Authority Secret -Th-is aocuaont nonsists r Shine -3033 s ariamw r 017166 memorandum 1 i UNITED GOVERNME T0 - UHF cargo I i FROM fa mm swag g I Safagagrds war the Mort of Naclaar Mgtarita ls Attached for year Mamatian are copies of two mamaranida reporting on a meeting held in Ottawa on Nwember 5 cancer-ring the safeguard g 0f expert a nuclear materials This meeting was attended by representatives from South Africa Australia the United Kingdom the United States and chaired by the As-- sistant- Under Secretary far Eartamail Affairs of Canada Atta chment Gapies of I two manoranda Secret DECLASSHHED AuthorityIIHHb 31 2 970 111111111 1111 1 11- 11111 1111 11 111 11 11 if 111 12 1712 1 '91111111 1111111111 111m1111 gaff 11111 1111111 1111 1 a1111111 1 11111111111111 1 531 1111- 111111 1 1 1111111 111 1111111111 11135111111 #11 I W11111131 I 11 11111111 - 2 21 31 1111111 11 1 1111a 111111 13 1111111111111 11 g 1131 1 1 111 111111111L111 - 3111 1 11111 1111111 11 11111111111111-111 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bllatual dtllts on anytb 1n9 otkl lJ' tium iii IUdt 1a aad The the 1ts Mid tMt u l tabn noacUon to ritbt$ they had U tbe r t a9l 'Geflllimtlll nor we tbc'e flAy il llllWd1 $ d'ef thou lng' eo Mr LIIl'an obunld 1ft p l$$lftgtMt the UK p1i r E d Mill of the Utle of by o e tinuyaM 1t8keptldM e Mimal faith- o d1a n aM 1 t the Mr Gny uked tUt in the w_t tM AI_cyfdb to Haell apoo ilfmt _ thI I df ll'd 9%f1 ld the UK be pnpaHd to l _t lit ed ua1' h $yet_ bUat l Att 4ehltlh dId Mt Ui r this q Uon Mat r ' that then 'II'M to a a gON eMn if galab'tg t within Ateney ft fIAd ib ay a ned tM t tMft wire ral Veu's yet lI fore the pill'obl of cont nl bcK a acut W-ch h old tMt the It-lUsh tJ U't ll f U that if Japttl wore Iater aiM bt dlll'll'dop 149 o ftlolClqr at the at w$ to fl e Y 1'$ llIIOuld Hded u ttMt U_ requlHd 11 til Jltpline oo N' nh n lted by i con uQl s lb er fUrtblt1' Il' t tMt Mould the JapaMse move more rap1dlr tban ftOlil b kle the $e there would Ull blII 1 y _1 Amount f pl onlU 11 nail ble Mitue 1965 or 1''' The conclusion m f r this 1_ o dt ule we tllat it appurM wOlJld hay VAtU about 1961 o to reacA ag ' t within the Apftey wlth 1 W1' n$ul ooll'l' that wtl woul4 lm lrw cOfIsldeJ 'U1y blIIfore that time whether oX' not t ' we would succelild 1ft r oodd ng agX' t wt th the h fiet Un10 ORO ' such a pon to Iilaxter IIuKuttd that cfJVAU-1At 'Iid nt Mturilill ura fd lJIII as reactor 'u l would al _t inIWitab11 di$cloM 11 pHg 'am d o1venlon aa llIIOulo biw e to to1 a about five U the M l ntlQ 'litE Mort ir%flo1atlon perl i f re to pHdl lce $lplUca nt ts of lm OfIiUilt fo l ' ulury $e$ Bugge $tN that the patte m of UUiWsl Con OfI wolll0 tbli' 1'efol 'e dhdoM naUcNl iAtlmt b Att M1ehela ralMd tho oi$$t1 of how cbelll1pl Jll foce would be hamUeQ At thh jvncture only the l$ $1M the l have luU tell could hanGh the Nt unl uraMwa wb1dl tbe JapaMM have 1 'e '$ ed fl'Olll thI I Apncy His question we tbat if thls utu'td 18 t to the tIS 11' tI tOI' c s woulo thea c oUfltrie$ p pa ud to ace ept lAEA in ctQI'Il to l'- viM thb part of th OCfUi$ Ho odGitd that the t IC llII01dd not cowmilftlAL DECLASSIFIED Authority 9% 170 - 5gwu W1 A 11 1 11 11111111 111111 11111 11 111111 1111111111 1 if-5 5 1 3 11111131111111 1 11111 11111 1111 1111 g1 13 1111 1111111 111111 21 11111-11111 11 1111111111 11111 - 1 2- 1 1111 1111 11 11 11 11 1111 11 111 111111 1111 $1 i111 353 it mg -11 111111 11 111 11 1111311111 11 1111a111'1 91$ 31111 111111 111 1111 1111111 11111 1a r 1 11 11111 11 11111111 111 111 111111 111111 11 11151 7111111 11 1111111 1 11111 11 111 111111 11-111 111111111 111 1 Wi h 11131 #1 1111111111 g 1111 - 1 131W - 11 1111111 - - 11-1111111111 11 111 1111111 11 111 1113 11 111111111 MW 1 W3 7% 3 1th 11a111 11 11 111 1111 1111 11 11111 1111 11 111 1111111111 4135-5 1'1 1 11111 it 111 - 11 11111 1111 1111 11111 11 1 11191 1 g 1e ' 11g 1 111111111 - 1 1 x bb y wmwihk 1121 DECLASSIFIED f Authority N241WW hxhq 1E1 I Authority NHD Record_prepared by the Canadian Delegation of a-meeting held in the Conference Room of the East Block of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa on November 5 1358 to discuss The Application of Safeguards to Nuclear Exportsc Present In the Chair Mr Dav LePan Department of External Affairs Canada Australia Professor JoPa' Chairman Atomic Energy Baxter Cohoha Commission Mr For Homer Acting High Commissioner Union of South Dr CoB E Fincham - Acting High Commissioner Africa or Mac Scientific Attache Shuttleworth South African Embassy - Washington United Kingdom _Mr Molt - Under Secretary Michaels Atomic Energy Office United States' Mr Algie Wells Atomic Energy Commission' of America - Mr J Robert State Department Schaetzel Mr a Willis Cs Embassy of the United States Ht Mra Myron Kratser Atomic Energy Commission Canada Mro JQL Gray President Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Mro Do Watson I Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Mra S Pollock Department of Finance Mr J C Langley Department of External Affairs Mr HGWilliamson Canadian Embassy washington The Chairman welcomed the participants to Ottawao He regretted the short notice at which the meeting had been called but hoped that all would agree that there was some urgency in seeking to reach a meeting of minds on the subject to be discussed Not only were some countries faced with the problem of deciding what type of safeguards system they wish to apply in ful- 'filment of the obligations incurred-under their bilateral agreements but a number of developments such as the establishment of precedents for uncontrolled exports of nuclear materials and increasing commercial pressures for the latter were also occurring which would make it increasingly 'difficult as time passed to secure international agreement for a satisfactory safeguards systems In his-view the chances of doing so were greatest before atomic energy became commonplace in the public mind He suggested that the meeting might discuss a the subject in three phases - 2 - a what were the prospects for an agreement on safeguards b what sort of safeguards system might be appropriate workable and acceptable under present circumstances c what further action would be required to promote such a system 2 Several delegations expressed appreciation that the meeting had been called The South Cl frican representative explained that the South African authorities were most interested in the subject and welcomed the opportunity to take part in the meeting however the time factor had not permitted them to make adequate arrangements for representation or for the preparation of instructions and his participation would therefore be as an observer PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT 3 The Australian representative stated that while he had no definite instructions he knew that the Australian authorities were in favour of a safeguards system if one could be devised The question had been academic for Australia until recently since the Combined Development Agency had been purchasing the entire Australian uranium output CDA had however recently indicated a wish to terminate its contract and this would create an Australian uranium surplus and consequent domestic problems In his view it would be difficult to devise a safeguards scheme which would work for a country which really wished to divert materials particularly since the advance of technology and the wide availability of uranium meant that many countries could now put together a crude bomb A safeguards system posed many technical problems such as those outlined in the U K paper Which would require careful thought 4 The U S representative said that his country had done a good deal of work on these technical problems on which he might be able to circulate some information shortly His attitude was one o cautious optimism and he considered that the issues at stake were so important that the United States and friendly countries had no alternative but to work towards an agreement on safeguards Mr Schaetzel added that this could be regarded as part of the effort to bring modern implements of war under some kind of control The United States considered that this was the psychological moment for seeking agreement in respect of the peaceful uses of atomic energy 5' The Canadian representative thought that it would not be too di fficul t from a technical point of view to devise a system which would enable one at least to detect the diversion of materials the Canadian paper outlined one system which would meet this requirement 6 The United Kin gdomrepresentative said that his country was publicly committed to the concept of safeguards but that he was frankly sceptical about the chances of devising a completely satisfactory system and of securing its adoption internationally The first three papers circulated by the United Kingdom were designed to define the difficulties as the United Kingdom authorities saW them Essentially the view expressed was that it was technically impossible to devise a 100 percent DECLASSIFIED 3 Authority END 323570 guards System and that even with a nu mber of diversion couldtors Which were POlitically out of the question it was Conside got be reduced below about 2 percent Since Customers th re impossible to discriminate between potential create a 0 i PrOblem was to devise a system which would misconducg Pad Climate that would discourage a country from and in in 0 16 also be acceptable both domestically Objecti Tag Pient countries This might appear a modest 5 st V9 ut as the U S representative had said such a g em might later fit into a more general scheme for Atsarmament He wondered to what extent the United States omic Energy Ct 0f 195 laid down conditions on the type or safeguards system which the U S Government might adopt watertight safe resident inspec 7 The United States representative replied that the Act laid down no explicit requirements with regard to a safe- guards system apart from calling for certain guarantees which are embodied in U S bilateral agreements Congress would however certainly expect the Administration to develop a suitably careful system Similar considerations would apply in connection with the safeguards called for in IAEAFs statute 8 The United Kingdom representative suggested that this raised a point of major significance He thought that all the participants in the meeting would agree that they should work towards a common safeguards system since it would be impracticable for each of several countries supplying a recipient country with different materials triggering safeguards to apply its own system It appeared to him that the simplest and most workable common system would be one applied by IAEA and that this would also avoid the odium which would fall on individual countries if they were to apply their own safeguards Since the U S had offered 5 000 kg of U235 to IAEA and Congress would have to be satisfied that the Agency's safeguards system was satisfactory before this offer was fulfilled the United States view on what type of Agency system was acceptable would be decisive 9 The Chairman wondered whether the safeguards embodied in the U S A Euratom agreement would throw any light on this 10 Mr Schaetzel replied that the safeguards problem had given rise to some difficulty during the negotiations with Euratom The European Atomic Community had all-encompassing rights under the Euratom treaty and as a sovereign authority had refused to accept an externally administered safeguards system as this would have been more restrictive than the arrangements which the U S had with the U K and Canada It had seemed to the United States that by making a con- cession to Euratom they would be able to contain a large part of the French atomic energy programme within the larger Euratom scheme and that this would be a net gain The United States had therefore agreed with Euratom on a system the details of which were subject to U S approval involving the continuing right of mutual audit and embodying the ul- timate sanction that the U S could terminate the co-opera- tive programme if it were not satisfied that the system was being properly executed Both parties had also agreed to consider transferring responsibility to an international system at an appropriate time if one should be put into effect 11 The United Kingdom representative had no difficulty in accepting the objectives of the United States in reaching agreement with Euratom on the safeguards system in question He asserted however that by choosing to foster European supre national institutions the United States had lost something 'respect of another objective _the development of an international safeguards system He was not worried about the effectiveness of the Euratom safeguards system in practical terms Nevertheless the_de jure position was serious since the right of self inspection had-been granted to Euratom and by thus contracting a Western European group of nations out of a larger international scheme the chances or achieving the latter had been reduced countries which proposed the adoption of an international scheme-through IAEA were also open to attack on the grounds that they were using the Agency only to-retain a measure of control over under developed countries l2 Mr Pollock suggested that if groups of member countries of IAEA were to organize themselves on a basis similar to Euratom it would be difficult to discriminate against them by denying them the rights now accorded to Euratom He-wondered what the reaction of the United States would be if it were suggested that_IAEA introduce a system of regional self inspection l3 The United States representative thought that this would depend on the type of regional group involved Some might be acceptable others not In any case it was diffi cult to foresee any genuine regional group similar to Euratom apart perhaps from OAS The idea however should not be dismissed out Of hand lb The United Kingdom representative agreed that inspection- by regional bodies within an IAEA system might offer possibi lities He cautioned however that the image of Euratom as a quasiwmilitary group was a political reality and that this was-liable to cause trouble and must be reckoned with ELEMENTS OF A SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM 15 At the request of the United States representative Mr Kratzer gave an indication of United States thinking on this aspect of the problem He agreed that a 100 percent effective_system was not possible A good deal of work however had been done on estimating the degree of effective ness of safeguards systems in various circumstances and it had been found that the effectiveness of safeguards was closely correlated with the cost of the systemo This relationship could be represented graphically by a curVe approaching 100 percent effectiveness at the high rates of expenditure which a full time residential inspection system would involve The advantage of an inspection system falling on this part of the curve was that its effectiveness could be accurately predicted At lower levels of expenditure where effectiveness fall off so did the accuracy of predicting effectiveness Audit-systems of safeguards suffered particularly from this disadvantage and on the basis of U S studies it was thought that the probability of detecting a one percent diversion of material under a simple audit system was only percent 16 The United Kingdom representative agreed that an audit system by itself was not adequate since there was nothing to prevent a dishonest management from maintaining two sets of books Audit must therefore be supplemented by sampling and inspection The essential choice was between a 2hwhour resident inspection system and an audit spot check system He believed that the effectiveness of the former was largely illusory as compared with the type of system proposed in the Canadian paper and that it was politically out of the question as well as being impossibly expensive in terms of scientific manpower He illustrated DECLASSIFIED Authority dqie m - the sort of difficulties which would be encountered in securing 'international agreement for any type of safeguards system by citing the United Kingdom s negotiations for an Atomic Energy agreement with Brazil which were being held up on this very issue the Brazilians had taken the line that theirs was a friendly nation and that it would be difficult to secure parliamentary approval for an agreement centaining safeguardsa 'He concluded that something along the lines of the Canadian proposal perhaps_somewhat elaborated and graduated in the rigour of its application according to the technical nature of the situation to which it was being applied would meet the requirements we had in minds 317 The Canadian representative agreed with much of the foregoinge He suggested that the cost of a safeguards system on the basis proposed in the Canadian paper would be minimal in terms of both money and manpower He also maintained that it was futile to aim at a completely watertight safeguards system since extensive United StateseCanadian experience in acCounting for_plutonium in fuel rods irradiated in Canada indicated that it was impossible to predict plutonium formation within a margin of error of less than 180 The Australian representative suggested that it might be fruitful to-cbnsider a differentgapproacha Why not classify- countries according to the likelihood of their diverting materials Many countries were not interested in large scale nuclear development while others had ample nuclear technology and resources of their own This left a few countries such as Japan and India which would be acquiring large research or power reactors within the next few years and which would only then have the technological resources to fabricate nuclear weapons Instead therefore of trying to devise a rigorous universal system one might aim at a minimal universal system and make special more comprehensive arrangements for the real problem countriesa One might also overcome their objections to safeguard_s by including some of their nationals as inspectorso l9 Mra Kratzer suggested that there were three objections to this approacho First that Canada the United Kingdom and the United States had sought uniform rights regarding safeguards in all their bilaterals second that this approach would involve_discrimination in the implementation of safeguards third _that it would make it much more difficult for IAEA to apply safeguardso 20 The United Kingdom representative agreed that discrimination as between countries was not possible since it would be regarded as an Anglo Sason conspiracy In his opinion the most practicable way to go forward was through IAEA with perhaps some arrangement for inspection on a regional or group basis as had been suggested earlier in the meetings The Japanese request that the Agency appiy the safeguards embodied in the - and U980 acceptance of this expressed at the last General Conference of the hgency meant that IAEA must quickly develop a safeguards systemo 'It would be little short of catastrophic if the Agency were to present a system unacceptable to the United States in particular since this would mean that the latter would be unable to fulfill its pledge of fissile materialo The Soviet bloc already maintained that the United States offer was a propaganda gesture devoid of content and the United States would be open to sharper criticism' of this kind if it should even appear unwilling to fulfill its pledge however justifiable the reasonso It therefore appeared fto him that there was urgent need_to clarify the ideas of those - 6 present on what would constitute an acceptable Agency system and then to pass this information in a discreet way to Roger Smith Head of the Safeguards Division The United Kingdom was assigning a man to the Division in December and would like to brief him in advance if a decision could now be reached on what constituted an acceptable system In view of the Japanese request to the Agency it would be difficult for the U S S R or other countries to oppose a reasonable Agency system and there was therefore a real chance of securing the Board's approval If this was to be 'done however it was essential that Western countries should not announce their own intentions and ideas on safeguards and should not give cause for suspicion that they were seeking to influence the Agency until after it had produced its own scheme 21 The United States representative agreed that the essential point was to determine what type of Agency system would be acceptable to the countries represented at this meeting The United States authorities were aware of the urgency in reaching decisions on this matter and this sense of urgency had been reinforced by some of the new arguments which had been advanced Mr Kratzer added that the U L paper presented a fine analysis of the problem He nevertheless thought that safeguards offered a real hope of buying time during which an agreement on disarmament or test cessation might be negotiated he also thought that having regard to the limited nuclear power likely to be produced over the next few years the degree of efficiency and rigour of the safeguards system would have a significant effect upon the length of this interim period 22 The United Kingdom representative could not agree Quoting the case of Japan he said that if the Japanese now purchased a power reactor it could not be in operation before 1963 allowing one year for the irradiation of fuel elements and another year for cooling off they would have little plutonium before 1965 There was therefore ample time to develop a nuclear disarmament scheme and the extra time which the most rigorous safeguards system would add to the interim period was almost insignificant from this point of view 23 The Australian representative added that by exer cising control over the fuel available to the Japanese it would be possible to detect if they were misusing their nuclear resources since to obtain plutonium quickly they would have to use short irradiation periods and would require fuel at up to five times the normal rate 24 The United Kingdom representative stated that this raised another problem namely whether U S and U K chemical processing plants should be open for inspection under a safeguards system For the time being spent rods from Japan and other countries would probably be returned to the U S or the U K for processing and it might be difficult to deny access for inspectors to verify the treatment and disposal of plutonium This problem had been previously discussed and the United Kingdom had at one time offered to permit inspection This offer had however since been withdrawn 25 The United states representative stated that his country only had joint military civil plants Plants designed exclusively for civil purposes might later be established and this might make it easier to permit inspection In the meantime one might consider the possibility of hypothecating the appropriate quantities of plutonium to the custody of lA A whenever fuel rods were returned from countries abroad for processing Hill I Authority NHD 2 70 I 7 The Australian representative had understood the United Kingdom representative to suggest that no safeguards be applied until the Agency had produced its scheme He wondered whether Canada intended to put its proposed system into effect before this and whether the meeting should not try and decide whether its collective goal'was an_acceptable _and ompatible IAEA System or one which producing countries could put into effect before- IAEA announced its system or if it failed to do so 27 The Canadian representative said that it was unlikely that Canada would apply safeguards within the next year or so Canada had nevertheless been disturbed by reports of a South African sale of uranium to Japan without provision for the application of safeguards and considered that it Was important that all producing countries continued to establish their rights in this matter in agreements and sales contrasts with other countries 28 Mr Schaetsel thought that this touched on a real problem 'if the countries present at the meeting did not present a common front in insisting upon establishing their right to apply safeguards efforts to develop a safeguards system would collapse It was clearly also necessary to reach agreement on the substance of a safeguards system among countries participating in the meeting and other friendly countries if an international system was to be sold in the international forum FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION 29 The United Kingdom representative suggested that if progress was to be made the countries represented at the meeting must agree among themselves on a safeguards system and then try and secure international approval for it through IAEA in the meantime maintaining a discreet silence on their plans 30 The Australian representative agreed and wondered whether IAEA's Board might not ask the Director General to put forward an Agency system by a given deadline He also thought that it might be useful if specific proposals for a safeguards system acceptable to the five participating countries were drafted on the basis of the present meeting Bl The Chairman thought that it might be somewhat precipitate to undertake drafting at this stage It was his impression that another meeting might be required in order to reach definite agreement prior to drafting 32 The United States representative agreed saying that his country still had to present its analysis In response to a query he added that it might be possible to do so by early December The Chairman proposed that a meeting of officials perhaps drawn from the Embassies concerned should be held '_in Washington about December 15 1958 to receive the U 8 paper and to exchange any additional information which might be emailable 3a The United Kingdom representative suggested that if possible the United States paper should include a list of items of equipment which would be covered by a safeguards system He also suggested that a later meeting which should aim at reaching definite agreement on a safeguards system should if' lJEl LASSIFIED Authority Nl'l'D '1 ' Go 70 I - 8 - be held in Vienna following the meeting of the Agency's Board of Governors in J'anuary 1959 pointing out that many of the persons concerned would already be in Vienna at that time and that this location would permit an informal and unobtrusive briefing of Roger Smith on the type of Agency safeguards which would be acceptable to the five countries present 35 It was agreed that a the United States representatives would circulate certain technical papers to other participating countries as soon as possible b that a meeting would be held in Washington about December 15 1958 to receive the U S analytical paper ec that a meeting would be held in Vienna about January 20 1958 with the object of reaching agreement on a safeguards system d that in the meantime no publicity should be given to the intentions or plans of participating countries with regard to safeguards 36 During the concluding e changes at the meeting the following additional points were mentioned a when the question of safeguards arises in IAEA the best tactics might be for the United States and United Kingdom to favour a rather rigorous system while the other three countries advocate a system which would in fact be acceptable to all five countries The U S and U K could then appear to compromise and thus increase the chances of gaining general acceptance for a reasonable system b the United States is considering the possibility of permitting the e port of sample quantities of natural uranium greater than the present limit of 1 000 kg for uncontrolled e ports to anyone country subject to limited safeguards of the kind provided in its research bilaterals periodic reports periodic inspection and the return of spent fuel to the U S A for reprocessing ec the United Kingdom representative reminded the meeting that his country had always taken the position that it would not seek to apply safeguards to materials e ported to Australia and South Africa He wondered whether others had considered the possibility of e tending similar special treatment to members of the new Commonwealth such as India The U S and Canadian representatives replied that neither of their countries was considering any form Of special treatment for India The United states has recently agreed to lease some heavy water to India and the lease agreement provides for safeguards Canada has consistently refused to supply uranium to India without safeguards d i t was generally agreed that it would be useful if the Under-Secretary of state for E ternal Affairs were to e plore the Russian attitude towards safeguards with the new U S S R Ambassador to Canada should the opportunity arise The U S DECLASSIFIED Authority $0413 a 970 I ii -9- authorities had discussed_this question with the Russians on several occasions at the time of the first Geneva Conference without any useful result The U K representative had-more recently spoken to the Russian member of the Agency s Board of-Governors and had formed the opinion that the U S S R would be inclined to agree privately with the application of safeguards to countries such as Japan but would Continue to take the position in public that safeguards were a Western device to keep control oVer under-developed countries                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu