I DECLASSIFIED i Authoritynnosesoia 7 2 immerse senses on 3 PRESENT AUSTRALIA Mr A D Thomas BELGIUM M J Boon Nita Jc 0063116 CliNi iDj m V Mr 1 H _Wershof Mr K Mr J E G Hardy FRANCE M A Finkelstein SOUTH AFRICA Mr D 3 Sole UNITED KINGDOM MIN 1 on I Mr H E Shepherd MP 34 17V Pde th Mr B L Sutton MP Jo CW d'f lk r w5 9 baiwj W m Liaison Office in London Australian Atomic Energy Commission Counsellor Belgian Embassy London Commer01ol Attache9 Belgian Embassyi London Ambassador and permanent representative of Canada to the European Office of the 5 United Nations and Canadian member of the oard of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency Counsellor Canadian Embassy Vienna Counsellor Csneda Houses London Commisseriet a l'Energie Atomique Minister in Vienna and South African member of the Board of Governors of the Inter national Atomic Energy Agency Under Secretary Atomic Energy Division Office Of the Ministo for Science Foreign Office Commonwealth Relations Office Board of Trade United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority DECLASSIFIED Authority magma SECRET STATES Admiral P Foster Mr E L Bredy a embaeeador end United States member of the Board of Governors of the Interw national Atomic Energy Agency Scientific Adviser to the United States representative to-the International Atomic Energy Agency nee-tree Mro D 1G B Jones Miss A Stoddart Office of the Minister for Scienceg Atomic Energy Divisiony 2 Richmond Terrace Whitehall j i nynneenerzn Office of the Minister for Science Foreign Office DECLASSHUED Authority MORNING SESSION 15TH DECEMBER 1960 Introduction The United Kingdom repreSentativegsaid that it was important that there should be an agreed Western line When safeguards and related subjects were discussed at the January 1961 meeting of the Board of Governors of the I A E A The United Kingdom thought it would be useful to have an exchange of views among the Western Icountries and had therefore called this meeting at short notice 2 The United States representatives welcomed the action of the United Kingdom in calling the meeting They thought it was important that at its January meeting the Board of Governors should make it clear that it had taken serious account of the comments I made at the Fourth General Conference on the Principles_and Procedures of Agency Safeguards While the United States thought that no retreat should be made on the principles of safeguards some more flexibility might be introduced in respect of details They had been ready to modify their position on these in the hope that all Western governments could present a united front 3 The Australian representative said that his Government was determined to finalise the safeguards document at the January meeting Many other difficult problems would face the Board of Governors during 1961 and it was important that their time should not be taken up with continued discussion of safeguards h The Belgian representatives said that they were attending the talks as observers only 5 It was agreed that the agenda of the talks should be Consideration of detailed criticism of safeguards scheme made at the General Conference and amendments to be put forward by Western countries ii Tactics for dealing with criticism of principles of the Agency safeguards scheme at the January meeting of the Board of Governors and if time permits '95 SECREI DECLASSIFIED AuthoriW NMB DPra i I Problems arising on the document on the Agency's inspectors including the question of the Agency's liability for the actions of its inspectors iv Staffing of the Agency's Inspectorate Division Other items on the agenda of the January meeting of the Board which have safeguards connotations Detailed Amendments A Para 33 of 6 The South African representative said that his Government censidered it essential that a distinction should be made in this paragraph between source material and special fissile material They would like to see the paragraph amended as follows The provision for the application of neminal safeguards when the cumulative total of P N material in a State amounted to between 2 and 10 metric tons in the case of natural uranium and and 20 metric tons in the case of depleted uranium and thorium should be deleted Safeguards on source materials should not come into force until applied with their full rigour when the cumulative total of P N material in a State reached 10 metric tons of natural uranium and 20 metric tons cf depleted uranium and thorium Nominal safeguards should be applied to special fission able material when the eumulative total of such P N material in a State ameunted to between 200 grammes and 1 000 grammes Full safeguards should be applied when the cumulative total exceeded 1 000 grammes The final sentence of para 35 shculd he deleted 7 The United States representatives said they were prepared to support but not to propose or ecusponscr amendments to para 33 which Wuuld delete the provisions for the application of minimal safeguards to scurCe materials and which uld raise the thresholds for the application of full safeguards to-iO metric tons in the case of inatural uranium and 20 metric tons in the case of depleted uranium and thorium They were not prepared to accept deletion cf the final sentence of para 33 but they were prepared to agree that Safeguards shOuld not apply to produced fissile material until it reached a cumulative total of 200 grammes They tabled a redraft of para 33 Annex 1 to give effect to these proposals 8 The Canadian representatives said that their Government would have preferred not to make any significant changes in at the present time The document was in any case to be reviewed in two years1 time and it would be preferable to give it a trial run as it stood They would not however object to amendments on which other Western countries were agreed 3 but they hoped that no Western country would put forward amendments which were positively unacceptable to the other countries taking pert in the present talks and particularly to the United States 9 'The following further points were made in discussion 3 3 5 - The Uni ted Kinad omg representatives felt that it was difficult to justify the retention of thorium under safeguards at the present There was unlikely to be a substantial nuclear breeder time use until the late i960s or early 19708 when reactors might possibly be employed on a commercial scale Thorium nitrate was to some extent a commodity in general international trade The difficulty caused by the fact that thorium was included in the definition of source material in Article XX of the Statute might be overcome hy saying in that safeguards were not at present being applied to thorium but that the position would be reconsidered when it came into general atomic use The removal of thorium from safeguards could be presented as evidence that Western countries were pre pared to pay serious attention to constructive points raised by other countries Although this concession might not impress the Opposition it could have a broader 5 hm hm DECLASSIFIED Authoriwmsoasaoaa i 0 Public relations value The United States said that this this point was under consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington They thought it was wrong in prin- ciple and inconsistent with the safeguards document to depart from the fundamental principle that thorium was a source material with thesame basic nuclear qualities as depleted uranium They would however report back the discussion at the present meeting It was agreed that other Western countries weuld not press for the removal of thorium from safeguards if on reconsideration the United States felt that an increase to 20 metric tons in the threshold for the application of safeguards was the meatthat they could accept I The drafting of the amendments to para 33 should be looked at carefully to make it clear that the cumulative totals for natural uranium depleted uranium and thorium applied to each material independently without reference tothe others but that the cumulative totals for fissile materials which were interchangeable applied to all types of these materials taken together The United Kingdom would circulate a draft lEitGP in the present talks It might however be desirable to make the intention of the draft clear by statements written into the record of the Board rather than by very complicated drafting the sense of which would subsequently be obscure It was pointed out that the final paragraph of the United States nedraft would lead to the application of safeguards in some cases where the quantities of source material were substantially below the thresholds set out in the first Moreover the sentence was inconsistent with para 26 of If the redraft were tabled in this form at the meeting of the Board of Governors the countries tabling it might be accused of DECLASSHUED I 3 L h if if MQK -bad faith in putting forward amendments which appeared to make concessions but included an easily detected provisionvmich effectively restricted most of them On the other hand substantial quantities of fissile material could in certain circumstances be derived from the quan tities of source material below which safeguards would not be applied it was desirable that there should be some form of safety net to permit the application of safeguards to these large quantities of fissile material The Canadian representatives suggested that if the United States felt that they could not accept amendment of para 33'unless the final sentence of their draft were included it might be better to leave para 53 as it was It was agreed to adjourn the discussion on this point and resume it at a later stage in the present talks a are 58 of 10 The South African representative said that he did not wish to suggest any amendment of this paragraph He would like to say for the record at the January meeting of the Board of Governors that his Government felt that this paragraph should be interpreted with a considerable degree of flexibility Safeguards should only be applied under it if the specialised equipment or non-nuclear material could in the circumstances of the specific project he used to further a military purpose 11 The United States representatives said that the case by caee approach suggested by the South African representative was suitable for some commodities heat exchangers which could clearly only be used for military purposes in connection with certain types of project There were however other commodities heavy water which could be used for military purposes when the supplies exceeded a certain amount The United States felt that in such cases cumulative totals above which safeguards should apply should be laid down in general terns by the Board of Governors For heavy 7 as mi water they suggested that nominal safeguards should apply when the cumulative total in a particular country amounted to between 3 and 10-metric tons and full safeguards should apply when the cumulative total exceeded 10 metric tone This problem would arise in connec tion with the 6% tons of heavy water which the United States were supplying through the Agency for use in a 10mg reactor at Vinoa in Yugoslavia that it was desirable to lay down general principles before the Board took a decision on the Vince project agreement so as to avoid a case by case approach 12 the United Kingdom representatives said that it was politically undesirable to relate the general question of applying safeguards to heavy water to the Vince project The reactor involved was of very low power which could not possibly be used for military purposea and the application of safeguards to it might be regarded as inconw sistent with para 37 of which exempted small research reactors from all but nominal safeguards Yugoslavia neutral country uncommitted on safeguards and it world be undesirable to antagonise her The way out might be for the Agency 1 to enter into an agreement with the Yugoslav Government under which safeguards would not apply while the heavy water was in the Vinca_ reactor but the Yugoslav Government would bind themselves to accept Safeguards if the heavy water were used in some other project and the Board of Governors then felt that it was desirable to apply safeguards a new project agreement would then be drawn up 13 The South said that hi3 Government had always opposed the concept that heavy water should trigger off the application of safeguards The general principle proposed by the United States would prove very controversial and there was no hope of securing agreement to it at the January meeting of the Board 1h On the suggestion of the Canadian representatives it was agreed that as the Yugoslav project agreement was unlikely to be circu lated in time for consideration at the January meeting of the Board Western countries should try andavoid a discussion at that meeting of points arising on para 38 of 1 If other countries suggested detailed amendments Western countries would try and ride them off by general statements that the paragraph should be interpreted very flexibly 8 DECLASSIFIED Authority W3 1 SESSION 15th DECEMBER 7960' Ma B France was present for part of the 'session Detailed Amendments Para 33 of Besuned Discussion 15 The_ nited States representatives said that they had reported the gist of the morning's discussion by telephone to Washington 'where the matter was receiving urgent consideration The initial reaction was that the omission of the final paragraph of the United States redraft of para 33 would give rise to considerable difficulty inter glig in connection with U S atomic legislation 16 The South African representative said that his Government thought there was a very strong case for the proposals which he had put forward in the morning and he hoped that the United States would reconsider their position If the United States position was not clear by 9th Januarys South Africa must reserve the right to table her two amendments to para 53 for consideration at the January meeting of the Board General Tactics at January Meeting of the Board 17 The United Kingdom representativessaid that it was necessary to distinguish between amendments of principle and amendments of detail even though the border line was not clear It was also necessary to decide on a concerted Western line for dealing with amendments of principle put forward by India and other opponents of safeguards 18 The following points were made in discussion It was of paramount importance that the safeguards issue should be settled at the January meeting of the Board Western tactics should be determined by the need to do this 7 It was possible that India or theSoviet bloc would ask for an open debate on the safeguards issue There was go 1 general agreement that an Open debate would set an extremely bad precedent and that any proposal to hold one should be voted down It would be undesirable to try and stop the opposition from putting forward the suggestion that the safeguards scheme should be revised on the lines contained in the Five Power resolution at the General Conference safeguards involving inspection should only be applied to fissile material a guarantee of peaceful use should be asked for in the case of source material no conditions at all should be attached to the supply of nuclear equip ment Western countries should however exercise self denial and not reply in detail to the points made by the opponents of safeguards It would be sufficient to saythat these points had been answered previously and to refer to the relevant passages in the records of previous DECLASSHHED 1 Authority ma 1 meetings of the Board of Governors and of the Fourth General Conference The Australian representatixg felt however that deliberate replies should be made to the 7 more significant points If it was suggested that this procedure implied disrespect to the Board of Governors particularly the five new members the West could reply that two of the new members Belgium and Poland - had taken part in some of the earlier discussions of the Board and that all the new members had taken part in the Fourth General Conference The discussion at the January meeting of the Board of Governors should conclude with a definitive resolution approving the Principles and Procedures of Agency Safeguards as amended during the course of the meeting A draft of this resolution should be tabled well in advance of the beginning of the meeting and if possible by 9th January 19 The United States tabled the draft definitive resolution at Annex II It was agreed that this draft was generally acceptable but that it should be examined by the resident representatives in an who should consider in particular whether It was wise to include in the preamble the reference to taking into account the views expressed in the General I Conference in view of the Fact that few and possibly no amendments would be made in response to these views On the other hand if this reference were omitted the procedural ground that General Conference Resolution No 71 required the Board to take into account I as appropriate the views expressed at the General Con ference The answer might be to quote in a suitable context the exact words of Resolution No 71 the reference in substantive paragraph Lite should be retained there or placed in a footnote The representatives could not commit their Governments on 20 co sponsorship of the definitive resolution but their preliminary DECLASSHHED Authority W3 views were Canada the United Kingdom and the United States-would very probably be willing to co Sponsor if a satisfactory solution to the problem of amending para 33 of was achieved 'South sfrica would be willing to co sponsor if the quantitative limits in para 35 were increased as she had suggested but not otherwise would like to consider her position in View of the fact that Mr MdKnight was Chairman of the Board for the current year France was not willing to co sponsor or speak in favour of the resolution but would vote in favour The Belgian observers were asked to invite their Government to consider whether they could co sponsor It was desirable thata number of other countries should 21 Once it was clear that the Canada co sponsor and South Africa were in a position to semaponsor the United States 11 13v 5 A DE CLASSIFIED Authoriwnnbasaoja I 7 - - e2 would approach friendly members of the Board either in Vienna or through their capitalso It was important however that the tabling of the resolution should not be unduly delayed on this account It should be tabled once three or four additonal co sponsors had been found The Agency Inspectors Staffing of the Inspection Division 22 The South African representative said that his Government thought that the Board of Governors should as soon as possible settle the point of diapute set out in para 3 of about whether only regular officials of the Agency should serve as inspectors or the staff of inspectors should be specially selected by the Director General and approved by the Board of Governors on the basis of broad representation of member States and that at the request of a country on whose territory an inspection was being made or of any country which had made avail able to the Agency special fissonable and source material or a given team of inspectors should include an The South special equipment inspector or inspectors designated'by such countries -African Government felt strongly that Western countries should stand firm on but recognised that this Aprz'xblem was linked with the discussions at the Geneva Nuclear Test Conference They also felt that there was no case at present for appointing an Inspector General but that the'Director of the inspection'Division should be appointed as soon as possible so that the staffing of this Division Could be discussed at the April meeting of the Board of Governors 23 The United Kingdom representativg agreed that it would be inappropriate to appoint an Inspector General at the present time The Director of the Inspection Division should be a citizen of one of the so called neutral countries Sweden Switzerland Finland Yugoslavia or more doubtfully Burma Mexico Iraq Indonesia Morocco Tunisia A suitably qualified man could probably be 12 DECLASSIFIED Authority mg i SEQRET obtained only from one of the European neutrals It was important that he should have some political sense 2h The United States representatives said that it would be useful if suitably qualified members of the from other Divisions could be used from time to time to carry out inspections 25 The Canadian representatives said that they would not like to see a position in which tue Eastern and Western blocs felt it necessary to have their citizens in the Inspection Division Their personal View was that the Division should be very small and should be composed of two or three European neutrals including the Director one Asian possibly from India or lndonesia and one Latin American possibly from the Argentine or Brazil 26 After discussion it was agreed that the Governments represented at the talks would give further consideration to this matter in advance of the January meeting of the Board of Governors the views of the Director General of the Agency would be sought the question whether to force the issue on the alter natives in parao 3 of at the January meeting of the Board of Governors should be decided immediately before that meeting Concertina of Western Tactics 27 It that a meeting of Western Governors should be held in Vienna on Friday 20th January 1961 to concert tactics and deal with any points which had arisen in the meantime The United Kingdom representatives said that this would be very inconvenient but that they would consider furthers i A DECLASSIFIED 5 Anthorityaabasaoia I assume 16TH pessimism 1962 25 The South African representative said that at the Fourth General Conference the Swiss and Dutch delegates had said that the Agency should accept some degree of liability for losses caused by the actions of its inspectors He had subsequently suggested to the Secretariat that they should prepare a paper for the January meeting of the Board which would cover not only losses directly due to an inapector's actions but also losses caused by the unauthorised disclosure of information by an inspector This problem was linked with the problem cf staffing the Inspection Division and was an additional argument in favour of the View that only regular _officials of the Agency shOuld serve as inspectors It should be possible to find a formula under which the Agency accepted some degree of liability and to cover this liability by insurance He envisaged that this item would be taken at the January meeting of the Board of Governors after the safeguards document had received definitive approval It had seemed to him desirable for the West to take some initiative so as to prevent the issue being raised by the opposition and used as part of a filibuster on safeguards If the time was not ripe for discussion at the January meeting of the Board of Governorsq the item could be deferredi although he disliked the deferment of an item just because it was difficulto 29 The Qpited said that the standard technical assistance agreement used by the Agency and also by the Specialised Agencies contained the following provision The technical assistance rendered pursuant to the terms of the Agreement is in the exclusive interest and for the exclusive benefit of the peOple and Government of In recognition thereof the Government shall undertake to_bear all risks and claims resulting from occurring in the course of or otherwise connected with any operation covered by this Agreement Without restricting the generality of the preceding sentence the Government shall indemnify and hold harmless the Organisations s and their experts agents or employees against any and all liability suits actionsS demands damages costs or fees on account of deathv injuries to persons or property or any other losses resulting from or connected with any act or omission performed in the course of operation covered by this Agreement a 1 DE CLASSIFIED Authority W3 I This was a very sweeping indemnity which had been worked out by experience over several years The possibility of some amendment was being considered in the United Nationsy but it would not be fundamental The problem raised by the South African represent ative was in general adequately covered by the provisions in the Statute and the Staff regulations to ensure that Agency officials did not disclose information obtained in the course of their duties It would be difficult to cover any liability accepted by the Agency by insurance as the liability itself was so vaguea Moreover it would be difficult to prove in-the case of a particular loss that disclosure of information had taken place that an Agency inspector was responsible or-that the loss was due to the disclosure 30 The Canadian representatives said that the Agency Statute and Staff Regulations went as far as was feasible by regulatory action The question which arose was whether some compensation should be paid if these regulations failed to prevent unauthorised disclosure in a particular case It was unfortunate that this issue had been raised for the January meeting of the Board of Governors as it might lead the opposition to safeguards to put forward the argument that definitive approval of the safeguards document should be deferred until this issue had been settled 31 It was agreed that Western countries would consider their attitude to this problem further when they had seen the paper being prepared by the Secretariat Detailed Amendments_to Principles Avency Safssraisa Para 3 of real-lead discussion 32 The United Kingdom representatives tabled a redraft designed to cover the drafting point referred to in parao 9 b above and to give effect to the preposals for raising the thresholds at which safeguards should be applied to source materials but not to the proposal in the final paragraph of the United States redraft at 15 Annex I that safeguards should be afplied when the amount of produced fissile material reached 200 grammes even though the amount of source material supplied was below the threshold A number of amendments were suggested to the United Kingdom draft that the reVised version at Annex gave effect to the intention behind the draft ynited States represen atiygg said that it was not at present acceptable to their Government a decision on whether to table this redraft at the January meeting of the Board of Governors should be deferred until the United States had had an opportunity to consider their position further The South reserved his Government s right to table an amendment on the lines of Annex even if the United States Government did not change their positiono He also emphasised that his Government would not be able to delay a decision on whether to table this amendment beyond early January even though the United States position had not then been clarified 16 55 SECRET a ANNEX I Redpaft of Paraa of tabled by the United States 'In each of the following cases Agency safeguards will be attached to nuclear material supplied by the Agency_and to Special fiseionable material produced in or by the use of such' rmaterial if the quantity of such PN material in the state exceeds A 10 metric tons in the case of natural uranium or depleted uranium with a Uranium-255 content of 0 5% or greater 20 metric tons in the case of depleted uranium with a I Uranium 255 content of less than C 20 metric tone in the case of thorium or D 200 grams total in the case of plutonium Uranium 233 or fully enriched uranium or its equivalent in the DECLASSIFIED caee of partially enriched uranium However Agency safeguards will be applied in a nominal manner to special fissionable material supplied by the Agency if the quantity of such PN special fiesionable material in the state including the material supplied lies between 200 and 1 000 grams of plutonium Uranium 233S or uranium fully enriched in Uranium-235 or its equivalent in the case or partially enriched uranium Safeguards will he applied fully to all apecial fiesionable material that is in excess of the amount specified in above which has been produced in or by the use of material supplied by the Agency These safeguards will be applied at the beginning of the process for separating the produced material from the materials in which they are contained DECLASSIFIED Authority W2 SECRET 3 y ANNEX I success Dears RESOLUTION FOR BOARD ACTION ON tabled by themgpited agapes sow-vs -The Board of Governors Recalling its resolution A of 7th April 1960 provisionally approving the principles and procedures for the attachment and application of safeguards by the Agency as set forth in the Annexes to document Recalling also its resolution of the same date submitting the afore mentioned principles and procedures to the fourth regular session of the General Conference for consideration and appropriate action in accordance with the Statute resolution of 30 September 1960 ' Having received and considered the records of the discussions of the General Conference on the afore mentioned document Taking into account the views expressed in the General Conference 1 the principles and procedures as contained inr document 2 Dggiggs that these principles and procedures shall he put into effect as of the date of the adoption of the present resolution I 3 Requests the Director General to transmit this document to all Member Governments together with the text of the present resolution h Decides to include in its future annual reports to the General Conference an account of the application of the principles and procedures for the attachment and application of safeguards as contained in document and 5 Decides further to report to the sixth regular session of the General Conference on the results of the general review to be undertaken by'the Board of these principles and procedures after two years in the light of the actual experience gained by the Agency as Well as of technological developments 16th Decenher 1960 DECLASSIFIED AuthorityWa I 1 1 I I 8 United Kingdom redraft of para 53 as amended in discussion Agency sa eguards will be attached toasource material supplied by the Agency and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such material in the following circumstances In the case cf natural uranium or depleted uranium with a 0 235 content-of or greater when the amount of such material in a State which is P N material exceeds 10 metric tons In the case of depleted uranium with a H 255 content of less than 0 5% when the amount of such material is a State which is P N material exceeds 20 metric tone 0 In the case of thorium when the amount of such material in a State which is P N material exceeds 20 metric tons Agency safeguards will he attached to special fissionable material supplied by the Agency and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such material when the amount of such material in a State which is P N material exceeds 200 grammes Safeguards will he applied in a nominal manner when the amount of such material in a State which is P N material amounts to between 200 grammes and 1 000 grammes                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu