Approved for Release 2015 03 24 005'055521713526 EO 13526 3 5 c All redactions in this document based on sections 3 3 b and of EO 13526 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 c03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 I 7 INSPE CT OR RAL SURVEY 0F HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP August to mid October 1962 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Wt THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL This document curtains informarim referring to C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 20 November 1962 MORANDW FOR Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Handling of Intelligence Information During the Cuban Arms Build-up 1 0n 5 November 1962 you asked me to investigate the input of raw information during the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba with particular reference to reporting that suggested installation of weapons of offensive capability My report of investigation was submitted on 12 November 1962 2 You asked that certain points be clarified or expanded and that certain additional information be included A copy of the report of investigation revised is attached 3 Also attached is a list of the questions you asked and the comients you made regarding the original report of investi gation These questions and comments are numbered consecutively on the list The numbered tags that are clipped to various of the pages of the revised report correspond to the numbered questions and comments on the list amen Ins ctor General Attachments cc DDCI Exe cutive Dire ctor Copy 1 of 1 Li Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 'c03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Fu 0 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 1' 2 3' it Hui Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Director s Comments Regarding the IG Report of 12 November The original report listed a ban on publication of intelligence on offensive weapons in Guba without express permission or the President DGI comers What ban This section of the original report dealt with an order by the Director in mid-August to make sure that reports were checked with NPIC This sounds like an excuse What DCI ordered was a check by EPIC of reported missi es in cube The check to be either careful review of recent photographs of particular areas or new photography Do not understand that this involved no reports until NPIC check DCI COMMENT Our original report said that on 6 September analysis of the results of the 29 August mission had led to suspicion that the Banes site was offensive in nature DCI COMMENT This is overdrawn as Banes always was considered a coastal defense site wording indicates suspicion of MRBM's and this not so This section of our Ban original report dealt with The Pablication DCI COMMENT a were any in house CIA reports on MRBM offensive weapons withheld b Did our Checklist carry any reference to actual probable or possible MRBM's from August 29 until OctOber lh Q Did CIA have anything in hand which might have caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRBM missiles were there Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 V 5 6 7 8 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 nor new d I think our right to pdblish in the Checklist pretty well extinguishes this point Do not believe we were seriously hurt nor any conviction re NEBM's suppressed because of this e Better document whatever is said tense in our original report read chief of the Current Support Staff of ORR netes that CIA was most effectively blocked in attempts to impune seme significance to the arms deliveries DCI COMMENT By whom What is CI procedure of coordination These paragraphs of our original report concerned the restrictions on the September overflights DCI COMMENT a Why was the original flight plan of september proposed h Did NRO participate 0 use any consideration given to flying over known SAM sites to find out what they were protecting d was any consideration given to D01 September 7 request for frequent coverage' Our original report listed the missions flown from 29 August through 14 October and summarized the results DCI comm But say what kind of missiles Our original report said series of Clandestine Services reports in addition to a selected'DD P distribution went to standard addressees outside of the Clandestine Services DCI COMMENT Ben'nmny Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 10 ll 12 13 1h Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 This paragraph of our ori inal report read in part The distribution of is typical of that made of reports in the series That message distributed on 2 October reported the observation on 19 September of SSM's being unloaded at the port of Mariel underlined not clear DCI COMMENT marginal note This Our original paragraph begins Taking as an example the message whose distribution is discussed above this is the Sequence of processing between date of Observation and date of receipt by the user DUI COMMENT What did this contain This paragraph in our original report concerned the PSAIM system DUI COMMENT Question mark in the margin alongside the paragraph Our original paragraph read in part But at the time SNIE 85-3-62 was under discussion there were as yet no valid reports of an offensive build-up DCI COMMENT no valid reports of an offensive build up is underlined ' Question mark in the margin The first sentence of our paragraph read mr Sheldon saressed the lack of credibility in Clandestine Services reporting Clandestine is underlined DCI COMMENT note 1'or refugee Marginal Our original paragraph read However we do think that the pdblishing ban had the effect of prolonging this skepticism until the eleventh hour If the ban had not existed an item on the possible presence of in Cuba could have appeared in the 923 in the last days of September providing it could have survived the coordination process and it might have changed some people's minds DCI COMMENT Did this item appear in the Checklist 3 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 15 16 i7 18 1 9 20 21 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Our original paragraph read in part there was little excuse for demeaning the validity of CIA reporting indicating a shift to offensive weapons DCI COMMENT What such CIA reporting 'This section of the original report dealt with the preparing of DCI CQMMENT Marginal note between paragraphs dealing with the situation as of 19 September when the U313 approved 85-3-62 and the fir st reports suggesting offensive missile activity views on This section of the original report dealt with the views of the Director of Central Intelligence DCI COMMENT Did you find any analytical effort as contrasted with philosophical conclusions You asked whether once the SAM sites had heen established anyone sat down and asked why3 for what purpose were they given to the cabana Just to keep the U 2 s away Ehis paragraph of the original report listed the Current Intelligence pdblications DCI COMMENT President's Checklist This section of our original report dealt with Restrictinns Overflights DCI COMMENT Why and under what circumstances were CIA Septe ber flights--two over eastern coastal area--changed to four covering about the same area -0ur original Annex listed abstracts from the 013 DUI COMMENT What was in the Checklist Approved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 C03054547 22 23 2h 25 26 27 ApproVed for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 This section of our original report dealt with the 22 Auglst Current Intelligence MEmorandum summarizing recent Soviet military assistance to cube - DCI COMMENT Suggest full wording of the report be included Our original paragraph dealt with a CIB draft concerning arrival of we said refusedTEZther to coordinate it or to insert a footnote DCI COMMENT Why Our original paragraph said But until 10 October CIA and DIA were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pieaes of information DUI COMMENT Examples Chronology of differing reports You asked for the names of the ships in Nariel on 19 and 23 September were they missile carrying ships in light Jf information we now have You asked if there was any evidence that our ran a computation on what the Soviet ships could hare been carrying other than SAM equipment and whether any thought or analysis was given to what other cargo the ships might have been carryiig I realize that this annex does not fully answer your question but it makes clear that our information on Soviet shipping was incomplete and that no precise analysis was possible You asked whether any thought was given to a quantitative estimate during the critical period based on the mass of shipping Which had been reported This annex again reveals more than anything else the incompleteness of information available to us Navy simply has been unable thus far to Provide informs tion on all Soviet shipping 5 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 HANDLING OF RAW ETEILIGENCE INFORMATION INJBDIG CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP TABEE OF CONTENTS Co PO 0 Coordination Problems Restrictions on Overflights TheMis'eileReporting 18 How the Reports Were Selected 20 Distribution of Reports 22 Speed of Dissemination 21 MiS me't of Clandestine Services and 00 Reporting 28 31 Action Taken on the Views of the Director of Central Intelligence 33 the I I I The Mechanics of Putting Together the 0113 3B The P'I esident's Checklist 40 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 L -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ---' Handling of Eaw Intelligence Information During Cuban Arms Build-up 1 This paper will discuss the movement and use 01' raw intelligence information during the intensive Soviet arms build-up in Cuba from mid-July to mid-October 1962 with particular emphasis on the period beginning in late August Except during a few days at the end of the period when the PSALM System was in force the flow of intelligence reports was normal They were delivered to all officers at all levels who needed them both in CIA and e Lsewhere in the intelligence community 2 However there were certain limitations on the formaL publication of this material in community-coordinated publications which may have diluted the impact of this information upon the community at large These limitations were a A caution on publishing information about Soviet military preparations in Cuba before determining whether or not it was contrary to photogr phic evidence in the possessi'on of NPIC b A ban beginning on 6 September on publication ether than in the Presidentrs Checklist of intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba without express permission of the President c Difficulties in inter-agency coordination d Restrictions on reconnaissance overflights as veIl as delays caused by weather which hindered verificatiorL of information and delayed acquisition of additional information 3 In a recent memorandum to the DCI Mr Richard LehmEm OO discussed in detail the broader aspects of CIA action during thin period - COP 5 EQfH l f I ------------------ Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 CO3054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 enaanaaee% The Caution h Beginning in may 1962 the began the practice of checking out with NPIC any report that was susceptible to photo graphic verification The following which we have confirmed appears in Mr Iehman's memorandum In May 1962 NPIC began publishing a series of formal reports Photographic Evaluation 2 Information on cube in which the reports referred to NPIC were evaluatedfin the light of photographic coverage In the seven issues of this publication published between 31 may and 5 October EPIC examined 138 reports referred to it for comment Of this total only three cited missile activity which could not be directly linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments NPIC's evidence negated these three 5 According to Mr walter Elder in the Director briefed the President on the increasing volume of refugee and agent reports on the Soviet build up in Guba The President directed that every effort be made to check Out these continuing reports The Director instructed the to check every available source particularly including EPIC This instruction from the Director was passed onward orally 6 Chief Middle America Branch Latin America Division OCI is the chief OCI analyst on Guba He was one of the ultimate recipients of the instruction and one of the persons required to take it into account received the instruction orally He says that however the instruction to to check informant reporting was intended he received it or at least interpreted it as an outright ban on publishing anything that could not be verified'by that in fact nothing susceptible to photographic verification was published which had not been verified Although we can offer no written evidence in proof we believe that this instruction to check became a ban through a combination of the following a Distortion of the Director's instruction as it passed from mouth to mouth 2 4aanssesa Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 b The weight the Director's word carries within the Agency is such that the ultimate recipient of it leans over backward to comply In this case if the ultimate recipients received the instruction as it was originally worded they read into it a meaning that was not intended at all e A procedure for checking reports with NPIG had heen in effect since may When the Director s instruction of mid August reached the it is reasonable to assume that they concluded that the existing procedures were inadequate and that a more positive and all-inclusive checkwas desired There is other evidence that the Director's instruction came to he considered a restriction Mr Lehman is a senior officer in OGI His memorandum of 7 November on the arms build-up was Well researched A quotation from his memorandum is illustrative of the views he found in 001 at the time he conducted his research At some point prdbably Just after 27 September an item on the subject the arrival of might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications Itcould not he written because the analytic level was under the injunction not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corrdboration It should be noted that an item could have been written for the President's Checklist but none was Further when we first discussed this subject with we Sheldon he said that there had been an outright ban issued in mid August on publishing anything that could not be verified by photography and that this ban had come from the President Sheldon later came to realize that his earlier recollection was wrong but it is probable that his first impression was a fairly accurate reflection of views widely held within the complex Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Joe saw The Publication Ban 8 its ban on publication of intelligence on offensive weapons has the following history 9 On 29 August a U-2 flight confirmed establishment of a missile defense of western cube and found a missile site at hence in Oriente Province On 31 August the President ordered General Garter not to allow publication of this information pending clarification of U E policy General Carter relayed this order to the UBIB The information on the SAM sites was released for publication on 5 September In a memorandum to the dated 6 September the AD si reported that WA_preliminary analysis of the technical parameters of the facility indicate that the missile system present is a surfaceeto surface cruise type system P I analyses of the additional photographic coverage should be available on 7 September On 7 september the Director of NPIC and the Chief of the Offensive Systems Division of 031 jointly addressed a memorandum to the 1313 1 It read in part The Banes installation is assessed as a surface-to surface tactical missile site most likely for cruise type missiles The pmrpose of the system and the effective range of the missile cannot be conclusively determined from the available data It swat be emphasized_that while we cannot definitely exclude the possibility of this missile installatiOn being for offensive purposes attack on Guantanamo Naval Base or possibly the Florida mainland we believe the evidence is much stronger for the coastal defense role The President was informed that the precise nature of the Banes installation had not been conclusively determined He ordered General Carter to put a complete freeze on publication of informa tion on the Banes site A Current Intelligence Memorandum of lH-Septemher based on a full readout of the 5 September photography says we conclude that there is no longer any reason to dodbt that the Banes site has a coastal defense mission The information was released for publication Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 203054547 10 Following his conversation with the President General Carter received approval from mr McGeorge Bondy to allow access-to such information and provide the results of their analysis to policy makers on needuto know basis 11 The minutes of an executive session of U813 on 7 September imply a publication ban on all types of intelligence pertaining to offensive weapons in cube There is however no explicit written record of the ben s imposition The gave the orders to this effect on or about 6 September The ban was further discussed at an executive session of U313 on 13 8eptember 12 On 1% September the issued the following instruction _to certain members of his staff This is to remind everyone that we are under a White -Ehuse injunction not to print in any publication which goes outside CIA any intelligence bearing on Guban offensive military weapons At the same time we are enjoined'by the to insure that normal distribution is made of material bearing on Guben military capabilities so that analysis of this intelligence may continue This prohibition need not apply to the resident's Intelligence Checklist but it does apply to all other publications Any material which might ordinarily be thought to be publishEble on this for- hidden subdect should be brought to the attention of the or the 13 This restriction as was intended reculted in a virtual blackout from intelligence publications of information on offensive Weapons The only exception'wes publication of information on the arrival of IL-28 bombers in cube General Carter asked Mr HhGeorge Bondy for permission to publish The request was refused General Carter then referred the matter to the Director pointing out that the information had already appeared in Department of Navy publica- tions The Director himself then called Mr Bundy and got approval for publication The information appeared in the and in the Gabon Daily Summary on ll October lb Certain observations are in order as to the probable effect of this publication hen Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 El idi e i 15 Hotels reports on offensive weapons were withheld from dissemination All received full dissemination within CIA and to all other components of the intelligence community In the case of Clandestine Services reports this runs to some 200 copies None of the reports found their way into intelligence publications because of the ban on publishing reports on offensive weapons 16 This ban of course did not apply to the President s Checklist but none appeared there either we have compared items appearing in the Checklist with those appearing in the gig and the Cuban Daily Summary Nothing of any significance appears in the Checklist that does not appear in the other publications Rene of them makes mention of the offensive buildiap 17 CIA did have reports in hand which night here caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MREM missiles were being installed There are eight reports that are quoted in the section on The Missile Reporting Four were disSeminated between 20 and 23 september inclusive The other four were disseminated between and 8 October inclusive Mr Lehman noted in his memorandum that an item could have been written in late September had it not been for the publications ban we asked Mr Cline if an oral report had been given to the President He told us'that none had 18 It can be argued that there were no restrictions on pnhlishing in the Checklist Regardless of the original intent of the Checklist we foun' a substantial agreement within the complex that the Checklist has been used primerily to call to the attention of the President those particularly significant solid items of intelligence appearing in the Various intelligence publications for the day The concept of it being a vehicle for passing to the President and a few other senior officials inferna tion not included in formal intelligence publipations has largely -been lost The evidence strongly suggests that the practice of orienting the Checklist to solid information g hnrt us in this situation There were reports on the introdnetion of offensive weapons that were not suitable for use in normal Current Intelli- gence publications This information could hawe been included in the Checklist but it was not because the Checklist was too closely tied to other publications Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 ---- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 OP L -______________________ 19 This is the evidence en which we base oW conclusic'llS as to the effect 0 1 the pVblications ban a With respect to po ssible in-house CIA eports being withheld we can report tb a t we found nothing worth disseminating that was not disseminated b With respect to o ur co nclusion that the Chec li Jt carried nathing on the offenSive build-up we have attached a s annexes to this repart extracts from the Checklist the CIE and the Cuban Daily Summar We have checked the tht ee publicatio ns No thing on offensive wea l 0ns appears in a of them c With respect to CIA having re o rts in hand upon which to base oral briefing of the President we have ciT ed the specific reports ano have quoted from them in the sedion en The Missile Rellart1ng Jf COllies of the actual re portl are in aw handa - 7- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 05 27 003054547 Coordination Problems 20 On 3 August CIA made its first attempt to place an item on the build-up in the Central Intelligence Bulletin CIB noting an unusual number of suspected arms carriers enroute to Cuba NSA and DIA objected to the item because of an NBA intercept I e1 that the increased Sow ship traffic was due tn1 The itenn as VJ-J nugut b in ass as were four other CIB items in August chief of the Current s ' iort Staff of can notes that was most effectively blocked by Eli in attempts to impute some significance to the arms deliveries It should be noted that over the years the concept of the CIB being a fully coordinated and agreed upon publication has developedr In the past higher authority would not tolerate split items presenting differing views The proceoure for coordinating items for the CIB is outlined in the section entitled The mechanics of Putti girogether the Egg 2i The 29 August President s Intelligence Checklist stated many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear fto Cuba The CIA officer who delivered the Checklist to the White Ehuse on that date reported that General thwell Taylor challenged the statement According to this officer he cited this statement from the DIA Intelligence Summary of the same date The high vollme of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba 22 General Taylor was further quoted as saying that he had seen no hard evidence of armaments going into Guba that equipment like trucks and tractors could he used for military purposes but that he did not think this was the case in cube and that in his opinion the Soviet aid to Cuba was purely economic 23 This was the day of the mission wh confirmed SAM sites in western Cuba According was informed on or about this time by we Joseph W Nauhert of Mr Roger Hilsmar's office in the State Department that General Taylor had requested State's INR to withdraw a memorandum which noted an upsurge in Bloc ves3els traveling to Cuba under conditions suggesting increasing deliveries of arms The same source said General Taylor had mude this request after consultation with Admiral Dennison Approved for Release 2015 05 27 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 m 2A These incidents illustrate the disagreement which prevailed throughout August between CIA and the Defense establishment over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to cube we have_reviewed DIA intelligence publications for August and september and can confirm that DIA did indeed insist throughout August that the increased shipping reflected an increased flow of economic aid 25 The USIB watch Committee placed cube on its agenda in late August This action followed submission to watch Committee members of an urgently worded 22 August current Intelligence Memorandum cc No 3ot7 62 from CIA Distribution of this paper was as follows l l 001 73 Watch Committee 25 Items on the Cuban build up began to appear in the Combined watch Report with the 29 August issue 26 After the U-2 missions of 29 August and 5 September coordination of material relating to the speed up of arms deliveries to Cuba became less difficult But until lO'October CIA and DIA were in disagreement'over interpretations of specific pieces of information Attached as Annex is a copy of a memorandum elling out coordination difficulties It was prepared by an ORR officer intimately involved with these problems a e we drew heavily from this memorandum in preparing our report The full memorandum gives the'sequence of reports and the coordination difficulties encountered W- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015103124 003054547 -10- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Restrictions on Overflights 29 On 10 September at a meeting in the office of Mr McGeorge Bondy For other details about this meeting see Annex D Page 3 CIA sought approval for a single reconnaissance flight along the south coast of Guba across Guantanamo and Banes and along the northern coast The secretary of State objected to the CIA proposal Annex L He said he considered it unwise to overfly international waters and Cuban territory during the same mission He said that if the aircraft fell into enemy hands during such a mission the 0 3 would be in a very position to defend its rights to overfly international waters The result of this concern was that the meeting rejected specific proposal but gave CIA approximately_the coverage it asked for by authorizing three flights for the month of September in addition to-the one remaining in the normal September allocation of two Of these four two were to be overflights two peripheral flights Because of bad weather and one mechanical abortion the progranawas not completed until 7 October Thus it took nearly a month to get the coverage CIA had Sought to get in a single mission This coverage as requested on 9 September by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance COMOR see Para 33 below did not include the western end of the island where 5AM sites had already been discovered 30 we now' know that SAM sites in western Cuba were defending _sites which were being prepared for the installation of offensive missiles The four missions approved on 10 September were confined to the eastern part of the island and therefore did not detect these preparatiOns we do not knOW'whether photography would have detected offensive preparations in western cubs by 7 October when the four-flight program'was completed Nor do we knOW'for sure whether the weather conditions would have permitted such detection In any case there was no photographic corroboration of agent and refugee reports suggesting offensive missile activity during late September and early October Confirmation had to wait for the 11 October use flight A fuller explanation of the planning of the four-flight program follows -31 Do September the Chairman of the COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence It is quoted below in its entirety Yoor approval of paragraph is requested 2 The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance reviewed the results of the latest mission on cube No 3088 flown on 29 August and concluded as follows Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for I elease 2015 03 24 003054547 a That in View of finding SAM sites on the western end of the island on 3088 it is particularly important that as soon as weather permits the next authorized ndssior should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed because of weather or because the range did not permit b That priority areas of interest should be the areas referenced in a above and to include other targets on a Second priority basis which might require coverage c That the complex at the eastern end of the island should be photographed again but there i _ng_re uirement at this time for recoverage of the SAM sites Underlining supplied by IG 3 The targets for operational planning will be prepared by the CQMOR WOrking Group in pursuance of the above and forwarded directly to the Intelligence Officer O A hDR for use in operational planning 4 Recommendation That the foregoing be taken into account in determination of when the next Unban mission will be flown The recommendation in paragraph A was approved by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence 32 On 3 September the COMOR approved a paper on Requirements and Targets Applicable for Tactical-Type Aerial Reconnaissance over Guba The paper was forwarded to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence Significant extracts follow In pursuance of your request that the DONOR examine the kind of information which could'be obtained through the use of BF-lOl FBU-type of aircraft to complement the present reconnaissance of cube and to indicate in order of priority the information and the targets which have been sobmitted to COMOB the following is reported a Tactical type reconnaissance aircraft could acquire information on the identified SAM sites which would permit more reliable estimates of the operational status 33 On 9 September 1962 the Chairman-of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence subject Next 0-2 Mission Over cube The text follows 12 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 The Committee on Overhead Eeconnaissance has now reviewed the information obtained from the last U-2 reconnaissance of Cdba on 5 September unfortunately weather precluded photography of the'possible Site at Banes on the eastern end-of the Island as well as a portion of the Guantanamo area The Mission also did not cover the Isle of Pines to check on SAM deployment and other areas in the eastern half of the Island which should be searched for SAM wendpossible SEM deployment 2 The Committee recommends that another U-2 mission be flown as soon as weather permits to cover Banes and the other targets mentioned above and identified on the attached map IG comment The use of as the next to the last word of paragraph 1 of the memorandum quoted immediately above raises the interesting possibility that the COMOR might have been proposing a or IRBM's Rather than relying on the memories of those involved in preparing the memorandum we have checked the map on which the targets are identified It is clear that the 38M reference is to possible coastal cruise missile sites 34 we have in our possession the referenced map of Guba'with an acetate overlay showing the tracks desired by CIA and the tracks approved in the 10 September meeting in tr Bundy's office CIA proposed coverage of the southern coastline of Guba from about 82% degrees eastward to the Guantanamo area at about 75 degrees and coverage of the northern coastline from Banes at about 75% degrees westward to the Segue la Grande area at about 80 degrees The targets to he covered are indicated thus Isle of Pines missile search Bay of Batabano Coastline missile search Zapata Swamp missile Search Coastline Zapata Swamp to Guantanamo Bay missile search Guantanamo Area troop build-up Banes Area suspect SSM installation coastal cruise missilei Coastline Banes to Hague la Grande missile search This evidence strongly suggests that with the exception of the Guantanamo and Banes areas the September flights were proposed for the purpose of finding new missile sites 35 Acc0rding to Mr James Reber Chairman of the COMDR and Mr James Cunningham Deputy Assistant Director of the Office for Special Activities of DER the NRC does not participate in the planning phase of overflights l3 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 36 we here exemined the written evidence to see if any consideration was given to flying over known SAM sites to find Out whet they were protecting we find nothing suggesting that any such consideration was given 37 40n 7 September the Director cabled urging frequent reconnaiSSance coverage we find no specific mention of this request in any of the documents we have examined There is e series of documents prepared by the COMGR urging tactical reconnaisnance by or FBU aircraft so that better photography could'be gotten of known sites however the first of theSe documente resulted from a COMOR meeting on 3 September prior to receipt of the Director s cable It is possible that the urgency the Agency attached to getting this tactical reconnaissance resulted from the Directdr s cable but we have found no proof of this 38 Attached as Annex is a chronology of cuban overflights from 5 August through 14 October 1h Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 The PEALM System 39 An actual restriction on the flow of information existed only during the last few days of the period under discussion This was the'PSALM system and its imposition came about as follows to The 11 gig item on arrival of IL-28's in Cdba required Presidential approval because of the offensive capability of this medium bomber The DCI requested such approval because the photographs of the crates were already widely available in the intelligence community When the President gave the DCI permission to publish the item he also instructed him to put into effect immediately a formal system whereby such information could be fully controlled A special UBIB meeting on 11 October put this order into effect as of the close of 12 October The order provided that information or intelligence on offensive capabilities in cuba will be disseminated outside each UBIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisers to the President here a need to know and that there is no intent hereby however to inhibit the essential analytic yrocess - 15 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 003054547 App'roved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 The 22 August Memorandum 42 Intelligence received through the third week of August 1962 on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba was summarized in the Current Intelligence Memorandum of 22' August mentioned in paragraph 25 above 43 It described the arrival in a period of a few weeks of several thousand Bloc personnel and of an unusually large number of Soviet ships carrying military cargoes It described the Imusual security'preceutions observed in the unloading of these cargoes and in their transportation to construction sites from which Cuban residents had been evacuated It observed The speed and magnitude of this influx of 310 yersonnel and equipment into a non Bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities clearly something new and different is taking place A copy of the Current Intelligence Memdrendmn is attached as Annex G - 16 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 CO3054547 - were 43 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Increase in Reports 1 4 How new and how different soon became apparent in the rapid increase in reportsu from gglrefugees as well as other sources--suggesting missile activity in cube In the 30 days up to and including 22 August there had been only seven such _reports In the-next 30 days up to 21 septeMber inclusive there Thereafter until 111- October the day the U-2 proved the existence of offensive missile sites there were 1 2 making a total of 85 for the period 23 August through 14 Our discussion of reports anfl what was done with them will be limited to these 85 concerning suspected missile activity In the some period there were also six reports relating to and four relating to 45 There were of course many other reports relating to other phases of the Soviet military program in cube deliveries of conventional aircraft and other military gear electronic devices transport vehicles and construction materials soviet transport conyoyss Soviet encampments and personnel including the imported labor force many of them reportedly airfielde and operatiOns 46 In four months the over-wall reporting on Cuba increase-'1 between three and four times In July Task Force W'disseminate 76 reports in August 1933 in September 223 in October 271 -17 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 The Missile Reporting The 85 reports concerning suspected missile activity in cute which were disseminated'between 23 August and 1% Octdber were all distributed to USIB members and to all elements of CIA having known requirements for them In addition kl were referred to EPIC 36 were sent to the CIA representative with CINCLANT 25 to the Immigration and Naturalization Service 10 to the Executive Office of the President and 9 to CINCARIB Detailed dissemination will be discussed below Eight of these are considered by and to have been especially significant as indicating the possible existence of offensive missile activity At least two of them marked by double asterisk in the sub paragraphs below taken together were so suggestive as to pinpoint San Cristdbal in Pinar del Rio Province as a target for overflight reconnaissance These eight reports are summarized in the order in which they were issued a On 20 Septemberl was quoted as having said on 9 September we have 4D-miie range guided missiles both surface-to surface and air-to air and we have a radar system which covers sector by sector all_of the Cuban air space and beyond as far as Florida There are also many mObile ramps for intermediate range rockets They don't know what is awaiting them b On 21 Septemberl quoted as saying we will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have everything incIuding atomic weapons The same report quoted as saying that about 1 000 Soviet technicians were constructing a nuclear weapons base in western Cuba Headquarters commented that the source might be referring to Mariel Eaval Area where another source had reported construction of a missile base and observed that ther had been no previous reports of nuclear weapons in cube c Also on 21 September a refugee was quoted as having observed in Havana on the night of 12 September a convoy of 20 Soviet trucks driven by Soviets and pulling trailers 65 to 70 feet long carrying canvas covered Objects which looked like missiles The source s descriptions and sketches matched photographs of Guided Missile Surface-to Surface - 18 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 a u-Approved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 d On 23 SepteMber a refugee at Port Isabele was reported as haWiug Observed there on 2 September 20 metal cylinders #5 to 50 feet long and about five feet in diameter and having later seen five of them being carried toward Santa Clara on trailers e Another refugee report dated 1 Octdber concerned the sighting on the night of 17 September of a military escorted convoy of Soviet trucks The source said the convoy which was on the road leading to San Cristobal included seven 32-foot trailers carrying huge tubes covered with canvas f A source in Guba reported on 2 October that large intercontinental rockets more than 20 meters long were unloaded by Soviet personnel the night of 19 SepteMber in Nariel Head- quarters commented It is more likel source observed SA-2 missiles being offloaded g Another 2 October report described a refugee s obser- vations at Mariel on 23 September The source Observed two trucks and included two missile launchers -h9 The other reports dated 23 August through 1% October and dealing with suspected missile activity are summarized in Annex A Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 4 3 5 4 5 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 How the Reports were Selected 50 The 85 reports that have been mentioned are among a total of 123 for a broader period extending to 26 October 19622 These were selected at the request of the DUI by Mr William K Harvey Chief of Task Force A three man team from the Intelligence Group screened Clandestine Services reporting back through January 1962 Office of Operations 00 reporting back through early May 196 anc Special Intelligence reporting back through earhy June 1962 51 In addition to the 123 reports which nr Harvey considered 'to have definite or highly probable references to Soviet missile activity in cube there were 8 referring to delivery of the MIG-21 and 7 on the 0f the total of 138 60 came from Clandestine Services sources 67 from 00's exploitation of refugees and 11 from Special Intelligence Thirty-seven of the total were referred to NPIC with a request for either immediate photographic interpretation or additional overflight reconnaissance to clarify or confirm the reported activities 52 The searchers reviewed about 1 70o Clandestine Services reports 1 800 Office of Qperations reports and some 6 000 entries on 150 teletype strips of Special Intelligence material 53 The above reports came from every province of cube They varied in content appraisal and source evaluation Many of them care from untested ultimate sources and unskilled observers But allowing for inconsistencies or distortions in individual the mosaic picture that emerged was remarkably consistent a wide spread and large scale construction activity b many convoys of Soviet trucks frequently moving by night and with trailers carrying massive tubular obJects c new restricted military areas from which Guban residents have been evacuated d Soviet personnel supervising the unloading of ships and the land transport of their cargoes e frequent specific references to surface-to-air missiles and their accoutrements to cruise missiles and to the construction of missile sites and f evidence of almost exclusive Soviet or Bloc occupancy and control of new military sites 54 Many other reports including communications intercepts which contained no reference to actual or suspected missile activity added hreadth and perspective to the picture of a massive and unprecedented build up of Soviet-manned military installations to 20 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 excess of the actual defense needs of the island of cube Among the most intriguing of these were several NBA intercepts of Soviet military radio traffic in Eastern Europe calling for volunteers to serve in Cuba 55 Confirmatory evidence and new evidence was supplied by interpretation of the results of the U-2 missions as follows 29 August eConfirmed establishment of a missile defense of western Cuba seven SA-E sites the coastal defense cruise missile site at Banes was discovered but not positively identified as to type found unidentifiable construction at Guanajay 5 more SA-2 sites bringing the total to ten proved that the Banes site was intended for short-range coast missiles found a and several others still in crates at Santa Clara airfield 26 SepteMber--Three additional SA-2 sites discovered bringing the total to 13 29 September -One more SA-2 site found bringing the total to 1h another coastal defense cruise missile site was identified 5 October 0ne more SA-2 site was discovered bringing the total to 15 7 October--Four more sites were discovered bringing the total to 19 1h October -Identification of MRBM site in the San Cristobal area Tc mamn mr__ Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Distribution of Reports a 56 There-was a standard distribution of each series of raw information reports on the Guban arms'build up The standard distribution itself was Wide Each report received a supplemental distribution based upon the known interests of various components of Government 57 The advance teletype distribution of 00 reports based on interro ations of refugees went to these addressees OCI ORR OSI element TFW Department of State ACSI -AFSSO no JCS and AEC The follow-up hard-cepy distribution went to these same addressees plus other components of the intelligence community having use for the information 58 The series of Clandestine Services reports in addition to a selected distribution went to a standard list of 20 addressees outside of the Clandestine Services -The addressees on the particularly significant reports disseminated after mid-September were Department of State DIA Air JCS Secretary of Defense NSA RIC USIA 001 ONE OCR ORR OBI 00 EPIC FBI and CINCLANT through the Agency's representative to the command The cable Secretariat made direct distribution to eadh of these named addressees except Din ACSI Nhry Air JCS and the Secretary of Defense 59 After the offset master had'been run by the cable Secretariat yielding the copies needed for direct distribution the master was taken by courier to the Army Staff Communications Center in the Pentagon Army Staff Communications then re ran the master reproducing enough copies to allow distribution to the standard Department of Defense addressees ACSI Navy Air JCS and the Secretary of Defense to which CIA did not make direct distribution plus other Department of Defense elements having an interest in the report 60 The cable Secretariat distributed six copies of each report to the Office of Central Reference can Based on known requirements OCR then distributed these six copies to offices other than standard addressees having an interest in the particular report 61 The dist ibut' on is typical of that made of reports in the series The message distributed on 2 October reported the Observation on 19 September of large - 22 - Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 1 intercontinental rockets being unloaded at the port of Mariel irt ei ht copies of the raw cable from the Task Force on which thatlees based had already been distributed within 01A by the Cable Secretariat The recipients of 62 After theEreport had been prepared from the raw cable theEwss distributed in 199 copies as follows No of Copies Recipient 12 Task Force 30 Other elements of the Clandestine Services and miscellaneous CIA addressees who were not standard addressees and whose interests were not served by OCR These included DUI and the Office of security 001 ONE OCR Liaison Staff OCR Industrial Register OCR Biographic Register DD I Assistent to rianning OSI DD R Office of Special Activities ORR 00 OBI Department of State NPIG Isms FBI CINCLANT NBA NICE USIA Reproduced by the Arm Staff Communications Center and distributed to A081 Navy Air JCS and the Secretary of Defense plus other interested elements in the Department of Defense 2 DIA CD -23- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 sir Speed of Dissemination 63 many of the Clandestine Services re orts on the arms dy i ere based on island and there was an inevitable delay between the date of observation and the date of receipt of the information by Reports based on interrogations of refugees-at Ops locka suffered a similar time lag in that the information could not be - gotten until the refugee had managed to escape from Cuba 64 Where measurable the time lag between the date of an observation on the ground in Cdba and the date a report was issued in washington was as short as six days as long as ho days The average was around l9 days 65 Taking as an example_the meSSEge whose distribution is discussed in paragraph 61 shove this is the sequence of processing'between date of observation and date of receipt by_the user 19 September Date that unloading of missiles at meriel-wss observed 23 September Bets lforwerded 1 October Dateli lreceived at in Miami 1 October Date that the information report was cabled to Headquarters from JMHAVE 1 October Date time of receipt of cabled 2120 information report by the cable Secretariat 1 October Date time of receipt of the cabled 2156 information report by the Intelligence watch The Intelligence watch is responsible for disseminating cabled information reports In this case the report was referred to Task Force W'for dissemination because the ind - 21% - Approved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 av Intelligence watch had reservations as to the appropriateness of appraisal of possibly true 2 October Date time Task Ferce'W delivered the 1h39 finished report to the cable Secretariat for reproduction and distribution 2 October Date of delivery of reproduced report to the customers The exact time of delivery cannot now be readily deter mined Gable Secretariat records show only that the report was picked up by the courier who was on duty after the normal close of business In any event delivery was completed in time for the report to be available to the customers at the opening of business on 3 October This report carried a ROUTINE precedence designation and presumably received no unusual expedite treatment were it not for the fact that the ntelligence watch had doubts as to the proper Vi appraisal of this information it is probable that the report could have been in the hands of the customers 2h hours earlier 66 we found no evidence that the President s ban on publishing information concerning offensive Soviet preparation in Cuba hindered the nermal dissemination and analysis of raw intelligence The PSALM system uhich was in effect from 12 to 22 Octdber did limit distribution as it was designed to do but it imposed no limitation an analysis of the material and in any case it affected only two or three days of the period prior to is October 67 There was close and rapid communication between 001 and Task Force W'personnel with the former performing on the spot evaluations for the latter as they scanned incoming raw reports for inclusion in the Cuban Daily summary The working relationship between Task Force W 651 the Targeting working Committee NBC and NPIC was such as to facilitate rapid and effective action on raw information meriting such attention Coordination on requirew -nents with DIA was swift and smooth in marked contrast with publication coordination difficulties - 25 - Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 68 Task Force officers took part in the deliberations which led to the 19 September publication of SNIE 85-3-62 which concluded inter alia that the Soviets might be tempted to establish offensive weapons in Udba but that such a development would'be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as currently estimated 69 The estimators received and studied the raw traffic and discussed it with and operators But at the time SNIE 85-3-62 was under discussion there were as yet no valid reports of an offensive buildrup The first of the significant and valid reports on offensive missiles was disseminated on 20 September one day after SNIE 85-3-62 was approved by the USIB I It reads Ill 'we have 40-mile range guided miss1les ootn suriace-to- sUrface and surface to air and we have a radar-system which covers sector by sector all of the Cuban air space and beyond as far as Florida There are also many mobile in ramps for intermediate range rockets They don't know what is awaiting them ' 70 The first report that concerned possible offensive weapons and'Which suggested an area where they might be found was not dis -seminated until 21 September two days after approval of the estimate The estimators were unable to sense that the Soviets were departing radically from past patterns and practices Nor could they sense that the Soviets themselves were victims of a gross misestinete of their own that they were miscalculaiing U S ability to detect their mischief and to take prompt and vigorous action to counter it 71 As of 19 September the date USIB approved SNIE 85-3 62 coordinated intelligence publications of wide community distribution had stated that there were in Cdba at least nine SAM sites one coastal defense missile site and eight ROMAR-class guided missile patrol boats and that h 200 Soviet military technicians had arrived since mid-July The intercept information that the Soviets were seeking volunteers for Gabe from military units in East Europe had also been pdblished 25 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 72 The first reports which definitely suggested offensive missile activity and which started the targeting process that led to production of photographic evidence began to come in two days after the estimate was printed 73 The facts show that the raw information flowed as it should have done and was discussed by the officers in CIA whose business it is to analyze and use it Whether or not the publishing ban veiled its importance is a matter of speculation We have gathered opinions on both sides It is possible that the restriction against publishing information about offensive weapons in Cuba may have served to draw the attention of to reports of such activity and to ensure that they briefed their superiors on them -27- I Approved for Release 2015 03 24 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Mistrust of Clandestine Services and 00 Reporting The nr Lahman's memorandum deals with the mistrust of CIA reporting on the arms build up in Cuba He says files contain 282 intelligence reports not including press items on missile and missile associated activity in Cuba before 1 July 1962 All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity CIA had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion Our conversations with officers in components confirm Mr Lehman's statement that a resistance had built up to CIA reporting on Cuba 75 Mr Sheldon stressed the lack of credibility in CIA reperting He specifically cited Clandestine Services reports of Africans in Cuba with bones in their noses and rings in their ears Mr B J Smith in cementing on failure to use CIA reporting cited two factors The first Was its unreliability which he rated as ranging between the ridiculous and the inane specifically referring to reports of Negroes with rings in their noses The second factor was the lack of sufficient oval-flights to confirm reporting 76 We have identified three reports with references to Negroes being in Cuba There may be others that have escaped our attention These Clandestine Services reports came from three separate untested sources none of whom was reportingufrom direct observation Dates of information ranged from 30 July to about mid august Two of the reports were disseminated on 31 August and thethird on 3 September One of the 31 August reports mentioned the arrin of Mongoliens Negroes er Congolese some wearing earrings The other 31 August report mentioned Congolese having arrived at Mariel and Congolese being camped at Guanajay The 1 September report said that among foreigners arriving in Cuba in early August were numerous Africans goment inserted in the 1 September report says The cans frequently reported as having recently arrived in Cuba may possibly be Bantus who were in the Soviet Union as students or laborers W- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 6f' I ------------------ 77 At least one officer told us that this touch of the bizarre b a d the ring of circumstantial truth and tended to make the reporting more credible 78 As late as the second week of October shortly cefore the 'Q'-2 p t'oduced hard eVidence some officers remained unconvinced of the offensive nature of the preparation The eight reports previously referred to had of cOllrse come to their attention and seyeral of them Were e en then getting meticulous attention from the targeters But the reports were indiyidually not of h t quality and n officer who thought them lli eleas as some did could scarcely be ble med It should be emphasized that th i s Skeptical attitude was not due to a ny inWediment in the flow of raw informatio n--there was none until the PBAIM system was imposell- p or did it as far a s we can determine in a ny way hamper swift action on the information 79 However we do think that the publishing ban had the effect of prolonging this skepticism until the eleventh hour If the ban had not existed an item on the possible presence of MRBMja in Cuba Gould have aPPeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin in the last days of September providing it could have survived the coordination 'process and it might have changed some J'6ople I fl m 1nas Such an item of course could have appeared in the President's Cheyklist but it did not 80 o Attached are three graPhs showing a Clandestine Services and 00 reporting on missile 'activity rom January thr vgh September 1962 b o All Clandestine Services reporting on Cuba from January through September 1962 c All 00 reporting on Cuba from March through Sepi iember 1962 81 From theSe charts it can oe seen that the le-v-el of total 00 reporting on Cuba fluctuated w1de howeve r beginning in Avgust there waB a dramatic upsurge both in total Clandestine Services reportip g on cuba plus 00 reporting on missile activity From Mr Lehman fs report one might infer that the volume of reportiIlf combined with the earlier false reporting on missile activity was such that the analysts could not have been eXJ ected to recognizE the signif'icance of the August and September reporting on missi _e artivity - 29 l Q e aESRm Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 a a rirl -45inhal mill Fragmeraultz Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 la x 1v IUZ mun Unxop v uu zum m m2uuam 2mmuhm5 9 3m uz 303054547 za 0 33m mussel urnmm A 40x40 0mm 29 A Emawmmz nu I nn 2 L I b 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 2015 03 24 00305454 rll Eatv 141 11Turin 1 - Mr_um a 4 LIP-I 0 M- _ qffw 17 2n wh 0 Em mmz mnPuI npumm 053mm nu A HOXHO 2 C03054547 onwrm wdpul nr w- W- I ail - 5 1-53 THIN to Release 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 u 5 11118 11y 13hr ca 511 8e p'ten ge IL96- Total 03 or Cuba from Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 82 -The evidence suggests that in fact CIA were concerned about the meaning of this reporting but that HIA remained unconvinced The belittling of the contribution mede by CIA reporting seems to derive frOm the need for an explanation as to why this concern was not filtered upward to the policy making levele - Even if one were to cancede that the abrupt upsurge in missile-aeeocieted reporting in August was not neceaearily a vaLid indicator of something new afoot the aerial photography of 29 August confirmei the truth of much of this August reporting and thereafter there was little excuse for demeaning the veli ity of CIA reperting examples of which appear in paragraph hB indicating a shift to offensive weapons Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Analyses and Estimates 83 we found little agreement among the several officers interviewed as to the prdbable effect of SNIE 85 3-62 on the work of the Some officers felt that the would not be appreciably influenced by an estimate--that they'might in fact take delight in uncovering evidence of its inaccuracy Others felt that the would be wary of information that ran counter to estimates based on solid evidence then existing 8h Although proof is lacking and evidence is scanty we believe that SNIE 85-3 and the political and operational climate from which it grew did have a significant effect on the use made of raw information during late September and early Catcher Not only do we believe that the estimators influenced the but that the influenced the reporters 85 we can cite only one example of influence on reporting but it is significant There was extremehy close coordination between the reporters in Task Force'w and the users in the components Reports often were checked out with the before being disseminated In the main we think that seeking assistance from the experts was and is a desirable procedure as long as that assistance is limited to help in accuratehy presenting the facts we think it of doubtful wisdom however to intrude this expert and analytical assistance into the realm of inter pretation at the reporting level 86 The rticular report that illustrates our point is summarized in paragraph #8 above which reports large intercontinental rockets being unloaded in Mhriel on 19 BapteMber A Eeadquarters comment made with assistance the was added to the effect that it was more likely that the source Observed SA-E missiles being offloaded 87 Admittedly we are speaking from present knowledge that the report as written was probably accurate and that the Headquarters comment was wrong There were SSM's in Guba on 19 September Mariel is a port that served the San Cristobal and Guanajay sites and the are about 20 meters long Why then the Headquarters comment that it is more likely that the missiles were SA-E's which are only about 10 meters long Did Headquarters have any evidence not available to the field upon which to base such a comment Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 The answer of course is no Headquarters did however have the benefit of an estimative Judgment that the Soviets probably would not put offensive weapons in Cuba plus photographic evidence that as of 29 August they had not done so 88 Thus we find prevailing opinion and invalid evidence filtering into the processing of a current report with the result that the significance of new and in retrospect valid information was lessened We recognize that even if this comment had not been added at the reporting level it is probable that it would haVe been added at least tacitly at the analytical level However this gratuitous comment was made a part of the basic report and each of the perhaps hundreds of persons who read it would be inclined to interpret the facts as they were presented to him The presentaticm said in effect This is what our source says he saw we do not believe him 89 In fairness to the reporters we should point out that this is the only evidence we found of possible distortion of reporting Considering the volume of reporting on the arms build- up and the admitted unlikeliness of the Soviets doing what they did we think the reporters were remarkably objective in their treatment of seemingly doubtful information -32- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Acting Taken on the Views of the Director of Central Intelligence 90' Throughout the period of the Cuban arms build-up the Director of Central Intelligence urged an interpretation of its significance that received little or no acceptance elsewhere in the commnity Everyone of the several senior CIA officers whom we intervieWe-d said that he could not at this point claim to have recognized the significance of the information being received on Cuba Mr Sherman Kent for example told us that on 13 October he- teraonally reviewed a selection of sigii icant recent informa tion reports on Cuba and foundwno Justification for revising his thinking 91 We looked for evidence of any information existing in CIA on the Cuban build-up to 1which the Director had access and to which other officers or other members of the intelligence community did not We 'fOund none The fact remains however that the Director did correctly assess the Soviet threat and he made his views known 'repe atedly 92 On 10 August at a meeting in Secretary Bush's conference room attended by Secretary Rusk Mr Johnson Secretary McNamara Mr Gilpatric Mr Bandy General Taylor and a number of others for the purpose of discussing General Lansdale's Phase II activities the Director reported on the sudden importation of material--at that time the characteristic of which was unidentified and Soviet personnel and at that meeting speculated that this could be electronic equip- ment fer use against Canaveral and or military equipment including medium range ballistic missiles 1 93 On 21 August at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office - attended by the same group the Director again reviewed the situation as it- developed since 10 August reported definite information on surfaCe-to-air missiles and again speculated on the probability of medium range ballistic missiles 91 On 22 August the Director gave the same information to the President adding certain details concerning the number of Soviet and Chinese personnel who had recently entered Cuba as reported by 95 On 23 August in a meeting with the President Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Mr Gilpatric General Taylor Mr Bundy -33- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 _Junasseesr' and others the Director again reviewed the situation and questioned the need for the extensive SAM installations unless they were to make possible the concealment of 96 The same reasoning was applied in discussions with Senator Russell's subcommittee CIA subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Vinson s subcommittee CIA subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and in a private talk with Chairman Cannon Chairman of the CIA subcommittee of the Hbuse Appropriations Committee prior to the Director's departure on 23 August 97 On Saturday 25 August the Director urged General Carter Acting DCI to propose low-level flights over certain Soviet-cuban installations in order to Obtain detailed technical information 98 The Acting DCI initiated a series of actions designed to get low-level photographic cdverage 99 At a COMDR meeting on September the JCS representative indicated that he needed advice on what requirements in Cuba could he met by the tactical type reconnaissance aircraft which the could not meet 100 At a COMOR meeting on 3 September in further pursuance of the request of the Acting DCI it_was agreed that Tactical type reconnaissance aircraft could acquire information on the identified SAM sites which would permit more reliable estimates of the operational status 101 On 9 September the Chairman of was informed'by the Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State that the Secretary of State had raised a question whether the information on'Banes could be obtained by peripheral reconnaissance means The COMOR met on the morning of 10 September to answer this qpestior concluded that Peripheral phetography could satisfy acme of the objectives planned for coverage in the current proposed mission those objectives on the north and south coast and some of the Isle of Pines It could not satisfy requirements in the Guantanamo area nor search which may'be required later for further inland nor for future count on inland'bases nor for technical intelligence whica mav be reouir on already known or yet to be found missile sites 3h - Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 102 On 10 September the Acting DGI addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which It is recommended that you initiate the necessary action including Special Group approval to provide for the employment when directed by higher authority of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes or other targets as are identified in canoes-2MB which was made available to DIA on 1 September 1962 103 The minutes of the Special Group meeting of it September reveal the outcome of these efforts representative outlined the capabilities fer low level coverage of certain targets in Cuba It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations the nature of which is not clear at present 10h Durin September the Director forwarded a series of cables in which he repeated his belief that offensive weapons would be installed urged frequent repeat reconnaissance missions suggested that the Board of National Estimates study the motives behind the defensive measures and finally expressed a reservation regarding SNIE 85 3 62 the substance of which had been cabled to him These cables from the Director initially were distributed by the Cable Secretariat to the office of the DCI and pertinent portions were passed to the and the by General Garter 105 As noted above General Carter's efforts to get tactical reconnaissance of cabs were resisted'by the Secretary of Defense pending the results of further Agency reconnaissance Elsewhere in this paper in the section on the September overflights we describe the resistance of Secretary Rush and others to any U-2 missions that would run any risk of being shot down 106 It should be noted that throughout this period the analytical level continued the analysis of incoming information There was particularly significant analytic effort carried on among operational elements Task Force W for example dealt directly with the COMOR We conclude though that the intelligence and the estimators never carried their analyses and estinetes to the point of asking themselves Is it reasonable to believe that so costly a defensive apparatus would be constructed against a nebulous invasion threat particularly since the defensive structure would not halt a determined invader The full account of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence is the subject of a separate report -35- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 107 From our discussions with the estimators it is evid ent that they were unprepared to believe tha t the Soviets might install of' ensive weapons in Cuba or that the Soviets would grossly underestimate'United States ability to detect an offensive bUild-up and to react to it with forthright resolution '- - 36 - Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Publishing the Information 108 Coordinated items from the reports were printed in the Cuban Daily Sumnary with round-ups in the Cuban Weekly Sumary and its limited-distribution counterpart the G ban WEekly Report Less detailed coordinated information appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin era and the Current Intelligenc'eTige'e-t the 99 Night Journal and the Current Intelligence weekly Review The President s Checklist was not confined to coordinated items but it contained little that did not appear in the coordinated pdblications 109 The principal vehicles especially for high-level policy makers were the Egg and the Daily Summagz Of these two the CIB has the larger circulation more than 300 copies a day are prinEEd half of them going to 30 recipients outside the Agency and there is also a very wide circulation to CIA and Defense installations of partial or complete contents by electronic means The Daily Summary is printed in about 75 copies with about 20 going to high level outside the Agency Brief abstracts from the Egg and the Dailz Summary appear as Annex B and Annex C respectively 3 110 In a 26 October memorandum to General Carter Mr Harvey described information on Soviet missiles MIG-21's and IL-28's in Guba as reflected in current intelligence publications and he attached abstracts of such items from the Cuban Daily Summary the Night_Journal the weeklz Review and the 9 37' In it he stated The Guban summaries through 19 October 1962 were found to contain no references to any medium range or long range missile actirity The earliest positive acceptance of the possibility of introduction of SAM systems into Guba _appeared in the 17 August 1962 Guban Dail Summary The possibility of eventual delivery of MI -2l's to cube was implied in the issue of 5 March 1962 Future delivery of the was first mentioned in the 1 August 1962 DaiLy Summary but was not accepted as probable until an entry in the 11 Octdber issue in 7 37 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 TOP SECRET The mechanics of Putting Together the 013 111 The Central Intelligence Bulletin is an all source intelligence publication that is issued every day but Sunday 001 is responsible for getting it out The GIB for the day normally goes to press about 0400 hours Reproduction can be delayed for an hour or so to accommodate a very urgent last minute report but it usually begins at about 0400 112 The content of the day's CIB has begun to take shape by about noon of the preceding day a tentative selection of items to be included has been made from information then available The submissions have been prepared in draft form normally between noon and 1300 the tentative draft is teletyped to DIA and to the Department of State so that in those agencies may review the items 113 At 1515 hours each afternoon except Saturday the 013 panel meets to agree on the content of the CIB for the following The panel consists of OCI DIA the Department of State and the-Clandestine Services The panel considers the items that should be included and the information that each should contain - 114 When the panel has agreed on the content the items are typed on offset masters which are retained in the GUI watch Office throughout the night Although an item may have been fulhy coordinated in the panel meeting its contents need not remain static If information received after the close of the panel meeting dictates need for change 001 may amend items at any time prior to actual printing 115 Information that is received too late for coordination in the panel meeting is inserted uncoordinated item The fact that it has not been Eogrdinated is indicated by an asterisk 116 Entries that are available for consideration at the time of the panel meeting normally appear in the 013 as coordinated items Either State or DIA or both may not completely agree with a particular submission but if the reservations are not so serious as to require 'outright nongconcurrence the item appears in the 013 as a coordinated entry If there is marked disagreement on a particular item and its -38 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 urgency is such that it must not be delayed in publication two courses are open A footnote may be inserted setting forth the views of the non-concurring agency or the item may appear with an asterisk falseky indicating that it has not been sobjected to coordination In either case the CIA submission appears as the basic entry in the GIB 117 The footnote or the false asterisk appear very rarely 001 can recall only one case of a footnote and one case of a false asterisk in recent months The item with a false asterisk was the previously mentioned submission of 27 September in which DIA refused to go along with CIA's conclusion that at least 22 and possibly 25 to 30 had been delivered to Cuba Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 The President's Checklist 118 - Another iIqportant reporting medium was the daily President's Intelligence Checklist of which only ten copies are printed and which goes to the PreSident the Secretaries o f Statf and Defense General M ax well Taylor and M r McGeorge Btm None of the-bans on publication of information on offensive weapons in Cuba applied to this publication and it was not subject to inter-egen y coordination It was a private communication from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Presideni and a very few of his closest advisors 119 Therefore there was no requirement that the Checklist writers limit themselves to material which couJ d be published in the Central Intelligence Bulletin or the Cuban Daily SUMma Y' Nevertheless the Checklist reporting almost exactly parallels that of the other two much more widely distributed publications The defensive build-up is covered in much the same fashion- Ther-e is nothing in the period under conSideration which even hints at -the offensive build-up 120 o As noted earli-er there were at least eight widely disseminated reports in September and early October which might have found their way into publi ations had it not been for the ban liowever these suggestive scraps of information did not even get into the uninhibited Checklist But they were by no means ignored Two of them those- mentioned in parag r'aphs lJ8 c and lj8 e above came to the surfac in the analytic process as indicative of surface-to-surface missile activity and led to the 14 October U-2 mission over San Cristobal - - 40 - -pop S8 1 lL________________________ Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Conclusions 121 On the basis of this investigation we conclude a That with a few minor exceptions intelligence 'information on the Cuban arms build up moved rapidhy to those officers who needed it b That limited use was made of the information available because of publication restrictions which were aggravated'by coordination problems and because officers in CIA as well as other agencies were skeptical of refugee and agent reporting that this skepticism may have delayed the community's realization of the true significance of the CUban arms build-up c That the estimative process failed'because the estimators were unprepared to believe that the Soviets might install offensive weapons in cubs or that they would grossly underestimate United States ability to detect an offensive build-up and to react to it with forthright resolution and d That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights following the incidents in Sakhalin and China affected the planning of cuban reconnaissance flights during September 1902 31% bl Approved for Reiease 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 I 31 1 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 CO3054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 00305454 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Appi oved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 303054547 Approved for Release 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Release 2015103124 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 4 5 4 7 3 5 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 CO3054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Releasef 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 FCO3054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for'Release 2015 03 24 203054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 c03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 - Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 A i i i Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 ANNEX OCI No 3047 62 22 August 3 962 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SUBJECT Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba 1 _I ntelligence on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargoes to Cuba since late July and that some form of military construction is underway at several locations in Cuba by Soviet bloc personnel who arrived on some of these ships and are utilizing material delivered by the vessels During the period at least 1 500 passengers have debarked from four ships under security conditions suggesting that their mission is related to the construction and military activity another 1 500 arrived during the'pe'riod and were greeted with considerable publicity as economic specialists and students Some still uncon rmed reports suggest that recently arrived Soviet bloc personnel number as many as 000 The speed and magnitude of this in ux of bloc personnel and equipment into a non-bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities clearly something new and different is taking place As yet limited evi den e suggests that present activities may include the augmentation of Cuba's air defense system possibly including the establishment of surface- to air missile sites or the setting up of facilities for electronic and com- munications intelligence 2 As many as 20 Soviet vessels may have already arrived in Cuba since late July with military cargoes Five more Soviet vessels have left Black Sea ports under conditions suggesting that they are en route to Cuba with additional military equipment Most reports on these shipments have referred to large quantities of transportation electronic and construction equipment such as communications and radar vans trucks of many varieties mobile generator units tracked and wheeled prime movers cranes trailers and fuel tanks Eyewitnesses who saw the material being transported from the port areas report that much of the transportation was done at night and even that town street lights were turned off as the convoys passed through -1- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 3 Personnel who arrived on the four Soviet passenger vessels each of which has a normal passenger capacity of 340 though one of them declared 365 passengers when leaving the Black Sea -have been described variously by Cubans who have seen them Most agree that they were obviously non Cuban in appearance and were dressed in civilian clothing A number of independent ource s report that the foreign personnel were dressed in dirty dustry slept in red-checkered shirts and faded blue trousers The foreign personnel unloaded the vessels themselves usually Cuban militiamen have been charged with this work even when it wasia military cargo There is no hard evidence that any of these people are 'in combat military units There is strong evidence that their mission is related to unidentified military construction 4 Atleast a dozen refugees from the area of Matanzas have reported independently on military construction at two sites near that north' coast city Two and possibly more ships arrived in the port of Matanzas and unloaded cargoes under tight security preciautions Cargoes were taken to at least two general areas where construction is underway Initial construction according to one of the eyewitnesses involved the grading-and leveling of a naturally level portion of the western slope of a hill by Soviet personnel using heavy equipment This was taking place at a site just east of Matanzas at a place called El Bongo Other sources confirmed that material was leaving the docks in the direction of Bongo Another source who left Cuba more recently reported that by 4 August foreign personnel were assembling what appeared to be a prefabricated curved-roofed structure at El Bongo The other site of construction activity near Matanzas is apparently just across the provincial border in at Santa Cruz del Norte near the former Hershey sugar mill In this place too construction activity initially involved the leveling of a portitm of a hill near the coast Cuban residents had been cleared from the area 5 There are as yet no confirmed report of construction activity underway in other parts of Cuba However there is considerable reason to presume that such activity is underway or is to be initiated shortly in a number of other locations in Cuba ranging from Oriente province in the east to Pinar del Rio in the west reported that a Soviet ship unloaded in late July at no roy Nicaro The material unloaded including electronic vans tracked prime movers and trailers was moved through Antilla toward the Peninsula de Ramon an area where he reported construction work had 2 SE ET Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 been underway for some time Another ship is reported to have dis- charged a similar cargo as well as foreign personnel in the port of Casilda in southern Las Villas province In northern Las Villas Gaye Esquivel an island off the coast has reportedly been evacuated in the area just south of Havana city we have numerous independent reperts- that a number of farms have been evacuated and that the boys reformatory at nearby Torrens has been converted for living quarters for numbers of foreign personnel Information from individuals who live near the reformatory indicate that the numerous Soviet personnel who moved in early this month wore casual dirty civilian clothes Other reports indicate that quantities of equipment such as has been reported elsewhere have been seen on the confiscated farms near the reformat-cry Other reports from other parts 'of the island indicate that Cuban families have been evacuated from an island near Mariel the 'port inEPinar-del Rio province where much of the equipment was unloaded -Soviet practice in other countries receiving bloc military assistance would and from a farming area near Guatana Pinar del Rio province 6 What the construction activity involves is not yet known The activity in the Matanzas area could be the initial phases of construction of a5AM equipped air defense system erection of electronic and com- pinnications intelligence facilities aimed at Canaveral and other US installations or an EGM system aimed at US space missile andi'or other operational electronic systems The kinds of equipment described could fit With any of these objectives the evidence thus far as well as suggest at least tentatively construction of an air defense system based 0n the GUIDELINE missile Information to confirm or refute this should become available within a week 7- The step-up in military shipments and the construction activity once again provide strong evidence of the magnitude of the USSR's support for'the Castro regime Together with the extraordinary Soviet bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in recent months these developments amount to the mo st extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the USSR Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 SE IG Comment This memorandum was distributed as follows ADI CI Senier Intelligence Duty Officer O CI President's Checklist Staff 0C1 Pfoduction Assistant Western Areas IOC-I Latin America Division 001 Watch Officer 061 Indications Officer 0C1 Current Support Staff ORR USIB Watch Committee 25 copies -4- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 39122 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 000054547 303054547 SUBJECT Approved for Release 2015 05 27 003054547 ANNEX 29 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR ODDI ATTENTION 'Mr Lehman Difficulties in Coordination with CIB on Cuban Military Build-up l The Current Support Staff of the Office of Research and Reports in support of the Office of Current Intelligence has prepared much of the material on Soviet Bloc delivery of arms to non bloc countries since that program began in 1954 1955 Coordination of Central Intelligence Bulletin submissions on this subject has always been difficult Prior to 5 September coordination of material relating to the speed up of deliveries to Cuba was extremely difficult especially with DIA Coerdination remained difficult until 10 October After much effort by members of the staff and others excellent cooperation was initially attained on 10 October when DIA agreed that an crate was a clearly identifiable object 2 In summary it was very difficult -to the point of direct con- frontation On 6 October between the CI and the Director CIIC DIA- to- get coordination of that which was published Itfis respectfully asserted that had we attempted to go further still-which unfortunately we did not attempt -coordination would have been impossible 3 The first submission dealing with the Cuban military build-up made on 17 August did not involve coordination since it was submitted after the CIB panel for the 18th had met This article stated limited information available thus far suggests it may include initial work on SAM sites to augment Cuba's air defense system No coordinated publication carried such a statement until photography on 28 August and 5 September indicated the installation of such a system 4 The first CIB submission on the build up to undergo coordina- tion which was submitted on 3 August suspected arms carrier s en route to Cuba Approved for Release 2015 05 27 003054547 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 05 27 003054547 Documentary evi -- dance of the NSA objection remains in 5 In addition CIB items appeared on 9 23 and 29 August deal- ing essentially with shipping deve IOpments Each of these was in various degrees watered down in the coordination process We were most effectively blocked in attempts to impute some significance to the deliveries Through late August DIA continued to publish that these arrivals were largely additional economic aid goods 6 On 27 September this office submitted a CIB draft based on deck-borne crates which concluded that at least 22 and possibly 25 to 30 had been delivered to Cuba This draft also concluded that of some 100 Soviet dry cargo vessel voyages to Cuba since mid-July 7 about'BS probably involved deliveries of military and related equipment a This item was submitted by cable to DIA in advance of the CIB panel refused to either coordinate or insert a footnote and after involve- ment of the C1 the item was run with an asterisk anormally indi cating'late submissions 7 A fairly major dispute eventually involving the and the Director Gillie occurred on 5'0ctober This article noted that crates observed on the Alatyrles in late September probably contained IL -14 piston transports and did not contain DIA would neither accept our evaluation or make one of their own This resulted in a attempt to have Mr R Srnith withdraw the piece or asterisk it asuncoordinated Mr Smith resolved the dispute at a late hour by offering DIA the choice of a footnote stating their lack of concurrence and the reason therefore or agreement DIA eventually accepted the latter choice Approved for Release 2015 05 27 003054547 C03054547 developments Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 5W 9 The same problems in coordination experience in preparing 'rnaterials for the CIB were evident in other forms chie y from the point of view of this staff in the Watch Committee Mr H Sheldon would be the better authority on this area 10 Y l of UNI the Navy Comint shop at NSA has been extremely cooperative through the build up in Cuba as in earlier Soviet Bloc arms movements by water despite minor differences over the turn around on 23 October of the ships en route to Cuba Should expressions of appreciation be-in order this unit should receive them On'the other hand it is respectfully suggested that BIA not be charged with its faults unless a defense of this Agency absolutely requires such action Suchan action Would not particularly facilitate theneces sary cooperation which will be required in future developments and as of the moment the concerned DIA personnel are rnore cooperative than at any time in the past 11 As a final note it should be pointed out that on about Augut Neubert' of Mr Hilsman's officie called for support Mr Hilsrrian was under the same pressures to vzwithdraw an INR Inemu randurn which noted an upsurge in Bloc vessels traveling to Cuba under conditions suggesting increasing deliveries of than that The request for withdrawal came from Gen M Taylor after consulta- tion with-Adm Dennison Commander of GITMO who saw no unusual Mr Neubert was offered some assistance that afternoon Publication on about 30 August of the Situation'Summary for Cuba on 28 August eliminated the need for further support to Mr CS 29 October 19 62 WT Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 303054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 C03054547 MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 ANNE i 15 November 1962 olive Soviet Ships in Mariel Harbor on 19 and 23 September 1962 Our information on specific ships in specific places in Cuba sketchy because of Soviet communications security procedures e lack of intercepts A careful review of the evidence however indi- cates the following ships probably were in Mariel on the following dates 19- September KIROVSK - POL - - FREDERIK - - Z KYURI 23 September ALATYRLES - - LENINOGORSK Probably arrived at Mariel about 18 September from a Baltic port and with a military cargo Cargo details are not known The deck cargo not known to have been photographed Probably arrived at Mariel about 15 September and had left by 24 September No cargo infor4 mation available but this ship probably delivered and associated equipment She has batches of a size sufficient to put such equipment below deck Deck cargo included miscellaneous crates and probable military trucks Arrived at an unidentified Cuban port about 14 September may have been Mariel Was out- bound by 2 0 September Ship delivered a military cargo but details are lacking The deck cargo is not known to have been photographed Probably was still in Mariel on 2 3 September after delivering a cargo which included three deck loaded probable twin engine CAB transport aircraft May have arrived in Mariel about 21 September with an unidentified military cargo Deck cargo photo - graphy shows probably military vans We Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 w WEI ANNEX lo NOV remote 1 1962 MEMORANDUM FDR Inspector General SUBJECT Total Cargo Tonnage Moved to Cuba by Soviet Ships Z July - 30 September 1 Our information on tonnage moved to Cuba in this period is extremely limited Ships carrying military cargoes almost always carry light loads relative to their capacities We have declarations of tonnage for most of the Soviet ships leaving from the Black Sea some of'which could be checked later during their unloadings Snoh declarations are not available on ships from the Baltic hOWever and tonnage has been estimated '1 2 During the period 26 July through 30 September Soviet dry cargo ships excluding 15 passenger ship voyages made about 95 voyages to Cuba carrying an estimated 135 000 tons of cargo About 90 of these voyages involved deliveries of military or military- related equipment totaling about 115 000 tons I 3 WT Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 003054547 Approved for Release 2015103124 003054547 ANNEX a 16 November 1962 MEMORANDUM son SUBJECT Ballistic Missile Shipments to Cuba 1 This memorandum partially answers the questions asked in paragraph 213 of your memorandum of 15 November It gives as much information on the activities of ships suspected of carrier missiles as we have gathered together so far We do not have and can not obtain precise information to answer most questions dealing with cargoes carried to Cuba and ports in the USSR where the ships were loaded We have not included the information requested on what these ships did in Cuba after unloading their cargoes that is what was loaded and taken back to the USSR In almost every instance these ships returned immediately in ballast in order to make a return voyage However to verify this in detail would take many hours of painstaking effort which would preclude answering your question for some days 2 We have identified seven--possibly ten--Soviet ships which have made calls at Cuban ports and could have carried below deck Seven of the ships have a hatch about 70 feet long which could accommodate about 6 missiles on transporters the other three have a hatch about 60 feet long and it is far less likely they carried missiles although they may well have carried missile equipment such as erectors and oxidizer trailers some of which also requires an extra large hatch 3 Our information on the activities of these ships is sketchy but in retrospect we can identify 7 voyages which probably account for the delivery of 42 ballistic missiles to Cuba These voyages have been checked by every available means --inc1uding intercepts photography and ports of entry They also have been plugged into a time chart of the construction of the missile bases in Cuba By using both collateral reports many of which became available after the sites were identified and the aerial photography a good estimate of the timing of activities at the MRBM and IRBM sites can be made The seven voyages mentioned above fit almost precisely into the chart where deliveries of missiles should have occured Many other voyages by these ships involved military equipment but probably not ballistic missiles 1 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Shig Voyage Number and Details BELORETSK 1 May have arrived in Mariel about 25 August Photography shows trucks and cranes on deck Probably carried missile equipment but no missiles Ship loaded in an un- identified Black Sea port 2 Arrived in the Mariel area about 13-14 October with an un identified military cargo from the Black Sea BELOVODSK 1 Was on maiden voyage from the Baltic at the time the US quarantine was announced The ship carried a civil cargo including 12 MI-4 helicoPters grain and our and arrived in Havana about 3 November 1 1 On its maiden voyage to Cuba in September this ship delivered 10 IL-28 bombers carried as deck cargo It probably did not carry missile equipment Arrived in the Mariel Havana area about 30 September 2 Turned back from a voyage to Cuba on 23 October when the US quarantine was announced Had departed from the Baltic KIMOVSK 1 Arrived in Cuba from the Baltic on 10 August on its maiden voyage Port of arrival unknown Probably carried military equipment but no ballistic missiles Photography shows a large number of trucks and cranes on deck suggesting the snip may have carried an advanced unit of missile personnel and equipment involved primarily with construction Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 2 Arrived Casilda about 22 September from the Black Sea No definite information available but in all probability the ship delivered a cargo which included ballistic missiles some of which were loaded in Casilda when they were returned to the USSR Photography of the ship shows no piece of equipment which can be traced to ballistic missile systems but the crates on deck are similar in size and constructiOn to those seen on several other ships believed to have delivered missiles 3 Ship turned back on 2 3 October when it was approaching the area of the US quarantine on a voyage from the Baltic KRASNOGRAD 1 Arrived Mariel on 21 August from the Baltic Photography shows a large 1 number of trucks and construction equipment on deck This delivery probably involved equipment for missile units but not the missiles themselves 2 Probably arrived in Mariel about 2 October from the Black Sea Photography shows large number of - trucks and crates on deck The crates are similar to those seen on other suspect missile carriers Ship prob - ably delivered missiles OKHOTSK l Arrived Havana on 2 0 September with agricultural equipment from the Soviet Far East port of Vladivostok Photography of the ship as it went through the Panama Canal indicates it did carry rice harvesters on deck Probably did not carry any military equipment -3- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 OMSK l Apparently loaded military equipment in the Black Sea port of Nikolaev in mid- June and arrived in Cuba -probably in the Mariel area--on 28 July No photography is available but this ship ment probably did not involve ballistic missiles 2 Arrived at an unknown Cuban port from the Black Sea by 9 September probably in the Mariel area This may have been the first shipment of ballistic missiles to arrive in this area and would account for at least one collateral report shortly after this No photography for this voyage is available 3 Arrived in Cuba--probab1y in the Mariel area--about 16 October from the Black Sea No photography for the voyage is available but it appears likely 4 that it involved the delivery of additional missiles ORENBURG I l Entered the Cuban port of Casilda on 29 August from the Black Sear This may have been the first shipment of missiles to arrive in Cuba Photography 'of the ship again shows the same type oi crates observed on other suspect missile carriers 2 Probably arrived in the Mariel area about 6 October from the Black See No photography of the ship is available bui we believe it probably delivered ballistic missiles Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 EDP-W PO-LTAVA 1 Arrived at an unknown port in Cuba about 2 August from the Black Sea No photography is available but because of the date of arrival it seems likely this voyage did not involve delivery of missiles 2 Arrived in Cuba -probably in the Mariel area--about 15 September from the Black Sea Photography of the ship shows the same type of crates observed on other suspect missile carriers Ship probably was among the first to deliver to Cuba 3 Turned back from a voyage to Cuba on 23 October after President Kennedy s speech In all probability the ship was carrying a cargo which included ballistic missiles possibly the first Photography of the ship shows the same type of crates seen on several other ii- suspect missile carriers and one proba ole IRBM launch ring can be observed on deck l Arrived in Havana about 17 October on its maiden voyage from the Baltic No cargo information is available but we do not believe the ship carried ballistic missiles on this voyage ls -5- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 4 4 7 3 5 5 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Win-4 manna- Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 Approved for Release 2015103124 003054547 ANNEX VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM mommum FOR was SPECIAL GROUP All SePtember 1962 SUBJECT Reconnaissanee of Guba At a meeting in MI Bundy's office yesterday attended by the secretary of State the Attorney General the Acting Director of Central Intelligence and others the Secretary expressed concern at the_Agency s planned coverage of Unba involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space all in one flight He said that-he had no objection to the peripheral parts and in fact thought it useful to continue to'establish our right to fly over international waters On the other hand he recognized the necessity of Obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Gabe at this time He felt however that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the would put the U S in a very poor position for standing on its rights Taking these views into account the Agency plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts - the Isle of Pines the area roughly east of longitude 77 west and two legs along the coast one north Within this framework higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currenthy outstanding Priority will be given to the two overflights Thomas A Parrott Distribution hr Johnson Mr Gilpatrio General Carter nr Bondy HANDLE VIA BEEMAH CONTROL BYE-3729X62 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION REFERRING To IDEAIJST 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 3 5 4 5 4 7 Approved for Release 2015 03 24 003054547 l3 September 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP Reconnaissance of cube REFERENCE MEmorandnm for the Special Group dated 11 September 1962 same subject Please add the following footnote to ref document N B Mi Bun y said on 13 September'l962 that he thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that the entire number of four missions could be considered as being approved This thus extends the ouistending euthorizahione from three to four Thomas Barrett Distribution Mr Johnson Mri Gilpatric General Garter Mr Bundy This document contains information referring to IHEALIST HANDLE VIA 23mm CONTROL SYSTEM m-376ea 62 Cy 1 of 5 cm Approved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 Egg pproved for Release 2015 03 24 C03054547 A                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu