I Augo wm Date l 1 -- This casement consists pagee ii Copy No 13W 01 8311's in or 0017338111101 Fig it 3 30 peso um ram-m7 3 1956 'W amu mumamtmmi Main My Agency 1 MEWS The Beorotm-y m Strauss Chan-nun Atomic Energy Comieuon Hr Steesen Special Assistant to the President on nemmsm Maj Gen Loper to the Secretan' of Defense Ltcnie mien-g M W U 3 Representative for IAEI Hr Herohant mm i 3 Mr Bowie Mr Hall Hr Hilooen IO 6 k 66 Mr Spiere ID 9 R Hr south Mr Farley I mm 1'03 3 3 2 - Hr Bowie if mo - Adm Strauss IO - Mr Hiloour Mr Mean 6 HIJ Gm lab EUR - Hr Merchant 9 Ir alien recalled that the meeting had been called at the invitation or end ow to consider plans for the twelve-nation discussions of the International Ataxia mug Agency beginning February 27 1956 Proliminary discussion with the II In and Canada were scheduled to meme on February 6 The M810 question lit-II regard to the United States position was whether the Agency should operate with limited controls designed merer to insure that nuclear assistance not divided to miter uses or whether the U S objective should be to nit-pt to hip teeth countries Iron producing nuclear weapons 3 is said that in the Gomisaion's view the u 3 should as mean We control to went diversion of Agency assistance to militia-3' pal-pol Gawain aim controls mints by recipients against diver-don of silence Ind provision for inspection and 3 3th for nuclear be ud- imdstory in the Agency's Statute The Agency should he lives Motor-y than controls but those Ihould not be mandatory in the Statute them mould-nits sohiwoMbypermaieu mthertheneoercion we 'l sibnhed mmunmigmuy SESRH mm By Date Edi- SEEM a mute the value of this material would be twenty-five dollars In addition the commission believed that the U 3 should to latch all other contributions of material on a reimbursable basis for a period of perhaps five years Unclassified technical information and easie- tance necessary for the Agency's operations would also be rovided so Strauss said also that the Gcmisaion believed that a sizable amo of material should be eanarked for EMTCM as an effective any of demonstrating U 3 support for European integration - With regard to the proposals of the State Department for more comprehensive not control he said that he believed a IIno weapons pledge would not be feasible and that France in particular could not accept such a pledge Agency inspection of the United States power reactor program appeared dif cult to accept The United States would not accept sufficiently strict inspection and control of its own program to satisfy prudent requirements for safeguards abroad and reciprocal inspection would thus serve as an excuse for other countries to limit inspection and control to what the U 8 would accept ch Mr Strauss referred was a ceiling within which we would match contribution by other countries Mr Strauss said that the Commission proposed allocating twenty thousand kilograms for foreign atomic energy activities One thousand kilograms would be earmarked initially for the Agency and in addition the U 3 would match allocations from other countries He pointed out that the U K would be able to make only small allocations for some time so thatdn effect the U 8 was offering to match allocations from the USSR Thus the remaining nineteen- thousand kilograms might be used to match allocations to the mm by the and USSR to supply EURATCH and to cover requirements under bilateral agreements proposed allocation of 20 000 kilograms of 1-235 to foreign programs had been orted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy The view of the Department of Defense was currently being solicited Gen Loper said that the Department of Defense had not yet received notice of the proposed allocation but that the matter had been given general study and he thought that a twenty thousand kilogram foreign allocation over a period of eight to twelve years would be consistent with military uiremonte The Department of Defense understanding was that this mterial luuld earmarked but not withdrawn from stock until needed by foreign users The Secretary asked whether the one thousand kilograms for the Agency to Mr Smith observed that are reference to EMTOM in the U 8 announcement of the allocation would require careful handling Amh Wadsworth said that hELfelt this announcement would have very great effect on BEA negotiations and that this effect should not be dissipated through premature release Adm Strauss said that he thought the announcement would have to be nods soon for practical reasons and that it would establish an excellent atmosphere for later steps The Secretary asked for Mr Stseeon'e views as to the extent of controls over the atomic energy programs of other countries which the U 8 should seq-t1 Hr Stasem said that he believed the objective of the U 3 should he to prevent or retard the developzont of nuclear weapons in fourth countries is a practical matter the United States could not get the necessary controls unless the error We should propose a comprehensive control water and let the USSR hear thu i go of rejection recalled that the United States hr recently 2 DECLASSIFIED Authorin I 255 1 BF-JCZNARA Dazeg iL 3 5 10 sent note asking the Russians for their proposals as to effective inspection and control Hr Bnith pointed out that if the U S objective is the prevsntion of now stondo weapons programs then the nininum controls proposed by ABC could be ineffective from the Agency even though limited to peaceful purposes uould utopia r free the other resources of a nation to mpp 't a parallel uc pcns program Mr Strunss indicated personal ngreomnnt with this view but pointod out that it sppenrsd extremly difficult to get agreement on brondcr control I The Secretary said that it would be difficult for notions to forage premsnently their right to nuke nuclear weapons uhilo the U 3 USSR end U I continued to nuke them He thought it might be possible to get agreement by other countries to forego reopens production so an interim measure looking toward the institution of international control of steeds energy which could apply to all countries including the present military atomic powers Hr Steeson agreed and pointed out that the U 3 should not he in the position of appearing'to plan to menu- feature nuclear weapons forever Our approach should be to ask other countries to forage manufacture of nuclear weapons for a specified period uhile so and the 1 other major powers continue to work toward effective comprehensive control It i use in this spirit that he had recommended as a priority disarmament objective i of the U 6 that we prevent retard or minimize the devolopment of nuclear reopens programs in othEr countries Mr Smith said that we consider what steps the U 5 might take st this time in anticipation of eventual brood agreement on control end as an earnest g of our intentions He proposed as one such measure U 3 policy of using by- product plutonium from U S civilian poser reactors solely for pesceful purposes and thus separating the emerging U S civilian power program from ourwnilitcry 5 weapons program and putting it on the some basis as the penceful uses progress - of other countries He pointed out that the present U 5 military program did not rely on plutonium from civilian poser reactors thus the only sacrifice for the U S in separating our peaceful and military progress uould be the possible need to spend some money on additional military plutoniun reectore if needed Hr Strauss doubted that the U I would be able to accept such proposll 3 Hr Smith acid that the U K5_Ehbessy had queried the Foreign Oifice specifically i on this point and had advised us that the U K program was slresdy on the basis of separating reactors devoted to production of plutonium for the military program from civilian reactors for the production of nuclear power Plutoniml' from the civilian power was being set aside ll fuel for ll'tll reactors Hr Strauss said that the ides one one shich appealed to bin and one which he thought the Bresidentfuould support asked rhether plutonium would have any substantial use for pesceful purposes Hr Strauss said that while the present use es a reactor fuel use insignifiosnt it could probably bosons an important fuel once it was for novdlitsry use The Secretary doubt as to the value of the proposed gesture countries such so India were concerned with whether or not ths U 8 continued to produce nuclear weapons scold not care where us got the plutonium for such respons Mr Smith said the mes-mm appeared important to hill mainly so an 5 meat of our eventual disumnnt intentions end of our sincerity is pressing I I er some DECLASSIFIED a 4 Authoriwng Date ahead uith negotiations for control of atomic energy The Boer-story said that if this matter appeared important on further study it should be raised again i but that at present he did not think the U 8 should make such an offer Us a rivemyoar period while the major powers attempt to work out effectin initial control or both unitary and peaceful uses of atomic entry He warned that i there would be many problems to nest in negotiating agreemmrt with the UBLR on an ertective inspection Operation even limited to peaceful uses of steeds comm General leper said that Mr Robertson would shortly send a letter outlining I the following Department of Defense position The no meat of Wanna Imam flexible approach to the control of peaceful uses of atomic angry It believes that the arms control problem which required stricter controls should be kept i distinct from Agenc r activities and that Agency controls should not apply to military programs We should seek a modest control arrangement initially other- Ilise the establishment or the Agency might well be delayed The mesent draft Statute appeared generally acceptable to the Dem-talent of Defense The Joint weapons If this risk appears significant than more rigid mandatory controls might be required rather than pomssivo controls The Department of Defense agrees generally with the ABC views on support or the Agency including the their peaceful uses programs will be used for military purposes Such an would require inspection of the U 8 programs which should not be undertaken under the Agency but only under a broad arms regulation casement the provisions which should be written into the charter to advance our objective of preventing other countries from developing nuclear Weapons The Beer into the charter Hr nith observed that we have our most effective bar position at this tins and we should seek to obtain controlanthority before we in nuclear weapons production The Secretary said that he was convinced countries would not come into the Agency 11' required to commit themselves for Ill time not to make weapons Hhatue must ask is that they same for a specified poriOd of time as a self-dermis more not to complicate the problu or nuclear ditemmont by engaging in atomic weapons production Ibile the great powers try to hing the situation and their con stocks or these weapons under control Iron-1d I it Miami cynicism g seem                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu