Encryption Selected Legal Issues Richard M Thompson II Legislative Attorney Chris Jaikaran Analyst in Cybersecurity Policy March 3 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www crs gov R44407 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Summary In 2014 three of the biggest technology companies in the United States--Apple Google and Facebook--began encrypting their devices and communication platforms by default These security practices renewed fears among government officials that technology is thwarting law enforcement access to vital data a phenomenon the government refers to as going dark The government speaking largely through Federal Bureau of Investigations FBI Director James Comey has suggested that it does not want to ban encryption technology but instead wants Silicon Valley companies to provide a technological way to obtain the content stored on a device for which it has legal authority to access However many in the technology community including technology giants Apple Google and Facebook and leading cryptologists have argued that it is not technologically feasible to permit the government access while continuing to secure user data from cyber threats This problem is exacerbated by the fact that some suspects may refuse to unlock their device for law enforcement The current debate over encryption raises a wide range of important political economic and legal questions This report however explores two discrete and narrow legal questions that arise from the various ways the government has attempted to access data stored on a smartphone One method has been to attempt to compel a user to either provide his password or decrypt the data contained in a device pursuant to valid legal process This prompts the first question whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would bar such a request Generally documents created independent of a government request e g a photo stored on a camera are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection because their creation was not compelled by the government as required under the text of the Amendment However the act of unlocking the device may have testimonial content of its own e g it may demonstrate that a suspect had access to the device which may trigger Fifth Amendment protection While there are a handful of lower court rulings and a growing body of academic literature on this issue there is only one appellate case applying the Fifth Amendment to compelled decryption and as of the date of this report no Supreme Court case law The other method is going to the company and requesting its assistance in unlocking a device which prompts the second question whether the All Writs Act--a federal statute that provides federal courts with residual authority to enforce its orders--can be interpreted broadly enough to cover compelled assistance on the part of the device and software manufacturer This question is the subject of ongoing litigation--including government requests to access the iPhone used by the San Bernardino shooter--in various federal district courts and is likely to engender similar litigation in the future This inquiry will largely hinge on whether the request would impose an unreasonable burden on the company and whether it would be consistent with the intent of Congress This report first provides background to the ongoing encryption debate including a primer on encryption basics and an overview of Apple Google and Facebook's new encryption policies Next it will provide an overview of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination survey the limited case law concerning the compelled disclosure of encrypted data and apply this case law to help determine if and when the government may require such disclosures The next section of the report will provide background on the All Writs Act explore both Supreme Court and lower court case law including a discussion of United States v New York Tel Co and apply this case law to the San Bernardino case and potential future requests by the government to access a locked device Congressional Research Service Encryption Selected Legal Issues Contents Introduction 1 Background 2 Encryption Basics 2 Going Dark Debate 4 Compelled Decryption and the Right Against Self-Incrimination 6 Fifth Amendment Framework 6 Testimonial and the Act of Production Doctrine 7 Foregone Conclusion Exception 7 Physical Acts 9 Compelled Decryption Case Law 9 Supreme Court 9 Eleventh Circuit 9 District Courts 10 State Courts 12 Application of Fifth Amendment Analytical Framework to Compelled Disclosure 12 Compelled Disclosure of Passcode 12 Compelled Entry of Biometric Passcode 13 Compelled Production of Decrypted Data 14 Compelled Assistance and the All Writs Act 16 Background 16 All Writs Act and the Supreme Court United States v New York Tel Co 17 Lower Courts 19 Application of All Writs Act to San Bernardino Case 22 Does the Order Impose an Unreasonable Burden on Apple 23 Is This Application of the All Writs Act Consistent with the Intent of Congress 24 Is Apple's Assistance Necessary to Carrying out the Court's Order 27 Potential Congressional Response 27 Tables Table 1 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CALEA 25 Contacts Author Contact Information 29 Congressional Research Service Encryption Selected Legal Issues Introduction In September 2014 Apple announced that its new operating system iOS 8 would encrypt most data stored on iPhones--such as iMessages photos calendars and apps--by default 1 This was after Apple Inc started to encrypt iMessage and iCloud data sent among Apple servers and users 2 Apple asserts that under this new practice it can no longer comply with government requests for data off iDevices 3 even with a valid probable cause warrant as it no longer has access to the inputs needed to decrypt such data 4 Google maker of the popular Android operating system announced a similar policy shortly thereafter 5 Likewise the popular Facebookowned messaging system Whatsapp announced in November 2014 that it would offer end-to-end encryption on its service 6 This move by Apple Google and Facebook--three of the biggest technology companies in the United States--has renewed fears among government officials that technology is preventing law enforcement access to vital data a phenomenon the government refers to as going dark 7 The government speaking largely through Federal Bureau of Investigations FBI Director James Comey has suggested that it does not want to ban encryption technology but instead wants Silicon Valley companies to provide a technological way to obtain the content of data stored on a device for which it has legal authority to access 8 However many in the technology community including American technology giants Apple Google and Facebook and leading cryptologists have argued that it is not technologically feasible to permit the government access while continuing to secure user data from cyber threats 9 The current debate over encryption raises a wide range of important political economic and legal questions 10 This report however explores two discrete and narrow legal questions that arise 1 Craig Timberg Apple Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones iPads for Police Even with Search Warrants WASH POST Sept 18 2014 available at https www washingtonpost com business technologynology 2014 09 17 2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story html 2 Greg Kumparak Apple Explains Exactly How Secure iMessage Really Is TechnologyCrunch February 27 2014 available online at http technologycrunch com 2014 02 27 apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is 3 iDevices include iPhones iPads and iPods 4 See Apple iOS Security Whitepaper Sept 2015 available at https www apple com business docs iOS_Security_Guide pdf 5 Craig Timberg Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption Blocking Police WASH POST Sept 18 2014 available at https www washingtonpost com news the-switch wp 2014 09 18 newest-androids-willjoin-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police 6 Andy Greenberg Whatsapp Just Switched on End-to-End Encryption For Hundreds of Millions of Users WIRED Nov 18 2014 available at http www wired com 2014 11 whatsapp-encrypted-messaging 7 See Going Dark Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies before the Subcomm on Crime Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Committee on the Judiciary 112th Cong Feb 17 2011 8 Going Dark Encryption Technology and the Balance Between Public Safety and Privacy Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee 114th Cong July 8 2015 written statement by James Comey Director Federal Bureau of Investigations 9 Ellen Nakashima Tech Giants Don't Want Obama to Give Police Access to Encrypted Phone Data WASH POST May 19 2015 available at https www washingtonpost com world national-security tech-giants-urge-obama-toresist-backdoors-into-encrypted-communications 2015 05 18 11781b4a-fd69-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story html 10 See generally CRS Report R44187 Encryption and Evolving Technology Implications for U S Law Enforcement Investigations by Kristin Finklea Steven Bucci et al Encryption And Law Enforcement Special Access The U S Should Err on the Side of Stronger Encryption THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION Sept 4 2015 available at http www heritage org research reports 2015 09 encryption-and-law-enforcement-special-access-the-us-should-erron-the-side-of-stronger-encryption#_ftn1 Urs Grasser Don't Panic Making Progress on the Going Dark Debate continued Congressional Research Service 1 Encryption Selected Legal Issues from the various ways the government has attempted to access data stored on a smartphone One method has been to attempt to compel a user to either provide his password or decrypt the data contained in a device pursuant to valid legal process This prompts the first question whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would bar such a request Generally documents created independent of a government request say a photo stored on a camera are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection because their creation was not compelled by the government as required under the text of the Amendment However the act of unlocking the device may have testimonial content of its own e g it may demonstrate that a suspect had access to the device which may trigger Fifth Amendment protection While there are a handful of lower court rulings and a growing body of academic literature on this issue there is only one appellate case applying the Fifth Amendment to compelled decryption and as of the date of this report no Supreme Court case law The other method is going to the company and requesting its assistance in unlocking a device which prompts the second question whether the All Writs Act--a federal statute that provides federal courts with residual authority to enforce its orders--can be interpreted broadly enough to cover compelled assistance on the part of the device and software manufacturer This question is the subject of ongoing litigation--including government requests to access the iPhone used by the San Bernardino shooter--in various federal district courts and is likely to engender similar litigation in the future This inquiry will largely hinge on whether the request would impose an unreasonable burden on the company and whether it would be consistent with the intent of Congress This report first provides background to the ongoing encryption debate including a primer on encryption basics and an overview of Apple and Android's new encryption policies Next it will provide an overview of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination survey the limited case law concerning the compelled disclosure of encrypted data and apply this case law to help determine if and when the government may require such disclosures The next section of the report will provide a background to the All Writs Act explore both Supreme Court and lower court case law including a discussion of United States v New York Tel Co and apply this case law to the San Bernardino case and potential future requests by the government to access a locked device Background Encryption Basics Encryption is a process to secure information from unwanted access or use Encryption uses the art of cryptography which comes from the Greek words meaning secret writing to change information which can be read plaintext and make it so that it cannot be read ciphertext Decryption uses the same art of cryptography to change that ciphertext back to plaintext 11 Encryption can be applied to a variety of plaintexts Data is encrypted at a host to be sent in transit between a user and a web server with which they are communicating e g for online continued THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR THE INTERNET SOCIETY HARVARD UNIVERSITY Feb 1 2016 available at https cyber law harvard edu pubrelease dont-panic Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate pdf 11 Matt Bishop Chapter 9 Basic Cryptography in Computer Security Art and Science Boston MA AddisonWesley 2003 pp 217-240 Congressional Research Service 2 Encryption Selected Legal Issues shopping Data can also be encrypted at a host for transit between two users chatting with each other e g iMessage or Telegram Data that is stored on a drive is considered data at rest and may also be encrypted Data on a drive may be encrypted by putting the file into an encrypted container e g a file folder so that only the files in that container are encrypted while the rest of the drive is in plaintext Or the entire drive may be encrypted known as full-disk encryption so that all the data on the drive is encrypted e g encrypting the user-accessible space on a cell phone so that the contents of that cell phone are encrypted There are five elements needed for encryption to work 1 the encryption function 12 2 the decryption function 3 the key 4 the plain text and 5 the ciphertext In symmetric encryption the key used to encrypt and decrypt a message is the same In asymmetric encryption the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the message are different Much of the recent debate over encryption stems from new security policies released by Apple Google and Facebook In September 2014 Apple released a new iOS operating system for iPhones iPads and iPod touch devices 13 As described in an Apple Whitepaper On devices running iOS 8 and later versions your personal data is placed under the protection of your passcode For all devices running iOS 8 and later versions Apple will not perform iOS data extractions in response to government search warrants because the files to be extracted are protected by an encryption key that is tied to the user's passcode which Apple does not possess 14 The Whitepaper explains that each device has The iPhone uses a distinctive implementation of a unique ID UID fused directly into the encryption which requires both a user's input passcode or password and a device-specific unique identification hardware during manufacturing When users number UID to create the encryption key The key is set up a device for the first time they are not stored on the device itself Instead when the user asked to set up a passcode for unlocking the enters their passcode or password the system combines device That passcode becomes entangled that input with the UID and if the device decrypts it was with the device's UID to create the encryption correct key of which Apple does not retain a copy Thus even if the government produces a valid warrant Apple has claimed it cannot decrypt the data Perhaps the biggest change brought about by iOS 8 is that encryption now operates by default rather than requiring the user to affirmatively turn on encryption 15 Shortly after Apple announced its new encryption policy Google which had been offering encryption in its devices since at least 2011 announced that the newest iteration of its Android operating system Lollipop 5 0 would also employ full disk encryption by default 16 Similarly the popular Facebook-owned messaging system Whatsapp announced in November 2014 that it would offer end-to-end encryption on its service 17 One observer noted the unprecedented nature of this security upgrade The result is practically uncrackable encryption for hundreds of 12 A function is the mathematical process in use Timberg supra note 5 14 Apple Whitepaper supra note 4 15 Apple Inc iOS Security press release September 15 2015 https www apple com business docs iOS_Security_Guide pdf 16 Timberg supra note 5 17 Greenberg supra note 6 13 Congressional Research Service 3 Encryption Selected Legal Issues millions of phones and tablets that have Whatsapp installed--by some measures the world's largest-ever implementation of this standard of encryption in a messaging service 18 The concept of practically uncrackable encryption is important to the encryption and cryptosystems Assuming someone has intercepted the ciphertext but does not have the key and wants the plaintext they could use a brute-force attack A brute-force attack that is guessing every possible iteration of the key until the key is discovered is a long process Cryptosystems are built to require processors to run through multiple instructions and multiple iterations of those instructions before something is encrypted or decrypted This natural time delay slows down guessers and this is before additional delays e g times between key entry or temporary locks after incorrect attempts are enforced Additionally some cryptosystems allow for many possible keys For instance a 4-digit cell phone passcode has 10 000 possible combinations 0000 to 9 999 However a 6-character alpha-numeric password upper and lowercase letters and numbers that also allows a user to choose among 10 special characters offers more than 139 billion combinations The possible combinations increase exponentially when 8- 10- or 14character passwords are used Because of the large amount of possibilities those seeking to use a brute-force attack do not just start at zero and add characters until they get to the key Instead they would attack other elements of the system For instance knowing that users choose simple passwords the attacker could start guessing likely options to greatly reduce the time to find the key Or an attacker could circumvent a cryptosystem entirely and insert themselves between the user and the information they are accessing Data can only be encrypted while at rest stored or in transit being sent Once a user accesses the data or is otherwise processing the data it is in plaintext So rather than try to compromise the cryptosystem an attacker may determine that it is better to compromise the device that employs the cyrptosystem e g the computer or the cell phone If the attacker has malware on the device that allows them access to what the user is viewing on the device they could see what the user intends to encrypt before the cryptosystem is activated So while the encryption is still sound it does not protect against other forms of attack Going Dark Debate The phenomenon of technologies preventing government access to communications and other data--the so-called going dark problem--is not new to law enforcement agencies The shift to new electronic forms of telephone communications in the latter part of the 20th century hindered the ability of the government to intercept voice communications even when it had the appropriate legal process to do so This resulted in the passage of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CALEA in 1994 19 CALEA provides that a telecommunication carrier shall ensure that its equipment facilities or services are capable of expeditiously isolating and enabling the government pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization to intercept to the exclusion of any other communications all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area 20 In other words telecommunications companies had to build into their systems a way for law enforcement to access data for which it has lawful legal process to obtain As telephone communications were shifting from traditional land lines to the Internet the Federal Communications Commission FCC extended CALEA in 2005 to cover facilities-based 18 Id Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act P L 103-414 108 Stat 4279 1994 20 47 U S C 1002 a see Table I p 23 for a more detailed survey of CALEA 19 Congressional Research Service 4 Encryption Selected Legal Issues broadband Internet access providers and providers of interconnected voice over Internet Protocol VoIP service 21 Notably CALEA does not apply to information services and explicitly provides that telecommunication carriers are not responsible for decrypting ensuring the government's ability to decrypt any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication 22 Although the Administration has actively engaged industry on this issue FBI Director James Comey stated at an October 8 2015 hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security that the Administration is not seeking legislation at this time to require companies to enable the government to access encrypted data 23 However this was not the Administration's only word on the issue Robert Litt general counsel of the Office of Director of National Intelligence ODNI stated that although the then-current political environment may not be best suited to scaling back encryption Congress might be more receptive to such legislation in the event of a terrorist attack or criminal event where strong encryption can be shown to have hindered law enforcement 24 This was the reaction of European leaders in response to the two terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 Following the 2015 terrorist attacks of French newspaper Charlie Hebdo British Prime Minister David Cameron called for the outlaw of any app--such as WhatsApp or iMessage--that permitted the transmission of communications that could not be read by government officials 25 More recently the Investigatory Powers Bill was introduced in the UK following the November 16 Paris attacks while not calling for a complete ban of encryption technology the bill would require the companies to create the means to allow the government to read encrypted messages 26 While the Obama Administration has stated that at least for the time being it will not introduce anti-encryption legislation it has continued to push American technology companies to come up with a technology workaround to this problem In early January 2016 the Administration sent a delegation of high-level government officials to Silicon Valley to discuss among other things how technology companies could help the government thwart individuals from utilizing encryption technology to engage in terrorist activities 27 However some in the technology community including Apple CEO Tim Cook continue to state that providing government exceptional access would necessarily render a device more susceptible to cyber threats 28 21 See Fed Communications Commission In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services 20 FCC Rcd 14989 Sept 23 2005 22 47 U S C 1002 b 23 Threats to the Homeland Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 114th Cong 3 2015 statement of James B Comey Director Federal Bureau of Investigation 24 Ellen Nakashima Andrea Peterson Obama Faces Growing Momentum to Support Widespread Encryption WASH POST Sept 16 2015 available at https www washingtonpost com world national-security tech-trade-agencies-pushto-disavow-law-requiring-decryption-of-phones 2015 09 16 1fca5f72-5adf-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story html postshare 9031442410909976 25 Katy Barnato Whatsapp iMessage Face Ban in Terror Crackdown CNBC Jan 13 2015 available at http www cnbc com 2015 01 13 whatsapp-imessage-face-ban-in-terror-crackdown html 26 Andrew Griffin Investigatory Powers Bill Could Allow Government to Ban End-to-End Encryption Technology Powering iMessage and Whatsapp INDEPENDENT Nov 7 2015 available at http www independent co uk life-style gadgets-and-tech news investigatory-powers-bill-could-allow-government-to-ban-end-to-end-encryption-technologypowering-a6725311 html 27 Jenna McLaughlin White House Raises Encryption Threat in Silicon Valley Summit THE INTERCEPT Jan 8 2016 available at https theintercept com 2016 01 08 white-house-raises-encryption-threat-in-silicon-valley-summit 28 Jenna McLaughlin Apple's Tim Cook Lashes Out at White House Officials for Being Wishy-Washy on Encryption THE INTERCEPT Jan 12 2016 available at https theintercept com 2016 01 12 apples-tim-cook-lashes-out-at-white continued Congressional Research Service 5 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Likewise several prominent computer scientists and technologists noted in a July 2015 report Keys Under Doormats that law enforcement demands for exceptional access to private communications and data shows that such access will open the doors through which criminals and malicious nation-states can attack the very individuals law enforcement seeks to defend 29 Undoubtedly if Congress fails to enact legislation providing government access to encrypted data law enforcement will face situations in which it cannot access encrypted data One possible response would be to mandate the user to either provide his password or decrypt the data contained in a device However mandating that an individual provide his passcode or decrypted data could implicate among other possible legal protections his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination Compelled Decryption and the Right Against SelfIncrimination Fifth Amendment Framework The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that n o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 30 Known in common parlance as pleading the Fifth this right against self-incrimination protects a defendant from the cruel trilemma of offering incriminating evidence against oneself and risking a criminal conviction lying to government officials and risking perjury or keeping silent and risking contempt of court 31 At one point the Fifth Amendment was read to protect the compelled disclosure of any incriminating papers 32 However later cases held that a person may be required to produce specific documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact so long as the creation of the document was not compelled by the government 33 Thus under the modern interpretation of the Fifth Amendment the following elements must be met for a Fifth Amendment privilege to be successfully asserted 1 the statement must have been compelled by the government 2 it must be incriminating 34 and 3 it must be testimonial The first two elements of a self-incrimination claim--compulsion and the incriminating nature of the documents--are rarely in question Rather most cases in this area concern whether a given statement should be considered testimonial continued house-officials-for-being-wishy-washy-on-encryption 29 Harold Abelson et al Keys Under Doormats Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government Access to All Data and Communications MASS INST TECH CYBERSECURITY AND INTERNET POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE 2015 available at https www schneier com cryptography paperfiles paper-keys-under-doormats-CSAIL pdf 30 U S CONST amend V 31 Doe v United States 487 U S 201 212 1988 quoting Murphy v Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor 378 U S 52 84 1988 32 Boyd v United States 116 U S 616 634-35 1886 33 United States v Hubbell 530 U S 27 35-36 2000 34 Doe v United States 487 U S 201 208 n 6 1988 noting that 'compelled testimony' need not itself be incriminating if it would lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence Congressional Research Service 6 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Testimonial and the Act of Production Doctrine The Supreme Court has held that a statement is testimonial when the government compels the individual to use the contents of his own mind to explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact 35 The Fifth Amendment does not however protect documents existing before the government's request as any incriminating statements contained in the document could not be said to be compelled by the government for such a request came after the statement was uttered 36 For example even if an individual has an incriminating item on his smartphone--say a text message or photo that links the user to a crime--that person cannot claim a Fifth Amendment privilege from handing it over to the government on the basis that the document is incriminating While the content of the documents might not trigger a Fifth Amendment privilege the act of producing that record may have testimonial implications of its own meaning the act could communicate a statement of fact to the government 37 This is known as the act of production doctrine The act of production doctrine originated in the 1976 case Fisher v United States in which the Internal Revenue Service IRS had requested certain tax documents from the lawyers of two taxpayers The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers on their face might incriminate a taxpayer for the privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications 38 Because the documents were created voluntarily the Court held that they could not be considered compelled testimonial evidence 39 Accordingly the taxpayer could not avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains incriminating evidence whether his own or that of someone else 40 But the Court observed that t he act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer 41 The Court noted however that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the papers by complying with the subpoena--the only possible testimonial aspects of disclosing these documents--should not be considered testimonial when the existence and location of the papers were a foregone conclusion 42 Put another way because the IRS already knew the existence and location of the documents the taxpayer's disclosure of those documents would not implicitly relay any incriminating fact to the government This is known as the foregone conclusion exception to the act of production doctrine Foregone Conclusion Exception The foregone conclusion exception to the act of production doctrine was elaborated on in the 2000 case United States v Hubbell which concerned the investigation of potential federal 35 Doe 487 U S at at 210 Fisher v United States 425 U S 391 1976 37 See United States v Hubbell 530 U S 27 40 2000 The 'compelled testimony' that is relevant in this case is not to be found in the contents of the documents produced in response to the subpoena It is rather the testimony inherent in the act of producing those documents 38 Fisher v United States 425 U S 391 409 1976 39 Id at 409-10 40 Id at 409-10 41 Id at 410 42 Id at 411 36 Congressional Research Service 7 Encryption Selected Legal Issues criminal violations relating to the Whitewater Development Corporation 43 There the Independent Counsel served the defendant with a subpoena requesting 11 categories of documents Appearing before the grand jury the defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to state whether he was in control or possession of any of the documents requested in the subpoena The prosecutor then produced an order previously obtained from the district court pursuant to 18 U S C 6003 a federal immunity statute directing the defendant to respond to the subpoena and granting him immunity to the extent allowed by law 44 The defendant produced 13 120 pages of documents which ultimately provided the Independent Counsel sufficient information to secure an indictment The district court dismissed the indictment because all of the evidence that would have been offered against the defendant at trial derived either directly or indirectly from the testimonial aspects of his immunized act of producing those documents On appeal the government claimed that the act of producing ordinary business records was insufficiently testimonial because the existence and location of the documents sought was a foregone conclusion 45 Rejecting this argument the Court noted that government did not have prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13 120 pages of documents produced by the defendant 46 It was not enough the Court continued that a businessperson will always possess business and tax records 47 Moreover the Court found that it would be unquestionably necessary for the defendant to make extensive use of the 'contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the subpoena 48 Ultimately the Court concluded the act of producing these records was testimonial at least with respect to the existence and location of the documents After Hubbell and Fisher determining whether an act of production is testimonial appears to depend largely on the government's knowledge regarding the documents before they are produced 49 In Fisher the government knew of the existence of the tax documents in question when it made its demand In Hubbell however the government could not demonstrate its knowledge of the existence and location of the documents it sought 50 The government need not have actual knowledge of the existence of each and every responsive document 51 The majority of circuit courts have held nonetheless that the government must establish its knowledge of the existence possession and authenticity of the requested documents with reasonable particularity 52 It is the government's knowledge of the existence and possession of the actual documents the Ninth Circuit has noted and not the information contained therein that is central to the foregone conclusion inquiry 53 43 Hubbell 530 U S at 29 Id at 31 45 Id at 44 46 Id at 45 47 Id at 45 48 Id at 43 49 See United States v Ponds 454 F 3d 313 320 D C Cir 2006 50 Hubbell 530 U S at 44-45 51 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated April 18 2003 383 F 3d 905 910 9 th Cir 2004 52 See Ponds 454 F 3d at 321-22 In re Grand Jury Subpoena 383 F 3d at 910 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25 2011 670 F 3d 1335 1346 11th Cir 2012 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 1 F 3d 87 2d Cir 1993 53 In re Grand Jury Subpoena 383 F 3d at 910 emphasis added 44 Congressional Research Service 8 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Physical Acts In addition to the foregone conclusion exception the Supreme Court has held that certain physical acts are not considered testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment For instance giving a blood sample54 or providing a voice exemplar55 have not been considered testimonial as they do not require the suspect to disclose any knowledge he might have or to speak his guilt 56 Put another way it is extortion of information from the accused the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause 57 Compelled Decryption Case Law The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of compelling an individual to disclose a passcode or decrypt data but has provided some insight in dicta in how it might rule on this issue The lower federal courts and some state courts are beginning to see more cases as law enforcement officials are increasingly encountering encrypted data Supreme Court While the Supreme Court has yet to opine on how the Fifth Amendment should apply to the compelled production of a passcode it has discussed the production of combination number and keys to traditional real-world safes During the current decryption debate many have attempted to employ this key combo metaphor to access smartphones This key combo distinction appears to have originated in a dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens in the 1988 case Doe v United States 58 There Justice Stevens noted that while a suspect may in some cases be forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents he cannot be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe--by word or deed 59 His argument was premised on the idea that requiring someone to give up a safe combination required him to use his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime whereas giving up a safe key would not 60 The Doe majority appeared to accept this dichotomy when noting in a footnote that we do not disagree with the dissent that ' t he expression of the contents of an individual's mind' is testimonial communication for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment 61 This dichotomy was later affirmed in Hubbell 62 Eleventh Circuit Beyond the Supreme Court the only circuit court to have addressed the issue of compelled decryption arose in a 2012 Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case addressing government access to data on an encrypted hard drive 63 There the government obtained a warrant to search the hotel 54 Schmerber v California 384 U S 757 764-65 1966 United States v Dionisio 410 U S 1 7 1973 56 Does v United States 487 U S 201 211 1988 57 Id at 211 58 Does v United States 487 U S 201 211 1988 59 Id at 219 Stevens J dissenting 60 Id 61 Id at 210 n 9 62 United States v Hubbell 530 U S 27 43 2000 citing Doe 487 U S at 209 n 9 63 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25 2011 670 F 3d 1335 11 th Cir 2004 55 Congressional Research Service 9 Encryption Selected Legal Issues room and any electronic devices found on a John Doe who was suspected of sharing explicit material of children on the Internet 64 Because forensic examiners from the FBI were unable to access certain portions of the drive a grand jury subpoena was issued to require Doe to produce the unencrypted contents of the hard drives Upon Doe's claim that compliance with the subpoena would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination the government sought and received act-of-production immunity for such production Although forensic examiners believed that there was encrypted information contained on the hard drive because the drive was encrypted an expert for the government could not determine what data was on the drive The government admitted that the material requested was compelled and incriminating thus the only question before the Eleventh Circuit was whether Doe's act of producing the unencrypted data would be testimonial under the Fifth Amendment The court noted that this question ultimately turned on whether the government could show with 'reasonable particularity' that at the time it sought to compel the act of production it already knew of the materials thereby making any testimonial aspect a 'foregone conclusion ' 65 The court concluded that the testimony was not a foregone conclusion and that Doe had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege Nothing in the record before us reveals that the Government knows whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives what's more nothing in the record illustrates that the Government knows with reasonable particularity that Doe is even capable of accessing the encrypted portions of the drives 66 District Courts In addition to the Eleventh Circuit several district courts have also addressed the compelled decryption issue Like the Eleventh Circuit case these cases largely turned on the extent of the government's knowledge concerning the documents In the 2007 case In re Boucher border patrol agents stopped Sebastien Boucher and his father as they attempted to cross the Canadian border into the United States 67 One of the officers found a laptop computer in the backseat Without needing to enter a password he was able to access approximately 40 000 files on the laptop some of which appeared to contain pornographic images An ICE special agent then investigated further finding thousands of images of pornography including one file labeled in a way to suggest it as child pornography but he was unable to open The laptop was later powered down and could not be accessed again due to an encryption program installed on the laptop Secret Service agents estimated that it would take years to crack the password using a brute force attack To gain access to the data the grand jury issued a subpoena requesting that Boucher provide all documents whether in electronic or paper form reflecting any passwords associated with the seized hard drives Boucher moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it violated his Fifth Amendment right to self-incrimination The government conceded that Boucher could not be compelled to disclose his password as this would be inherently testimonial Instead the government asked that Boucher be compelled to enter his passcode In granting his motion to quash the subpoena the court noted that entering a 64 Id at 1339 Id at 1346 66 Id 67 In re Boucher No 2 06-mj-91 2007 WL 4246473 D Vt 2007 65 Congressional Research Service 10 Encryption Selected Legal Issues password implicitly communicates facts By entering the password Boucher would be disclosing the fact that he knows the password and has control over the files on the hard drive 68 The government later narrowed its request to requiring Boucher to produce an unencrypted version of the hard drive 69 The magistrate judge determined that the foregone conclusion doctrine did not apply because the government had not viewed most of the files on the drive The district court judge reversed this decision however noting that the government need not be aware of the specific contents of the files but instead must be able to demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows of the existence and location of subpoenaed documents 70 Because the government had already viewed some of the files on the hard drive and ascertained that they might contain child pornography providing the government access to the hard drive add ed little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information 71 Like the government's first request in the Boucher case the government in United States v Kirschner requested that the defendant produce the passcode to his encrypted computers 72 Relying on the Supreme Court's safe key combination dichotomy from Doe the district court found that revealing a passcode was the equivalent of revealing a safe combination which would impermissibly require the defendant to reveal the contents of his mind 73 In United States v Fricosu the District Court for the District of Colorado rejected a Fifth Amendment claim made by a defendant who was ordered to produce the unencrypted contents of a hard drive found during the execution of a search warrant 74 With little explanation the court noted that because the government already had possession of the hard drive there is little question here but that the government knows of the existence and location of the computer's files The fact that it does not know the specific content of any specific documents is not a barrier to production 75 Moreover the court found that the government had sufficiently demonstrated that the hard drive belonged to the defendant through independent evidence 76 Finally in In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System the District Court of Wisconsin initially rejected the government's request to compel the defendant to decrypt certain hard drives found in his home that contained files with names that were indicative of child pornography 77 The court reasoned that although the government had proven that the drives actually contained data and that the defendant was in possession of the drive it had not demonstrated he had access to and control over the encrypted storage devices 78 However upon review the court granted the government's renewed request to compel production of decrypted data as the government had offered additional evidence to demonstrate that the defendant had control and access to the drives 68 Id at 3 See In re Boucher No 2 06-mj-91 2009 WL 424718 D Vt 2009 70 Id at 3 71 Id 72 United States v Kirschner 823 F Supp 2d 665 666 E D Mich 2010 73 Id at 669 74 United States v Fricosu 841 F Supp 2d 1232 1234 D Colo 2012 75 Id at 1237 76 Id 77 In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System No 13-449 D Wis April 19 2013 78 Id at 3 69 Congressional Research Service 11 Encryption Selected Legal Issues such as showing that drive contained personal financial information and photographs of the defendant 79 State Courts In addition to the federal courts several state courts have addressed the scope of the right against self-incrimination in the context of encrypted data In Commonwealth v Baust Virginia's Second Circuit Court addressed whether the government could force an individual to provide his smartphone passcode 80 Relying on the safe key combination dichotomy from Doe the Virginia court held that revealing the passcode was like revealing a combination and therefore was considered testimonial 81 However the court also held that requiring the defendant to enter his fingerprint into the device would not be considered testimonial as this did not require the witness to divulge anything from his mental processes 82 Similarly the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts assessed whether requiring a defendant to enter his passcode in order to access an encrypted hard drive should be considered testimonial for purposes of his self-incrimination claim 83 The Massachusetts High Court noted that the act of complying with the government's demand could constitute testimonial communication where it is considered to be a tacit admission to the existence of the evidence demanded the possession or control of such evidence by the individual and the authenticity of the evidence 84 Nonetheless the court rejected the defendant's claim as he had already admitted to law enforcement officials that he had encrypted the device and had access to it In doing this the government did not need to rely on his production of the passcode to prove ownership or control of the laptop--depriving such production of any testimonial import Application of Fifth Amendment Analytical Framework to Compelled Disclosure Applying the Fifth Amendment analytical framework and the recent federal court cases concerning compelled disclosure of electronic data access can be broken down into at least three discrete government requests 1 compelled disclosure of a user's passcode 2 compelled entry of biometric password and 3 compelled production of encrypted data Compelled Disclosure of Passcode Based on the limited case law from the lower federal courts and dicta from the Supreme Court there is a strong argument that the Fifth Amendment would bar the government from compelling an individual to disclose his passcode to the government First looking to the limited Supreme Court pronouncements on this subject providing a passcode generally seems more akin to providing a safe combination which the Court said in Doe would be considered testimonial 85 and less like handing over a safe key which would not be considered testimonial This approach was applied in the encryption case Kirschner in which the district court observed that forcing the 79 In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System No 13-449 D Wis May 21 2013 Commonwealth v Baust No 14-1439 Va 2d Jud Cir 2014 81 Id at 4-5 82 Id at 5 83 Commonwealth v Gelfgatt 468 Mass 512 521 2014 84 Id at 521 85 Doe v United States 487 U S 201 210 n 9 1988 80 Congressional Research Service 12 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Defendant to reveal the password for his computer communicates that factual assertion to the government and thus is testimonial--it requires Defendant to communicate 'knowledge ' unlike the production of a handwriting sample or voice exemplar 86 Put another way the target would be forced to engage in cognition for the benefit of the state and to turn over the results of that mental process 87 Likewise the government conceded in In re Boucher that disclosing a passcode from the defendant would be considered testimonial 88 It appears that these courts are treating the disclosure of a passcode as inherently testimonial as it will always require the target to reveal something from his mind when disclosing the passcode Moreover one leading Fifth Amendment theory supports this result Several scholars posit that testimonial under the Fifth Amendment means substantive cognition--the product of cognition that results in holding or asserting propositions with truth-value 89 Breaking down this rule they note that cognition involves the acquisition storage retrieval and use of knowledge 90 The paradigmatic example of Fifth Amendment protection they offer is the retrieval of information from memory in response to a question 91 Recalling a passcode and relaying that information to the government would seem to squarely fit this description First it requires mental cognition on the part of the user--the retrieval of knowledge from one's mind Second such retrieval results in the assertion of a proposition with true-value--that is that the passcode provided can either be correct or incorrect At least one author has argued that a statement is only testimonial when it involves substantial cognitive content and that providing a passcode does not rise to the level of substantial content 92 However even this author notes that the c ourts have not yet framed the issue this way 93 and it is not at all clear how a court would make such a determination between substantial and insubstantial cognitive content Compelled Entry of Biometric Passcode In addition to using alphanumeric passwords many smartphones can be locked using either biometric data or some other physical act Depending on the specific method required to open such a phone employing such methods could alter the self-incrimination analysis As technology advances smartphone manufacturers have developed new ways to open and lock their devices Beginning with the iPhone 5s Apple smartphones employ Touch ID a system that can unlock a device using the user's fingerprint 94 Similarly various smartphones that employ the 86 United States v Kirschner 823 F Supp 2d 665 669 2010 Caren Myers Morrison Passwords Profiles and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Facebook and the Fifth Amendment 65 ARK L REV 133 147 2012 88 In re Boucher No 2 06-mj-91 2007 WL 4246473 D Vt 2007 89 Ronald J Allen M Kristin Mace The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted J CRIM L CRIMINOLOGY 2004 90 Id at 267 91 Id at 268 92 Dan Terzian Forced Decryption as Equilibrium--Why It's Constitutional and How Riley Matters 109 N W L REV 1131 2015 93 Id at 1135 94 See iOS Security supra note 4 at 7 87 Congressional Research Service 13 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Windows operating system use iris scans to access the device 95 And Android devices come equipped with Face Unlock which uses facial recognition technology to unlock a device 96 If a court were to apply the key combination distinction it appears that the government could request a defendant to enter his biometric information into his smartphone to unlock it 97 First as noted by a Virginia state court addressing encryption 98 a fingerprint is much more like a key than a combination which the Supreme Court has said albeit in dicta is non-testimonial However unlike a key providing biometric information that successfully decrypts a device suggests the target previously interacted with the device which might indicate ownership or control Second when a user is asked to enter his fingerprint into a device he is not asked to reveal the contents of his mind or reveal any information to the government This makes a command to enter biometric information more like a command to give a voice exemplar or blood sample which is not considered testimonial 99 rather than a command to reveal knowledge to the government Compelled Production of Decrypted Data If the government is not able to compel the production of a device's passcode or if the device is not enabled with a biometric passcode the other alternative is for the government to request the user to produce the decrypted data Whether accessing such data would be considered testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment will largely turn on application of the foregone conclusion doctrine--that is whether knowledge of the testimonial content of providing the decrypted data would be a foregone conclusion As noted by the Supreme Court in Fisher and Hubbell a statement is deprived of testimonial content if knowledge of the existence and location of the documents were a foregone conclusion 100 As elaborated by the circuit courts the government must be able to establish its prior knowledge of the existence possession and authenticity of the requested documents with reasonable particularity 101 What is not certain from the case law is whether the government would have to prove the existence and possession of the smartphone itself or the files contained on the device Some scholars have argued that it is the device that the government must have knowledge of 102 Under this theory in many cases it would not be difficult for the government to 95 Mauro Huculak How the Iris Scanner on the Lumia 950 and 950 XL Works WINDOWS CENTRAL Oct 8 2015 available at http www windowscentral com how-iris-scanner-lumia-950-and-950-xl-works 96 Gary Muzo How to Set Up Face Unlock on Your Android Phone ANDROID CENTRAL July 24 2012 available at http www androidcentral com how-set-face-unlock-your-htc-one-x-or-evo-4g-lte 97 See Paul Roseinzweig Pass Phrases Protected Fingerprints Not--Curiouser and Curiouser LAWFARE Nov 7 2014 noting that requiring entry of biometric passcode was right doctrinal answer available at https www lawfareblog com pass-phrases-protected-fingerprints-not-curiouser-and-curiouser 98 Commonwealth v Baust No 14-1439 Va 2d Jud Cir 2014 99 See Physical Acts infra pp 9 100 See United States v Hubbell 530 U S 27 44 2000 Fisher v United States 425 U S 391 411 1976 101 See Ponds 454 F 3d at 321-22 In re Grand Jury Subpoena 383 F 3d at 910 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25 2011 670 F 3d 1335 1346 11th Cir 2012 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 1 F 3d 87 2d Cir 1993 102 Orin Kerr Apple's Dangerous Game WASH POST Sept 19 2014 available at https www washingtonpost com news volokh-conspiracy wp 2014 09 19 apples-dangerous-game Because people must know their passcodes to use their own phones the testimonial aspect of decrypting a person's own phone--admitting that the phone belongs to them and they know the password--will be a 'foregone conclusion' whenever the government can show that the phone belongs to that person If the phone's in the suspect's hand or in his pocket when the government finds it that's not going to be hard to show Dan Terzian Force Decryption as Equilibrium--Why It's Constitutional and How Riley Matters 109 N W L REV 56 58 2014 Where the government can 'independently confirm' the testimonial continued Congressional Research Service 14 Encryption Selected Legal Issues prove ownership and control if it can prove the suspect possessed the device at the time of seizure 103 These scholars argue that the government's independent demonstration that the suspect owned or controlled the device is sufficient to deprive the act of producing the decrypted data of any testimonial content However even if the government can prove the suspect owned and possessed the device this does not mean that the government can prove the defendant had access to the device or knew how to decrypt the data stored on it In In re Grand Jury Subpoena the Eleventh Circuit required the government to prove not only knowledge of the files contained on the encrypted hard drive but also that the defendant had access to those files and the ability to decrypt There are certainly instances where someone may own a smartphone--for instance where a parent purchases a smartphone for a child--but may not have access to the device when the child sets the password Moreover some of the recent encryption cases focus not on whether the government already knew the suspect possessed the device but rather whether the government could prove the existence and location of specific files on the hard drive In Hubbell the court noted that it was the existence and authenticity of the documents that was the crux of the inquiry While in Fisher the Government already knew that the documents were in the attorneys' possession and could independently confirm their existence and authenticity through the accountants who created them here the Government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13 120 pages of documents ultimately produced by respondent 104 Likewise in In re Grand Jury Subpoena the court rejected the government's access to files stored on an encrypted hard drive as the government failed to show any basis let alone shown a basis with reasonable particularity for its belief that encrypted files exist on the hard drives the the defendant had access to those files or that he is capable of decrypting the files 105 The panel noted that although the government physically possesses the media devices it does not know what if anything is held on the encrypted drives 106 To the contrary in Boucher the court compelled the defendant to produce the decrypted files as the government had a prior opportunity to learn the existence and location of some of the incriminating files on the hard drive thus knowledge of their existence was a foregone conclusion 107 If a court treats the device as the relevant scope of inquiry--that is whether the government can independently prove the defendant owned and controlled the device--the standard may not be difficult for the government to meet in many cases especially where the device is found on the person of the suspect However if a reviewing court were to treat the data contained on the device as the relevant scope of inquiry the government would have to prove it knew of the existence and location of the specific documents it seeks preventing the government from going on a fishing expedition for incriminating evidence It appears likely the government would be foreclosed from making the argument that it already knows the existence and location of documents on a smartphone--say for example texts emails photos and calendars--based on continued component here computer ownership through specific 'prior knowledge' that goes beyond mere suspicion it can still compel production 103 Kerr supra note 102 104 Hubbell 530 U S at 45 105 In re Grand Jury Subpoena 670 F 3d at 1349 106 Id at 1347 107 In re Boucher 2009 WL 424718 at 3 Congressional Research Service 15 Encryption Selected Legal Issues the simple fact that smartphones generally hold such information This argument was rejected in Hubbell in which the court observed that it was not enough that a businessperson always possesses business and tax records 108 Likewise the Eleventh Circuit rejected an argument that the government already knows of the existence and location of the files simply because the data is in the government's physical possession that is that the information is stored on the device's physical memory 109 The Eleventh Circuit noted that i t is not enough for the Government to argue that the encrypted drives are capable of storing vast amounts of data some of which may be incriminating 110 Moreover it noted that categorical requests for documents the Government anticipates are likely to exist will not suffice 111 Just how much particularity would be required if this latter approach is adopted would likely be resolved through litigation Compelled Assistance and the All Writs Act In addition to requesting a smartphone user to provide his passcode or decrypted contents the government has also sought assistance of device manufacturers in accessing a locked device 112 The most prominent example is the cell phone used by one of the terrorists who caused the death of 14 people and injured 22 others in San Bernardino CA on December 2 2015 Primarily the government has utilized the All Writs Act to seek such relief The legal question presented by such requests is whether the All Writs Act can be interpreted broadly enough to require Apple to help the government in accessing the data on the device against Apple's wishes 113 The answer will likely depend on whether this mandate would pose an unreasonable burden on Apple and whether it is consistent with the intent of Congress Background The All Writs Act enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 114 provides that federal courts may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law 115 The Supreme Court has observed that t he All Writs Act is a residual source of legal authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute 116 In other words the act performs a gap-filling function that can be used to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders of the court 117 U nless appropriately confined by Congress the Court has noted a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs needed to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it 118 However and this is an important caveat the Court has warned that the All Writs Act does not authorize courts to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance 108 Hubbell 530 U S at 45 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25 2011 670 F 3d 1335 1346 11 th Cir 2012 110 Id at 1347 111 Id 112 For a brief overview of court-ordered access to smartphones see CRS Report R44396 Court-Ordered Access to Smart Phones In Brief by Kristin Finklea Richard M Thompson II and Chris Jaikaran 113 Since the government obtained a valid probable cause warrant in this case Apple is not contesting the search of the device under the Fourth Amendment Thus any privacy interest involved must derive from some other constitutional statutory or extra-constitutional source 114 Act of Sept 24 1789 1 Stat 81-82 115 28 U S C 1651 a 116 Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v U S Marshals Service 474 U S 34 43 1985 117 United States v New York Tel Co 434 U S 159 172 1977 118 Id at 172-73 quoting Adams v United States ex rel McCann 317 U S 269 273 1942 109 Congressional Research Service 16 Encryption Selected Legal Issues with the statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate 119 Although the All Writs Act was penned 226 years ago 120 the debate in the San Bernardino case and similar past litigation has centered on a much more recent although pre-digital 1977 case United States v New York Tel Co 121 All Writs Act and the Supreme Court United States v New York Tel Co With minimal Supreme Court cases on point most of the guidance in the San Bernardino case as to the All Writs Act questions derives from New York Tel Co In that case a United States district court issued an order authorizing FBI agents to install and use two pen registers--a device for recording the outgoing numbers dialed on a telephone but not the contents of the call--with respect to two telephone lines connected with a suspected gambling hall 122 The agents had sufficiently demonstrated probable cause to engage in the search The order directed the New York Telephone Co to furnish the FBI all information facilities and technology assistance necessary to employ the pen registers unobtrusively 123 The FBI argued that it needed the company's assistance to successfully engage in the surveillance 124 The telephone company refused to comply with the court's order The company informed the government agents of the location of the appearance --the spot where the specific telephone line emerges from the sealed telephone cable--to help the FBI install its own wires but the company refused to provide a leased line to the FBI a process the FBI argued was needed to ensure the unobtrusiveness of the surveillance device The district court granted the government's order compelling the telephone company's assistance but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed It found that the most important factor weighing against the propriety of the order is that without Congressional authority such an order could establish a most undesirable if not dangerous and unwise precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress unwilling aid on private third parties 125 Further the Second Circuit appeared to accept the company's argument 119 Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction 474 U S at 43 One might argue that because the All Writs Act was enacted 226 years ago it is ill-suited to address issues arising from government access to evidence in the digital era Two things should be considered when assessing this assertion First courts apply old laws all the time The Bill of Rights including the Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791 two years after the All Writs Act was enacted and the text has not changed since The Fourth Amendment in particular is applied to ever-changing factual scenarios including those involving new technologies on a daily basis Second the All Writs Act like other grants of judicial authority was written broadly enough-- all writs necessary and appropriate --to allow it sufficient flexibility to be applied to changing technological situations 121 United States v New York Tel Co 434 U S 159 1977 122 Id at 161-62 Pen registers do not intercept because they do not acquire the contents of communications as that term is defined by 18 U S C 2510 8 Indeed a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a communication existed These devices do not hear sound They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed--a means of establishing communication Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call their identities nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers Id at 167 123 Id at 161 124 Id at 162-63 125 Application of U S in Matter of Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register 538 F 2d 956 962 2d Cir 1976 rev'd sub nom United States v New York Tel Co 434 U S 159 1977 120 Congressional Research Service 17 Encryption Selected Legal Issues that a major reason for its opposition to the order was the danger of indiscriminate invasions of privacy 126 In an opinion by Justice Byron White the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit rejecting both the innocent third party and privacy arguments 127 As to the former Justice White observed that the act extends to persons who though not parties to the original action or engaged in any wrongdoing are in a position to frustrate the implementation of the order or the proper administration of justice 128 As to the latter the Court noted the minimal privacy invasion caused through the use of a pen register which again does not intercept the content of the communications and the fact the government had obtained lawful process to install the device 129 While the Court ultimately held that the All Writs Act required the telephone company to comply with the court order Justice White's opinion was not precise when articulating the appropriate test to be applied in future cases After rejecting the view of the Second Circuit that third-party companies could not be forced to assist the government in surveilling a customer Justice White noted that t he power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not without limits unreasonable burdens may not be imposed We conclude however that the order issued here against respondent was clearly authorized by the All Writs Act and was consistent with the intent of Congress 130 This passage suggests at least two inquiries in an All Writs Act analysis First whether the compelled assistance would pose an unreasonable burden on the company and second whether the order would be consistent with the intent of Congress 131 Additionally the Court provided a third inquiry whether the private party's assistance is necessary to carry out the court's order 132 As to the burden on the company the Court Under New York Tel Co and subsequent case law a reviewing court should make three broad inquiries when applied a seemingly non-exhaustive list of faced with a government request for compelled factors Some of the factors focused on the assistance under the All Writs Act actual burden on the company in complying Whether the command would be an unreasonable with the order The Court observed for burden on the company forced to comply example that the order required only meager Whether such order would be consistent with the assistance from the company the order was intent of Congress in no way burdensome compliance with the Whether the company's assistance is essential to the order required minimal effort by the fulfillment of the government's purpose company the company regularly employed such devices for billing purposes and the order provided the company be fully reimbursed for its efforts 133 An additional component of the unreasonable burden inquiry appears to be the level of the company's perception of the request Justice White noted that the use of the pen register was not offensive to the company the company had not proffered a substantial interest in not providing assistance and the company 126 Id United States v New York Tel Co 434 U S 159 1977 128 Id at 174 129 Id at 168 It is clear that Congress did not view pen registers as posing a threat to privacy of the same dimension as the interception of oral communications and did not intend to impose Title III restrictions upon their use 130 Id at 172 131 Id at 172 132 Id at 175 133 Id at 174-75 127 Congressional Research Service 18 Encryption Selected Legal Issues had previously promised to provide the FBI instructions on how to install its own pen register 134 Finally the Court suggested that disruptions to the company's operations should be taken into consideration in an All Writs Act analysis Next the Court inquired whether this application of the All Writs Act was consistent with the intent of Congress Justice White observed that Congress clearly intended to permit the use of pen registers by federal law enforcement officials and without the assistance of the telephone companies these devices simply cannot be effectively employed 135 He continued We are convinced that to prohibit the order challenged here would frustrate the clear indication by Congress that the pen register is a permissible law enforcement tool by enabling a public utility to thwart a judicial determination that its use is required to apprehend and prosecute successfully those employing the utility's facilities to conduct a criminal venture 136 Lastly the Court assessed whether the company's assistance was essential to the fulfillment of the government's purpose noting that without the Company's assistance there is no conceivable way in which the surveillance authorized by the District Court could have been successfully accomplished this help was essential to the fulfillment of the purpose--to learn the identities of those connected with the gambling operation--for which the pen register order had been issued 137 Lower Courts Although it was handed down almost 40 years ago there are relatively few cases applying the All Writs Act test articulated in New York Tel Co and even fewer applying these principles to technological impediments to surveillance However a few lower courts have applied the All Writs Act to various requests from law enforcement for technology assistance in carrying out a warrant or order to engage in surveillance of some kind including at least two specifically addressing encrypted devices Several of these cases like New York Tel Co involved a private company assisting the government in installing and operating various surveillance devices In one case the Ninth Circuit was asked whether a district court acting upon an application of the United States possesses the power to issue an order compelling a duly licensed public utility to perform an in-progress trace of telephone calls by means of electronic facilities within its exclusive control 138 The court ordered that the company be compensated for its assistance Like the telephone company in New York Tel Co and Apple in the Central District of California case the company did not claim that the order violated its Fourth Amendment rights but rather argued that the ordered relief was beyond the reach of the All Writs Act 139 Looking to Supreme Court case law the Ninth Circuit observed that the principles announced in New York Telephone compel the same result here First the assistance required was substantially similar to that required in New York Tel Co and was virtually identical in terms of its intrusive effect as the pen register in 134 Id at 174-75 Id at 176 136 Id 137 Id emphasis added 138 See Application of U S of Am for an Order Authorizing an In-Progress Trace of Wire Commc'ns over Tel Facilities 616 F 2d 1122 1123 9th Cir 1980 139 Id at 1128 135 Congressional Research Service 19 Encryption Selected Legal Issues New York Tel Co 140 second the company's assistance was necessary to carry out the court order 141 third on balance the burden on the company did not rise to the level of unreasonableness 142 and fourth this application of the statute was consistent with congressional intent as Congress apparently believes that federal courts possess the authority to order the cooperation of private carriers in electronic surveillance 143 Other cases in the lower courts have approved assistance in the following situations Ordering a provider of electronic communication services to provide information facilities and technological assistance to facilitate the consensual recording of all electronic communication s and messaging web trafficking and text messaging to and from a cell phone 144 Ordering a landlord of an apartment complex to provide access to videotapes from a security camera 145 Ordering a defendant to produce the decrypted contents of a hard drive 146 Perhaps most relevant to the San Bernardino case are two recent cases applying the All Writs Act and the New York Tel Co factors to requests for access to data stored on various locked electronic devices These two cases differ greatly in their level of analysis In an unreported 2014 ruling the government applied to the Southern District of New York under the All Writs Act for assistance in accessing a locked cell phone seized from a suspect incident to arrest 147 In a short and cursory opinion Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gorenstein held that based on New York Tel Co it was appropriate to order the manufacturer to attempt to unlock the phone and that orders providing technological assistance of the kind sought here are often not deemed to be burdensome 148 In a more in-depth ruling Magistrate Judge James Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York EDNY assessed whether the All Writs Act could support the government's request for assistance in unlocking an iPhone 5c running an earlier version of iOS 149 On February 29 2016 the court issued its ruling holding that the government's request exceeded the court's authority to compel Apple's assistance against its wishes 150 Judge Orenstein observed that the court cannot rely on the statute to do something that another statute already covers but might have more stringent 140 Id at 1129 Id To a greater extent than in New York Telephone the refusal by Mountain Bell to cooperate would have completely frustrated any attempt to accomplish the tracing operation 142 Id at 1131 143 Id 144 See In re U S for an Order Directing a Provider of Communication Services to Provide Tech Assistance to Agents of the U S Drug Enforcement Admin No 15-1242 2015 WL 5233551 at 1 D P R Aug 27 2015 145 See In re Application of U S for an Order Directing X to Provide Access to Videotapes No 03-89 2003 WL 22053105 at 3 D Md Aug 22 2003 Here the only cooperation required by the apartment complex is merely to provide access to surveillance tapes already in existence rather than any substantive assistance and nothing more Therefore the order directing the apartment complex to provide access to the security videotapes will not be burdensome for the apartment complex's business operations or its employees 146 See United States v Fricosu 841 F Supp 2d 1232 1238 D Colo 2012 147 See In re XXX Inc No 14-2258 2014 WL 5510865 S D N Y Oct 31 2014 148 Id at 2 149 See In re Order Requiring Apple Inc to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court No 15MC-1902 E D N Y Feb 29 2016 150 Id at 1 141 Congressional Research Service 20 Encryption Selected Legal Issues requirements nor can the statute be used to request assistance that is explicitly or implicitly prohibited under another federal statute 151 First Judge Orenstein set forth three elements the government must demonstrate based upon the text of the All Writs Act 1 issuance of the writ must be in aid of the issuing court's jurisdiction 2 the type of writ requested must be necessary or appropriate to provide such aid to the issuing court's jurisdiction and 3 the issuance of the writ must be agreeable to the usages and principles of law 152 Because the government easily satisfies the first two elements the court saved its more exacting scrutiny for the third element 153 The court agreed with Apple that this inquiry must assess not only enacted legislation that either authorizes or prohibits certain government action as the government argued but also legislation that was considered but ultimately not adopted 154 Judge Orenstein noted that a rule that only looked at enacted law would transform the AWA from a limited gap-filling statute that ensures the smooth functioning of the judiciary itself into a mechanism for upending the separation of powers by delegating to the judiciary a legislative power bounded only by Congress's superior ability to prohibit or preempt 155 Because Congress has significantly debated but ultimately decided not to include companies like Apple within CALEA's scope the court concluded that extending the All Writs Act to the government's request would be against the usages and principles of law 156 The government had argued that CALEA does not speak to the current controversy as its scope only covers telecommunication carriers in relation to data in transit while the present controversy concerns data at rest and Apple is not considered a telecommunications carrier Judge Orenstein rejected this argument noting that when Congress wants to impose an obligation on a service provider concerning data a rest it has to affirmatively do so in enacted law but has not done so here 157 Further the opinion described three additional factors from New York Tel Co that must be assessed 1 the closeness of the relationship between the person or entity to whom the proposed writ is directed and the matter over which the court has jurisdiction 2 the reasonableness of the burden to be imposed on the writ's subject and 3 the necessity of the requested writ to aid the court's jurisdiction 158 As to the first element the court noted that the fact that Apple merely leases and does not sell its iOS software to a device user is insufficient to provide the required closeness of relationship 159 Moreover Judge Orenstein stated there was a significant legal difference between Apple's declining to offer assistance which he held is 151 Id at 15 Id at 11 153 Id at 11-12 154 Id at 21 155 Id at 26 156 Id at 14-16 Judge Orenstein's partial reliance on the term usages and principles to reject the government's request has been questioned by at least one scholar See Orin Kerr The Weak Main Argument in Judge Orenstein's Apple Opinion The Volokh Conspiracy March 2 2019 However his analysis of the usages and principles language is appears to be very similar to the consistent with the intent of Congress inquiry required by New York Tel Co See All Writs Act and the Supreme Court United States v New York Tel Co infra p 19 157 For this proposition Judge Orenstein cited 18 U S C 2703 f 1 which provides that a provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service upon the request of a governmental entity shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process 158 Id at 11 159 Id at 36 152 Congressional Research Service 21 Encryption Selected Legal Issues permissible and thwarting a government investigation which is not 160 Under the second element the court found that the rationales for upholding the order in New York Tel Co were virtually all absent here including the following 1 Apple is not a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public 2 Apple has argued it is not in its best interest to comply with the order 3 The assistance the government sought here is not something Apple would do in its normal course of business 4 Apple has never offered the government the information needed to bypass an iPhone's passcode security on its own 5 The burden on Apple in bypassing security of just one iPhone diverts many hours and hardware and software from Apple's normal business which based on the number of requests Apple has received to unlock other devices could have a cumulative impact on Apple 161 In addition to these factors perhaps the most important determination by Judge Orenstein was that a reviewing court could take into consideration not only the financial burden of complying with the specific request at hand but also more general considerations about reputations or the ramifications of compliance 162 Application of All Writs Act to San Bernardino Case While the San Bernardino case is not the first in which Apple has been ordered to assist the government in unlocking an iPhone it appears to be the first time Apple has been asked to write and install unique software on a specific device Specifically on February 16 2016 Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym of the Central District of California ordered Apple to provide the FBI with three forms of technical assistance Allow the government to enter more than 10 passcodes without the risk of the data being wiped after the 10th incorrect try i e shut off the auto-erase function Automate the entry of those passcode combinations rather than have to enter them manually Try back-to-back passcode attempts without the gradually increasing delays between attempts that are currently programmed into the system Of note the court order does not request or compel Apple to compromise implementation of encryption on all iPhones The order directs Apple to insert a weakness into the implementation-- unlimited passcode attempts and no danger of the phone being wiped because of incorrect guesses--only for the iPhone in question Because of the limited case law much of the litigation will likely depend on whether a reviewing court thinks the Supreme Court's interpretation of the All Writs Act in New York Tel Co can be read to cover Apple here or whether the burden on Apple is too great to force compliance 163 160 Id at 35-36 Id at 38-41 162 Id at 43 citation omitted 163 As a threshold issue like in United States v New York Tel Co 434 U S 159 1977 It is undisputed that the order in this case was predicated upon a proper finding of probable cause and no claim is made that it was in any way inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment the FBI in the San Bernardino case obtained a warrant to search the device continued 161 Congressional Research Service 22 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Does the Order Impose an Unreasonable Burden on Apple A reviewing court would likely first assess whether the order would pose an unreasonable burden on Apple This inquiry could largely rest on whether a reviewing court accepts Apple's argument that the unreasonable burden test includes an assessment of not only the burden on the company in creating and installing new software on this particular phone but also the burden on Apple's business as a whole While one factor from New York Tel Co is the extent to which the legal order would disrupt the operations of the business in question it is not certain whether the focus should be on the disruption posed by the immediate need to unlock the phone or the potentially larger disruption to Apple's financial bottom line Apple has acknowledged that it has the technological capacity to unlock the device but asserts that the desire to protect the privacy and security of its customers is sufficient to warrant its opposition to the court's order 164 Moreover there are distinct differences between the telephone company's reaction to the assistance required in New York Tel Co and Apple's perception of the order in the present case First while the New York Telephone Company had regularly employed pen registers as part of its billing practice Apple has not created the type of software the government seeks here Second while installation of the pen register in New York Tel Co was not offensive to the company the company had not proffered a substantial interest in not providing assistance and the company had previously promised to provide the FBI instructions on how to install its own pen register 165 Apple has adamantly opposed altering its security features to allow the government access to the device has proffered various financial and ethical reasons for not wanting to create such software and has apparently never instructed the FBI on how to create such software on its own 166 Some might ask what persuasive value Judge Orenstein's decision from the E D N Y has in the San Bernardino case and potential future litigation 167 There are a few technological differences between the assistance requested in the recent ruling from the E D N Y and the pending case in the Central District of California that might alter an All Writs Act analysis especially with regard to the burden imposed on Apple First the hardware and software of the devices in each case are different In the E D N Y case the phone in question is an iPhone 5s running iOS 7 In the San Bernardino case the phone in question is an iPhone 5c running iOS 8 This difference is notable because while the iPhone 5s has more advanced hardware it is running an older operating system one that does not encrypt the phone's storage by default This distinction reduces the technological burden on Apple Rather than rewrite their operating system as is the request in the C D Cal case Apple already has the technological capability to access parts of a phone that is locked in the E D N Y case While continued in question thus vitiating any Fourth Amendment argument by Apple Instead the magistrate judge's order was contested on the grounds that it exceeds the All Writs Act 164 Letter from Apple CEO Tim Cook A Message to Our Customers Feb 16 2016 available at http www apple com customer-letter 165 Id at 174-75 166 In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300 California License Plate 35KGD203 No 15-0451 at 1-5 C D Cal February 25 2016 Apple Inc's motion to vacate order compelling Apple Inc to assist agents in search and opposition to government's motion compel assistance 167 Note that a magistrate's decision has no precedential value in other jurisdictions Congressional Research Service 23 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Apple could not access all information on the phone they would have access to information stored within Apple's native applications on the device 168 Second Apple contends that the government has not exhausted all its options before seeking to compel the company to take an action it would otherwise not 169 The E D N Y phone in question is equipped with a Touch ID fingerprint scanner to unlock the device In that case the phone's owner had already pleaded guilty to the charges against him and is in government custody while incarcerated Apple's response to the order asked why the government has not sought the fingerprint from the owner to fully unlock the device under penalty of contempt of court 170 Finally Apple contends that because the iPhone in question in the E D N Y case runs iOS 7 the government could seek the assistance of a third party digital forensics company to perform the same services it seeks from Apple Unlike the C D California case Apple is not the only party that can accomplish the type of data extraction the government seeks 171 Apple argues that as a private company it should not be conscripted into government service when a market exists where the services the government requests may be hired and bought Is This Application of the All Writs Act Consistent with the Intent of Congress In addition to the potential burden on Apple a reviewing court must assess whether compelling Apple's assistance would be consistent with the intent of Congress 172 This would appear to turn on what if any applicability CALEA has in the present case and how much weight if any a reviewing court should place on the fact that Congress has debated but not enacted a law mandating forced decryption on U S technology companies The Supreme Court has noted that where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand it is that authority and not the All Writs Act that is controlling 173 The question here is whether CALEA or any other federal law can be read as specifically address ing the relief the government seeks The government takes the position that unless and until Congress actually enacts legislation on this issue congressional silence does not suffice to limit the authority of the federal courts to require Apple to help the government access potentially vital information on this and other devices 174 Apple supported by the Feng ruling from the Eastern 168 Apple Inc 's Reponses to Court's October 9 2015 Memorandum and Order available online at https www eff org files 2015 10 23 2015-10-19_apple_response_brief pdf 169 Apple Inc 's Supplemental Response to Court's October 9 2015 Order and Opinion available online at https www eff org files 2015 10 23 e d n y _1-15-mc-01902_16 pdf 170 See Compelled Entry of Biometric Passcode infra pp 13-14 for Fifth Amendment analysis of compelled use of fingerprint scanner 171 Id 172 United States v New York Tel Co 434 U S 159 172 1977 173 Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v U S Marshals Service 474 U S 34 43 1985 174 See In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300 California License Plate 35KGD203 No 15-0451 C D Cal February 25 2016 Apple Inc's motion to vacate order compelling Apple Inc to assist agents in Search and opposition to government's motion compel assistance Congressional Research Service 24 Encryption Selected Legal Issues District of New York 175 posits that should courts look not only to enacted law but also to whether Congress considered but declined to adopt regulations on technology companies like Apple 176 As shown in Table 1 CALEA creates a broad requirement on a telecommunications carrier to help the government intercept various real-time communications but includes several exceptions to this requirement Table 1 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CALEA Category Title U S Code Section Statutory text 1 Capability Requirements 47 U S C 1002 a A telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment facilities or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate terminate or direct communications are capable of expeditiously isolating and enabling the government pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization to intercept to the exclusion of any other communications all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier 2 Design of features and systems configurations 47 U S C 1002 b 1 This subchapter does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer-- to require any specific design of equipment facilities services features or system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment or any provider of telecommunications support services or prohibit the adoption of any equipment facility service or feature by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment or any provider of telecommunications support services 3 Information services private networks and interconnection services and facilities 47 U S C 1002 b 2 The requirements of subsection a of this section do not apply to-- information services or equipment facilities or services that support the transport or switching of communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of interconnecting telecommunications carriers 4 Encryption 47 U S C 1002 b 3 A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication Source Compiled by CRS 175 See In re Order Requiring Apple Inc to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court No 15MC-1902 at 15-16 E D N Y Feb 29 2016 176 See In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300 California License Plate 35KGD203 No 15-0451 at 15-19 C D Cal February 25 2016 Apple Inc's motion to vacate order compelling Apple Inc to assist agents in Search and opposition to government's motion compel assistance Congressional Research Service 25 Encryption Selected Legal Issues There appear to be two potential inquiries concerning CALEA's relationship to the All Writs Act First Apple argues that CALEA's text itself would make application of the All Writs Act here inconsistent with the intent of Congress To make this argument Apple relies primarily on category 2 which provides that the government cannot require a provider of an electronic communication service to adopt any specific equipment design or software configuration 177 The government citing category 1 has countered that CALEA does not apply at all in this case as it only obligates a telecommunications carrier to help the government intercept communications--that is access data in transit but does not cover data at rest which is what this case concerns 178 Note that the scope of the limitation in category 2 states that this subchapter does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer while the limitation in category 3 states that the requirements of subsection a do not apply One way to interpret this difference is that category 2 provides that the government cannot use CALEA to mandate a company adopt specific hardware or software designs and that category 3 creates an exception for the obligations under subsection a Under this reading the limitation in category 2 could be interpreted broadly to cover not only data subject to subsection a --that is data in transit--but explicitly precludes the government from relying on CALEA to mandate that an electronic communication provider-- which Apple asserts it is--from adopting specific features in relation to any data at rest or in transit If this reading is accurate one could argue that mandating Apple here would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress expressed in CALEA However it should be noted that even under this reading category 2 merely states the government cannot rely on CALEA to mandate providers of electronic communication service to adopt certain designs but does not operate as a flat-out ban on the government mandating such designs The government in theory could resort to another statute for such authority Additionally Apple argues that the exception in category 3 for information services which again Apple argues it is indicates an intent by Congress not to bring it within the CALEA's umbrella The second inquiry is whether the fact that Congress has considered but failed to obligate companies like Apple to assist the government in decrypting data should preclude application of the All Writs Act here Again the government argues that any indication of congressional intent must come from enacted law while Apple asserts that a reviewing court must also assess whether Congress considered but failed to adopt this type of proposal If a court accepts Apple's view there is evidence that Congress did in fact consider applying CALEA to companies like Apple but declined to do so 179 And as noted by the Eastern District of New York more recently Congress has significantly debated imposing obligations on technology companies to provide decryption assistance but nothing has garnered sufficient support for passage The government 177 Id at 16-17 See In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300 California License Plate 35KGD203 at 24-25 Feb 19 2016 government's motion to compel Apple Inc to Comply with This Court's February 16 2016 Order Compelling Assistance in Search 179 H R Rep 103-827 1994 Also excluded from coverage are all information services such as Internet service providers or services such as Prodigy and America-On-Line The term 'information services' includes messaging services offered through software such as groupware and enterprise or personal messaging software that is services based on products including but not limited to multimedia software of which Lotus Notes and Lotus Network Notes Microsoft Exchange Server Novell Netware CC Mail MCI Mail Microsoft Mail Microsoft Exchange Server and AT T Easylink and their associated services are both examples and precursors It is the Committee's intention not to limit the definition of 'information services' to such current services but rather to anticipate the rapid development of advanced software and to include such software services in the definition of 'information services ' By including such software-based electronic messaging services within the definition of information services they are excluded from compliance with the requirements of the bill 178 Congressional Research Service 26 Encryption Selected Legal Issues argues however that CALEA by its terms applies to data in transit not rest so CALEA is inapplicable here and further that there is no other enacted law prohibiting the relief it seeks here Is Apple's Assistance Necessary to Carrying out the Court's Order Lastly a reviewing court must assess whether Apple's assistance is necessary to enforce the order The FBI requires Apple's assistance in accessing the iPhone in question because of how Apple implemented its encryption The encryption key is derived from a combination of user input i e the passcode and the device's UID Even if the FBI had the passcode they would need to enter it on the specific device because it needs to be combined with the UID to create the key In order to accomplish the FBI's request of disabling security functions Apple designed the FBI requires Apple to create an operating system without those functions Apple's operating systems are digitally signed using a certificate generated through a cryptographic process to ensure the integrity of the software being loaded when the device is turned on Recreating that cryptographically signed certificate would be as challenging as brute-force attacking an encryption key as described above Having Apple create the operating system allows the FBI a direct way into the phone and the opportunity to try to guess the passcode Each pass at an attempt will be combined with the UID to create the key Moving forward a hearing is scheduled in the San Bernardino case for March 22 2016 Potential Congressional Response With technology companies moving toward more not less encryption for data transiting and stored on their devices there are various potential responses by Congress Mandate Backdoor Congress could create a CALEA 2 0 and require technology companies to have the technological means feasible to access data stored on locked devices similar to the mandate on telecommunication providers contained in the original CALEA DOJ suggested such a proposal in 2010 180 and again in 2013 181 but this measure was never introduced 182 The Obama Administration has stated at congressional hearings and elsewhere that it is not seeking such legislation at this time 183 Criminal Penalty for Failure to Decrypt At least one commentator has suggested that Congress could make it a federal crime with severe penalties to refuse to enter in one's passcode when requested by a law enforcement officer 184 180 Charlie Savage US Tries to Make it Easier to Wiretap the Internet N Y TIMES Sept 27 2010 available at http www nytimes com 2010 09 27 us 27wiretap html _r 0 181 Charlie Savage US Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws NY TIMES May 7 2013 available at http www nytimes com 2013 05 08 us politics obama-may-back-fbi-plan-to-wiretap-web-users html ref charliesavage 182 Apple has raised both First Amendment and substantive due process claims that could if valid restrict Congress's ability to enact such legislation See In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300 California License Plate 35KGD203 No 15-0451 at 32-34 C D Cal February 25 2016 Apple Inc's motion to vacate order compelling Apple Inc to assist agents in search and opposition to government's motion compel assistance This issue however is beyond the scope of this report 183 See Senate Hearing supra note 8 184 Kerr supra note 102 Congressional Research Service 27 Encryption Selected Legal Issues However if an individual has a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination the government could not force the individual to turn over the passcode without providing him use and derivative use immunity 185 Data retention laws Congress might require that companies retain certain categories of data such as text messages emails or other content material for a certain period of time Prohibit Encryption Mandates Alternatively some Members have sought to prohibit any mandate on technology companies to be able to decrypt data on their devices The Secure Data Act of 2015 S 135 H R 726 and the End Warrantless Surveillance of Americans Act H R 2233 which contain identical provisions concerning anti-encryption mandates would provide that no agency may mandate or request that a manufacturer developer or seller of covered products design or alter the security functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or service or to allow the physical search of such product by any agency 186 The bills contain an exception for any mandate under the Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act CALEA Create a National Encryption Panel Several Members recently introduced the Digital Security Commission Act of 2016 S 2604 H R 4651 which would bring together leading experts and practitioners from the technology sector cryptography law enforcement intelligence the privacy and civil liberties community global commerce and economics and the national security community to examine the intersection of security and digital security and communications technology in a systematic holistic way and determine the implications for national security public safety data security privacy innovation and American competitiveness in the global marketplace 187 The commission would report to Congress not later than one year after the commission first convenes Such a report would assess among other things the economic and commercial value of encryption technology the effects of encryption on law enforcement and national security investigations and potential changes to federal law to accommodate these varying interests Improve Law Enforcement's Capabilities to Investigate Despite Encryption In her testimony to the House Judiciary Committee cybersecurity expert Susan Landau offered an alternative to the government choosing between strong encryption and weak encryption 188 She suggests that the government help law enforcement develop and build the capability to conduct investigations through technical means and in accordance with the legal framework passed by Congress and enforced through the courts This option would not weaken encryption or reduce the adoption of encryption but would attempt to provide a capability to continue investigations despite encryption 185 See generally United States v Hubbell 530 U S 27 2000 S 135 114th Cong 2015 H R 726 114th Cong 2015 H R 2233 114th Cong 2015 187 S 2604 114th 2016 H R 4651 114th 2016 188 U S Congress House Committee on the Judiciary The Encryption Tightrope Balancing Americans' Security and Privacy prepared by Susan Landau PhD 114th Cong 2nd sess March 1 2016 186 Congressional Research Service 28 Encryption Selected Legal Issues Author Contact Information Richard M Thompson II Legislative Attorney rthompson@crs loc gov 7-8449 Congressional Research Service Chris Jaikaran Analyst in Cybersecurity Policy cjaikaran@crs loc gov 7-0750 29                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu