0 -Secrct uAffC Defense Intelligence Assessment Mobile Short-Range Ballistic Missile Targeting in Operation DESERT STORM Key Judgments r G fF3 Efforts to destroy Iraqi mobile short-range ballistic mis siles SRBMs during Operation DESERT STORM have provided valuable lessons in overall U S capabilities to target mobile ballistic missile systems This experi ence has validated the usefulness of several target intelligence sup• port techniques that had never been tested in combat Area limitation 2” • Iraqi tactics further _ i the launch areas 1 the end of the first week of hostilities it became apparent that the Iraqis were op - _•_l_ I_ — _t__• _ 2 V MThe geographic contraction of mobile SRBM operating areas ho’ was still not sufficient to allow for effective Info rnosion s of I Nonbr 1991 OGA-1040-23-97 Ill -‘Ot or ct- 3 VI3-Improvements in national and tactical intelligence collection and architecture might provide mote timely cuing to strike aircraft in certain situations However the inherently mobile nature of SRBM-type targets will probably not support the translation to a “fixed ‘sotutioñ t of tar”’ - I The key to successful future appears to be developing intelli type opemtion search areas to the point thL narrow sufficiently to gence capabilities tactical aircraft can effectively search the area and localize targets of interest - vr tc r ru M ex perience also h iights the need to develop and exercise an adap tive targeting architecture aimed at shortening current target intelligence mission planning and force execution timelines The lessons learned in Operation DESERT STORM can provide the framework to develop more effective and realistic approaches to targeting mobile systems in the future iv - Mobile Short-Range Ballistic Missile Targeting in Operation DESERT STORMS Introduction —‘l3fl413 Efforts to destroy Iraqi mobile short-range ballistic missiles SRBMs during Operation DESERT STORM have provided valuable lessons regarding overall U S capabilities to detect locate identify and target mobile ballistic missile systems This study examines the information gained in Operation DESERT STORM including intelligence successes and shortfalls In addition intelligence estimates made before the outbreak of hostilities mobile SRBM target intelligence support provided during the war and an assessment of the results of the counter-SRBM targeting efforts against Iraq are surveyed proved to be a generally accIrate portrayal of actual Iraqi wartime operations By late August 1990 the bulk of the Iraqi SRBM force had dispersed from central support bases such as bases rrsed OL flVN rThe effectiveness of the imagery effort in identifying SRBM-related dispersed t bases cannot be 1 • — Prehostilities Intelligence Assumptions • —0frW NINumerous general assessments regarding Iraq’s SRBM force including operational concepts of force dispersal and ie ana ysis resulted inthe identilication of dozens of potential SRBM forward support facilities that were duringthetT-’ elements coupled with -optical imagery search and analysis resulted in specialized target materials being produced both before and during the war Iraqi SRBM Force Dispersal and Forward Deployment LE’WN -The operational paradigm of Iraqi SRBM operations developed prior to the conflict dilemma of targeting these facilities became particularly acute in western Iraq late in the conflict It became the sole remaining western —k441UtOfl N r3o4-€t mobile SRBM launch area during the final period of the war and it most likely contained at least one support base —See Iraqi Extended-Range SCUD System Capabilities Assessment JfNETcchnicat cstimatcs of Iraqi SRBM capabilities were particularly important 3 5tUHt IINUt-J were also used to shed tight on general SRBM operating areas L to the mobile missile target support mission Operational launches later confirmed the model-derived assessments of Iraqi-modified SCUD range payload and accuracy Assessments of maximum modified SCUD range proved valuable in bounding potential launch areas prior to the outbreak of hostilities Based on these estimates range arcs within 580 to 620 kilometers of probable targets in the US Central Command USCENTCOM area of responsibility and in Israel defined potential launch areas These factors further refined by area limitation analysis proved reliable in predictii ‘MLWiThis area limitation analysis significantly reduced the overall imagery search and later armed aircraft search requirements li by successfully operating areas ’ I Mobi e SRBM Operating Area limitation Ana lysis ttr l 4 ffrmr C IT -From a targeting perspective prehostilities intelligence analysis provided a firm basis for determining general Iraqi SRBM s and I i-potential launch zones - Wartime Mobile SRBM Targeting Support Wartime Locationat Intettigence J1T7W 1raqi SRBM tactics and additional intetligence data quickly focused the location of SRBM firing sites initially based on prewar analysis zery s ti r 5 Effect ofIraqi SRBM Tactics - Gif ’WN _By the end of the first week of hostilities it became apparent that the Iraqis were operating from a relatively smati number of discretely defined “launch baskets ” These launch baskets can be rou ibed as taunch area - C’Zff Iraqi SRBM operating tactics presumably largely influenced by Soviet doctrine were specifically designed to minimize the vulnerability of the missile force by denying precise locational cuing to the enemy both br-- “ - Use ofReady-Hide Positions and Rapid Rede ployment Tacics4Sff TFA49 F1WConceaIment Methods Iraqi mobile missile launcher crews also effectively and Southeastern Iraq 6 _••%_ - --- e4- f’JNFiWNr Communication Security Iraq appears to have successfully employed communication sec”ritv nn’ complicate Coalition force targeting efforts Iraq appeared to have recognized that at the very least enemy forces would locate the missile launch — 7 i4F ’W43 false Target Generation SRB M targeting was greatly complicated because of the high number of apparently false targets attacked during counter-SRBM operations This false target phenomenon appeared to be the result of both Iraq’s use of decoys and its predilectior for operatingthe mobile missile force in areas that generally support numerous other l vehicles ‘3POI” — j Intelligence Cuing Shortfalls 8 E The CounEer-RBM Effort Effectiveness — Measures of launcher’s mobile nature which allowed Iraq to quickly move or hide destroyed or damaged launchers make bomb damage assessments extremely difficult What is more quantifiable at least at present is the impact of Coalition counter-SRBM operations on Iraqi mobile missile operating tempos 1 9i1 1 ”W4 The targeting challenge posed by the mobile missile operations problem presents equally difficult problems in measuring the effectiveness of such an effort Traditional measures of effectiveness based on thorough battle damage assessments provide a confused picture of the results of Coalition counter-SRBM efforts and may not prove to be the most germane means of assessing the campaign’s effectiveness 1fl iT ’WN A comparison of Iraqi mobile SRBM operations between the 1988 “War of the Cities” during the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war indicates that Coalition anti-SRBM efforts had a significant effect on reducing Iraq’s operating tempo either by destroying launchers and related logistics or by disrupting Iraqi operations These numbers suggest that anti-SRBM efforts may have contributed to the decline in Iraqi operating tempo although such figures cannot be viewed as conclusive This is particularly apparent given the disparities between Iraqi war aims during the Iran-Iraq war and DESERT STORM and the concomitant uncertainties s Oi1I17WtT -Coalition aircrews reported that more than launchers were da”” destroyedT JA review of available imagery and limited quantities of available gun camera film indicate that many of these reported kills were against vehicles similar in app launchers _such - -- low operating tempo that ‘Iraq sustained during DESERT STORM is especially telling in western Iraq where after the second week of the conflict Iraq was able to launch only four SCUDs per week furthermore launches from western Iraq where the counter-SRBM effort was exceptionally intense constituted a continually diminishing percentage of total Iraqi SRBM launches Conclusion Ltlic Iraqi’s USC ftfF LThc DESERT STORM experience should assist intelligence and operational planners in of decoys 9 improving current targeting strategies against mobile ballistic missile systems in the Third World and against the Soviet problem The proliferation of these systems along with improved guidan packages and the potential availability of chemical and biological warfare counter-SRBM operation needs to be built upon Area limitation analysis with the special imagery signature analysis conducted before and during the war proved to be a valid predictor of warheads provide Third World cvuntties with an attractive and relatively cost-effective attack option More importantly for these states acxuiring ballistic missiles or a nuclear biological or chemical warfare capability would allow them to achieve regional political status and the ability to apply geopolitical pressure against other countries i’i successes occurred they clearly did not provide a clear-cut solution to the targeting problem that Iraqi mobile missiles posed iWThc DESERT STORM 10 QOtO key to successful future operation against relocatable targets appears to be the development of realistic intelligence capabilities to sufflcientty narrow search areas to the point that tactical aircra I — €YN 3 Improvements in the intelligence architecture might provide somewhat more precise and timely cuing to strike aircraft in certain situations However the inherently mobile nature of these targets will probably not support the translation of mobile missile tar”’ to a “fixed target” type solutic eL_ively search the area and targets E_ The lessons learned during Operation DESERT STORM can provide the framework for developing a more effective realistic approach to targeting both Third World ballistic missiles and Soviet mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles in the future Reverse Blank 11