Ju Authority 2 OF INSTRUCTION ah Am a ccurity Imxi caiian FOR DC USE ONLY IA-10127 June 3 1969 susmcn Background on IAEA Safeguards Document to be Considered at Fourth IAEA General Conference September 1960 ACCRA BERN 90 ABA ANKARA ASUNCION ATHENS BAGHDAD BANGKOK BELGRADE BONN BRUSSELS BUENOS AIRES CARACUS COLOMBO 1 COPENHAGEN CUIDAD TRUJILLO DJAKARTA GUATEMALA HELSINKI KABUL KARACHI KHARTOUN LIMA LISBON LUXEMBOURG MADRID MANACUA MANILA MEXICO CITI mm NEW DELHI OSLO PRNON PENH TORT-AU-PRINCE QUITO RABAT RANGOON REIKJAVIN RIO DE JANEIRO ROME SAN SALVADOR SEOUL STOCKHOLM TAIPEI TECUCICALPA IERRAN TEL AVIV THE HAGUE TOKYO TUNIS VIENNA I-JELLINGTON IAEA I Brief Background of IAEA Safeguards A The term safeguards refers collectively to those principles and procedures which are utilized for the purpose of ascertaining that nuclear materials and equipment destined for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military use Article XII of the Statute of the Interna tional Atomic Energy Agency IAEA provides that the IAEA shall implement safeguards for materials and assistance provided through the IAEA Since 1956 the United States and a group of friendly countries with similar views have been working for the establishment of effective and reasonable safeguards principles and procedures within the IAEA During the past year this effort has been intensified as a result of which the principles and procedures incorporated in IAEA Document sure 2 to this instruction have been provisionally approved by the 23-member Board by the very substantial majority of lb none against and 5 absten- 1s tions 3 Soviet Bloc India and Ceylon with 2 Board members UAR and Indonesia not participating in the vote' However although not required by the Statute the Board bv has referred the document to the Fourth IAEA General ABA Conference meeting in September 1960 for appropriate action under the Statute and the United States strongl lhopes that a substantial majority of the General Confer wil 1 support the document so that the Board's provision OFFICIAL USE ONLY approval 'u - See listing on voting for nrovis m 9 9 OFFICE e ms CFFIGIAL USE ONLY use rs As DECLASSIFIED vacuum PAGE 2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY scat 17y lasxi caticn approval may be made final immediately after the Conference B Since the United States has approached various govez ments in the past especially those which are members of the IAEA Board seeking their support on various as acts of the problem th following detailed information may be useful 1 In April of 1959 the Safeguards Division of the IAEA circulated for the comments of the IAEA's Board of Governors a preposed set of principles and procedures for IAEA safeguards This document was long and complex and contained features which were not acceptable to various members including the United States In September of 1959 the Board provisionally approved a much revised and condensed version of the safeguards princi les The Board requested that a set of rocedures implement ng the prin- ciples should be drafted By the TAEA Secretariat These draft procedures were considered by the Board at its January 1960 meeting At this meeting the technical basis for the procedures prepared by the Secretariat and the previously approved principles came under particularly heavy criticism from the Soviet Bloc and neutral countries l In addition many other countries submitted extensive amendments to the draft procedures Consequently the Board decided to refer the whole problem to a technical drafting committee under the chairmanship of Professor Gunner Renders of Norway In opposing draft safeguards documents during the Board discussions Soviet Bloc spokesmen have followed the eneral line that the proposed Agency safeguards system is too onerous and detailed and rests on a question- able scientific basis is discriminating in that it would apply only to the less-developed countries the atomic have-not countries and should consist merely of safeguards measures developed for each Agency project on a case-by-case basis India has followed much the same line while professing its willingness to adhere to a safeguards system which has universal non-discriminatdry application to all countries India has also maintained that safeguards on nuclear source materials and equipment are not necessary l i since these are now normal articles of commerce The UAR and certain other countries of the Afro-Asian bloc have L tended to follow the Indian lead in this regard or 1 remain silent during Board discussions 1 2 The drafting OFFICIAL Conn-3m 07 8 PAGE 3 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Security Classi cation 2 The drafting committee included technical representa tives from Brazil Czechoslovakia France India Uhion of Soviet Socialist Republics the United Kingdom and the United States It was instructed to simplify and combine into one document the previously approved principles and the amended procedures In February the committee met in Vienna and prepared a draft document in accordance with its instructions This document was considered at the crucial March-April Board of Governors Meeting provisionally approved as finally amended issued as and referred to the General Conference as mentioned above It is in general accordance with the United States safeguards position 3 The Uhited 5tates strongly supports document which represents the results of exhaustive consideration in the Board as well as at the technical level and reflects a realistic balance of technical and political considerations although the document was developed by the Board of Governors and the great majority of the IAEA members who will attend the General Conference have not participated actively in its preparation all member countries have had the opportunity to review successiv drafts during the perioiof the Board's consideration of this document iherefore the United States strongly hopes that in order to achieve definitive action on this important problem at the General Conference other member states will Join us in seeking to avoid a recapitulation of the Board discussions by reopening each paragraph of the document to substantive debate As further background a summary of the salient features of is enclosed Enclosure 1 II Action Required In view of our intent to actively support this document at the General Conference in September we will be initiating discussions with various IAEA member governments with the object of making clear the significance and need for IAEA approval of these principles and procedures It is anticipated that the United States will be joined by proponents of safeguards in approaching various IAEA member governments Addresses Missions are therefore requested a To become thoroughly familiar with the contents of i b To address DECLASSIFIED Amhority OFFICIAL USE Security lassi italics r b To address to the Department any questions on this 1 document or on safeguards in general not later than July 1 in order that the Department may reply well in advance of the Conference c Tb report any significant inquiries received on this subject and d Not to initiate any formal discussions on this subject with representatives of the governments to which accredited at this time Further specific instructions on this matter will follow at a later date eCountrios on the IAEA Board of Governors voting for provisional approval of IAEA safeguards document at March April 1960 Board Meet- ing Australia Brazil Canada France Japan Mexico Netherlands Norway Peru Philippines Portugal Spain Union of South Africa United States Venezuela the United Kingdom Enclosures 1 Summary of IAEA Safeguards Document 2 Copy of 217% $2346 CO The American Embassy OTTAWA The American Embassy PARIS The American Embassy CANBERRA The American Embassy LONDON The American Embassy CAIRO The American Embassy CAPETOWN IAEA Mission VIENNA Enclosure 1 only 1 9 OFFICIAL use ONLY Security M cah'a n c 7 Authority 2 1 Paea_5_ - OFFICIAL USE ONLY Security Classi cation ENCLOSURE 1 SUMMARY OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT The following is a summary of with reference to the paragraph numbers in that document A The proposed IAEA safeguards principles and procedures seek to prevent nuclear materials and equipment from being used in such a way as to further an military purpose in the following three situa- tions Paragraph 1 a when the IAEA supplies the assistance b when the IAEA is requested to administer safeguards for bilateral or multilateral agreements and c uhen the IAEA is requested to apply safeguards to a State's own activities 3 The scope of the principles and procedures covers the require- ments anticipated by the IAEA in the Immediate future and relates only to Paragraph u a research test and power reactors with less than 100 thermal megawatts output b the source and special fiesionable materials used and produced in these reactors and c small research and development facilities 0 Throughout an important distinction is made between attachment and application of safeguards Paragraphs 21 and 22 Attachment means the requirement to apply appropriate procedures Application is the implementation of these procedures D IAEA safeguards will be applied to the various types of nuclear material supplied by the IAEA when the quantity of that material subject to IAEA consideration in the State exceeds Paragraph 33 a two metric tons of uranium with a Uranium 235 isotope content between 0 5 and 1 0 per cent or an equivalent amount of more highly enriched uranium corresponding to 200 grams of pure Uranium 235 Uranium 233 or plutonium a formula for deriving OFFICIAL USE ONLY ecuritv Jus catia DECLASSIFIED 110ch Pace 6 OFFICIAL use 0er i Sawfly Classi cation l deriving equivalent amounts of uranium of various enrichments is used see appendix b four metric tons of depleted uranium with a Uranium 235 content of less than 0 5 per cent or c four metric tons of thorium Safeguards will be applied in only a nominal manner when the quantities are between 2 and 10 metric tons of natural uranium or its enriched equivalent and 20 metric tons of depleted uranium or and 20 metric tons of thorium E IAEA safeguards will be applicable to nuclear materials pro- duced processed or used in nuclear facilities or materials which are subject to IAEA safeguards IAEA safeguards will also be applicable to all special nuclear material produced in a reactor to which IAEA safeguards are not applicable but which contains nuclear material to which IAEA safeguards are applicable if such material permits the reactor to operate at more than 2001 per cent of the power at which it could operate without such mater sl Paragraphs 26 30 3h 35 36 F IAEA safeguards will be applicable to nuclear facilities supplied or substantially asskted by the IAEA Reactors not fueled with IAEA supplied nuclear material which after an inspection at initial criticality are assessed by the Board tq have a maximum calxzulated power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts shall be exempted from safeguards provided that the total such power of reactors thus exempted in any State may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts Paragraphs 27 31 G IAEA safeguards will be applicable to non-nuclear material and equipment supplied by the IAEA if it can substantially assist a nuclear facility or further a military purpose Paragraphs 32 38 H The IAEA safeguards principles and procedures provide for the review of the design of existing facilities and those which are planned or being constructed which will become subject to IAEA safeguardss The purpose of such a review is to determine whether the facility will further any military purpose and if it will permit effective IAEA safeguards assassaas I A provision l United States position favored 150 per cent Lg United States powition favored placing all reactors under at least nominal safeguards with no exemption OFFICIAL use ONLY Security DECLASSIFIED 11 11'Iuea_ 1l OFFICIAL USE ONLY Security Ian i rsfion I A provision is made for records and reports which will be worked out in detail for specific facilities with a State receiving substantial assistance Special reports are required in case of incidents involving possible loss of material Reports are also required whenever significant changes are made in inventories of equipment subject to safeguards The minimum routine report fre geg y reactor facilities will be twice a year Paragraphs J Special inspections are permitted in cases of possible mate- rial or equipment losses or changes in inventories or equipment which are reported as mentioned above Routine inspections will be made at a maximum frequency provided by a technical evaluation of the signifi- cance of the quantity enrichment and type of the material provided or the special nuclear material production potential of the facility provided These inspections will normally include verification of amounts of material by physical inspection measurement sampling auditin reports and records and examining facilities Paragraphs 55-60 h 66 K Nominal safeguards for less significant assistance will require only one annual routine report no routine inspections ani special reports and inspections as necessary Paragraph 61 r Security gimsi grid                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu