gm LLH WK Hus 2139533715 ens CNZ 'Seo CYZ 601 69 9 4271 A ourcomo cone CABLE TO AKASHL UNPF ZAGREB attn SRSG PC ONLY STOLTENBERG GENEVA ONLY FROM AN NAN UNATIONS NEW YORK 15 1r 10 DATE 11 NUMBER 2 2 8 SUBJECT _Situation in Srebrenica 9 47 1 Thank you for the excellent reporting you have given us by cable and on the phone on the events in Srebrenica it is an extraordinarily difficuit situation for the mission and we here have nothing but praise for the competence and courage of the UNPROFOR personnel inv0lved in it as well as for the calm leadership you have provided them 2 The policy approaches outlined in your 2-1139 are well here though as a separate cable explains the Security Council is porsuing a somewhat different line in its draft resolution The situation does however raise some serious questions of general significance for the Force How was it that UNPROFOR was taken unawares again as with Gorazde and stasis last year by the true extent of Serb intentions What intelligence resources do you What information if any was provided to UNPROFOR by those troop contributing countries With intelligence-gathering assets in the area i intend to meet with the Permanent Representatives of Contact Group Governments here on Wednesday to pose the same question i find it difficult to accept that no early warning was possible When the evidence suggests that a major build-up of troops and heavy weapons by the BSA occurred prior to the offensive Exhibit# 'i-1 5 Date Admitted ZBJUI '04 Reference 5 866 Ff R0012268 91 43 u n HYK Hos 2129633715 CNZ 580 CYZ 601 5 This raises the further question of whether in your best judgement the Serbs have deliberately embarked on a new phase in their military strategy Is there a discernible pattern to their current e 113 conduct that might lead to the conclusion that Zepa and or Gorazde will be next If 4 Please accept our best Wishes in your efforts to negotiate an acceptable outcome in Srebrenica We are conSCious from your 2-1138 how crucial the next 48-to-72 hours will be Despite the gulf between your repeated under-scoring of the unviabllity of the safearegs and the rorb'ust signals that Governments wish to 56% the Security Council we are aware of the extremely limited resources and options at your diSposal You may be assured you may be obliged to make in the days ahead R0012269 Of s of our full support in the difficult decisions