5 A MA RCH 72 Ax DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ftM nMU-vt i 5 Soviet and Peoples Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment - - Policy and Strategy copv3 OF COPIES 72 PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA g NUCLEAR HEAPONS EMPLOYMENT - 3 POLICY AND STRATEGY II PART TABLE OF CONTENTS Peoples Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy ANNEX A Force Development and Deployment ANNEX B Peoples Liberation Army Training ANNEX C Command and Control ANNEX 0 Highlights of the Nuclear Weapons Development Program ANNEX E Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Production-and 5 3 Related Facilities l II DISCUSSION PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA A Antecedents l l949-1960 The Formative Years Nuclear weapon employment policy and'strategy Perception of the threat Long range US nuclear attacks on mainland China followed by large scale conventional assault by land naval and air forces a 2 Responses_and initiatives In l949 whenzthe Chinese communists came to power they possessed little more than a sizable land army And to quote Mao that army possessed little more than millet plus rifles To the Chinese leaders their victory proved the validity of Mao- teachings that man not weapons is the decisive factor in war and that victory over a technologically superior enemy can be gained in a protracted war 0% attrition and annihilation I Despite an assertion by Mao as early as August l946 that the atom bomb is a paper tiger used by the US reactionaries to scare- people the Chinese appreciated the fact that their defense capabilities were limited Hence they had to look to the Soviet Union to underwrite their security 0n l4 February l950 China signed with the USSR a Treaty of Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance and a program of military aid began There is no evidence that the Chinese communists participated in planning for the Korean 31111 - 11-1 I need not escalate into a nuclear war Further in their 1949 1960 cont 5 War nor until the summer of l950 made any preparations for participation But with the entry of United Nations forces into the conflict and their success against the North Korean forces and the approach to the Yalu the Chinese reacted out of a real sense of fear In entering the korean war the Chinese communists wrote two new facets of their strategic doctrine they would fight beyond their own borders to insure the integrity of those borders and they would fight to prevent the collapse of another Asian communist regime 5 China emerged from the Korean War with a more modern military force and with the perception that conventional conflicts a- eyes the Korean Her experience underscored'the Maoist concepts of the power of mobilized and indoctrinated masses the necessity of clearly understanding the political objectives of warfare and the importance of man over machines as the decisive factor in war China had also learned the need of an indigenous military industrial capability but was burdened with a heavy debt for Soviet assistance provided By saddling the Chinese with outlays as heavy as they could bear the Soviets for a number of years rather dramatically hindered China from developing an independent military establishment _During the period 1953 54 the Chinese were assessing the impact of international events on 11-2 - l949 1960cont their military strategy The Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons increased China s security but this was offset by the US development of thermonuclear weapons At the same time the strategic massive retaliation concepts of the Eisenhower administration contained in Chinese eyes alarming features Additionally while Soviet thermonuclear developments were gratifying the Chinese began to question Soviet support on China's behalf at the risk of US thermonuclear response on Soviet territory And lastly the united States Asian containment policy represented by the creation of SEATO posed further problems for the Chinese These events showed Peking that while political factors might remain Supreme China s foreign policies would'be subject to major constraintS' so long as the thinese lacked adequate means of their can for deterring nuclear'threats I Peking reinforced its efforts to develop the base necessary to support an indigenous nuclear capability But this led to the strategic debates of l955-56 Should China acquire her own weapons or should'reliance be placed on a Soviet nuclear umbrella Professional military leaders argued in support of nuclear weapons and of new military technology in general at the expense of the slow development of the country's economic potential as favored by some party leaders The final policy decision rejected the program In October 1957 the two countries signed an l949 l960 cont view of the military professionals economic development would be pursued In l956 the Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev introduced a new equation He argued that atom bombs were no respectors of class laws that conflicts could escalate and that one should not insist on violent revolution to the point of courting disaster This contradicted the Maoist belief that atomic weapons were paper tigers and presented again the question of continuing Soviet strategic nuclear support Meantime however the Soviets did provide substantial assistance to the Chinese_nuclear agreement on new technology for national defense The weakness of the Chinese and the Soviet refusal to back them in any risky situation was evident in-the uemoy crisis of August September l958 Events made it clear to the Chinese leaders that while the US might be willing to use nuclear weapons if pressed too hard the Soviets were unwilling to take similar risks in protecting China Here again was reason to question the validity of Chinese reliance on the Soviet nuclear shield The decision of the Chinese to develop their own missile delivery systems must have been 11 4 1949 1960 cont made prior to l958 possibly as early as l956 Options available varied from that of stressing relatively short range missiles based on the systems being received from the Soviets to developing an ICBM with which to reach the continental United States The first of these options was accepted Thus China established the basis for creation of a regional nuclear strategy and capability Sine-Soviet relations began to deteriorate as early as l956 Subsequent events caused further schism and in l959 apparently contributed in large degree to a renewed policy debate among the Peking leadership and the dismissal of the Minister of National Defense and four vice ministers During that sameiyear the Soviets abrogated the l957 national defense agreement The final breach in Sino-Soviet military cooperation occurred in l960 when the Soviets withdrew their military advisors and a large portion of arrangements for economic military cooperation were phased out China was on her own having operated under a nuclear strategy of defense dependency but now finding the guardian gone - b The Evidence - Force deployments Following the Korean War the Peoples Liberation Army was generally deployed to accomplish two objectives defense against a US conventional attack on 1511 5 m 3 19494960 mt - mainland China and maintenance of internalsecurity ' Defense against a strategic nuclear attack was limited to subsonic interceptor aircraft and conventional antiaircraft artillery weapons deployed in a point defense pattern The grdund forces remained the dominant element of China's military- structure but all elements had undergone some modernization and had acquired three years experience in fighting a con ventional war against a modern and well equipped enemy These forces were constrained to the conduct of limited and uncon ventional warfare bl Before l960 direct Soviet military assistance had included the provision of advisors and a vast variety of equipment Of the assistance_provided most significant to China s future strategic nucTear capability were an experimental nuclear reactor facilities for processing uranium a_cyclotron and some equipment for a gaseous diffusion plant Related military equipment included two jet medium bombers l3 propeller driven medium bombers plans for a Golf class conventionally powered guided missile submarine 53-2 and 33-3 surface to-surface missiles and launch equipment technology for developing the 85 4 and a small number of SA-Z surface-to air missiles Additionally the Soviets probably provided assistance in constructing the missile test range at Shuangchengtzu T98 _ aan - l949-l960 cont ii 2 Exercises and training In the i first year of its formal existence the Peoples Liberation Army PLA training was oriented toward a military first _ concept Following the Korean War efforts were initially directed to correcting-deficiencies pointed up by that war Subsequently stress was placed on the political aspects of training while traditional military training was degraded At the same time the trend was away from Russian doctrine with emphasis being given to Chinese needs and conditions Throughout this period training by all services was exclusively concerned with the conventional and unconventional offense g and defense character of warfare Command control No nuclear command and control system existed in China during this period 3 Research and developments In l95l Peking signed a secret agreement with Moscow through which China provided uranium ores in exchange for Soviet assistance in the nuclear field There is some indication that by l953 the Chinese under the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear energy had initiated research leading to the development of nuclear weapons - bl In mid-October l957 the Chinese and Soviets signed an agreement on new technology for national I - $1 101 11 - - a - titan 34 m - 1 WW defense The full scope of this agreement is not known but from available evidence it included provision for additional Soviet nuclear assistance as well as the furnishing of some surface to surface and surface to air missiles Pursuant to this agreement the Soviets provided the Chinese with assistance in building a major gaseous diffusion facility for production of enriched uranium Some years later the Chinese accused' Moscow of having torn this agreement up in l959 and having refused to gupply a simple atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture Thus the Chinese were forced to continue to play down the importance of advanced weapons age while at the same time attempting gradually to build up an advanced weapons capability with only token Soviet help -- and to do this first in the face of national emphasis on domestic economic development and then later in the face of the chaos created by the Great Leap Forward In May l958 the Chinese announced that they intended to build their own missiles 2 l96l-l969 -- China Goes It Alone a Nuclear weapon employment and policy - ll Perception of the threat Long range nuclear attacks by the United States or the Soviet Union or the alternative of large soale conventional assault primarily by the Soviets Responses and Initiatives Just when the Chinese leaders began - - mvv-m I - I5 I _ it certainly must have been apparent to the Chinese leaders xv l960-l969 dent to think about the concept of a strategic nuclear doctrine r and strategy is not known and Chinese reticence even up - to the present time with respect to their nuclear capability and intentions has not facilitated the evaulation of China s nuclear strategy and plans for developing a strategic nuclear force Almost nothing has been written or voiced by Chinese ieaders which could indicate the formulation of a definitive nuclear strategy In fact it is quite possible that Peking has not even today clearly defined its doctrine and strategy for waging nuclear war Nevertheless - from the start that they had almost achieving nuclear parity with the superpowers Consequently their cautious pragmatic doctrine for development deployment and employment of their strategic forces was forced on them rather than being adopted voluntarily Certainly the development of a deterrent doctrine and capability must have appeared as the only feasible course of action at least for the near and mid-term periods Should deterrence fail the Chinese leaders perceived the need for an assured retaliatory capability But at the same time they were highly sensitive to the paucity of their defenses against a strategic attack If China was to survive such an attack measures were necessary to insure such survival Hence the defensive strategy of hardening dispersal 11-9 - - l960-l969 cont redundancy and civil defense measures was adopted During the early years of this decade available evidence indicates that the formulation of a comprehensive Chinese strategy was characterized by major gaps and unresolved problems Chinese thinking about nuciear war continued to be concerned with defense and survival although reference was made to use of-tactical nuclear weapons In essence the doctrine took into consideration the following types of warfare 1 Surprise strategic air attack with nuclear weapons against mainland China Invasion of the mainland by ground forces armed with conventional weapons I Chemical bacteriological war- fare both strategic and tactical a lg Low r level conflicts such as local wars in contiguous areas At that time the Chinese had little to propose as a defense against a strategic nuclear attack except improvement of air defenses and the dispersal hardening and camouflage of military targets Nevertheless they postulated that a_potential enemy could not rely exclusively on nuclear weapons in dealing with China because of China s vast territory complicated terrain and huge numbers of people 19504959 cont - Thus their defense strategy provided for the possibility of a protracted war on Chinese soil requiring large conventional forces This strategy sought to exploit time space man- power and will The Chinese-initial program for construction of space and missile related facilities which had begun in l957 or l958 was insulated from the ravages and collapse of the Great Leap Forward 2 With the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in l960 however progress in the program was slowed nevertheless the Chinese did move forward with a broad program Possibly even to a greater extent the Chinese appear to have successfully isolated_the nuclear energy program from disruptive domestic influences At the same time China's military leaders continued to realize that until China had developed an effective go-it alone capability they could find themselves dependent upon Soviet assistance in any Sino-US confrontation Just what form that assistance would take and under what circumstances it could be expected remained very much in question As a consequence new_emphasis was placed on self reliance as a solution to national defense problems and on the theme of man-over-weapons as the determinant in war The l962 Sine Indian border incident provided no reason to change II-ll fluimh I 960-1969 cont - that theme On the other hand the Cuban confrontation in l962 offered the Chinese a rather telling lesson in the consequences of serious strategic inferiority 9 That the Chinese were interested in developing a tactical nuclear capability as well as strategic can be traced back to at least l96l At that time training in both defensive and offensive tactical nuclear situations was being stressed in support of conventional forces In policy terms the Chinese may have calculated that a tactical nuclear capability could be used to persuade a'nuclear armed enemy against intervening in local crisis situations or raising intervention to a nuclear level - In October lQb China joined the nuclear club by conducting its initial atomic test at L0p Nor in western China This was the prelude to a series of In increasingly sophisticated test shots which has continued up to the present In announcing this test the Chinese promulgated a no first use policy reiterated Mao s atom bomb-paper tiger theme repeated China's advocacy of complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons condemned the Moscow test ban treaty of l9 3 as a big fraud to fool the people of the i world and stated that China s aim is to break the nuclear monoply of the nuclear powers The Chinese conducted the first firing of an MRBM missile with a range of about 600 nm in l963 1960-l969 cont - and the first firing of an IRBM having a range of l 400 nm in l966 On 27 October l966 they conducted their first and to date only missile delivered nuclear test CHIC 4 Events following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in l964 created consternation among China s hierarchy Most troubling was the bombing of North Vietnam which created a real fear that it would be-extended into China This precipitated a new debate within the Peking leadership not_ on whether China should enter the war but rather how China could best be defended against the US air attacks The conservative elements in the leadership again prevailed and China continued to stress scientific technological development i over a spectacular force development and modernization program Out of that debate_emerged a relevant Chinese doctrinal statement In an article on l0 May l965 Lo Jui ching then Chief of the General Staff wrote Our principle is He will not attack un- less we are attacked if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack In June l967 China exploded its first thermonuclear sdeficein its sixth nuclear test The Chinese cultural revolution during the-period l966 l969 had far reaching effects on the political governmental military educational and economic 'spheres of Chinese society Again strategic nuclear and I'lw special importance however was the knowledge that at no time 1- l960-l969 cont related activities were insulated from these disruptive domestic events and progress continued to be made in the acquisition of a strategic deterrent posture During this same period the United States both became fully involved in the Vietnam War and began to feel domestic as well as some international pressure to withdraw from that war These facts most significantly the latter were not lost on theleaders in Peking The commit ment of the US to the war confirmed in Chinese eyes the estimate that where a people have a will to make revolution and can appeal to weaknesses and instability in an eiisting reginezi a breeding ground for wars of national liberation exists 0f during the period_before the bombing of North Vietnam ended in l968 had the US_made any threat to attack China While this would not mean that the Chinese could totally discount a US threat and more particularly a nuclear attack they certainly must have perceived that the US had explicitly sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the PRC It is therefore possible to deduce that the Chinese could with some sense of relief turn their attention to the develOping threat along the Sino-Soviet border In l965 the Soviets had begun a buildup of their forces_along the Sino-Soviet border This buildup accompanied by increasing tensions certainly enhanced res esaizsa7e l960- l969 cont the possibility of clashes involving ever increasing numbers of men and equipment despite the fact that Chinese troop deployments remained largely unchanged The border clashes beginning with the Ussuri River incident in March 1969 clearly pointed up in thinese eyes a serious Soviet threat 0 The Chinese began troop training firings of the MRBM System at least by the spring of l9 9 in preparation for deployment I b The evidence _Force deployments PLA troop deployments remained generally stable during this period and showed litt1e_evidence I of any significant reaction or international developments However substantial steps were being taken to assure the survivability of the Chinese military forces industry and the_civilian population I A campaign was initiated in l959 to disperse and harden military installations This was clearly a passive defensive strategy undertaken to reduce the effects of a nuclear attack In the early 19605 this campaign was expanded to include heavy industries The attainment of a nuclear capability in l964 did not lessen the pace of dispersal and hardening and the war preparations campaign of l969 broadened the scope of such activities Miln' gm 1 - Hui-i 1960-1969 cont On 9 June l96l an instruction on Construction policy was published by the General Staff Uepartment the General Political Department and the General Rear Services Department It was approved by the Military Affairs Committee and stated that the instruction was necessary to insure an understanding of the sudden nature and destructiveness of modern warfare and of carrying out the MAC construction policy The instruction continued For strategic requirements new barracks warehouses and factories must be built in locations far from large- and medium-sized cities communication and transportation centers large'manufacturing and mining i districts large reservoirs and densely 1 mm populated areas They should be built near and into hills on hillsides and be properly dispersed according to topo- 1 graphic and terrain conditions Further- more they should be properly camouflaged - This-instruction certainly indicated that the Chinese did not expect a purely counter force campaign and were concerned with the question of survivability Thus renewed stress was being given_to the government policy on dispersal hardening and redundancy Similar stress was being given to at least some civil defense measures In the early l960s the program of building personnel air raid shelters According to available evidence this program is nationwide and has been -progressing at a steady pace Shelter construction received tl960-l969 cont two added shots-in the arm by government direction during the 19505 The first was during the mid-l9605 when the bombing of North Vietnam started and the second followeithe Sino Soyiet border clashes in l969 By l968 over personnel shelters had been identified in-Shanghai and in several cities in north and northeast China 7 2 -Exercises_and training During this period Lin Piao succeeded Peng Teh-huai as Minister OfFiational perense Lin instituted the revolutionized military requiring the Chinese _cdmmunist forces to develop the glorious tradition Emphasis was now on ideological training and required a minimum of 50% of the time be assigned daily for studying Mao s-writings lhe remaining hours were used for the work of the masses and part time agricultural production This left little time for actual military training Lo Jui-ching Chief of General Staff under Lin felt this emphasis was detrimental to national defense Without Lin's approval Lo shifted the emphasis back to military training For his efforts Lo like Peng Teh-huai has purged on the charge of treason against the armed forces It became obvious that stressing military training over political training Was unsafe Military training during this period emphasized basic training within the company especially on the individual soldier team squad and platoon levels l960 l969 cont After a good foundation had been laid by company level units the military regions could arrange joint training for a few battalions regiments and divisions as required The India PRC conflict Sino Soviet split and the Gulf of Tonkin incident all took place during this time period however none of them seemed to affect the training doctrine Between l967 and the present two events occurred which greatly eifected the course of PLA training The cultural revolution brought most large scale military training to a standstill What training that did take place had the following characteristics Ed 1 Short training periods courses which usually lasted-several years were now telescoped to a few months - g_ Emphasis was placed on experience and theories a Mutual teaching and learning - between students 3 Interior quality'of students as a result of emphasis on family background and political outlook Frugality -- lack of training facilities equipment and instructors necessitated keeping training very basic 19604969 cont The l969 border conflict with the Soviet Union awakened the Chinese to the need for effective military training Although ideological training remains number one in priority military training has been upgraded' to prepare for combat Combat readiness exercises are emphasized as well as bivouac training live ammunition firing sea air and land-air joint exercises and longwdistance marches The largest'and prbbably the most extensive field and command post exercises ever conducted by the Chinese have taken place since l969 This type of training is continuing In l968 the large surface to sur face missile training facility identified at hunei appeared to be getting ready for a new phase of activity Possibly i as early as Aughst 1968 but certainly no later than the spring of l969 tnaining of some missile force personnel had begun there - Meanwhile live firing exercises had begun at - 37 Command and control Little evidence is available concerning command and control systems being developed by the Chinese in support of their strategic nuclear forces during this period Several references to a Second Artillery created a basis for speculating that the Chinese were establishing their counterpart to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces However there was insufficient evidence during this 11 19 _w 1960-l969 cont time to verify the function and operational methodology of this organization Command and control of conventional forces during this time as reflected by communications intelligence indicated a high degree of centralized control at Ministry of National Defense level 4 -Research and development The gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou construction of which began in l957 -probably commenced operation in l963 Construction of a plutonium production Complex at Yumen in Kansu Province was also started in l958 or 1959 This construction continued steadily-for atrleast the next decade and operation of the large plutonium chemical separations plant position of the complex commenced in the latter part of l970 During that same early'period of time l959 the Chinese began construction of a nuclear stockpile site and large weapons complex both available _use sometime in is considered possible that beginning in the late 505 the Chinese put such a high priority on development of a viable nuclear energy program particularly as it related to weapons development that a higher ratio of China's scientific expertise was assigned to this program than that devoted to similar programs by either TCS 3 7gege l960-l969 cont - the US or the USSR Regardless Peking realized that a nuclear capability remained some distance in the future In January 196l a Chinese military leader stated that should a war occur within the next three to five years the Chinese would have to rely on hand_weapons This seemed_to imply that the Chinese leaders did not expect to acquire a nuclear weapons capability before 1964-66 The first Chinese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Hor on 16 October l96 CHIC It was a tower shot involving a fission device with a yield of 25 kilotons However of the ten test shots that followed by 29 eptember 1969 six are believed to have been related to thermonuclear development The others had as their goals the adaptation of CHIC for bomber delivery and test of a missile warhead CHIC 4 CHIC 6 an airdrop test on June l967 was the first fullryield two stage thermonuclear test - The Chinese conducted their first test launch of a ballistic missile in l963 Test plaunches continued-throughout the period with this system furnishing the delivery vehicle for the first and to date only missile delivered test shot in October l966 CHIC 4 Production of the Chinese version of the jet medium bomber began in l968 mos-554775-72 a -response to the Ussuri River and subsequent incidents was -negligible Peking initiated a vigorous 1969-1972 3 l969 T972 Emerging Strategic Nuclear Capability a Nuclear weapon employment and strategy Perception of the threat Soviet nuclear attacks of either a nationwide or selective nature accompanied by large scale assaults by conventional forces The likeli _hood of US attacks on China is seen as being greatly reduced unless China were to create a severe provocation Responses and initiatives I while immediate Chinese military campaign urging the Chinese people to wage an all-out struggle against the new Tsars During the late summer of l969 there were numerous indications that the Soviets could be preparing to use nuclear weapons against China _ China's only apparent response was to initiate a war preparations program Although a border truce was initiated between the two countries in October l969 the exchange of acrimonious charges and countercharges has continued and it is now evident- that by the latter part of l969'the Chinese recognized the Soviet threat as the most immediate and most ominous Since that time China has augmented its ground and air forces deployed in the military regions and air districts contiguous to the border This augmentation however has been fairly modest 11-22 Iblu 1969 1972 cont and the bulk of the forces remain in a defensive posture considerably removed from the border It became evident prior to l97l that China intends to become a major nuclear power To achieve this goal the Chinese are willing to accept the economic burden involved and the rishs of slowing basic economic development through-diversion of scarce resources and skills to specialized defense tasks This is apparent in that activity in both general purpose and strategic military programs is at an all time high but still must be considered as moving at a moderate pace It is equally g evident that some principles other-than Mao s peoples war guide the costly and wide-ranging strategic weapon programs now underway Those programs appear to be designed to iultimately provide for a considerable systems mix and a number of options in warhead yield It is probable that China deployed some possibly as early asl969 ' and a small number of css-z IRBMs beginning in late l97l Training of css-z crews had begun in l970 No firm evidence of such deployments - is available However l972 photography indicates the probable imminent deployment at two separate locations in China as well as the identification of ground support equipment at a 11-23 969-1975 tam military installation in the Peking Military Region It is highly likely that if deployment has occurred a major portion of the missiles are targeted against the Soviet Union The Chinese have twice flight tested a third missile-system which appears to have sufficient range to provide full coverage of the It could be operational by l974 75 Knonn as the Chingyu missile it is liquid propelled and is a two-stage vehicle with the first stage probably incorporating the design and technology of the CSS-Z This missile could be intended for hardened site deployment Additionally _on l0 September l97l the Chinese tested at reduced range a missile having the characteristics of an ICBM capable of striking targets within the continental United States Operational deployment of this missile is not expected to occur before l975 or l976 At the same time the Chinese recognize that both-the US and the USSR are developing strategic defenses including antiballistic missiles ABMs which would be more effective against the limited Chinese nuclear attack capability than they would be against each other Chinese countermeasures are not known at this time - The Chinese appear to be on the brink of establishing a tactical nuclear capability The two most recent nuclear tests CHIC l2 CHIC l3 are suggestions of a new phase of the PRC test programs Both were low yield l969 l972 cont weapons It appears possible that CHIC l3 was deliverEd Evian fighter aircraft and may have been a proof test of a weapon Asrwith strategic nuclear weapons the Chinese have given no indication of their doctrine for the deployment and employment of tactical nuclear weapons During the late l9505 China had become increasingly disturbed by perceived Soviet efforts to obtain arms control arrangements -Cn 2l January l960 the Chinese National Peoples Congress passed a resolution stressing that China would not be bound by any disarmament except with its ekpress consent and that it would accept no disarmament agreement unless it had participated in the negotiations The Chinese were to continue to deprecate the tripartite i nuclear test ban treaty and to stress the legitimate right of all peace loving nations to develop armed forces for self defense In 1963 Premier Chou En-lai enunciated for the first time the Chinese position that a summit conference on nuclear matters should include all the countries of the world large and Small On the other hand on 24 June l966 the authoritative Observer in the Peking Review stated Chinese representatives definitely _will not attend anv world disarmament con ference within or outside the United Nations The Chinese Government will advocate the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons when the US nuclear threat is countered 11 25 l969-l972 cont 9 As recently as 7 August l97l Peking rejected a Soviet proposal for the convening of a five power conference to include the US the USSR China Great Britain and France to discuss the question of nuclear disarmament In their statement the Chinese said that they had consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear_weapons and had declared on many occasions that under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons The statement went on to indicate that the PRC would at no time participate in a dis- armament conference between the nuclear powers behind the - backs of the nonnuclear countries It urged Moscow and_ Washington to openly agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances and called for the dismantling of all nuclear bases and stockpiled weapons on foreign soil - Following their-admission to the United Nations the Chinese again rejected a Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference placed under consideration by the 26th United Nations General Assembly The Peking representa- tive reiterated the previously expressed Chinese objections to such a conference There is some indication of growing Chinese interest in participating in multilateral arms negotiations through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament CCD However it is also evident that while the 11- missile development or deployment posed against the PRC l969-l972 cont - Chinese may be adopting a more pragmatic approach to the disarmament question they have as yet shown no inclination to abandon any of their Stipulated requirements essential to the convocation of a disarmament conference The Chinese leaders are watching the US and USSR SALT exchange and are intently interested in the outcome as it could have an important impact on the PRC strategic program The two areas of prime interest are those developments which could counter the Chinese missile program and the possibility of no agreement constraining The arms limitation program will probably become more of i 'an issue as the leadership changes-in China and the-world- i wide political area develops Since the-end of the cultural revolution and more particularly since joining the UN in late l97l the Chinese have begun to develop international relationships If the Chinese were to participate in arms limitation talks it would probably be through the UN channels Since coming to power the Chinese communists have sought to insure the existence of friendly states on their borders In addition the Japanese are seen by Peking as representing the greatest potential threat of any power in Asia with the exception of the USSR Therefore they are making strenuous efforts to discourage the rebirth of 11 27 'Tcs_osai7s 72 i M -Chinese had recognized the Soviet threat as the most ominous l969-1972 cont Japanese militarism particularly acquisition of a nuclear capability Concurrently however they are seeking Japan's technological and industrial know how to improve the PRC economy and industrial base particularly as it relates to their defense posture o The Chinese would view as an extremely serious development any Japanese move into the nuclear arena and could see in it a need for expanding their own strategic offensive capability b The evidence Force deployments By the latter part of l969 the I and immediate as any confronting them Since that time China 1 has augmented its ground and air force elements deployed in the military regions and air districts contiguous to the border This augmentation has been modest-and the bulk of the forces remain in a defensive posture considerably removed from the border The Chinese Navy while still essentially a coastal defense force is continuing to acduire more effective units and is beginning to deploy its units for longer operational periods and possibly to more extended ranges from the coast than at any time previously -The augmentation of the fleet with guided missile destroyers and destroyer escorts and with an increasing number of new lI 28 - gnu-pp 1 - - l969-1972 cont attack submarines provides the Chinese with a blue water operational potential and the capability of seeking out and attacking enemy strategic naval forces at increasing distances from the Chinese mainland i During this period the Chinese air force underwent considerable modernization Production of MIG- 2ls and the Chinese designed 9 believed to be destined for a ground attack role commenced and _production of the MIG- l9 was accelerated Production of the l6 'jet medium bomber and the IL- 28 light jet bomber continued also Deployment of these aircraft to operational units occurred and the F-9 may have been the delivery vehicle for CHIC l3 DeliVery of the to the 4th Independent Regiment_began i and at present 32 of these aircraft are operational It is believed that the Chinese have deployed in'limited numbers the and CBS-2 surface missiles Deployment could consist of from l5 to 30 launchers and_15 SCC72 launchers_ It is assumed that a large portion of such deployed missiles-would be oriented against the'Soviet Union Regardless the imminent deployment of surface-to surface missiles SSMS is indicated in recent satellite photography A probable SSH-related installation at Tienwei 53 miles north of Kunming was detected in photographs taken on El January Another missile complex revealed in the 2l January photography was ll nautical miles southwest of Kunming A third SSH related rc- r 1969 l972 cont installation is located near Liuchingkou in northcentral China Five miles to the northeast of Liuchingkou another SSH-associated facility has been detected Facilities at Kunming in South China and Liuchingkou in northwestern China appear to be constructed for such operational deploy ment A MRBM range with a three-megaton warhead deployed at Kunming could reach targets near the Vietnawese DMZ -ininorthern Thailand and India east of - Bangladesh On the other hand the most logical missile to be deployed at Kunming would be a USS-2 IRBM which _would bring Taiwan all bf southeast Asia and almost i_ 3 3 'half of India within range The inland location of Liuchingkou' dictates that the IRBM be deployed there - The would cover only a small portion of Mongolia while the CSS-Z would enable China to strike targets in the USSR India most of Southeast Asia Taiwan and South Korea Ground support equipment identified with the system has recently been observed in satellite photography-at a military facility in the Peking Military Region A facility for producing the new Chinese designed long range early warning radar has recently been identified at Sha Sheik The new radar which was first seen in 197 greatly increases Chinas early warning 11-30 v l969 l972 cont detection capability It is believed that up to ten of these radars have been deployed to date I The Chinese appear to be well on the way to developing a nuclear powerEd ballistic missile submarine The single'QOLF class conventionally powered ballistic missile boat in the Chinese inventory is believed to be committed to a test platform role in developing a new missile of native design Recent evidence of land based ejection facilities as mell as construction of an off-shore tube launcher for underwater ejection tests has been detected The Chinese designed and built_HBH class submarine has been 3 'undergoing sea trials since August l97l If not yet operational it should be in the near future the submarine is believed to be a nuclear powered torpedo attack boat While a this class boat will greatly improve the Chinese Navy s distant defense capabilities against enemy nuclear equipped surface forces one of its most significant features is that it will servce as a stepping stone in the development of a Chinese nuclear powered submarine launched ballistic missile SSBN force 'Such a force would enhance Peking's assurance of an effective retaliatory capability as well as strengthening her deterrent posture It is estimated that China s first SEEN could become operational in l976 2 Exercises and training The 1969 border conflict with the 23 if l969 l972 cont Soviet Union awoke the Chinese to the need for effective military training Although ideological training remains number one in priority military training has been upgraded to increase combat effectiveness Combat readiness exercises are emphasized as well as bivouac training liVe ammunition firing sea air and land-air joint exercises and long distance marches Since l969 the largest and probably the most extensive field and command post exercises ever conducted by the Chinese have taken place and this type of training is continuing Following an intensified and apparently successful testing of'the MRBM in l966 little- activity was observed relating to this system from the fall of 1966-through early l 69 During that time there were occasional exercises and possible indications of a few firings but no firm evidence of troop training At the Wuwei missile school no equipment was observed and some type of construction which had begun in l956 continued at a very slow pace through at least l969 The picture began to change in l969 l970 how- -ever as evidence accumulated of renewed MRBM activity It now appears reasonably certain that troop training involving live firings from Shuangchengtzu and possibly classroom and missile handling instruction at Nowei was underway at least by the spring of l969 if not by AuguSt l968 Training at both Shuangchengtzu and Nuwei has continued up to the present no 1 r 2 i 11 32 a f' I l969 l972 cont The first photographic evidence of training was obtained in November l970 This training which is being conducted at Wuwei is continuing at this time Live firings of this missile have been conductedifrom a launch facility at Huchai southwest of Peking and possibly represented training exercises beginning in mid-l969 3 Command and control Little definitive data are available on Chinese command and control procedures for nuclear weapons systems Further as the PRC nuclear force is just emerging as a viable force little change in the Chinese command and control policy or strategy has been noted in response to international incidents or changes in strategy of'other nuclear powers However the command and control communications systems - for all services is being modernized with the increased use of radioprinter equipment from the Ministry of National Defense level down to major field and territorial commands In l97l the main missile control authority moved from the test range at Shuangchengtzu to Sian in cent_eral China This location would place this control authority in the middle of the known missile related activities The location of probable SSM-related facilities near Kunming in southern China and Luichingchou in northcentral China would mean the new controller would be in the center of this 11-33 - - 4_t a an nunscont missiTe activity It is too earTy to predict the impact of this move on overaTT missile command and controT procedures 4 Research and deveTopment The PRC has conducted T4 nucTear weapons deveTopment tests daring the period October 1964 to March The tests designated chronoTogicaTTy as CHIC through 14 invoiving four fission devices the first second fourth and thirteenth one probabie fission device the nineth test and eight thermonucTear devicess data concerning CHIC T4 is in- sufficient to permit evaTuation at this time The first TT PRC tests CHICs appeared to be directed at the development of satisfactory Tow yield fission T05 of KT and high yier thermonuclear 3 MT weapons In this group of tests two basic fission device primary designs and one basic thermonucTear design have evolved from anaiysis of the test debris The 12th 14th tests appear to represent a new phase in the PRC nucTear weapons program This phase may inciude basic stadies of thermonuciear weapons phenomenology and tacticaT nucTear weapons deveTop ment 5 Nuclear faciTities and production Since January 1971 a second set of new nucTear faciTities have been identified This a gaseous diffusion plant at Chinkouho which is estimated to be abTe to produce more U-235 then the originaT pTant at Lanchou This new TCS 654775 72 faciTity shoqu begin partiaT production in Tate T972 with I- v Wm 1969 1972 cont fu11 operation in 1ate 1974 There is an additiona1 reactor for production of p1atonium at Kuangyuan and additiona1 weapons grade materia1 cou1d enter the stock- pi1e by 1974 75 A150 there is a possib1e new weapons fabrication faci1ity 1ocated at Tzntung A11 of these new wi11 give the PRC the capabi1ity of becoming the third 1argest nuc1ear power in the wor1d Based on their production capaoi1ity the Chinese cou1d have as many as JZD thermonuc1ear warheads and 260 fission nuc1ear weapons in the stockpi1e at this time IL35 was-eue s e PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT gg POLICY AND STRATEGY ANNEX Force DeveIOpment and Dep1oyment n - n filli' If r eiternal considerations U 'forces to Korea 125 armies by mid l952 and to the chhou General In general the deployment and development of the Peoples Republi of China's PRC armed forces in response to external crises has not been dramatic A possible reason for China's apparent irresponsiveness to external crisis may be simply that it has not had the flenibility or capability to respond to shifting external events with internal considera- tions such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution being far more demanding or limiting than mlEgg Other'than the movement by Chinese Communist ground coastal area two armies in l958 and two plus armies in l962 the ground force deployment of five armies from South China northward towards the Sino-Soviet-border in late_1969-early l970 represents the largest troop movement since the end of the China Civil war in l950 Air and naval force deployments have remained relatively stable even in the fade of apparent increased external threats China has traditionally positioned the bulk of its forces in and around vital areas and along principal lines of communications reflecting a defensive oriented military posture designed to cope with external threats from any direction - To cope with the external nuclear threat a campaign was initiated in l959 to disperse and harden military installations This was clearly-a paSSive defensive strategy A A fx I 13 x 3 1ch 3- - undertaken to reduce the effects of a nuclear attack China s lack of a nuclear capability dictated the necessity for such a campaign In the early l960 s this campaign was expanded to include heavy industries The attainment of a nuclear capability in l964 did not lessen the pace of dispersal and hardening and the war preparations campaign of l969 broadened the scope of such activities to include civil defense measures to protect the population U Likewise external developments have generally had little effect on the development of the Chinese Communist missile program with the possible exception of the Sino- Soviet Border_Dispute of l969 Deteriorating border rela- Egg tions with the USSR as early as l968 may have caused the Chinese to re-think their missile strategy for deployment of an MRBM system 16 August l968 MRBM troop training exercises were initiated at the Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Range and to date there have been l4 confirmed crewntraining firings Although there are only two detected SS missile sites near Kunming City in Yunnan Province South China the Chinese could have deployed l5 or more missiles to other undetected areas possibly most confronting the USSR Other missile system developments may have been influenced by the border incidents of l969 IRBM firings from Huchai at least 14 to T6 firings possibly two of these tin l97l associated with training and the Chingyu missile from -6 Ching yu in November l970 and _l97l The 2 _has many CSadvgh age '72 -Sept mber l97l -The earliest possible IOC for an ICBM_based - or two later including a greater range 1 500 nm over the and it is likely to be deployed in much greater number with deployment possibly having begun in late l97l The Chingyu missile is believed to be a two stage variant of the with a longer-range capability providing the Chinese with an improved strategic posture This system with a range greater than 3 000 nm would reach targets in European Russia and give the'Chinese'a considerable degree of latitude in choosing deployment areas for this System is not expected until l974 or l975 i The only missile that could be a direct threat against the US is a nmfrange ICBM The Chinese flight tested an a vehicle with ICBM characteristics-to a reduced range in on this vehicle woqjd be late l974 but more likely a year Ground Force In mid lQSO BEA-strength was estimated to be 2 3 million These personnel were organized into four Field Armies and one Military Area consisting of l9 Army Groups A total of 69 Armies were assigned to these Army Groups U In October-November 1950 the PRC intervened in the ongoing hostilities in Korea and by mid l952 had deployed 25 armies to that theater These units here drawn tram throughout China and included some former Nationalist units The PRC began to Withdraw its forces from Korea - -- and early l953 By late l954 only ll Armies remained in Korea During the period of intervention in Korea the CCA was reorganized along more conventional lines Almost one half 32 of 69 of the previously designated Armies were de activated during this period and their personnel absorbed by the remaining units By October l964 the deployment of Army-level refle ted_in T3516 H Ulh us Between l954 and l960 the remaining ll armies were withdrawn from Koreazand redeployed principally to Northeast North and East China areas so that by April l950 the deployment of Army-level unitswas_asqdepictediin_Table As shown in Table i- deployment of army level units 0t fthe CCA remained rather surprisingly stable during the - period following the Korean War despite the Taiwan situation the Gulf of Ionkin incident the US buildup in South Vietnam the cultural_revolution and the Sine-Soviet border In l97l two additional army- level units were formed bringing the total to 36 Some redeployment was noted and the number of armies in Peking MR increased by two Army strength for selected years is shown on Table 4 - At present the PRC Navy-is to all intents and purposes a coastal defense force which does not possess nuclear weapons Naval nuclear strategy appears to be one of ILA-4 survival in the event of a preemptive nuclear attack U The development of the navy since its formation in l949 has been spectacular From a heterogenous collection of World War II vessels left by the Chinese Nationalists in i l949 the force has expanded-to a current strength of l 235 However this expansion can nonetheless be attributed to a cannot be related to any external stimuli To comply uith a nuclear strategy of survival the growth of the force necessitated a con- comitant need for support and diSpersion ChiCom naval-shore facilities have steadilv developed matching overall naval - growth From an approximate total of eight facilities 15' - i l949 naval infrastructure now-totaJs more than 170_shore facilities located_throughout the three fleet areas g i Since l963 at least the Chinese have embarked on a program of providing a number of naval bases with underground facilities At least l6 bases located throughout the fleet areas have in various stages of completion underground facilities suitable for entry berthing and repair of either boats or submarines The function of the underground installations appears to be two-fold They provide protected 4 berthing to effect minor repairs as well as storage for missiles ammunition and logistics The dispersed location and reinforced construction will improve PRC naval chances of survival in the event of preemptive nuclear strike - Ii fi V 6 mead Ls _Air Force A Communist China's strategic air capability is limited to a small force of medium bombers assigned to the Chinese Communist Air Force CCAF 4th Independent Regiment 4th IR A portion of China s 350 aircraft jet light bomber force could be used in-a limited strategic role however the IL-28 low performance envelope mitigates against its use for strategic'bombingl'f The 4th IR came into existence with the delivery of l0 propeller medium bombers to Peking in February l953 In following years three more of these aircraft were acquired from the Soviets and in January l959 China I received two BADGER medium jet bombers from-the - 'China began producing the BADGER at the Hsian Airframe Plant -in l968 and now has-32 BADGERS in the operational inventory in addition to An additional l9 BADGERs have been produced but have not yet been turned over to the 4th From 1953 until 197l the Ath IR had only three home bases The original 10 remained at Peking from February l95 until March of that year when they moved to Shihchiachuang Takuotsun They remained there for one year moving bach_to Peking in March l954 Then in February of l955 the unit moved to Wukung its present home base From l955 until 197l all 4th 1R aircraft were based at Hukung however since mid-l97l the been at Manshui Airfield and since late 197T six BADGERs have been at Tatung ChingshuihopOSSible that Manshui and Tatung now house 4th IR a Jt a far move in 1955 from Peking to Nukung may have been for'defense upon receipt of BULLS in 1953 and progressed steadi unti1 aircraft on a permanent basis with the expansion to these bases made necessary by continued production and dep10yment of BADGERS In addition to 4th IR home bases aircraft from- this unit haveoperated for short periods of time from numerous other airbases in China The been detected operating from Kucheng Huaite Shuangchengtzu WushihtaIa and'possibiy from WUwei hanching Tachiaochang and Kaerhmu There has been no apparent re1ation between disposition of 4th IR aircraft and internationa1 events however the purposes to improve survivability in the event of air attack Medium bomber crew training began a1most immediate1y 1 lam extensive Iong-range night bombing training was noted in Iate 1954 'By 1956 BULL crews wene considered proficient in medium a1titude bombing under instrument f1ight - The inte11igence picture for 4th IR BADGER training activity is not so comp1ete as for BULL crews BADGER f1ight activity was first detected in Ju1y 1952 Since that time detected f1ight activity has been sporadic yet increasing Night f1ight activity was not noted unti1 1970 The first confirmation of BADGER bombing training was provided by sate11ite photography on 13_August 1971 when a BADGER was photographed exiting the Hsingjenpao bomb range Subsequent the Shuangchengtzo test center t3 in l969 and has continued over this range as bombing train ing Recent intensification of this training coupled with the highest noted altitudes for BADGER activity 41 000 feet confirms China s serious intent to develop a strategic strike capability i In addition to normal training missions 4th IR air craft have been used for a variety of secondary missions BULLs may have been used against Tibetan_ dissidents to shadow intruding CHINAT aircraft in air defense exercises and for aerial survey missions BADGERS were used extensively in l970 for air defense exercises in northeast China Both and BADGERs havetbeen aSSOCiated with special weapons programs In a_ddition to participating in nuclear tests both as drop aircraft and in air sampling roles BULLS and BADGERs have been photographed in the air to surface missile area of Little is known of China's strategic delivery tactics In fact they are probably still in the process of formulatiOn An analysis of the latest-bombing training indicates that they may intend to attack a target in 2 3 ship cells each cell approaching the target from different directions and at - widely separated altitudes and with the lead plane in each cell several minutes ahead of the_others _ Communist Chinafs strategic air capability is limited by old aircraft and a small inventory While BULL crews are believed to be highly proficient in both day and night H v 11 w u 3 ixb 3 3' 4' a '4 - - agate- operations the aircraft is highly vulnerable to virtually all air defense weapons Proficiency of the BADGER force as a whole is assessed as-fair for medium to high-level daylight bombing and poor for night operations The i does not have a low level capability With continued training the BADGER force will likely reach a high degree of proficiency in high altitude bombing under instrument flight conditions However the BADGER is extremelyrvulnerable to modern air defense weapons systems and would be hard pressed to survive in the air defense environment over the Soviet_Union China s medium bomber force does not presently have an air- to air refueling capability however it is considered within the technical capability to develop one I In'summary deployment and development of Chinals strategic air force has not been governed by external events_ with the possible exceptibn of defensive positioning of the force in central China This lack of response to external events is not isolated to the 4th IR but has been true of China s air defense and tactical air units also As a primary defensive force China has traditionally positioned the bulk of her air defense and tactical air units in and around key areas with little change in posture ever evidenced because of apparent increased threats See_Table 3 Missile Force External developments have generally had little effect on the development of the Chinese missile program with the u a 1' 3 a 't i Toads nmr unf'f training or firings However deteriorating border relations possible exception of the Sino Soviet border in idents The cultural revolution did not have any apparent effect on the Chinese missile program The MRBM test program is believed to have ended with the firing of'a nuclear-tipped missile in October l966 The MRBM was then believed to have been ready for operational deployment From l967-to l970 the Chinese tested the IRBM 2 to a range of 1 400 nautical miles Also during this period the Chinese modified Launch Complex El and started construction on 82 at Shuangchengtzu constructed the Wuchai IRBM Test Complex and began construction of the Chingyu SSM Test Complexf _A-few firings of the MRBM from-October l966 through mid l968 were probably associated with missile'modifications It appears that the Chinese had no intentions at that time of deploying the although it was within their capability and were beginning to concentrate their resources on develop- ing an IRBM Early firings of the were from Shuangchengtzu during l967 and then moved to Nuchai for longer range testing - During this period there was no evidence of MRBM crew with the Soviets in l968 may have caused the Chinese to re- think their missile strategy for deploying the MRBM In August l968 the lull was broken with the appearance of possible troop training exercises at the Shuangchengtzu Launch Complex A On several occasions during the remaingaf of the 6547 5 year support equipment was visible at the launch'comple x Since observing this activity from August T968 to date there have been l4 confirmed crew training firings of this several more firings could have occurred but were undetected geiagd Additional evidence concerning the existence of full- scale troopetraining program began to accumulate New construction at the Huwei Training Facility began in l967 and continued through at least the end of T969 but at a slow pace In mid August l970 a Tairly high_ level of activity at theffacility and a substantial amount of missile equipment was observed In September 1970 a training site was established 20 nautical miles south of Huwei near Shuangta Although we may have detected sites near Kunming wwe believe that the Chinese could have deployed 19 or more nissiles to other undetected areas possibly contronting the Soviet-Union Other missile systems that may have been influenced by the border incidents are fired from Nuchai and the uChingyu missile from Chingyu r At least l4 to TS IRBMs were_tested with at least two in 197T believed to have been associated with training The sighting of CSS-Z missiles and equipment in November l970 at Nuwei suggested that the system was near 100 and that an early troopftraining cycle could be expected Two SSM facilities were recently identified near Liuchingchou which could support operational IRBMs The CSS-2 has many advantages over the and it is likely to be deployed in much greater numbers with deploy 5%7e75- -72 ment starting in l972 The CSS '2 could reach gov1et c1 along the trans-Siberian Railroad from Vladivostok westward to Sverdlovsk from reasonable distances behind China's border A third system-is the missile fired from Chingyu to an impact area 2 050 nautical miles away The Chinese realize that to threaten Moscow and western USSR a longer-range missile than the required Erom technology the Chingyu missile is believed to be a two stage variant of the IRBM with a longer-range capability providing the Chinese with an improved strategic posture This system with a range greater than 33000 nautical miles would reach targets in Eastern Russia and give the thineSe a considerable degree of- latitude in choasing deployment areas The 100 for this system is not expected until l974 or l975 - The only missile that could be a direct threat against the US is a 6 000 nautical mile range The Chinese flight tested a vehicle having ICBM characteristics to a reduced range in September l97l The earliest possible IOC for an fCBM based on this vehicle would be 1075 but more likely a year laterDisarmament China'has announced on numerous occasions since l960 its position on international agreements limiting nuclear teSting nuclear proiiferation and nuclear disarmament Since the Chinese National Peoples Congress resolution of 3-654775-72 i Zl January l960 in wlich China disavowed any disarmament agreement to which it had not been a negotiating party through the present the Chinese position has shown little evidence of flexibility In essence that position has been summarized in the following statements China develops nuclear weapons because she is compelled to do so under imperialist nuclEar threats and she does so entirely for the purpose of defense and for breaking the imperialist nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage and at present she iS-not yet a a nuclear power nor will she ever be a 'nuclear superpower' practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly nuclear threats and i nuclear balckmail - - Statement of-the Government of the Peoplefs Republic of China on July 30 l97l -2 - New China News Agency report Aug 7 197l The Chinese Government's stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons secondly the Chinese Government has declared on many occasions that at'no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons thirdly the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and as the first step to reach an agree- ment on the nonuse of nuclear The Chinese Government holds that in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons the United States and the Soviet Union which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons should issue statements938 separately or jointly to openly 6 31f is i r arms negotiations throngh the Geneva-based Conference of the undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances and to dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw to their own countries the nuclear weapons stockpiled and nuclear armed forces stationed on those territories Whether this is carried out or not will be a test as to whether they have the desire to realize nuclear disarmament Statement of the Government - of the Peopie s Republic of China on July 30 l97l New China News Agency report Aug 7 l97 U1 During l97l some evidence of a highly sensitive nature indicated Chinese interest in participating in multilateral Committee on Disarmament CCD and possible future association I a with some previous arms control agreements It was indicated that Chinese membership in CCD could possibly follow expansion of the Conference membership to include a number of nations sympathetic to China revision of basic Conference working guidelines and adoption of organizational changes designed to limit US and CSSR intluence 'To date however the Chinese have made no openzmoves toward participating in any arms limitation negotiations - 1 TABLE I I PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA FORCE DISPOSITION selected years 1954 4960 1963 1964 1966 1969 1970 1971 -u - - - as Northeast China North China East China iseh rst- 1' 6 Hunt up Centra1 South ChinaNorthwest China 2 - 1 Southwest China 3 4 TOTALS 37 36' NNWOLO omoq- '90 occQ-d-' 5 1 PEOPLES CHINA NAVAL FORCE se1ected years TYPE 1949 1950 1954' 1958 1960 1963 1964 1966 1969 1970 1971 1972 FACE DDGS - - - - - - DEGS - - - - - '25PTFG PTH 40 50 120 136 150 155_ 178 156 138 343 378 389 391 PGMH - - - PACV Non operationa1 GQLF c1ass'SSB BOMBERS TU-4 TU-16 FIGHTERS MIG-19 MIG-21 F-9 1952 1954 10 10 50 150' MIG-17 totals TABLE 3 PEOPLES REPQBLI AIR FORC 0 OF CHINA se1ected years '1958 1960 '10 I 13 2 450 I 1963 645 1 030 1 150 1969 265 265_ 1970 19 5 1 780 94 0 1972 13 32 350 170 1 775 1 550 120 so 1543 1950 1954 1958 1960 1963' 1964 9966 1969 1970 1971 1972 GROUND 5000551 2 160 2 720 2 570 2 661 632 2 311 2 325 5000 5000 5000 5000 9000 5000 5000 2 379 000 2 700 2 814 2 815 000 000 000 TABLE 4 NAVY 9 000 34 000 595000 '70 000 82 000 95 000 134 000 151 000 198 000 214 000 309 000 1 PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARMED FORCES STRENGTH se1ected years 0 FORCE 14 500 60 000 79 000 80 000 - 120 000 150 000 197 000 1 291 000 342 000 363 000 396 000 MISSILE 602023 5- 10 000 10-15 000 15-20 000 1'72 - TABLE 5' PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM Now CBS-1 MRBM 10%00 1auhchers range about 600 nm with 3 Mt- warhead CSS-Z IRBM Ollslaunchers range about 1400 nm with 3 Mt warhead - - - Tue16 medium bombefs - 32 radius 1650 nm with 6600 Lb bombs 0 25 tactica bombs for de1ivery by F-9 or IL-28 32m - a Limited USSR Range ICBM - over 3000 nm with a 3 Mt warhead - about 1974 - Extended US Range ICBM - over 6000 nm with a-3 Mt warhead - about 1975 Nuclear powered Bai1istic Missile Submarines - about 1976 r n - La EEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHIEA MISSILE DEVELOPMENT ass-1 ass 2 - CHINGYU maul-m First Test l963 1966 1970 Sep 71 Firings to Date 35-40 l4 l6 A 2 IOC 1970 1971 1974 75 I 1975 76 Range nm 600 1 500' 3 000 6 000 Weight lbs 4 500 4 500 4 500 4 500 MT GEP nm luZ l 2 lm2 l 3 'Propellant Cryogenic Storable Storable' Storable Deployment 5 Soft' Soft I- Hard Hard Configuration Single Single Two Two Stage Stage Stage Stage 5 Guidance Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial 4m TBS-654775-72 REOPLES REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS a AND STRATEGY 0 ANNEX B P oples Liberation Army Training - General Policy governing the training of the PLA has been altered more often as the result of internal ideological conflict than by external crisis The ideological conflict is the result of the contradiction between the policies of salient politics and military first On one side have been supporterS'of Chairman Mao s theory that ideology is more important than weapons They maintain that the thoroughly indoctrinated soldier will always be more important than the weapons he employs This soldier is China Spiritual atomic bomb Opposing those 5_ who hold these views have been some professional soldiers i- who have argued for more military training and modern equipment They underlined the need for practical training claiming that it will not do to rely solely on ideological lectures Each side recognizes the value of both weapons and ideology The issue has been one of priorities By way of illustration PLA training has been broken down into four stages U During Stage One tl949-l953 training was oriented toward the military first point of view _ The PLA had expanded into an armed force with all services and arms The introduction of large quantities of modern Soviet equipment forced the Chinese to pay more attention to their military training Soviet advisors were pushing Soviet doctrine and tactics which added to the emphasis being placed Fm mulm 6032qu 1 307 33 DMD 33 ONO 12 UMO 13 ONO 33 ONO Emu 3mm 3mm 36 m20 CA - - egg in order to implement the concepts of unified command 'unified equipment and unified training The Ministry military training Chinese entry into the Korean Mar 1 created an even greater emphasis on military training This was caused by the shift from an unconventional guerrilla warfare strategy to one of positional warfare and from unit operations to the joint-operations of services and arms The Korean War proved to be the turning point between their old and new military training and_gave the Chinese their first actual experience in the conduct of a modern war U Stage Two l953 l959 saw the Chinese trying to correct the deficiencies which surfaced during the Korean War It was a period-of modernization and regularization i National Defense was Created in 1954 and under it the 3 i Training'Supervision Department insured the unified direction of the education and training of the various arms of the army and provided policy guidance for the education and training of the naval and air forces During this stage the Chinese began to move away from extensive studying of hussian doctrine and emperiences and gave more consideration to their own conditions Peng Teh-huai the Minister of National Defense placed military techniques foremost in training and denied that political thought was the most important factor in 'Chinese Communist combat effectiveness For this stand and because of his close association with the leaders of the Soviet Union Peng was purged in l959 and the emphasis in re fan-a a 4 - Mao's writings The remaining hours were used for the work gen I training changed accordingly Although the Taiwan crisis occurred during this stage it appears that it had no great effect on Chinese Communist training U Stage Three l959 l967 saw Lin Piao succeed Peng Teh huai as Minister'of National Defense Lin instituted the Revolutionized the Chinese Communist forces to develop the glorious tradition Emphasis was now on ideological-training and required a minimum of 50% of the time be assigned daily for studying of the masses and part time agricultural production This_ left little time for actual military-training Lo Jui ch'ing Chief of General Staff under Lin felt this emphasis was i ldetrimental to national defense Without Lin s approval Lo shifted the emphasis back to military training For his efforts Lo like Peng Tehehuai was purged on the charge of treason against the armed forces it became obvious that stressing military training over political training was unsafe U Military training during this period emphasized basic tTaining within the company especially on the individual soldier team squad and platoon levels After a good foundation-had been laid by company level units the military regions could arrange joint training for a few battalions regiments and divisions as required The India PRC conflict Sino Soviet split and the Gulf of Tonkin incident all took place during this time period however none of them seemed to affect the training doctrine U During Stage Five which began in l967 and has lasted to the present two events occurred which greatly effected the course of PLA training The Cultural Revolution brought most largeascale military training to a standstill what a training that did take place had the following characteristicsi a Short training periods courses which usually lasted_several years were-now given in a few months Emphasis was placed on'experience and not theories c Mutual teaching and learning between students d Inferior quality of students as a result of emphasis placed on family background and political outlook Simplicity lack of training facilities equipment and instructors necessitated keeping training very basic Ul The l969 border conflict with the Soviet Union awoke the Chinese to the-need for effective military training Although ideological training remains number one in priority military training has been upgraded to prepare for combat Combat readiness exercises are-emphasized as well as bivouac training live ammunition firing sea air and land-air joint exercises and long-distance marches Since l969 the largest and probably the best field and command post exercises ever conducted by the Chinese have taken place and this type of training is continuing - Ground Forces I Reporting on training activity in l968 dealt primarily _with communication exercises until midway through the year 11 8Ell-v an exercise in f kien involving armored vehicles -the vicinity of Shang An Hopeh Province The Peking MR -activity seemed to be a normal part-Of the armored training my gf'vl r - Initial indications of more substantive types of training were noted in late May when a radio conversation referenced Armored training was referenced again later in the year as Peking Military Region MR voice communicatibns between ll and 22 November reflected a field exercise involving the 4th Armored Division -This exercise consisted of three phases Preparation and road march combat training and assembly and instruction Between 26 and 28 November two of the armored units were involved in live-fire exercises in - cycle as reflected In 0 training went through-a yearly cycle with small unit and individual training emphasized from January to July and company size exercises during the second half of_the year Larger unit exercises normally seemed to peak in November % The year l969 was marked by increasing COMINT references to armored training and field exercises as well as indications of chemical-biological-nuclear CBN drills amphibious-- training and combined arms exercises Miniature range firing activity occurred at Nankou Peking MR and Ssuping Shenyang MR with basic driver training also being conducted in the latter site Other tank training included location of a firing range'at Tsinan Tsinan MR and driving exercises at Tang Shui Nanching MR Tanks deployed in a field exercise we - -- - e n in September 33 i mum- probably accompanied by rocket launchers were observed in September near Yu kuan chen Peking MR - CBN training was noted in July and August and the first known COMINT reference to amphibious training appeared Throughout l970 indications of training built a picture of more sophisticated large-unit exercises Units have trained in simulated nuciear and chemical-warfare situations and in antiairborne defense Moreover COHINT and PHOTINT acguired evidence of artillery armor and infantry training in a variety of combinations Fall and winter 197D 192l saw some of the most-extensive exercise f age activity ever reflected in COMINT Every military region participated to some degree and nearly every tactical unit 'was at some time inyolved In Kuangchou MR the MR HQ Kuangtung Kmangsi and Hudan Military Districts 4lst 42d and 55th Armies along with virtually every ground force unit in the region took part in a major exercise Air Force participatioh was noted as IL-28IBEAGLE jet light bombers and l3th Air Division tranSports were noted in probable related activity Extensive training exercises continued through spring and summer Elements of two armored divisions in Peking MR maneuvered in the same time period as an air ground exercise in northeast China Whiie neither interregional play nor direct involvement of the Ministry of National I Defense has been apparent the simultaneous and widespread nature of the activity strongly suggests more sophisticated planning at the national level It is likely that these exercises provided an evaluative vehicle for national defense measures taken in response to the 28 August l969 directive to defend the motherland Overhead photographs from_3Q Jandary to 4 February l97l provided evidence of some of the detected activity The first photggraphy of a major combined-arms exercise in Wuhan MR revealed elements of an unidentified tank regiment and probably the 2d Artillery Division training near Chueh-- shan Honan on 2 February l97l Dispersed in a training - area were eight tanks five assault guns l8 rocket launchers 'and 32 field artillery'pieces 0n 3l January 17 tank nassault guns and l8-antiaircraft weapons were deployed in the Huai an area of Peking MR and-on 4 February 29 tanks and l5 assault guns were training in the Tang-shui area of Nandhingl t ActiVe ekercise areas-that have been newly established near Taopuchi Inner Mongolia Taiyuan Shansi Kucheng Tanghsien Houlu and Changhsintien Hopeh provide hundreds of square miles for the training of 2 000-20 000 troops each Located identified training areas can support as many as a quarter million troops at a The preponderance of evidence since mid-l968 indicates that the tempo of PRCA training has increased considerably rm ri 4 and that army representatives continue to participate in I 0 4 - 31 71 A '51 1 1 supportathe-1eft and production activities The 1ack of training activity detected in COMINT during the first ha1f of 1968 most 1ike1y ref1ected the fina1 nonths of the cu1tura1 revo1otion CR when many troops were engaged fu11 time in maintaining order Because the Chinese army has had a history of c1ose invo1vement in civi1 affairs these nonmi1itary activities wi11 no doubt continue but wi11 affect on1y an insignificant percentage'of combat troops and wi11 have neg1igib1 impact on 1eve13 of Many CR activities during civi1 disturbances however had training re1ated benefits For examp1e signa1 medica1 and transportation units were frequent1y ab1e to exercise their specia1itiEs and the army as a who1e gained vita1 Hexperience in projecting units over 1on9 distances No 1ess important many of the production and propaganda duties of the PRCA especia11y during the CR he1ped to heighten the po1itica1 consciousness of the fighter _ Since Chinese mi1itary doctrine p1aces the highest priority on po1itica1 and ideoiogica1 indoctrination the CR was for the entire Peopies Liberation Army a period of maximum ehposure to this most important aspect of training The army has a1ways 1ived with substantia1 demands on resources that otherwise cou1d have been devoted to the sharpening of conbat ski11s and during the CR training_restrictions Were undoubted1y tightened In the aftermath of the CR however mi1itary training has been on the upswing and has taken on added nrgency through a TCS- 6547 7 campaign of war preparations intensified by Sino Soviet 99 '15'1'2'5 kiln l Modem L said- 1- tensions - The ursurge in military training since l969 has stressed nasic military skills as well as communication and field operations Additionally the functional orientation of army- wide training has undoubtedly had the normally expected benefical effect on morale- -The improved state of training has raised the mission effectiveness of Chinese ground units to a level unequalled in peacetime The net result of this - immense nationwide effort has been to increase readiness and enhance materially overall operational capability f Navy To date naval exercises conducted by the respective un- fleets have not demonstrated any capability to conduct offensive nuclear operations The entire spectrum of - exercises appear td'emphasize coastal defense techniques against an inferior naval power _Attached appendix indicates naval vessel activity from l966 l970 It is evident- that there was no Chinese naval reaction to the US naval presence in the Gulf of Tonkin i9661l970 however it would I appear that the navy responded as did the other elements of the Peoples Liberation Army to the need for emphasis on realistic military training following the Sine-Soviet con- frontati on in l969 -Although concentrating on developing an expertise in coastal defense procedures the Chinese are undoubtedly cognizant of the basic essentiais of nuclear defense at sea ne-3 r- 1 V1 f shag It is apparent that individual ships conduct decontaminating drills as well as practicing damage control procedures However again this type of activity suggests an aim of survival _ Air Force Staffing of the 4th Independent Regiment was probably accomplished by transferring pilots and crews from already -existing air units Evidence points to the TU Z equipped lOth Division Nanching as the source of at least ll crews in early l953 Pilots assigned to the 4th Independent Regiment probably had received their training at the and 2d Air Schools in the Shenyang Air Di stricts -3 Following the transfer of the l0 TU- 45 to China in February 1953 pilots of the 4th Independent Regiment Acommenced transitional training at Shihchianchuang This phase of training was apparently dnder the control of Soviet advisors and continued for some five months No reference to Soviet training advisers was noted after September l953 333% 3 t - After September l953 independent training under Chinese supervision included rounderobin flights up to 600 700 miles These reflected an advanced stage of training involving tow targets GCI _and possibly limited over water flights Night operations were first noted in March 1954 and by 1 June of that year _96 such flights had occurred - The Headquarters of the 4th Independent Regiment moved to Peiching on 9 March l954 and to Hukung the following ers-cae sage February Long range flights involving eight to lo aircraft followed Flights of l 400 miles of six to eight hours duration and including as many as 10 aircraft were noted in May l954 These flights had been extended to greater ranges in l957 Retrofit flights from Hukung to the USSR via' Shenyang Air District were believed to have occurred in l958a5 The period April August l95 witnessed the EKtension'of operational training flights of the strategic bomber force to Koerhmu and Lasa It is possible that this unit was employed against the Tibetan guerrillas at that time Late 1958 l959 and early 1960-found increasing flights to Northwest China four to possibly Koerhmu or beyond in April l960 and one to Shhangchengtzu the following June I At least five TU445 were along the Chinese coastal area as airborne bases for shadow operations against intruding PZVs over a-period extending to Augost l963 As many as l5 reactions were counted several involving two and three TU 4s_er flight training with the 4th Independent Regiment was first noted in July and December of l962 when aircraft were observed in round-robin flights from Nukung 'Throughont l964 and 1955 both and werewreflectedZin flights to Northwest China activitiesf probably associated with preparations for the series of nuclear shots that began in October l964 TU lbs have also been employed to act as intruders in operations along the coastal areas to make more realistic the training of AC units in tracking and a - communications techniques - Bomber naVigators are trained at the l th Air School Hsian where a three year including one-year preparatory course is offered -It is believed that most graduates are assigned to units-for operational training Only a select few are assigned to the strategic unit Communications personnel are also trained at the l6th Air School while ground crew personnel are trained at the 8th and 9th Air Schools Shenyang and Changchun respectively Weapons technicians are believed to be trained at the 8th and lOth Air Schools the latter at Taiyuan Unit proficiency of the 4th independent Regiment is probably as high as can be found in the CCAF and_the pilots are probably considered the elite of the air Missile Forces In October l966 a training base was identified at Huwei for personne1 in surfaceeto surface-missile systems However after late l9S6 missilefrelated activity at the facility ceased to be observed and the area showed few -- signs of use and through mid 1968 there was no evidence of crew traintng or firings In l968 Nuwei appeared to be getting ready for new activity nith the construction of new buildings Possibly as early as August l968 troop training could have begun at the Shuangchengtzu Launch Complex On several occasions during the remainder of Z the f year support equipment was visib1e at the 1aunch comp1ex Since-August 1968 there have been 14 confirmed crew training -firings of the 055 and severa1 more firings cou1d have 1 occurred without being detected A training site was identified in September 1970 20 nautica1 mi1es south of Wuwei near Shuangta Here crews became fami1iar with setting the missi1e up and conducting - a 1aunch sequence Actua1 1aunches are not conducted from Huwei or the Shuangta training site - The first photographic evidence of troop training with the IRBM was obtained in coverage of Huwei in November 1970 CSS-Z equipment at this training faci1ity has been - observed throughout 1971 and so far in 1972 - 1 The troops are apparent1y first brought to Wuwei for I'c1assroom'ano missi1e hand1ing instructions After comp1eting c1assroom instructions 655 1 trainees probab1y move to Shuangta for fie1d exercises The crews receive missi1e and equipment fami1iarization training at Wuwei After this phase of training is comp1eted CBS-T crews move to Shuangchengtzu and crews to Wuchai for conducting practice 1aunches When these practice 1aunches are comp1eted the crews apparent1y depart to a-dep1oyed site - os asav75 ea PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT -POLICY AND STRATEGY ANNEX C Command and Control vi _strategic offensive weapons are still in the formatiye stages since these weapons are just now reaching operational When the Chinese leaders decided some time in the mid-19505 to embark on a program to develop and produce nuclear weapons and strategic missile delivery Systems they may have had no very clear idea of just how they would employ these systems ' They may not have developed much doctrine beyond the conviction that the possession of such weapons was essential if China were to join the ranks of the leading military powers U The Chinese command and control procedures for status There are indications that a separate organization has been formed under the Ministry of National Defense as part of the Strategic Operational Missile Authority This new organization the 2nd Artillery Corps was first identified in 1967 and since that time very little has been learned of its composition and mission Three SSM missile test sites have been identified in China with the Shuangchengtzu MissileiTest Center acting as the main - center The other two sites_are the Huchai and Chingyu SSM complexes Other strategic nuclear delivery systems are virtually non- existent at this time with the exception of a few medium range l650 nm bombers Appendix depicts 'the organizational structure of the-PRC strategic missile force The command channel from the strategic Ito-i - 'l missile force a utholri y lo - center and then to the associatedasites makes up the Special Weapons Associated Military Mainline Group A separate communications network exists for functions To date the Military Mainline net has passed_very little radio traffic directly associated with launch activities and it is believed that the more important traffic is routed via landlineu The net is exploitable however and does lend some insight to the missile force capability Since the PRC nuclear force is dust emerging very little change in their command and control policy or strategy has been noted as a result of international incidents or changes in strategy of other nuclear powers Perhaps the only exception is that shortly after the Ussuri incident China's nuclear machinery was set in motion at a'more rapid pace however no strategic nuclear deployments or command and control changes were noted TheChinese have stated that their nuclear doctrine is a firm no-first-use policy In the light of the over whelming nuclear superiority ofhthe US and USSR this is probably a realistic statement of intent at this time It is highly unlikely that Chinese doctrine provides for initiating the use of nuclear weapons against its Asian neighbors Considering China's superior strength in conventional forces nuclear strikes against its Asian neighbors would seem unnecessary would entail great political costs and would risk retaliation from one of the super-powers Initiating a nuclear attack on the US or - nee USSR wou1d invite e 1_mma 10 Jna as an indu str'i and mthary power --_ Om UM mzmm O mm 4uoz r 3 mm fmu ownm Sn 20 02 IO I0 NU 344 oommum gumm lm dummn numzu mm Ohuzm 3 20 03mm 4J02m Ir I 25 3904 FDCZOI m umm 20 Zmu CZ mzl x JOZ Flu 4mm PZU Fomnm i Lllailm 20 0 OOKKPZU bLUuUmZ 9 Pun-d- mllal-H PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY ANNEX D H gh1ights of the Nuclear Weapons Deve10pment Program u 2 I The PeopTes-Repub1ic of China PRC has conducted 14 nucTear weapons deve1opment tests during the period October 1964 through March 1972 The tests designated chronoTogica11y as CHIC 1 through 14 invoTved four fission devices the first second fourth and thirteenth one probabTe fission device the ninth test and eight thermo nuclear devices the fission TN character of CHIC 14 has not yet been determined l The first eTeven PRC tests 1 11 appeared to be directed at the deveTOpment of satisfactory 10w yie1d fission 10 s of KT and high yier thermonuc1ear 3 MT weapons In this group of tests two basic fission device primary designs and_ one basic thermonucTear design have evoTved from ana1vsis of the test debris With the exception of the first thermonucTear test the one basic thermonucTear design which evoTved in the first e1even tests invo1ved a two stage tuba11oy borner incorportating successive improv mehts from prior tests 'The PRC appears to have achieved its goa1 of deveTOping a de1iverab1e 3 MT thermo- nucTear weapon as we11 as 10w yier 10's of KT fission weapons - I -The tweTfth and thirteenth nuc1ear tests appear to represent the start of a new phase of the PRC nuc1ear weapons program was a Ton yier 15 KT test of a - v 1 25 thermonuclear device Significantly debris analysis from - indicates that the device employed a boosted 3plutonium primary 2 KG's_Pui which contained no more than 3 5 KG of oralloy This may be indicative of PRC interest in developing all plutonium primarys or pure fission weapons for tactical uses The test site was heavily instrumented likely for diagnostics around the immediate vicinity of the ground zero This fact and in addition the wide variety of materials found in the CHIC-12 debris indicate that was aiexperiment to explore basic thermonuclear device phenomenology - The thirteenth nuclear test was_a test of a low yield 3 ea 8 KT composite fission weapon It appears possible that CHIC- l3 was delivered by an 9 fighter and may have been a proof test of a tactical weapon The attached table is a recapitulation of the 14 Chinese nuclear weapons tests conducted between l6 October l964 and ll March 1972 U The fourteenth nuclear testhinvolyed a deyice withi a-yield tentatively assessed at l70 kilotons CHIC l4 was an airdropped device most likely delivered by a jet medium_bomber Insufficient evidence is available at this time to permit a determination of the nuclear characteristics of this test weapon res e547w5 v2 TEST CHIC I CHIC 2 CHIC 3 CHIC 4 CHIC 5 CHIC 5 CHIC 7 CHIC CHIC 9 CHIC II CHIC I2 CHIC I3 CHIC BEST YIELD ESTIMATE 25 35 250 I0 300 3 300 15 25 3 000 20 3 400 3 000 I5 I70 tent TABLE I CHINESE TESTS KT DELIVERY GOAL I Tower Fission Design Adapted CHIC I for Bomber Airdrop Airdrop TN DeveTppment REMARKS First attempt to burn TN erI MissiIe Warhead Test I Tower TN DeveTopment Airdrop - TN DeveTopment - Airdrop TN DeveIopment AIrdrop - TN Deyejopment Underground 7% Airdrop TN DaveIopment Airdrop TN DeveIopment Two-stage First fuII erId two stage TN test Tw0 stagefaIIure Two stage First use of pIutonIum Purpose unknowni Surface Effects Diagnostics TN devIce Airdrop Weapons Proof Poss F-9 Airdrop Prob TU-I6 Fission device Insufficient data for evaIuatIon PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND SIRATEGY ANNEX E -Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Production and Related - 7'1 Research and Development and Production Facilities Three major nuclear weapon-related facilities have been identified in China The Koko Nor complex in Tsinghai Province the Hu shiht'ala installation north of the Lop Nor test site in Sinkiang Province and a newly discovered complex near Tzu t'ung in Szechwan Province Our knowledge of both the Hushiht'ala facilities is based entirely on overhead photography In the case of Koko Nor we have a considerable amount of communications intelligence and clandestine services reporting which confirms the existence of a nuclear complex in the area but our under- standing of its specific functio s and capabilities is based entirely on- analysis of overhead photograph y - The interrelationships among these three complexes are not clear Koko Nor is the major nuclear weapons center in China and up to the present at least it has been the major weapons fabrication center as well It has facilities for high explosive and fissile component produCtion lgeneral component cases electrical systems production final weapons assembly HE component testing and environment testing - The idEntification of'the Tzu t'ung complex as a nuclear weapons fabrication center rests on the presence -there of many revetted buildings and three HE test points similar to those at Koko Nor the overall size of the installation and the pattern of dispersal of the facilities - 'attempted to reduce the vulnerability of the complex to It is difficult to determine the operational status of the complex at this time because most of the available photography is small scale It did appear to be complete in early l97l and some portions could have been available for use as early as l969 While precise analysis of the functions of Tzu-t'ung must await higher resolution photography it seems clear that the complex represents a major increase in China's weapons fabrication capabilities - It is possible that the Thu t'ung cOmplex was built to provide strategic duplication and dispersal for both and production There is some evidence the Chinese bombing They haVe strung the buildings along narrow valleys and meticulously minimized the disturbance of the local terrain features and agricultural patterns Koko Nor on the other hand is highly visible - The Hushiht ala installation - built between l965 and l970 - isgclearly involved in not in production but its specific functions are not known Most of the operational structures in the complex are for personnel use and could house offices laboratories light engineering work and classrooms The proximity of the Hushiht'ala installation to the Lop Nor test site suggests that it may be involved in a variety of scientific and engineering activities supporting the test We do not know uhere the Chinese fabricate the nuclear components uranium and plutonium components for nuclear weapons It may be done at Koko Nor Pao Tao and or Yumen _- Two new facilities'in southeast China will significantly increase the PRC capability to produce both enriched uranium and plutonium Currently there is only one enriched uranium production facility the Lanchou Gaseous Diffusion Plant This facility is estimated to be producing weapons grade U-235 at a rate of from 150 to 330 K95 per year 'Modifications underway at Lanchou are expected to increase the plant s capability however dthe great increase in production will-be from the new gaseous diffusion plant at Chinkouko This facility is presently under construction and will probably b fully operational by late 1974 At that time it is estimated that Chinkouho will be producing from 750 to 2950 of U-235 per year - in addition to the original reactor at Yumen the Chinese are also building a secondfvery similar plutonium reactor and chemical spearation plant near Kuangyuan This facility could begin production in mid l973 and should have the same plutonium production capacity as the Yumen reactor 300-400 Kg per annum - A second possible nuclear weapons fabrication complex has also been identified near Tzu-t ung This is in north central China and there is a third facility at Pao tou which also may be producing nuclear components for weapons - The reasons behind all of this expansion are various 'Eirst they may be laying the foundations for future expansion the most_likely explanation Secondly the interior location clearly shows that dispersal was and probably still is one of the prime motives The original 'facilities at Lanchou Yumen and Koko Nor were built with Soviet help but they are- all located close to the Soviet -border and are highly visible and vulnerable to air strikes The new facilities in the Chinese heartland will require hostile bombers to make a deep penetration of Chinese air defenses To make the Tzu- t' ung complex even less vulnerable _the Chinese have strung out the buildings along the narrow valleys making them more difficult to find and hit Finally the great increase in production capacity in these different locations suggests that the Chinese may -be attempting to develop a'redundant capability - The additional nuclear production facilities will make China the third largest nuclear power in the world How- ever even with the present increase in their nuclear -production capacity the Chinese would still have to increase their stockpile capability considerably to match the number of warheads of either the US or USSR It is doubtful that the Chinese would attempt such a move to parity in the next ten years Thus until additonal new nuclear facilities beyond those which the Chinese are now completing become evident they will not have enough nuclear warheads to alter the balance of nuclear forces between the PRC and the US and the ussn - I Nuclear Weapons Control Storage and Logistics IHow the Chinese will control store and handle nuclear weapons for their strategic forces is notclear It is assumed that the authority to use strategic nuclear weapons would be reserved by the highest authority ianeking But as there is no evidence to support this assumption nor to permit the identification of any special communications net- 'work related to the command and control of nuclear weapons - The evidence of the system to be developed for storage and handling of nuclear weapons - from which it might be possible to infer something as to command and control is still very limited Only one stockpile site for the storage of nuclear weapons has been identified so far This site - consists of three vaults in a ridge about l2 nm from the Koko Nor weapons fabrication complex Some of this space is probably used for nuclear weapons inspection maintenance and retrofit - r-3 - U um I n The size of these stors and their proximity to a major weapons production facility sugcests that the Koko hor site is intended to serve as a central stocki'le At present any weaaons shipped from this stocnpile would have to travel over an all weather natural surface road for l2 miles to Koko Nor and some 50 n m further by rail to Hsining before transfer to air transport i-soul d be possible- Bomb Stoiage Operational storage sites for nuclear bombs at airtields have not been identified in China The Chinese practice of placing many of their aircraft storage and maintenance facilities underground will hamper'identification of nuclear weapons storage facilities The Chinese have aiready utilized temporary type facilities to assemble and check out 'nuclear devices during their test program at the Nushiht ala and Shuang ch eng-tzu airfields and it is not possible at this time to rule out the possibility that some nuclear weapons may already be dispersed to temporarys non- identifiable storage facilities at the capable air- fi elds around China - Missile Harhead Storage No facilities constructed specificaiiy to store missile warheads have'been identified in China Hith deployment of operational missile units the Chinese probably will TCQ - a provide facilities at the missile site or with the unit for check out and mating of the warhead and possibly for Vs parate or temporary storage It is not yet clear whether the Chinese will keep nuclear warheads with missile units continuously or keep them in a central stockpile or stockpiles delivering them to operational units only-in times oficrisis Missiles deployed at soft sites will probably not-be continuously on alert and the Chinese could design a logistics system to rapidly deploy warheads from nearby stockpiles to these sites while the missiles were being readied Missiles in hard sites can be kept at a higher state of readiness for extended periodsa and when silo deployment begins-the Chinese almost certainly will keep warheads at the sites or on the missiles - II-EJ7- If