DECLASSIFIED Authority STATE DEPT REVIEW SIAE El gain cilass'n wihhanac clauify ff CL C345 ooncurrc -- '7 SEP 91959 8-40 we Hmard Meyers 1M pm 951322 5' FILE cow 3 '9 UNITED sums OF AMERICA American Enbassy London England September 3 1959 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9 h uhconourrencso necessity In partand ex as shown 12356 860 3 5 1' WNW - Dear m1 No - Enclosed you will find 50 cepies of the Memorandum of Con- versation concerning atomic energ' safeguards reporting your discussion with Michael Michaela on August 31 Although you agreed with my suggestion that the memorandum be given wider circulation then you originally had in mind you did not specify what this might be and I feel that I am not at liberty to send 9 you can send them on to appropriate distribution and would like to suggest that it wculd be educative reading for various offices in the Pentagon and in the Atomic Energy Omission as well as CIA and the President's Scientific Advisory Camnittee I have forwarded copies to Moscow and our REA Mission and have retained several copies in London copies to the apprOpriate offices of the State Department and to other departments in Washington I enclose 50 copies so that I want to say again what a pleasure it was to spend some time with you I hope very such that you will decide to go into the Foreign Service because the Service needs somebody like you very badly and because I honestly believe you would enjoy the life fours ever SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY a cr - First Secretary of Missio A I Philip J Farley Esquire Special Assistant to the Secretary SPECIAL 41 for Disarmament and Atomic Energy To Tm bins as Department of State sin 5 New State Building Room 7253 t '5 Neshington D C p ft DECLASSIFIED can am an mm FILE 0an Memoramium of Conversation DATL August 31 1959 SUBJECT Atomic alnerg Fafeguards W Deputy Secretary Atomic Energy Office W Officer in Charge Peaceful Uses of Atonic hnergv Atomic bnery and Disarmap ment Department Foreign Office W Special Assistant to the Secretary for Disammnent 8 Atomic Enery Matters W First Secretary American hmbassy London Howard Mega First Secretary USED Brussels PLACE Atomic Energy Office 1 Terrace Whitehall London TO Department Moscow Vienna for IAEA lission London W1 asked whether the British thought the lm Board of Governors might reach at least majority agreement upon a safeguards paper 1 1 ch thought that it would be unlikely to have an agreed paper before the end of the October meeting of the Board of Governors that it was advisable now to get in all necessary points which we wished to make since the longer we de- layed so doing the greater became the possibility that in fact the Board would not reach agreement until the amary 1960 meetings In discussing the problem of achieving cannon agreement among the suppliers of atomic emerg- materials and ecpipment said that the key was the attitude of the French and the Russians Both he and Cm thought that the French would refuse in principle to agree to a semen front on the part of the western suppliers but would in practice substantially follow the concepts which were agreed upon by the other Western suppliersa They thought the French were influenced to be cooperative in fact although not in word by their need to keep in step with the other Western suppliers of materials in order to acquire such materials for the French military programs speculated that the French might intentionally be falling out of step so that the safeguards system might collapse and their problem of getting materials for their military program be eased The qzestion was whether Scuth Africa Canada and Australia would continue to adhere to sane form of cm understanding it the French should not so agree except tacitly In this connection dam noted that the South Africans had said at the conclusion of the last meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna that Lfthe it DECLASSIFIEDP Authoritym 'Li c if the French did not adhere to the comnon front agreement by the end of Novenber South Africa would no longer consider itself bound to require safeguards on its sales of uraniumu He asked whether the United States wculd be willing to approach Africa Australia Canada and Belgium and ask these countries to continue to adhere to something like the comes front agreement discussed at London May 27-28 as a means of inducing these countries to maintain some form of safeguards whatever might be the French action If such U9 approach were to be made it would be most ad- visable to do so by November mm While not answering this question directly g Fgley said there were clearly doubts whether there waisted sufficient inducements now to permsde other countries to continue to apply safe uards if they did not wholly support this concept now He thought that if we should be forced to change mr present approach to the safeguards qaestion there were two hypotheses under which one might conceivably proceed to deal Jith safe guards The first was as the Russians have argued to raise the question of uranium traffic and uniform applications of safeguards in the 1AM The second was to try and supplement the cocoa regulations by looking at requests for supplies of material and equipment on a casc by-case basis essentially with the idea that friendly non-omnist states could receive such assistance if they gave an undertaking that the materials and equip- ment mold be used only for peaceful purposes Hr iaeyggs said that the latter approach would be the end of IAM safeguards 1g uli gdls responding to Farley's points thought there was another aspect of the problem which bore directly on which of these taro hypotheses one accepted i e that if there should be a general agreement to suspend nuclear tests under a monitoring system there was no need to worry about safeguards over the peaceful uses of atomic energy since the basic issue of hampering the development of weapons capabilities by other countries be not largely by the ban on testing supervised by a moni- toring system If there should not be a test-ban agreement he thought it was doubtml that other countries would still be willing to accept safeguards Eichaels referred to the paper which had been handed to by Farley by Sig Patrick Deg on August 30 attached hereto He stated that the Russian attitude towards atomic energy safeguards at least in the peaceful uses field had been most equivocal For exauple the Soviet neither of the 1m Board of Governors Laelyanov while mblicly taking the line that the kind of safeguards suggested by the US and other western powers consti tuted an infringement of national sovereignty privately had expressed his apprehension about the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other countries and had linked safeguards directly to securing a permanent sus- pension of nuclear tests uighaels believed that the Russians had decided in 1956 that control over such test-suspension was the best way of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons mile leaving the Nest to suffer the political disabilities DECLASSIFIED Authority 32 35194-1 $229 - 1 sabilities of advocating safeguards to assure against diversions from peaceful uses of atomic energy He thought another aspect of the problem raised by the Russian attitude was apt to come up sharely in one year when the Indians as they already had stated oublicly would be shooting around for a large power reactor They could the first two countries required conditions which the Indians regarded as infringements on their sovereignty or as too enerous the Indians would inevitably turn to the USSR In this connection Michaela called attention to Nehru's statement of August 6th in the Indian Parliament in which the Indian Prime iinister stated that India was ready I shortly to produce fuel elements on a regular basis that there was regular production of Indian uranium that facilities for handling plutonium were already under 'cons traction - and that in five years India would be entirely self-sufficient in the atomic energy field Thus if the US and UK should mrsue their present policies in regard to safeguards the cuestion must be asked whether these oolicies would force India into Russian hands initially in the atomic energy field but oerhaps on yet a wider basiss Referring again to the caper handed to sin P aglex by 51 Patrick Dean 35 Hichaels suggested that if the President did not find an appropriate opoortunity to raise this issue with during the later's visit in it might be possible for US representatives to bring up these matters say with Lmelyanov during the General Conference in the fall in Vienna - Hmever Jr Cage disazreed somewhat with Lichae 3 regarding approaching Emelyanov and thought it would be advisable to discuss the cpestion with an apprOpriate Russian diplomatic or political figure since the missians appeared to give greater weight to oolitical direction of their atomic energy oolicieso Iro Farley concluded the dismssion by saying that it had been a nest interesting conversation with much food for 2110 1th 71 CM - POL M-J ltieyers 9 2 59 CWIDLMIAL Mum a A a Authority W9 i am I w nwmnucmma 5 cohwrrama was 258 - mm smut Safe uards on Nuclear orts It is reasonably clear that no safeguards scheme is likely to survive long unless all major exporters apply similar rules Her Majesty's Government have made it clear that they must reserve the right to reconsider whether to apply safeguards to their own exports in the event that the Soviet Government fails to apply comparable safeguards The real attitude of the Soviet Government is not clear In l956 it evaded the United States Government's attempt to secure its agreement to apply comparable safeguards to those in the International Atomic Energy Agency's draft Statute to Soviet exports Since that date the Soviet Government has attacked the concept of safeguards but has not in fact made any really significant nuclear exports outside the Soviet bloc The whole question may well come to a head within the next year in consequence of the Indian desire to purchase a power reactor without accepting the usual safeguards It is therefore hoped that if any suitable opportunity should arise during Mr Khrushchev's visit to the United States in connexion with any discussion of the Nth Country the United States representatives will take the opportunity to raise this issue again with the Soviet Government It might perhaps be said that if the Russians attach any real importance to preventing the widespread manufacture of nuclear weapons they should be prepared to take steps to ensure that any nuclear material or equipment which they export to other countries for peaceful purposes are not used for the manufacture of weapons They have ratified the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency I A E A which requires the Agency to apply certain safeguards including inspection to any such material or equipment which it provides to its members But while the United States and the Western countries have so far refused to allow nuclear material or equipment to be exported to other countries unless they agree to accept similar safeguards to those laid down in the Agency statute the Russians have boasted of the fact that they are prepared to export material without any safeguards except possibly a paper undertaking by the recipients to use the material only for peaceful purposes In addition they have taken every opportunity in the Agency or elsewhere to attack the whole concept of a 22 safeguards as being an infringement of the recipient governments' sovereignty We recognise that so far the Russians have not supplied any power reactors or DECLASSIFIED Authority other material of real importance to any country outside the Soviet bloc But they should realise that if they should do so in the future it may well be impossible for other countries to maintain their present policy of applying safeguards to their own exports and the widespread manufacture of nuclear weapons will be brought nearer in consequence The Russians might therefore be asked in their own interests to Acquiesce in the adoption by the International Atomic Energy Agency of a reasonably effective safeguards system in line with the provisions in the Agency's Statute and r Eh 4t A Authority 13 L 9 1 5'qu CONFIDENTIAL Make their own exports of nuclear material and equipment to countries outside the Soviet bloc subject either to the Agency system or to a system of bilateral inspection not less effective than that of the Agency him                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu