-- TOP SECREl' DECLASSIFIED Authority M IO GBP jY'lloI0 DEPARTMENT OF STATE s' - con L 7 - ' -- DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY Ma1l7 1954 sin - TOt IPil Ul amrAifr 1'8 II E2iiW o 1 11 Gerarci SUtil 1JKA _ Dartt w wa hllo ' 1 w 1 0 - SUBJECl't 1 1f54 MAY 8 HSC study CODeerDinC Wl ether ud Where to Proceed with the Prelideat'l Deoeaber 8 Proposall in tile Light o the Sortet lote ef ipril 27 YeN aigllt 1Ii11l te oouider the foliewing poiatl ia Jr epariag the ISC It 011 thil lojectt 1 We should proceed with the President's i-Bank proposals in spite of the Soviet retuBal in their note of April 27 to discusl this proposal barring agreelllent on the Bonet call for a ban on the use o atOllic and hydrogen weapons -- Cs It is doubtful that the USSR's response of ipril 27 vas a rejection of the proposals It 18 -b'uled in tel'1ll8 o a refUsal to discusl the proPOllalS until agre_nt ill reached 011 the Sortet call tor a ban on the use ot nuclear weapons but ilLnot a rejection P'_t M- as vall_confi ed b7 IfflSR Repre nta ' __ J 1 It in tll8 London _etings ot the Di8 1'll ll8nt eo-isaion IJUbco m1ttee London's 5141 Hay 1$ HoNOTer i t II 1st be read in the light ot the tact that the U S hal not otf'ici all7 responded to the Sortet proposal in their i1de eao1re ot January 19 that the President's Proposalll and the Sortet proPOlalS be diloussed in rotation Consequently tm Sort t lOy light han been desigued to toree SOM indication on our part ot the -7 in which the conTeraa tiOIl8 would be carried on Prior to the April 27 A1d 1re I had wondered whether the USSR would in tact rep17 to the outline uplU'ying the President's Proposals siDee in the _anwbile the Disama ent Co aisaion had been reconnDed on Western 1n1t1atin ud the _y in whicb atoaic energy- control vo1lld be handled obTious17 would be a point susceptible ot discussions 1n the Disal'll8lent Coa1ssion IUbcOMi tte o oet1Dgs aad thus lIOuld aftect the Sortet approacb toward tbe i-Bank proposals act i J I b 'Nn i t the USSR in tact intends at so point to reject the President's proposals it lIOuld not be advisable to base our approach to the proble On this aSlUllption while or course taking this poss1b1l1101 into account It aight be lIOrtblfhile recall i ng in regard to the USSR attitude on this whole subject tbat i t 1s generall1 agreed the Sortets aade a tre_adous diploaatic II1stake in their rejection of the Marshall Plan and that the present leaderll or the USSR 11 1 n'q well ban deoided that 1t vas better not to reject the President's Proposals outright because or their initial ruorable iJlpact Oil world opinion and the unfavorable iapact or an outright Bonet rejection 1'0 base our approach solely on the aSSUllptioll TOP SECRET the USSR SIDRET DECLASSIFIED AuthorityNNO 94'1 1070 - 2the USSR had or would reject the A-Bank proposals would limit our lIIJleUTerabil1t when the USSR is behaving in a more sophisticated fashion which enables them to deD1' that they had rejected the proposal and to point up the fact that the proposal does not deal with the basic issues of atomic disarmament c It as the President said one ot the principal purposes ot his proposal vas to reach agreement with the USSR in an area IIOre susceptible to agreeJlent because ot its limited scope as a step in opening up -a new channel tor peaceful discussions o o o to a positift progress toward peace- then it would see advisable to proceed to develop am 1ap18llent the President's Proposals in the hope that the USSR would at 210118 stage join in the operation d Another _jor reason tor proceeding with the President's Proposals is the unfaTorable effect on world public opinion should the U S cease this effort and the beneticial t pact on world opinion resulting trom our going ahead eTen lUXier adnrse circUIIStances in this effort to help the world realize the beneficial aspecte ot atoalc energy instead of fearing atomc denlopll8nt Furtheraore this course is T luable to help proTide hallOO to the Tarious statements on -ualiTe retaliation- the ertect on world opinion ot the thelW -nuclear tests' -tall-out- in tbe PacifiC and the uncertaj nty of the Indochina Situation In brief I think the U S badlJr needs to deaonetrate its interest in helping the world realize the benefite of the Placetul uses ot atollic energy in order to counterbalance tears that ve are set on a course ot unloosiDg atoalc and thel'llOnuclear weapons It certa 101 7 should help our reations with our allies as vell as stiJlulating a ore faTOrable attitude on the part of the neutral nations thus enb nei Dc our basic security interests 2 'lhe Pres1cient' Proposals should be de loped within the UN truework rather than elo ohere Ca I belleTe that tbe A-BaDit proposals should be denloped and 1IIple nted within the Ulf 1'raMwrk Certa'n'7 this vas their initial concept dellOnetrated b7 the tact tbe Pl'8111dent _de the proposals at the General Ulellb17J that he tated we would expect that such an gen07 tbe llEl would be t up UDder the egis ot the UN and that this is the course proposed 111 the outline _pl1 y1ng our Tievs transII1tted to the USSR on March 17 It wuld be difficult to raTerse this tread lid proceed outside a Ulf truework although it would DOt be iJIpolsible It can be predicted that there would also be a ratber un a rable reaction b7 MII7 UDited Xations aellbers to our prooeeding out Bide the mr ' 'belle countries would hope to reoein the benefits of eucll an Jgenc7'a operations lid would think tbat the7 would baYS a better cbance to realise these benetits if the operation vas carried out within a UI traanork rather than on a bilateral or l1Ja1ted aultilateral basis 1D w-hieh the 11 S would be able teo IIOre eas1l7 to obtain specifio benet1ts taTOriDg the U 8 at the a SECREt' ' 'Qf SECRET DECLASSIFIED Authority N O VjY'jIO70 - 3e%peruse of what other states Jlight believe was their own national intertst Conversely i t can be said that the U S would gain definite international prestige by dellOnstrating its wil11ngness to go ahead with the creation of an international organization with apparently less control over the operations than it would have if it were a bilateral agreement thws d8l10nstrating an apparently unselfish desire to help the world attain benefits froa the peaceful uses of atoJlie energy within an international fraaework In fact as is clear in the poesent organizational trameworlc ot the IAEl the U S and its principal allies would have the controU1 ng voice in the Agency' operations so that there 18 no ditficulty tor us with the international agency approach I b Moreover the presently suggested uendaents to the McHahon Act for the domestic control of atoldc energy would enable the U S to satisf - the needs and desires of certain triendl 7 nations such as BelgiUII who would preter bilateral arrangements with the U S to an international arrangement ot the sort presently envisaged tor the IAE t This would see to provide added reason tor proceeding with the President' proposals within the frueworlc ot the United Nations c It wil l certa1nl7 be all the re difficult tor the USSR to uplain any ret'wlal to discuss the President's Proposals or to join in the operations ot the Jgenc7 should it be set p i t the lgenC7 is established wi thin the tra 8worlt ot the United NatiOns The international nature ot the organization renders it INCh less susceptible to ec ui st attack than would be the case it we proceed on a bilateral or on a aore liaited aultllateral bas1e ect G- - r _r sip - Mr Mr Bowie Gall10D                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu