistance to the Sukarno regime which at its peak far ex- ceeded in annual totals the aid we are currently providing the new regime The conclusions drawn are in the first instance that the United States will jump to the assistance of embattled anti communists and in the second instance that political considerations are the key determinant of our aid 1 3 Finding our present assistance comparatively meager many Indonesians attribute the imagined deficiency to the absence of a communist threat to the present regime's ineptitude in exerting political pressures to a drive to force changes in some current policies or to our expectation that the present 5 1 might be replaced by others more amenable to our Mia 5 eptions are strengthened by the isolation the a during the late Sukarno era which prevented - - ant changes in the world situation and the cor- qited States policy SECRET SECRET Djakarta A-12 9 Recommendations There is of course no need to be defensive about our past in Indonesia Again our principal task is educating Indonesian leaders on the rationale and methods underlying our new aid posture and in this respect we should not hesitate to admit past mistakes Nationalism The Problem The present generation of Indonesian leaders have a some what unbalanced conception of their country's relationship to the outside worId Their youth under Dutch Colonialism has left them with a disguised sense of racial inferiority and a sort of love-hate attitude toward West erners Their participation in the 1945 Revolution has imbued them with an intense and emotional nationalism which is easily offended and as easily offensive The fuss causing and succeeding the cancellation of the Thomas Cup international badminton championship Djakarta A-601 is a typical manifestation of this attribute which will undoubtedly surface many times in the future The United States as the foremost representative of Western culture may often find itself on the receiving end of these emotional out- bursts Indonesian nationalism poses some immediate problems for Southeast Asian regional cooperation Indonesia quite clearly and reasonably envisages regional cooperation as a route towards asserting its leadership as South east Asia's largest nation In this sense the current government s re- gional cooperation policy may be said to share some of the goals of Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia The switch in methods of course makes all the difference but Indonesia's militant nationalism will continue to evoke the spectre of military expansionism for its neighbors Recommendations We should play to the Indonesian ego recognizing that we are dealing with an inferiority complex Public statements of sympathy and support for the new government will pay good dividends The reference to Indqnesia in President Johnson's June 19 Speech for example waspryungy displayed on the front pages of almost all Djakarta pkg-1y the failure to mention Indonesia when Asia jean off1c1als receives surpr1s1ngly Wide notice iiwi ve leaders although public comment on these my course muted sagas SECRET Djakarta A-12 lO Indonesia's self-seeking motives in furthering regional cooperation should not be allowed to sidetrack us from the goal of encouraging Indonesians to come out of their shell and get to know their neighbors The in uence Indonesia may expect to wield in or through a Southeast Asian regional organization may well be overshadowed by the changes this association will bring to the Indonesian outlook Emotional nationalism is of course less a problem with Indonesia's pragmatists and Foreign Minister 'Adam Malik is fortunately in this cate- gory When possible his hand should be discreetly strengthened especially in the sphere of regional cooperation where'certain military leaders of a more nationalistic bent including Acting Army Commander Panggabean have their own designs Is Suharto A Modernizer The Problem In each of the sections of this airgram I have stressed the necessity of finding and supporting the modernizers in Indonesian society in the belief that it is wise leadership rather than well-conceived aid which will determine the nation's future The question now arises as to whether - the Acting President himself can be placed in this category and if not what attitude should be taken towards his leadership Suharto is a product of the Javanese culture which is in general inimical to change and reform He is also aproduct of the Indonesian Armed Forces Which until recently have been motivated principally by nationalistic slogans and superficial unity formulas Despite this heritage he has assumed a determinedly pragmatic and clearly reformist approach to econ omic problems Few leaders have in fact performed so well under such difficult circumstances In the political sphere however where he must deal more with people and less with statistics the Javanese and the soldier in Suharto have surfaced While he continues to call for the establishment i of a New Order based on stable state institutions his willingness to live 1 with Old Order forces and customs has disillusioned many of his former supporters see Djakarta's 514 Modernizers and entrepreneurs i tend to be but among the minority cultures in Indonesia as in many other a a are clear signs that Suha rto' latent suspicions of - a sub-cultures and specifically the Sumatran-Moslem ffjnemaints on his c00peration with many of the nation' eras SECR ET ET Djakarta A-IZ 4 11 Recommendations Suharto's political technique which is based primarily on manipulating others' initiatives while concealing his own hand Djakarta A-428 revents us and most Indonesians from estimating with any cer- tainty his political goals Most Indonesian political leaders both modern- izers and traditionalists seem to be operating on the reasonable assump tion that Suharto has not fully formulated his political goals and that they consequently can in uence his final choice For the present we must operate on the same assumption and hope that our support will help mold and develop Suharto s political outlook For this reason and others our assistance must be carefully measured so as to constitute an incentive - rather than a substitute for Indonesian initiative It must nevertheless be recognized that Suharto even at this early stage of development offers the best that we have yet had to work with in Indonesia that alternatives to his leadership are nowhere near as promising and that we should conse- quently not let early opportunities to support and in uence him slip by Conclusion - Modernizing elements in Indonesia constitute a very thin layer which partly through fortuitous circumstance has now emerged near the top of the Indonesian power structure This layer rests precariously on an im- mense and restless mass of traditionalist forces which will require years i if not decades to change The fate of the modernizing forces in Indonesia is closely bound to the current stabilization and rehabilitation programs The success of these programs in bringing about some measure of economic improvement will alone not lift Indonesia over the modernization hump but should keep the nation pointed in the right direction Failure of these programs on the other hand would greatly increase the chances of Indonesia's breakup or more likely a reversion to symbol wielding invented foreign threats and brute force to keep the nation together impact extending far beyond Southeast Asia A failure on the scale of Indonesia would deal a severe blow to those underdeveloped nations who hope rational programs combined with free world aid and advice Weacious path to modernization than communism or other 7 ions We have only a supporting not a determining role present government's success but we have a heavy stake 1 Either of these last sequences of events would have a serious political and i GREEN 1w SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu