Dwight D Eisenhower Library Eisenhower Papers 193—61 Ann ‘tThiman file ‘ V’ -‘ —‘T January U L’L Ui 5 1961 I o3 Discussion at the 11 Z3rd Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday January 5 1961 SUBJECT Present at the ‘4T3rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States presiding the Vice President of the United States the Secretary of State the Secretary of Defense and the Director Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director Bureau of the Budget Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff the Director of Central Intelligence the Chairman Atomic Ener Commission the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Merchant Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C Smith the Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas Assistant Secretary of Defense John N Irwin II the Secretary of the Army the Assistant to the President the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs for Science and Tecbnolo and for Foreign Economic Policy Mr Huntington She Central Intelligence Agency the White House Staff Secretary the Assistant White House Staff Secretary the Executive Secretary NSC and the Deputy Execu tive Secretary NSC There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCTh INTELLIGENCE DIBECTIVES 1 Mr Gray said he wished to bring up first a matter which was not on the formal agenda The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intel ligence Activities composed of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence the retaries of State and Defense the Direc tor Bureau of the Budget and the apecial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs had submitted its report and was now preparing a list of recommendations on which the Principals bad agreed as wil as a list of recommendations which bad not been con curred ft A question had arisen whether a revision of the NSCIJYs would be necessary a their provisions affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense in the intelligence field At the present time the NSCID’s refer to the Military Services not to the Secretary of Defense The suggestion had been made that the Secretary of Defense be given authority by amendment of the NSCID’s to proceed with re organization of military intelligence within the Department of Defense DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS E O 12958 SEC 3 6 b 5- i Agency Cas m NLE Case By k Dwight I Eisenhower Liorary Eisenhower Papers 1953—61 Ann Whitman file Secretary Gates said this matter would affect the next Secretary of Defense The first issue involved in the report of the Joint Study Group was the one Mr Gray had mentioned namely the question of amending the NSCrD’S Another issue however was also involved namely membership on the U S Intelligence Board The report by the Joint Study Group recom mended that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the Military Services be represented on the USIB Secretary Gates was in favor of this recommendation but understood the Military Services were opposed Mr Dufles said he was also opposed to this recommendation Secretary Gates said this matter affected the NSC3Jts since the organization of the USIB was covered in the NSCID’s The President said he had been told that about $i 1i billion was being spent for the intelligence function in the Department of Defense He believed we were not good administrators if we could not perform this function at less expense He also believed that we were not doing everything that could be done to implement the concept of integrated strategic planning unless military in teuigence could be placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff He ‘was unable to understand why the antiquated system of separate intelligence organizations for each Military Service was retained Mr Duiles pointed out that the Military Services at the present time had the personnel the competence and the back ground in intelligence Until this situation was changed he would rather deal with representatives of the Military Services who know intelligence than with the representative of the Secre tary of Defense ‘who would not have the experience the personnel and the background judgaent required when organizational changes were made so that the representative of the Secretary of Defense had competent collectors and analysts working for him then Mr Dufles would not disagree with the recommendation for a change in the membership of the USIB but at present he repeated the change suggested would merely result in putting on USIB repre sentatives with inadequate intelligence support The President believed that the Services should collect battlefield intelligence but did not see the necessity for strategic intelligence in the Services He wondered ‘what in teuigence officers in the Services could do to get information from the center of the USSR and correlate it with intelligence on the rest of the world He said when he supported the establish ment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1911 7 he did it on the basis that the function of strategic intelligence should be in CIA and that duplication should be eliminated General Lemaitzer felt that the acquisition of technical intelligence e g inform ation about enen nuclear submarines req uired officials who know 2 wight D Eisenhower Liorary isenhower Papers 193—6l Ann ‘iThitman file • nuclear submarines The Services would be very much concerned if they were not represented on USIB The President believed that the information referred to by General Lemnitzer was battle field intlligence whereas the discovery of the shipyards where nuclear submarines are being constructed was the business of CIA He did not see why four intelligence services should attempt to find out where the submarines were made He believed it was the function of CIA to acqjaire strategic intelligence General Lemnitzer believed that each Military Service was working on a different intelligence target Mr Gray pointed out that a substantive discussion of the material in the Joint Study Group report seemed to be underway The President said that perhaps the membership of USIB could not be changed at once ‘out that a different type of intelligence board could be organized once military intelligence within the Department of Defense was re-organized Secretary Gates did not agree that the membership of US could not be changed immediately A Defense representative on the Board could do his homework in the Pentagon and bring the Defense position to the Board in the same way a Defense representative on the Planning Board reports the Defense position The President felt that changes in the membership of US 3 must be correlated with changes In the military intelligence organization Mr Gates said that thus far intelligence has not been affected by reorganization of the Department of Defense Mr Dulles said when changes were made in the organization of military intelligence there would be a reason for changing the membership of USIB since there would then be one high-ranking official who knows intelligence representing the Department of Defense The President said that there would in any case remain the need for technical intelligence gathered in connection with the normal deployment of forces Mr Dufles said the figure of $2 billion had been mentioned occasionally as the sum spent by this government on intelligence activities He wished to point out however that this figure included support of the radar station at Thule support of SAMOS etc ali of which ‘were really early warning functions The President said he had read a summary of the report by the Joint Study Group He felt that up to now we had not accomplished all it was possible to accomplish in integrating all our intelligence activities Secretary Gates said there was no review in the Department of Defense of intelligence requirements General Iemnitzer said the JCS agreed on the need for Defense re view of intelligence requirements 3 Dwight D Eisenhower Library Eisenhower Papers 1953—61 Ann 1tlhitman file Secretary Gates believed the policy question before the Council now was how far would this Administration wish to go in reorganizing intelligence during its last two weeks in office The President said he felt a dtrective on agreed matters could be issued and that he could pass on to his suc cessor his views on other intelligence questions Mr Dulles said he would lik to see the matter of the pictorial center worked out soon The President then remarked that soon after Pearl Harbor he was engaged in an operation which required him to have cer tain information which he was unable to obtain from the Navy i e the strength the Navy had left in the Pacific The Presi dent also noted that the U S fought the first year of the war in Europe entirely on the basis of British intelligence Sub sequently each Military Service developed its own intelligence organization He thought this situation made little sense in managerial terms He had suffered an eight-year defeat on this question but would leave a legacy of ashes for his successor Mr Gray said language would be prepared to permit agreed recommendations from the report of the Joint Study Group to be put into effect The President pointed out that in military history a single man usually dominates the intelligence service of a country at any given time He felt that a strong central position with respect to intelligence was necessary The Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be required to consult individually each of the Ser vices as well as CIA in formulating their strategic plans they should have their own intelligence service The National Security Council a — b — Discussed the question raised by the Secretary of Defense as to revising the National Security Council Intelligence Directives in the light of the recommendations relating to the military intelligence organization within the Depart ment of Defense and to the membership of the U S Thtelii gence Board submitted on December 15 1960 by a Joint Study Group on Foreiga Intelligence Activities composed of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence the Secretaries of State and Defense the Director Bureau of the Budget and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Agreed that the Secretary of Defense should submit his NSCIDtS recommendations for appropriate revisions in the 14 JwightD EisenhO4eT LlLrary isenhoweT Papers 1953—61 hive to the authority of the Secretary of Defense Ann Whitmn file the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense in consonance with the Defense reorganization Act of 1958 c Noted that the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense pursuant to b above together with the views of the Principals of the Joint Study Group regarding the Group’s report which are being consolidated by the Director of Central Intelligence would be considered at the next NSC meeting on January 12 1961 NOTR The actions in b and c above as approved by the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretary ofOefense and the Director of Central Intelligence 2 U S POLICY ON TtE PANAMA CANAL AND A FUTURE INTER- OCEA NIC CANAL IN CENTRAL AMERICA NSC Action No 2219-b- 3 SN 6L_6O SNIE 80-1-59 NSC 5902 1 Cabinet Paper 60-108 “Istbmian Canal Plans--1960” dated April 12 1960 NSC 6026 Mr Gray presented NSC 6026 to the Council A copy of Mr Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum In the course of his briefing Mr Gray read Paragraph 11 of the Briefing Note which referred to the President’s earlier interest in the canal route across Mexico The President said he realized that it might not be politically possible at the present tine to construct a canal across Mexico He then asked whether consideration had been given to the alterna tive of building a new sea-level canal through the present Canal Zone meanwhile maintaining the present canal in operation Mr Gray said this alternative bad not received extended consideration The President said that one difficulty with canal plans was that the canal was the only business in Paumna If a new canal some distance removed from the present canal were built Panama’s cities would become ghost towas It was for this reason he bad wondered whether a second canal could be built in the present Canal Zone However he realized that in their present state of mind the Pnmcinians would not be inclined to grant more land to the U S for the purpose of canal building Mr Gerard dth pointed out that there was a reference in the Appendix to NSC 6026 to a sealevel canal across the Canal Zone as one alternative However it would be very difficult to use nuclear explosives to build another canal near the present canal Secretary Herter thought that the problem of digging deep enough to construct a sea-level canal in the present Canal Zone would be a difficult one The President believed this problem would be encountered on any canal route Mr Gray pointed out that a sea-level canal though the 5 Dwight 0 Eisenhower Liorary Eisenhower Papers 1953—61 Ann Whitman file present Canal Zone was the most expensive alternative Secre tary Brucker said the Board of Directors of the Panama Canal Zone Company had commented on the possibility of a sea-level canal through the Canal Zone and bad concluded it would be feasible to build a new canal thre by means of conventional excavation methods Secretary Gates saId he understood it was not the purpose of the present paper to recommend a decision on the location of the new canal Mr Gray agreed and then resumed his briefing referring to the objectives of NBC 6026 and reading paragraphs 26 and 28 thereof Secretary Hefter thought NBC 6026 was an admirable paper which marked a real advance in inter-oceanic canal policy He wondered bow action might be initiated in view of the problem that might be encountered in Congressional relations The Presi dent supposed that a treaty would first have to be made with the country through whose territory the canal would pass This treaty would then have to be approved by the Senate Secretary Herter said it would be undesirable to conclude a formal treaty until Congressional sentiment had been sounded out There seemed to be a difference of opinion among engineers as to the date of obsolescence of the present canal If the Panama Canal would become obsolete in ten years then action looking toward a new canal should be initiated at once The President believed the recommendations of NSC 6026 should be approved Mr Stans agreed but wished to amend two paragraphs He pointed out that Annex B to NBC 6026 contained the following sentence Inasmuch as a sea-level canal constructed by nuclear methods at any of these locations is expected to provide a pro fit within a short time it should be entirely possible to finance such a canal by public bond issue ” There was no reference to financing the canal in the NSC 6026 recommendations Mr Stans suggested that Paragraph 20 of the Objectives and Para graph 26 of the Policy Guidance refer to the desirability of making the new canal a self-financing project The President asked whether it would then be similar to the Suez Canal Mr Stans said he was not suggesting that the new canal be built by a private corporation but only that it be self-financing Secre tary Herber believed it had been a mistake not to amortize the PnnR Canal The President said we had wanted to retain as much U S authority in the canal as possible 6 - - Papers 1953-61 isenhoweT Ann Whitman file • Secretary Anderson pointed out that the Footnote on Page 12 of NBC 6026 was not accurate and suggested that it be corrected factually Mr Gray said the necessary corrections would be made The President pointed out again that construction of a new canal might mean suffering for Panairia Mr McCone said that if the new canal were excavated by nuclear methods a large passage would be created and little or no service would be re He added that there were many unknown factors at the quired present time in connection with the use of nuclear explosives for excavations of this kind The President said the canal could not be too wide because the country in which it was located would certainly want to build some bridges across it He repeated that the recommendations amended as suggested should be approved The National Security Council a — 5 — Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contamed in NSC 6026 Adopted the statement of policy in NBC 6026 subject to the following amendments 1 Page 12 Factual correction of the footnote to paragraph 18 2 Page i11 paragraph 20 In the 2 th line delete the word “and” in the 5th line add the words “and preferably organized on a self-financing basis11 3 Page 15 paragraph 26 In the Z1 th line delete the word “and’1 in the 5th line add the words “and that preferably it should be self-financed ” NOTE NBC 6026 as amended by the action in b above subsequently approved by the President circulated as NBC 6102 for imple mentation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U S Government and refer-ed it to the Operations Co ordinating Board as the coordinating agency 7 Ann Whitman file 3 SIGNICA WORlD DEVCPTS AFFECTflG U SCtJRIT Mr Dufles retorted that Castro had reacted violently and defiantly to the rupture ft U S -Cuban diplomatic relations The controlled Cuban press had hurled a great deal of invective at the U S On the eve of the rupture in diplomatic relations Thrushchev had said at a Cuban reception in Moscow that the U S was pursuing a dangerous policy in attempting to suppress the Cuban revolution while reiterating Soviet support for Cuba he had remained vague as to the character of that support Peru was pleased at our action in breaking off diplomatic relations Chile had indicated it would not follow our example Venezuela aonauras and other countries were considering a rupture but will take no immediate action Newspapers in Brazil are calling the present situation a crisis and suggesting that Latin American countries do not follow the U S lead The President said this was a typical South American reaction Continuing Mr Dufles said Panama seemed on the verge of declaring the Cuban Ambassador persona non ata while Mexico had remarked that it would now be difficult to influence Cuba and get rid of Castro Secretary Herter said the reaction from Mexico had been much more moderate than a ticipated Mr Dulles said that all Latin American Communists and Coin munist front groups were urging support for Castro Apparently Canada will continue to maintain relations with Cuba Mr Dufles said the5O OOO applicants for U S visas in Cuba were very dis tressed at the severance of dimatic relations He added that the Soviet Czecboslovakian t-t____ — — t —‘ t embassies in Cuba now contained Communist Polish and Chinese that Bloc nationals not additional 200 and about 100 persons directly attached to the embassies were in Cuba Five more Bloc Hungary Roumania Albania North Vietnam and countries had been recoguized by Cuba Military equipaent from Mongolia the Bloc continues to arrive in Cuba _ _ aa_ -aa S_ — — — —— — - - Secretary Anderson pointed out that economic controls had not been applied against Cuba He thought such controls would have little effect now although they might have had some effect The Treasury Department was prepared to if applied a year ago apply these controls if a political decision were made to do so Secretary Herter said the application of these controls would involve invoking the Trading-with-the Enenr Act Secretary Ge tes asked why it would not be desirable to apply such controls He thought this would mean a desirable psychological move even though there was not much U S -Cuban trade at present The President • Including Item Li U S POLICY TOWARD CUBA NSC Actions Nos 2177 2191 2195 2201 2206 2213 2217 222 2239 2259 2261 2269 2273 2283 2309 2322 and 2329 8 tsra1 L LA_C said that the Secretary of Conerce should be consulted with res ect to our trade with Cuba The Vice President noted that many ueople in Florida objected very strenuously to such trade as we still carried on with Cuba Mr Dulles said the businessmen he talked to believed that the elimination of our rts to Cuba would have a desirable effect because the d Cuban people would blame Castro for the o The President asked whether economic controls could be a lied to Cuba without a public order Secretary Herber said a Executive Order would be required Secretary Anderson said the application of such controls would not have much economic effect now so that the decision for such application should rest on a political judaent The Vice President felt tha economic controls should be applied to Cuba now that diplomatic relations with that country had been severed In response a question from the President Mr audail said that while h e had been opposed to the early invocation of the Tradmg-Wi th the Enemy Act he now favored using all the instruments at hand against Cuba and would therefore favor economic controls The President asked Secretary Eerter consulting as necessary vih Secretaries Anderson and Mueller to let him have recoefl ions on the imposition of econOmic controls against Cu • “indicated that UAR agents were Stànleyviile with arms and money The UR nationals going into the Congo were publicly described as tecbnicia US •f1j Secretary Eerter said that the activities of the UAR in had long disturbed him but he bad been unable to th Con indicate the extent of such activities to the SeeretaGefl9- of the repre retary Get eral on Un activities 9 ç nn Ii LeJ ilflLLlflatl — in the_go Mr Duiles then concluded his briefing on the Congo by noting that the African Conference just starting in Morocco had started on a divisive note Secretary Eerter said he understood that the King of Morocco had turned completely against the idea of an Afri can confederation Mr Dufles noted that conditions in Ethiopia remained un ed following the recent revolt The Emperor was continuing settl repressive measures against those ‘who had participated in the re volt Apparently the Emperor intended to reconstitute his body guard a move ‘which would not be popular ‘with the Ethiopian army This weekend Mr Duiles said would be a vital one for Algeria Rumors of serious disorders in connection with the referendtmr on Algeria are rife and army behavior in Algeria is uncertain Secretary Herter noted that De Gaulle intended to lump the votes in Algeria and in France together rather than count them separately Mr Dulles reported that there was little change in the military situation in Laos The pro-Couuiijst forces claim that they still hold Xieng Giouang and that near Paksane they have Secretary cut the road running south and east of Vientiane by the ized ment Oum had been legal govern Herter said the Bonn l l to 0 with only eleven abstentions Laotian Parliament by a vote of t Secretary Herter said by iden the Pres In reply to a question pnent had ion to this develo been received from India that no react Turning to Communist China Mr Dulles referred to various newspaper stories concerned with floods droughts and other catastrophies ‘which were reducing the food supply available to the Chinese people The 1959 crop in Communist China had not been a good one and the 1960 crop was probably no better Mr Dulles believed that the Chinese bad exaggerated the extent of the natural disasters in China in an effort to cover up their 10 Dwight D Eisenhower Library Eisenhower Papers 193—61 Ann Whitman file lack of efficiency ft agricultural production He noted that the Chinese Communists needed to increase agricultural pro duction substantially each year in order to keep abreast of a population increase of about 15 million persons per year The National Security Council 3 Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Inteiligence on the subject with specific reference to reactions to the U S break in diplomatic relations with Cuba and developments with respect to the Congo Ethiopia Algeria Laos and the food supply in Communist China 1 Noted the President’s request that the Secretary of State in consultation as appropriate with the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce study and report promptly to the President whether the economic controls authorized by the Trading-with-the Enemy Act should be applied to Cuba NOTE The above action as approved by the President transmitted to the Secretaries of State the Treasury and Commerce 5 U S POSTtJRE FOR LIMITED POSSThLE DEFICIENCIES MIlITARY OPERATIONS Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary subject ”Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations” dated June 18 1956 NSC Action No l93 Memo for NSC from Executive Secre tary subject “U S and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962” dated September 28 1960 NSC Action No 2317-c Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary subject “Possible Deficiencies in the U S Posture for Limited Military Operations” dated December 30 1960 Mr Gray explained the background of this subject to the Council and called upon General Lemnitzer to make a presentation A copy of Mr Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum General Lemnitzer recalled the study on limited i’ar trans mitted to the Council on September 28 1960 which bad dealt with Berlin the Taiwan Strait hypothetical situations in five areas plans of some magrd Contingency Korea Southeast and Asia Iran operations in these key areas possible for prepared been had tude - U isenhower Papers l93—6l Ann ‘dhitman file The JCS had repared a report on possible deficiencies in the U S posture for limited military operations pursuant to NSC Action 2317 The JCS report had first made certain overail comments on studies of this nature fi limited war studies are not a valid basis for programming or decision-making 2 the adequacy of forces to cope with any one limited war situ ation depends on prompt action to initiate partial mobilization augment existing lift capabilities expand the war production base and waive financial limitations 3 the U S overall capability for general war would not be unacceptably degraded by participating in one of these limited aperations In fact it could be argued that one limited war situation would increase U S readiness for general war because of the measures which would be taken to meet the limited situation f1 any weakness in the U S posture is due to acceptance of calculated risks pertaining to the balance of forces and their supporting elements 5 the early use of relatively smail military forces in limited war situations would be more effective than the sub sequent use of much larger forces 6 many factors others than the purely military factors affect our limited war posture General Lemnitzer then suxmnarized the comments by the JCS on the specific possible deficiencies in our limited war posture With respect to airlift a resumption of hostilities on the scale of Korea would result in a shortage during the first twenty days but after that airlift would be adequate No actions to improve airlift bad been taken since the date of the limited war study 1 funds for purchasing additional C-l30’s had been made available and 2 additional allocations had been made to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet General Lemnitzer pointed out that terminal facilities constituted an extremely important factor in airlift With respect to sea lift the JCS had con cluded that our capabilities were generaily adequate although there might be some shortage in the first sixty days o± hostilities Turning to military logistics base plans General Lemnitzer noted that specific guidance had been Issued last March but there it full implementation If this guidance had not been time for to support limited war situations capability our implemented is should be improved in the near future without degrading general war readiness The Army has problems connected with the avai a bility of units the modernization of equipment and the mainten ance of readiness for general war The Navy is unable to fulfill certain mobilization plan objectives connected with modern con ventional weapons and ammunition The Air Force is genera Jyready for limited war operations having distributed its assets around 12 TOF Dwight 0 Eisenhower Library Eisenhower Papers l93-6l Ann Whitman file the world near possible limited war areas with the striking force of course remaining in the U S The Marines have problems with reserves and with reconstituting reserve stocks General Lemnitzer then summarized the ICS comments on Southeast Asia Limited operations there he said were handi capped by logistical limitatiorpemmthg from lack of communi cations lack of transportation7lack of port and terminal facilities Furthermore the existing facilities were extremely vulnerable to disruption and are inadequate to support sustained operations These limitations however have been offset to some degree 5y countermeasures The Pacific Command has recently been atigmented by an airborne battle group and an aircraft carrier Equipment has been pre-atocked in the Pacific area Periodic mobility training exercises are planned The Air Force moderni zation prograi will improve our limited war capability in the Pacific We now have authority for overflights in the Pacific area Other corrective action which is or could be taken will enable us to use additional bases and improve strategic signal communications and strengthen over-the-beach supply methods In concluding General Lemnitzer said that most of the prob lems adverted to in the limited war study were not new Additional funding would alleviate many of the deficiencies pointed out in the study but in the light of total requirements not all of the deficiencies could be remedied at once The President said this was the kind of report he could under stand Secretary Herter said the JCS report was very encouraging especially as regards airlift ifowever Secretary iferter felt he must take exception to Paragraph 9 on Page 6 of the JCS report This paragraph indicated that indecision and lack of clear-cut policies could contribute to starting a conflict we desired to avoid and then went on to say “a pertinent example is the recent conflict of judgment between the Department of Defense and the Department of State concerning the proper implementation of U S policy in Laos ” General Lemnitzer said this paragraph appeared in the JCS report because the JCS thought that last August when Kong Le rebelled the U S should have built up the Phoumi forces At that time the State Department embarked on a course of building up Souvanna Phouma This issue was not settled and as a result Kong Le had several months in which to build up his forces Secre tary Herter replied that the Phouna government became the recog nized government of Laos and therefore the government with which the U S had to deal Moreover our allies supported Souvanna Phouma and were opposed to Phoumi We had been successful in con tinuing military assistance to Phoumi even when he was a rebel against the recognized government Moreover we had worked con stantly to shift power from Souvanna Fhouma to Phoumi and had finally succeeded If the U S had armed Phoumi last August it would have been arming rebels against the recognized government 13 isenhoweTt Papers l93-6l Ann Whitman file The President said the word ttind i” must be eliminated from the JCS report No agency of the government had the right to say that another agency was indecisive and did not know what it was doing It was proper to say that the problems were such that decisions could not be made immediately but dereliction of duty should not he imputed to another agency The President said that even now we did not know what we could do about Laos because of the attitude of our allies The Joint Chiefs of Staff were correct from the military point of view in stating that it was better to use small forces promptly than to use larger forces later but the q uestion of when small forces can be used involved a political judgment General Lemnitzer said the JCS had experienced for some time a feeling of frustration about Laos The President asked to whom the JC$ report was made Secretary Gates said the report was made to him and would be a part of the NSC files The President said the criticism in the report of another government department must be removed Mr Gray noted that the JCS report spoke of allied coopera tion in sea lift but made no mention of such cooperation in air lift General Lemnitzer said it had been proved in the Congo that the U S has the only real airlift capability The President agreed that we should plan on allied assistance in sea lift He said that if we could not get cooperation from our allies we were foolish in attempting to establish a collective defense posture in peace time Secretary Gates said he had not during his tour of duty ft the Pentagon noted any deficiencies in our limited war capabili ties The JCS had never pointed out any deficiencies to hfm The President said he would like to see two division redeployed from Europe to the U S He believed these divisions were too much on the front line in Europe He said that the Secretary of State should brief the Secretary of State-designate on the situation in NATO and on the desirability of inducing the European countries to do their full share with respect to the support of ground forces Mr Gray referred to a draft Record of Action which bad been distributed at the meeting Mr Stans felt the word “improving” was rather weak in the light of the JCS report It was imposible to improve starting from “0” Mr Douglas agreed The Presidentsuggested that a word should be used to indicate that our limited war capabilities were good now but were still improving Mr McCone proposed that the word “substantial1t be used for this purpose The Dwight I Eisenhower Library •Eisenhower Papers 193—61 Ann Whitman file The President said our estimate of the situation was that a balanced military program did not require a radical allocation of additional resources to limited war but that some additional improvements would be made ft our capabilities for limited war Mr Stans said that Paragraph c of the draft Record of Action He believed the phrase might give a misleading impression our capabilities for general war’ should be uithout degrading h sub-paragrap inserted in this The President suggested that General Lemnitzer’s summary of the report should be retained in the official minutes of the National Security Council Secretary Herter inquired about progress on the limited war study directed by NSC Action 2317-b Secretary Gates said this study was underway but that problems had arisen in connection with formulating the assumptions on which to base the study The National Security Council a — Noted and discussed the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the subject and the report attached thereto from the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 30 1960 as summarized at the meeting by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff b Agreed that U S capabi1ties to conduct limited war are sub stantial and wiU show a further improvement on the basis of the FY 1962 budget as submitted and other actions taken since the completion in July 1960 of the Limited War Study Agreed that a balanced military program does not require a radical aliocation of additional resources to limited war capabilities c Noted further that planned logistics support capability is or will be adequate to meet any one or combination of con tingencies without degrading to an unacceptable degree U S overall capability for general war provided ft sum the do not exceed the general order of magnitude contained in the Korean contingency plan d Noted the President’s directive that the summary by the Chair man JCS of the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff enclosed with the reference memorandum of December 30 1960 be included in the official files of this NSC meeting NOIS The above actions as approved 5y the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman JCS 15 Dwight 0 Eisenhower Library Eisenhower Papers 193—6l Ann Whitman file 6 MISSILES AND MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS IISC Actions Nos 114-33 iti 81i 1615-c 1653 1690 1733 1765 i8oo 1814-6 1956 NOTE following 2013 2081 2118 2168 2207 2208 2238-b- 9 23OOg and 2315 Memo for NSC from Deputy Executive Secretary same subject dated December 1 1960 NSC 6021 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary same subject dated December 30 1960 and January ii 1961 Mr Gray briefed the Council on this subject A copy of Mr Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum The President asked how many POLARIS submarines would be operational by mid-19614 Secretary Gates said he believed fifteen would be operational by the 1and added that almost all of those now approved would be oper ational by the end of 19614 The President felt that with 14-o MINUTEMEN missiles 320 POLARIS missiles 3 5 of which would be on station plus ATLAS TITAN and our INBMS we would be in a good missile position in 19614 At that time we should certainly have enough missiles to destroy the USSR in the event we are attacked Secretary Gates satd he had never at any time been worried about the situation after 1963 In fact the farther into the future we look the better off we will be General Lemnitzer pointed out that in addition to the forces mentioned by the President a great bomber force would be available The President said he understood we also had 23 000 megatons Mr Gray then pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had some problems with the adoption of NSC 6021 He was not clear whether these problems were substantior procedural General Lemnitzer said that some statements incorporated in NSC 6021 were actually statements made in 1955 Accordingly if these statements are now adopted and sent out for implementation the impression would be fostered that we are just beginning to implement the policy contained therein The President felt that a policy adopted some years ago could be repeated in a later poiicy paper if it had been reviewed Secretary Gates then read Paragraph 2 of NSC 6021 and pointed out that it could be considered out of date at this time since it referred to the early development of the IRBM program The President said we might need to note that some of’ the missiles referred to in this 1955 paragraph were now operational Mr Douglas was not sure that the end of Paragraph 3 which referred to a statement by Khrushchev at the Paris meeting was entirely accurate Secretary Gates added that the statement in NSC 6021 appeared to be broader than the statement Khrushchev had actually made The President disagreed saying that at the Paris - lo wight 0 Eisenhower Library isenhower Papers 193—61 Ann Whitman file meeting De Gaulle had stated that a Soviet sateilite had passed over France seventeen times and might for all he De Gauue knew be taking pictures Khrushchev had replied that he did not care how many satellites took pictures over the USSR Mr Gray recalled that the language at the top of Page 3 of NSC 6021 had come from two NSC actions which the Departments of State and Defense had checked against the records last spring The Presi dent had approved that Record of Actions at that time because it had turned out to be a correct statement The President said he realized of course that Khrushchev if it suited his purposes would deny saying what he did say Secretary Herter said he had certain editorial revisions to suggest in NSC 6021 Mr Gray said the paper could be referred back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of’ the discussion The President asked whether the Council would meet only one more time during this Administration Mr Gray said there would be a long meeting next Thursday The President agreed and added that no NSC meeting should be scheduled on the 19th In response to a cluestion from the President Mr Dufles said he had not held a personal briefing for the President-elect during the last three or four weeks The President asked whether the President-elect had conveyed any distress or disagreement with U S policy to the Department of State particularly as re gards Cuba Secretary Herter said the President-elect had taken no position on our policy and indeed had not been asked to take such a position The Department of State had confined itself to informing the President-elect of developments The National Security Council a — Concurred in the recoimnendation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 30 1960 that NSC Action No 2207 be revised to provide “An operational force objective which specifies the achieve ment of 54-0 MINU’IAN operational missiles by mid-calendar year 1961 ” b Concurred in the recoimnendation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 30 1960 that NSC Action No 2315 be revised to provide 17 Dight 0 Eisenhower Library EIsenhower Papers 193—6l Ann Whitman file -_ ‘a A total of 19 POLARIS submarines authorized for construct ion 5 Lncluded in the FY 1962 budget submission — “b Long lead time planning and procurement actions authorized to permit the construction of 5 addi tional POLARIS submarines included in the FY 1962 budget submission ” c Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject con tained in NEC 6021 in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of January ii l96l and referred it to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion at this meeting NOTE The actions in a and 5 above as approved by the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense ‘1ov U MARION W BOGCS i8
OCR of the Document
View the Document >>