own 4 1min In I thl I I 1 1 1 1'11 Copy of Raport No DS-INTEL-IB June 16 2005 Review OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE Review of the Actions Taken to Deter Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes U 0n 1H 1 U1 1' l1U1 U1 11ffll 11 DOD OIG Water-hem Additional Copies rIfow have uestions on the report or to request co ies contact 1 at 604 DSN 664nimf ork Suggestions for Evaluations To suggest ideas for or to request evaluations of Defense intelligence issues contact the Of ce of the Deputy InSpector General for Intelligence at 703 604-8800 DSN 664-8800 or fax 703 604-0045 Ideas and requests can also be mailed to Of ce of the Deputy InSpector General for Intelligence Department of Defense Of ce of Inspector General 400 Army Navy Drive Room 703 Arlington VA 22202-4704 0F m line To report fraud waste mismana gomenband abuse of authorlty Sand written corrpIaIntsto Defense Ihe Pentagon Washington DC 20301-1900 Phone 800 424 9093 e-n'all Acronyms Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control Communicato in and Intelligence inns so use nus see 6 ill en re 11 1gence gency CDI Center for Defense Information CIFA Counterintelligence Field Activity CSP Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DCI Director of Central Intelligence Department of Defense Department of Justice Department of State FBI Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ISA Foreign Intelligence Surveiliance Act HUMINT Human Intelligence JCEO Joint Counterintelligence Evaluation Office ONCIX Of ce of the National Counterintelligence Executive NSA National Security Agency SAFE Support for the Analyst s File Environment SAP Special Access Program SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information SECDEF Secretary of Defense SIGINT Signals Intelligence USSOUTHCOM US Southern Command DIG 000002 1 1 4 c - INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE ARLINGTON VIRGINIA 22202 4704 June 16 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION SUBJECT Review of the Actions Taken to Deter Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes Report No 8 U U We are providing this report for information and use We conducted the review in response to a request from the Chairman House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence We considered management cements on a dra of this report in preparing the nal report 6 Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of Directive 7650 3 Although management concurred with all recommendations we request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics periodically provide us with the status of the plan 0 im a ac 0 4 CIA 5o u s c 403 Sec 6 DIA - iate the co 505 37 extended 0 06 aff Questions should be directed to Mama- leer bem I 664 ee Appendix or ereport Histnution earn members for this rerew are listed on inside back cover Thomas F Gimble' Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence DOD OIG 000003 DISTRIBUTION UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE INSPECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DIRECTOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY DOD OIG 000004 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK U came- 11 1 41 U Ana Montes receives the National Intelligence Certi cate of Distinction from DIA muse then-Deputy DCI George Tenet in DODIG 1-11-31 I DUDDUB Department of Defense Of ce of the Inspector General Report No June 16 2005 Project No 12 U Review of the Actions Taken to Deter Detect and Investigate the ESpionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes U Executive Summary UIIFQUQ Who Should Read This Report and Why Congressional intelligence oversight committees and the Intelligence Community should read this report to gain a better appreciation for the Cuban espionage threat to the United States The lessons learned from the Ana Montes case should help to counter future threats to national security U Introduction On September 2 l 2001 following months of intense scrutiny Federal Bureau of Investigation of cials arrested Ana Belen Montes at the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington D C on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States Ms Montes had been an employee of the U S Government for 22 years and had been employed as an intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency for the better part of those years She was recruited by the Cuban Intelligence Service in 1984 while employed by the Department of Justice Montes pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment and was sentenced to 25 years in prison on October 16 2002 She is currently serving her sentence at the Carswell Federal Medical Center Fort Worth Texas U0119459 In April 2002 the Director of Central Intelligence directed the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive to conduct a comprehensive damage assessment of the espionage activities of Ana Montes The Office of the Nationai Counter-intelligence Executive organized the Montes Damage Assessment Team to focus on the identi cation of US classified and sensitive information that was put at risk and possibly compromised to the Cuban Intelligence Service by Ms Montes between 1985 and 2001 The Damage Assessment report was published in January 2005 UHF-GHQ On August 27 2003 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General initiate a full review of the Montes security breach and the response of the US Intelligence Community to that activity The Committee further requested that the Inspector General include recommendations to correct identi ed weaknesses in Defense Intelligence Agency security and counterespionage procedures and practices If possible to acquire a complete mosaic ofthe life ofAna Montes and the totality of her espionage activities in support of Cuba this report should be read in conjunction with the Office of the National Counterintelligenee Executive Damage Assessment on Ms Montes U Objective Our objective was to examine the cepionage activities of Ana Belen Montes to determine the effectiveness of the Defense Intelligence Agency s security and counteresoionage policy procedures and practices relating to that case to assess the WW Intelligence Community s reactions to the Montes security breach and identify lessons learned that might prevent recurrence of espionage activities perpetrated against the United States U Results Based on our review we conclude that Lam inns in C 4-3 1 Willi-5 10 List a we tell mE om lens 10 List glitz-7 11 hit-5 burnt thjfit us a 424 over nitrite Dla inns SC gall-'4 thEfi U During the review we made several observations While the observations do not necessarily encompass the scope of the review they have an effect on the ability of the Intelligence Community to deter detect and investigate espionage activities perpetrated against the United States - Once Ana Montes was identified as a suspect the investigation leading to her arrest and conviction was a model of efficiency and effectiveness Um lull-3 in US C I124 inT E in we mm I 000008 so as sacs-151m thJIanE - The Defense Intelligence Agency s adoption of risk management as the operating information technology philosophy successfully postulates that it is possible to balance the risk of disclosure against the cost of protection W Summary of Recommendations We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence request that the intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum conduct a comprehensive joint evaluation of counterespionage information sharing formulate a plan to establish permanent Foreign Counterintellimqero billest to ibulda counteres ionage organization similar to the clan-map so Ll gurusand direct all entlties w1th po ygrap programs 1g1 me an re am or a minimum of 35 years all counterintelligence scope polygraph examination charts to We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics continue the process of establishing a central registry for personnel with access to Special Access Programs ma thus to 5 ass was burnt 1 We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security continue working with Congress to change polygraph provisions in Title i0 United States Code section 15643 and then update Directive 5210 48 and Regulation 5210 48-R accordingly Din bull to Ll 3C 3 42 1 tili5l- iDllI'liEl lb 1 1th 1111- - 1111131 in LI 3 51124 1111151 UHF-989 Finally we would like to acknowledge that we are deeply indebted to the Of ce of the National Counterintelligence Executive Montes Damage Assessment Team for its outstanding cooperation guidance and advice We are also grateful for the support given to us by Special Agents and counterintelligence of cials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington Field Of ce and counterintelligence officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency Their professional support helped us to better understand the complexities of counterespionage in general and Ana Montes betrayal of her country in particular U Management Comments We received comments on a draft of this report from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence the Director Defense Intelligence Agency the National Security Agency the Central Intelligence Agency and the InSpector General Department of Justice All organizations concurred with our recommendations however some suggestions were made to clarify the report See Part for the complete text of those comments While not required to comment on a draft of this report the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive offered meaningful informal suggestions and advice that clari ed the factual content of the report U Review Response Management comments were reaponsive Although management concu1red with all r ecommendations we request that the Under Sectetary of Defense foi Acquisition Technology and Logistics periodically plovide us with the status of the plan to implement tthe central 1e- ist1 CIA 11111 5 1 5131 13 31 1 4113 Sec 5_ 1111-1 I 000010 Wm U Table of Contents U Executive Summary U Part I Introduction U Background U Objective U Scope and Methodology U Limitations U Acknowledgment U Structure of the Report U Part II The Enigmatic Life of Ana Montes U Early Years U Education U Religion U Health U Lifestyle U Political Influence U An Employment Opportunity at the Department of Justice U Introduction to Espionage U Joining the Defense Intelligence Agency U Portrait ofa Spy U Part Government Service and a Commitment to Espionage U Initial Government Employment UHF-GHQ Recruitment by the Cuban Intelligence Service Moral Imperatives Justify Treason UHF-GHQ Valuable Asset for the Cubans U Background Developments at U DIA Applicant Processing U DIA Personnel Security and Clearance Adjudication Practices for New Employees U The Night Job Picks Up U Sharpening Skills as a DIA Analyst--I 986-1990 as a Cuban Clandestine Reporting Source A Second Clandestine Trip to Cuba U Security Reinvestigationn 991 U Coupling Analytic Expertise Eqs-riona A_tivities U Exceptional Analyst Program i i e Montes Encounters an ea 5 'o ygrap UHF-GHQ Counterespionage Efforts Against Cuba h I ON U Part IV Maturation as Analyst and Spy 33 4 13 See a 33 U Attendance a caemic orums 34 U Events Surrounding the Brothers to the Rescue Incident 35 U Signi cant Travel and Recognition 37 U Security Processing 39 U CountereSpionage Efforts Against Cuba 39 UH-F999 Support for the Analyst s File Environment System 42 U Prelude to Catching a Spy 43 U Part V A Prominent Life Un raveled 45 Concerns 45 U Signi can rave an Recognition 46 U Respect for Montes Deepens 43 U Additional Access 49 UHF-GHQ A Potential Fellowship at the National Intelligence Council Clouded by an Inspector General Investigation 49 Counterespionage Efforts Against Cuba 51 U The End Game 58 UH-F989 The Finale to More Than Sixteen Years of Espionage 63 U Post Arrest 63 U Part VI Findings Recommendations and Observations 65 U Part VII Appendixes 113 U Appendix A Montes Of cial and Unof cial Travel 1 15 U Appendix B Montes Awards Recognition and Training 121 U Appendix C Background on the Brothers to the Rescue incident 127 C Appendix D Montes Accesses to Sensitive Programs and Information 129 UHF-GHQ Appendix E 131 U Appendix F Report 1s 11 noon 133 U Part Management Comments 135 U A Of ce ofthe Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics 136 U B Under Secretaw of Defense for intelligence 37 U C Director Defense lntelli ence Agency 145 U E en ra nte igence gency 154 U F Inspector General Department of Justice 164 I I 000012 U Part I Introduction U Background UHF-GHQ On September 21 2001 following months of intense scrutiny and surveillance Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI of cials interviewed and then arrested Ana Belen Montes at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center Defense Intelligence Agency DIA Washington DC She was charged with conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States in violation of 18 United States Code section 794 a and Monies pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment on March 19 2002 The court sentenced her to 25 years in prison on October 16 2002 She is currently serving her sentence in the Carswell Federal Medical Center Fort Worth Texas Ms Montes was a US Government employee for 22 years the last 16 of which 1985-2001 she was an intelligence analyst with the BIA The Cuban Intelligence Service recruited her in late 1984 while she worked as a paralegal at the Department of Justice Dot in Washington 3 0 W On April 2002 the Director of Central Intelligence DCI directed the Of ce of the National Counterintelligence Executive to conduct a comprehensive Intelligence Community2 damage assessment of the espionage activities of Ana Montes The ONCIX organized a Montes Damage Assessment Team The Team formulated Terms of Reference which the DCI approved on August 6 2002 The Terms of Reference focused on identifying U S classi ed and sensitive information that Montes put at risk and possibly compromised to the Cuban Intelligence Service between 1985 and 2001 The ONCIX published its damage assessment report on Montes in January 2005 On August 2003 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General initiate a full review of the Montes security breach to include the response of the U S Intelligence Community The Committee further requested that the Inspector General include recommendations to correct identi ed weaknesses in DIA security and counterespionage procedures and practices The Committee suggested that the Inspector General review consider the basic report framework that the Inspectors General of the Central Intelligence Agency CIA and the Do used in their investigations of the espionage cases involving Aldrich Ames a CIA intelligence of cer and Robert I-Ianssen a senior FBI Special Agent in 1994 and 200 respectively On September 30 2003 following a series of discussions l U The ONCIX is responsible For improving the performance ofthe counterintelligence community by identifying assessing prioritizing and countering intelligence threats to the United States ensuring counterintelligence community efficiency and effectiveness and providing the integration ofthe countertntelligence activities ofthe U S Government The intelligence Community is composed ofthe Central Intelligence Agency the National Security Agency the Defense Intelligence Agency the Department of State s Bureau oflnteiligence and Research the National Reconnaissance Of ce the National GeospatiaI-Intelligence Agency and the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the Department of the Treasury the Department of Energy the Department of Homeland Security the Coast Guard and the Military Departments with the Chief of the ONCIX Montes Damage Assessment Team and officials who led the CIA and Do investigations of Amos and Hanssen Committee staff members and Inspector General representatives agreed on an open-ended reasonable time for issuing the report We initiated the review on October 1 2003 U Objective U The objective of our review was to examine the espionage activities of Ana Belen Montes to determine the effectiveness of DIA security and counterespionage policy procedures and practices relating to that case to assess the Intelligence Community reactions to the Montes security breach and to identify lessons learned that might prevent recurrence of espionage activities perpetrated against the United States To acquire a complete mosaic of the life of Ana Montes and the totality of her espionage activities in support of Cuba this report should be read in conjunction with the January 2005 ONCIX Montes damage assessment U Scope and Methodology UH-13999 We used an historical research design to reconstruct the past objectively and accurately by collecting evaluating verifying and evidence to establish facts and reach defensible conclusions We augmented that approach with compare-and-contrast methodologies where appropriate Our historical research design included the following eight components I We reviewed and analyzed more than 250 000 pages of relevant documentation received from and non-DoD entities that included the ONCIX Montes Damage Assessment Team the FBI the CIA the BIA the National Security Agency NSA the National Reconnaissance Office the National GeOSpatiai-Intelligence Agency selected elements ofthe Of ce ofthe Secretary of Defense including the Counterintelligence Field Activity CIF A the Department of State the Military Departments selected Combatant Commands and the Polygraph Institute We obtained a large portion of the relevant documentation from the ONCIX Montes Damage Assessment Team which had initially received the documentation from the FBI and DIA 2 We reviewed and analyzed other relevant documentation obtained from data calls to and non-DoD entities for historical e-mail records 3 We reviewed more than 40 transcripts of Montes debrie ngs conducted between the spring of 2002 and mid-2004 by of cials who had a major interest in her activities Videotapes accompanied many of the transcripts 4 We interviewed 78 current and former U S Government employees who had rsthand information or expert knowledge of the issues related to Montes The interviews were primarily open-ended narratives with additional questions and sessions as required Before we conducted the interviews we reviewed the results lol I 000014 nice-Wm of more than 100 FBI interviews Letterhead Memoranda of individuals who were directly or indirectly associated with Montes Those reviews helped us to determine whether followup interviews of those individuals were required and further assisted us in developing a list of of cials not yet interviewed whom we needed to contact to satisfy our objective Speci cally we interviewed cognizant civilian and military representatives from the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense the CIA FBI DIA NSA the National Military Joint Intelligence Center the Air Force Of ce of Special Investigations the Naval Criminal Investigative Service the Polygraph Institute and the CIFA We also interviewed a former Director ofthe DIA and Ana Montes 5 We discussed methodology best practices historical perspectives pro les and many other issues related to the Montes case with the II Director DIA Inspector General DIA DJA thudAssociate Director Office of Oversight and Review Do - Chief Counterintelligence Division Americas Section FBI Headquarters - Special Agents Washington D C New York San Diego and Dallas ield Offices FBI II General Counsel Office of the Inspector General CIA CIA nits t Chief I I Director Assessments Group ONCIX I Chief Montes Damage Assessment Team ONCIX - Executive Vice President Academy Group Inc a forensic behavioral science company - Of cials at the Federal Bureau of Prisons Carswell Federal Medical Center Fort Worth Texas 6 We searched the World Wide Web and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System for information on Government and non-Government organizations and information related to the Montes case We reviewed contemporary literature for historical information on espionage cases perpetrated against the United States 8 We conferred with counterintelligence and counterespionage of ciais at the 2004 Defense Counterintelligence Conference to gain a better appreciation of specific issues related to the Montes case WW U Limitations U We encountered three limitations during our review First Ana Montes entered US Government service in 1979 and subsequently began her career as an intelligence analyst at DIA in 1985 Thus some individuals particularly higher level officials with broader responsibilities found it difficult to recall speci c events or circumstances that occurred or details of actions taken several years ago Second we were unable to recover all of the historical records related to Montes particularly hard copy documents such as letters memoranda informal notes and records of meetings that may have been destroyed purged or discarded regularly before computers became widely used Even after reviewing more than 250 000 pages of documentation we couId not state categorically that we possessed all the necessary documents Third we were unable to obtain the Do 2003 classified report Review of the Performance in Deterring Detecting and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen Although the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence charged us to use the Hanssen and Ames reports as our guide for constructing the Montes report numerous requests to read the Hanssen report were rejected The and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence did not share the contents of the Hanssen report The CIA gave us access to their report on Ames U Acknowledgment UIIFQHQ We are deeply indebted to the ONCIX Montes Damage Assessment Team for its outstanding cooperation guidance and advice We appreciate the Team s can do spirit in assisting us in our objective We are also grateful for the support given to us by Special Agents and counterintelligence officials from the FBI Washington Field Of ce and counterintelligence officials from the DIA Their professional support gave us a better understanding of the complexities of counterespionage in general and Ana Montes betrayal of her country in particular Furthermore with rare exceptions of cials at every Government agency that we encountered gave us unrestricted access to all pertinent documentation and to key individuals who were associated with the Montes espionage case U Structure of the Report UHFQ-U-G This report is presented in eight parts including Part I the Introduction Part II provides a comprehensive mosaic of the life of Ana Belen Montes Parts IV and review Montes professional career and her career as a spy These parts also detail U S Government counterespionage efforts against Cuba during each period Part covers 1979 to 1994 Part IV I994 to 1998 and Part V 1998 through Montes arrest in 2001 Part VI addresses findings recommendations and observations Part VII contains six appendixes Appendix A discusses Montes of cial and unofficial travel Appendix lists the awards recognition and training that Montes received while employed at the BIA Appendix provides background on the Brothers to the Rescue incident Appendix lists Montes Intelli ence Communit accesses A endix explainsmemzeofw Appendixr In I 000015 1 4 6 contains the report distribution list Part contains management comments A list of commonly used acronyms is at the front of the report 0 Wm U Part II The Enigmatic Life of Ana Montes The King hath note of all that they intend by interception which they dream not of King Henry V Act 11 Scene II Shakespeare This quotation was found in Montes work place cubicle the day of her arrest She later explained that the quotation applied to her doubie life as a DIA intelligence analyst and as an espionage agent for Cuba U Early Years om m1 In I 000018 11 14% U Education U Religion UHF-9H9 U Health DU DIG mm U Lifestyle W Montes lived alone During her time in Washington she owned one modest condominium She portrayed herself as an introverted loner who did not need people to be ful lled She limited her social contacts to family members individuals she met in college and graduate school coworkers at the or members of the condominium association in which she was active She rarely invited colleagues to her home At work she seldom left her desk avoided office get- togethers and cultivated a reputation for being aloof She said she sacrificed a normal life and did not want pelsonal relationships to intelfere with hel iona activities In so doin_ she dated onl intermittent until her earl 405 DIM mil 1 416 313 ballbl U Political In uence saws Despite he1 family 3 meme of political and social activism Montes was politically inactive There IS no evidence to suggest that she attempted to join a WW 1 art or a uolitical action --rou In colle_e she exressed a commitment to U An Employment Opportunity at the Department of ustiee W Montes 1eceived some monetaly support from her fathel and woiked numeious a1t time and summer obs to assist in financin her colle education In I 000020 W In the fall of 1979 she accepted ajob as a clerk typist and then became a paralegal in the Of ce of Privacy and Information Appeals at the Do in Washington D C She analyzed Do records requested under the Freedom of Information Act and determined whether the documents could be released She helped in processing Freedom of Information Act appeal cases in which justi cation for or against the release of classified information was discussed in her presence by law enforcement policy and intelligence of cials from the FBI the CIA the NSA and the National Security Council She also wrote related af davits for court responded to congressional inquiries conducted training seminars and reviewed classified information for possible declassification She worked at the Do for nearly 6 years and it was during this time that Montes first ventured into the world of sources and methods counterintelligence investigations policy debates over disclosure and declassification of classi ed information U Introduction to Espionage W According to ONCIX Montes Damage Assessment Team FBI investiga ors an IA counterintelligence officials her decision to Spy was coolly deliberate The traitorous decision to betray her country was based on a combination of factors including an ingrained hostility toward US policy on Latin America an immature self serving personality aimed at retaliation against authority and a misguided sense of morality arms The activities of a Cuban access agent at Johns Hopkins provided the impetus that launched Montes career in espionage The access agent a fellow student apparently aware of Montes criticism of US policy in Latin America made a soft pitch to her in the summer of 1984 The agent asked whether Montes would be willing to meet some friends who were looking for someone to translate Spanish language news articles about Nicaragua into English The friends turned out to be a Cuban intelligence of cial at the Cuban Mission to the United States in New York City At dinner in New York City in December I984 Montes unhesitatingly agreed to work through the Cubans to help Nicaragua She agreed to provide the Cubans with a short autobiography and to visit Cuba as soon as practical In March 1985 Montes traveled to Cuba via Madrid Spain and Prague Czechoslovakia for her first clandestine trip as an espionage agent SAM In a series ofdebrie ngs following her arrest and conviction Montes said that the Reagan Administration s 1930s regional policy of Opportunism led to the in hues Wm Grenada intervention in 1933 That event her negative views on US foreign policy She said that the United States backed the wrong side in the wars in Central America in the 19803 and she supported the leftist insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala She believed that the United States did not respect the countries of Latin America and caused the death of people who didn t deserve to be killed In her view Cuba was victimized by US repression and she concluded that she had the moral right to provide information to Cuba Throughout her career as a clandestine agent she believed that destiny was offering me an Opportunity to do everything that I coold to help Cuba She often exclaimed couldn t give up on the people I was helping In sum she indicated that she felt morally rewarded SW-F Montes saw U S sopport for the Contras in Nicaragua as unjust and wrong She had a negative impression ofU S policy on Cuba believing that Cuba was not an enemy of or even a threat to the United States She believed that the fall of the Soviet Union increased the probability that the United States would invade Cuba She said If the United States could invade Panama for no justifiable reason then they couldjust as easily invade Cuba and take advantage of their weakness In her view Cuba needed her help to defend itself She believed that US policy was to try to destroy Cuba or force it to change the way it functions She admired Castro believing that he was a nationalist who would not have gone running into the hands of the Russians if the United States had not tried to overthrow his regime Montes claimed that she was not a Communist but that she strongly sympathized with the socio-economic goals of both the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions She claimed that her world view was similar to that of Castro She continually emphasized that she tried to avoid expressing her political views while at work to minimize suspicion The ONCIX Montes Damage Assessment Team noted that although many of her colleagues in the Intelligence Community were aware of her views on Nicaragua and Cuba none apparently believed that they were extreme enough to worry about sans Montes claimed that her sensitivity to m helped drive her decision to work with 11 ans on es never suggested that she worked for the Cubans She noted that her relationship with the Cubans was one based on mutual reapect and understanding According to her the Cubans were thoughtful of her were dedicated to their cause and sensitive to her needs In short Montes indicated that the Cubans were very good to me She was a comrade in the struggle against the United States policy on Cuba whose government hurt no people She knew that helping Nicaragua and Cuba was a violation of the law but stated My sense of moral obligation persuaded me that this is what I had to do or I could not live with myself She said was really doing something that was right She also stated that she would have rejected any offer by the Cubans to pay for her services 3 8m 1 4m Ema to m 1 11th I 000022 U Joining the Defense Intelligence Agency SM Following her recruitment by the Cubans in late 1984 and her first clandestine trip to Cuba in March 1985 Montes realized that she would need a job with access to classi ed information on the civil war in Nicaragua if she were to help the people of Nicaragua The classi ed information she had access to at the was narrow in scope and historical in nature She could not obtain unfettered access to classified information at her workplace she was allowed to review particular documents only when her duties required such access SW-F Montes continuously and vehemently argued that the Cubans had no role in directing her to find work at the BIA However as part of the early 2002 plea bargain negotiations Montes counsel provided an attorney proffer that she was Speci cally targeted by the Cubans to apply for a position at the BIA and that they assisted her in preparing her application In June 1985 at Johns Hopkins graduate whom Montes said she did not previously know helped to get her interviews with hiring officials at the BIA After two interviews she was offered l'lA' ti 3 1t Ll 1 53 and acce ted srtton as an entry-level it a Flt-L s tetra gagq nor 0 her departure from the Do one official suggested that Montes was disloyal to the United States because of her opposition to U S policy on the war in Nicaragua When questioned by the Defense Investigative Service 8 months after her arrival at the BIA she claimed that as a citizen she had the right to disagree with the policies of her government Throughout her tenure at the DIA she claimed that she never advocated the overthrow of the US Government security records indicate that in 1996 only one employee expressed concern about Montes and that a DIA security review found insufficient reason for further review or investigation 873M At DIA Montes was considered a stellar employee who was well regarded professionally by supervisors and many of her peers in the Intelligence Community Although she indicated that she believed she may have been hired by the BIA because of her academic background her ability as a Spanish linguist and her gender she stated that when she began her career at the BIA did not know the difference between a corporal and a colonel and I m not kidding I didn t even know which Service was wearing the green uniform and which Service was wearing the She was a quick learner however She took advantage of training courses offered by the BIA and other agencies and visited US military bases to hone her skills as a military analyst Over time she drew rave reviews from DIA management many of whom stated that whenever a tough job surfaced Montes was chosen to resolve the issue Shim-1 Other Intelligence Community and managers outside the did not give her such high marks and did not refer to her as Ms Cuba a view held sometimes grudgingly with a mixture of jealousy by many officials trots-ts Concurrent with her application for employment with DIA Montes applied for positions at the Disarmament Committee at the Library of Congress Federal Research Division and the Naval investigative Service now Naval Criminal Investigative Service The Naval Investigative Service rejected her application and the Federal Research Division offered her a position after she had committed to DIA Earlier she had applied for a position as a Latin American specialist with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency but never received noti cation from that agency on the status of her application 11 DI Montes was considered a loner who at times was emotional and unyielding in her views on Latin American political and military affairs She exhibited a rigid posture which manifested a superiority complex One coworker described her as a different kind of person who kept to herself Unbeknownst to her she was given the nickname la otra which in Spanish means the other or the outsider SW41 Th1oughout her career at DIA Montes had access to agency decision makers intelligence collectors Operational plans sensitive pto__rams_ an rn 'litary exercises From October 1985 throu- 1 1933 I Irec ora s eld asirnilai position as a She assumed the portfolio for - on uban issues until her arrest in September 2001 At various times in her career her areas of responsibility included the Dominican Republic Guatemala Brazil and Panama As an intelligence analyst Montes was responsible for assessing military and political issues and armed forces capabilities She prepared reports articles and brie ngs and represented DIA in numerous interageney forums associated with her area of expertise Among countless other enterprises she briefed the President-elect of Nicaraua 3 con ressional leaders and members of thei1 staffs she was a member of the li' 11111 511113 Mb SW that focused on innovative options f01 targeting us 3 pa 1c1pa e- 1n construct ofthe National Human Intelligence Collection Directives on Cuba and she served as an expert analyst in the National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the aftermath of the 1996 shoot down of Brothers to the Rescue aircra 1111 111 1111 1 41 1 Mill 1111151113424 bur-1 12 3 009024 Montes traveled extensively in her of cial capacity and found enough opportunity to visit foreign countries for personal vacations as well as to satisfy her clandestine commitments to her Cuban handlers UM-1999 Montes reputation as a skilled briefer is well documented She received accolades for a variety of presentations given to senior US and foreign officials such as the I but 1-1-1124 12 111 11 11 11 senses-ms 1- - rte-1 Elisa 10 LED 5-42-14 i ii 1 511124 11m bits to 1 1 5 13 111241 3 saws During her 16-year career at DIA Montes received promotions a multitude of performance awards and letters of commendatlon or high achievement She also attended a variety of courses of instruction that enhanced her professionalism A noteworthy accomplishment occurred 1n 1993 when she '31 11 146 L124 nu'articiated 1n the Eace- tional Anal st Pro-ram l 111 51e was name a rec1p1en I a tom 11 Igence ert1 mate of Distinction She said she was treated well at DIA and never felt looked down upon She said the awa1ds and promotions she received wele somewhat embarrassing given that she had devoted her life to working against the Government U Portrait of a Spy W Ana Montes was arrested by agents of the FBI at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center DIA Washington D C on September 21 2001 The arrest brought an end to her 22-year career in government service more than 16 years of which were devoted to esiionaie activities in suiiort of Cuba Bi mani See Appendix A for a comprehensive listing of Montes of cial and unof cial travel was subsequently charged with conspiracy to commit espionage in violation of 18 U S C section 794 a and to communicate deliver and transmit to the government of Cuba and its representatives officers and agents information relating to the national defense of the United States with the intent and reason to believe that the information was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of Cuba and that Montes committed acts to effect the objects of this conspiracy in the District of Columbia and elsewhere all in violation of 13 U S C 7940 Montes pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment on March l9 2002 and on October 16 2002 she was sentenced to 25 years in prison By entering a plea agreement Montes knowingly and voluntarily waived her right against self- incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and she agreed to cooperate truthfully completely and in any manner that the US Government deemed relevant She is currently serving that sentence in the Carswell Federal Medical Center Fort Worth Texas Currently scheduled to be released from prison in 2023 at the age of 66 Montes will be on supervised release for a period ofS years with several restrictive conditions Wit-1999 Unlike Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen Ana Montes was not motivated by greed frustration over poor work low self esteem reckless behavior lack of judgment in delity fascination with the art of espionage or other frailties Ames was a CIA intelligence of cer who reportedly received up to $2 5 million from his Soviet Russian handlers over a 9-year period he was arrested in February 1994 on charges that he conspired to commit espionage and evade taxes Robert Hanssen was an FBI Supervisory Special Agent who received more than $600 000 from his Soviethussian handlers spanning three distinct periods 1979-81 1985-91 and 1999-2001 over more than 20 years He was arrested in February 200 i just 2 months before his mandatory retirement date Nonetheless Montes did share some personal characteristics with Ames and Hanssen poor interpersonal skills a sense of intellectual superiority and a dour demeanor Yet overall the portrait of Ana Montes is much different from that of her fellow traitorous felons CIA earn 1 rite 5011313 5 40 3 See 3 SW Montes an neaerd to__ft what mi ht be considered the stereotypical mold for a spy m 34 53 6 We found no credible evidence that she accepte- payments romt uanst at would approximate the amounts that Ames and Hanssen received from the Soviets Russians Her ideological m we disposition fostered a negative view of U S foreign policy and that xation coupled with her sense of moral righteousness sealed her commitment to a cause from which there was no alternative at least in her mind In the nal analysis Ana Montes may well have been the prototypical spy She was intelligent professional self-assured and respected but not universally liked in the workplace She was also a major contributor to the success of an organization and a quiet frugal and unassuming neighbor One counterintelligence of cial echoed the words of many Intelligence Community officials that we interviewed We only really catch the dumb spies and the only reason we caught her is because we got lucky U Part Government Service and a Commitment to ESpionage 181% From 1979 to 1994 the unfolding drama of Ana Montes life takes her from a naive college student infatuated with leftist social causes to a respected professional intelligence of cer with the US Government to a valued espionage agent for Cuba She discovered her destiny as a champion of the downtrodden in a meeting with a Cuban intelligence of cial in 1984 She immersed herself in espionage for the Cuban Intelligence Service which along with her dedication to her duties as an intelligence analyst for the BIA served to mask her insecurities She began her espionage career with a clandestine trip to Cuba where she received tradecraft training from the Cuban Intelligence Service She Iate1 secured employment as a Latin America intelligence analyst with the DIA a position which would Eater pay signi cant dividends to he1 Cuban masters Her early years at the BIA included training as a AA AA AA A this period she successfully navigated two secu11 uac groun- inves 1gations and one polygiaph examination Her double life as a Cuban espionage agent necessitated frequent clandestine meetings in the Washin ton D C a1ea with her er esp1onage was recogmze en was awarded a medal by the Cuban Intelligence Service As a DIA analyst she also continued to impress her superiors as she was re nr romoted and received _-_lowin nerformance a raisals In 1990 she DIR 13 11 12-31 tens i'l'l'fl 11 111 1 433313 so 113 4 2 U Initial Government Employment W Ana Montes began her career with the US Government in December 1979 as a clerk typist in the Of ce of Privacy and Information Appeals at the in Washington DC The FBI completed an applicant investigation on her in March 1980 This personnel security investigation was entirely favorable with sources describing Montes as loyal very moral extremely independent with a flawless reputation and compassionate personality Based on the investigative results she was adjudicated eligible for Top Secreti Sensitive Compartmented Information SCI access She was assigned 16 mil-R- 000628 duties as a paralegal specialist to analyze records requested under the Freedom of Information Act and to determine whether documents should be released She also wrote related af davits for court responded to congressional inquiries conducted training seminars and reviewed classi ed information for possible declassification During her more than 5-year employment at the she enrolled in a graduate degree program at Johns Hopkins She attended classes from September 1982 to the spring semester 1984 when she completed the course requirements for a Master of Arts degree in International Economics and Latin American Studies While attending Johns Hopkins she wo1ked as an unpaid staff w1ite1 fo1 a newsletter published by the school Cente1 of Blazilian Studies UHF-GHQ Recruitment by the Cuban Intelligence Service-Moral Imperatives Justify Treason 8 Ana Montes gained her rst real insight into what she described as the cruel and inhumane nature of U S Government policy supporting the Contra rebels in Nicaragua during her graduate studies at Johns Hopkins She had not been politically aware during her undergraduate years although she had been attracted to the social Communist parties in Eur0pe during herjunior academic year in Spain in 1973 She described herself at the time as a leftist but not a follower of classic Marxist orthodoxy Her graduate coursework at Johns Hepkins included extensive study of Latin American histo1y and U S policy in that area as well as discussions about economic and political affairs Most of the other students and professors at Johns Hopkins shared her views about the unjustness of U S policies particularly regarding the Contras It was in this atmosphere that she developed a sense of metal outrage at the U participation in the hostilities 1n Nicaragua She saw the United States as waging a war against that country killing innocent peopl e and attempting to ovelthiow a legitimate govemment all of which in he1 opinion was rep1ehens1ble The U S invasion of G1enada in 1983 confirmed this ersonal worldview S Montes expressed he1 mo1al indignation about U S actions in Nicaragua 111 infmmal discussions with fellow Johns Hopkins students One of these classmates upfessed m-athies for the Nicarauan 1111- rent 1_ 1 41111 11111151 DOD 0 om mm 1 am ulbls'k rite him Is - uans on es emp asrzeu a a orce Ies my or a Intervene 3 Just the time she was experiencing moral outrage with US policies She commented again and again They the Cubans came to me they came to me She was being asked to help a people who were in dire jeopardy and she could not morally refuse this was a situation when moral principle took precedence over the laws of a nation In Auril 1935 while still em- o ed at the Do Montes and Dm I0 SEQIF I ism Ult'l IL- ti 000030 Valuable Asset for the Cubans W Whether Montes was targeted against the BIA by th Cubans 01 whether she decided entirely on her own to apply to that aenc ould not have achieved a more valuable placement than the DIA 111 31' 115 1-11 11 where she could report on U S military capabilities and' 1n en 1on5 owar us and its interests One of the primary collection priorities of the Cuban Intelligence Service was and continues to be information on US plans and intentions toward Cuba and the Americas As the agency responsible for providing all-source intelligence analysis and collection management support to the Secretary of Defense SECDEF and the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff the BIA is a major focus for intelligence collection and analysis on Cuba A mole such as Montes in the BIA could afford the Cuban Intelligence Service excellent insight into US military knowledge of the Cuban Armed Forces and possible forewarning of operational planning affecting Cuba SAN-F Montes was highly regarded and carefully handled by the Cubans she maintained that the Cubans did not control her nor did they use her for tasking purposes She told them what she was willing to do and how she was going to do it When she had a parting of the ways with her close friend and fellow asset in approximately 1988 the Cubans went to special to assure Montes that they had complete confidence in her Montes noted that her relationship with the Cubans was one based on mutual respect and understanding According to Montes the Cubans were thoughtful of her were dedicated to their cause and sensitive to her needs In short the Cubans were very good to me She stated that she would have rejected any offer by the Cubans to pay for her services U Background Developments at DIA Salim-ll Following the Vietnam era in the 197'03 the BIA was subjected to sevele personnel leductions However during the Reagan Administrtiaon the a_1e icy 111's i dly From 198 to 1985 the Di1ector DIA expandedm 1 mm 5 asw1th1n the agency As 1nsu1gency level-ope 1n en ral were ineleased to focus on that me ion Fo1 example E1111 1 115 1111 151 1124 specialized was olganized and rapidly grew 5121 elvtlian received 1111111 _13_ 121 U51 U DIA Applicant Processing l'Jli'Jr mo i3 424 nial-F Montes initially applied for an position with the BIA 1n June 1985 She later pos -arreso- er1ef1ngs that she had contacted an alumnus from her g1aduate school who was workin a tthe DIA to obtain the name of the person who was in charge of the 1 Montes contacted that individual and arranged an intervlew a ter 1ch ividual asked her to formally apply for a position with the BIA When Montes submitted herjob application she indicated that she wanted to leave the to obtain work related to career interests Throughout her post-arrest debriefings she consistently claimed that she could not recall that the Cubans attempted to direct her to seek employment with the BIA Rather she decided to apply for a position that would give her access to information of value for Cuban support to the Sandinista regime 84151411 On her application form submitted to the BIA Personnel Of ce in June 1985 Montes indicated that she had obtained a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Johns l-lo kins in June 1984 She also indicated that 12 1985 of the nomination of Montes as a candidate This noti cation launched the prospecnve emp securl ve mg process 1 5 part of routine applicant processing the Personnel Of ce also obtained written recommendations from previous employers Many former supervisors at the Do uniformly assessed Montes as an outstanding employee SM In August 1985 the BIA Pelsonnel Seemity Division conducted the initial personnel security leview of Montes eligibility for employment including an adjudication of her 1980 F131 back investi ation and a re- em loyment Although DIA did not use Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph CSP examinations or assessments in its hiring process at the time of Montes application she was notified in the Conditions of Employment statement which she signed on June 28 1985 that initial employment 01 continued employment 15 subject to a satisfactoly per sonnel seculity backglound investigation and reinvestigation requiled medical examination interviews and such other procedures deemed necessary to assure Agency security suitability and qualifications standalds a1e met After another adjudicative review the Petsonnel Security Division noti ed the Peisonnc Of ce on August 23 1985 that no objections were interposed to a fo1mal job tender to Montes and that she would be eligible for an inteiim Top Secret clearance at the time of her entry on duty with the BIA 20 8 0011032 U DIA Personnel Security and Clearance Adjudication Practices for New Employees SM 011 Se Itember 1985 both a NOVICE um tow 1on1 51-121 trained penetra ion agen assanent at the BIA was in the Ana Montes entered on duty with the BIA as and a fully recruited ervice Her initial an Din- to use ii 124 was grante- an 1n enm op ecre earance pen mg comp mm a oackground investigation which was initiated by the Personnel Security Division on October 2 1985 Montes signed a Classi ed Information Nondisclosure Agreement certifying that she had been given a security indoctrination on her obligation under applicable Executive Orders and public laws to protect classi ed information Also during her rst month of employment her supervisor and the Unit Security Of cer briefed Montes on DIA security procedures SW-F Unlike other major Intelligence Community agencies such as the CIA and NBA the BIA did not routinely use applicant polygraph screening or testing During September 1985 the DIA Personnel Security Division was establishing and staf ng a polygraph capability However civilian employees military personnel and contractors af liated with the DIA were subjected to the most stringent background investigative requirement as set forth by the The results of the background investigations as well as in-house security investigative scrutiny where appropriate formed the basis for evaluating an employee s initial and continuing eligibility for access to classi ed information DIR 10 U S C r124 UHF-GHQ In early l986 the formally requested that the Personnel Secur I rvisron cert notes as igible for expedited SCI access on a compelling need basis prior to completion of her background investigation A statement of justi cation for the request noted that intelligence support for U S policy makers and the large military assistance pro rams for El Salvador necessitated full use of the limited number of in them Montes had been given access to classi ed material at the ecret an op ecret levels since she arrived at the BIA Provisions for granting a waiver of the investigative requirements for SCI access are contained in the Personnel Security Directive Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information lfl4 November 1984 and are implemented by Intelligence Community security officials UM-1999 While the waivers for SCI access are not routinely granted they are not unusual Normally applied to newly hired personnel who lack a current investigation the approval of an SCI waiver depends on available security information In the case of Montes her investigation ve years earlier along with a pre-employment security interview and partial National Agency Checks conducted by DIA exceeded the DCI reuuirements fora waiver Thus the Personnel Security Division authorized SCI and Montes was formally indoctrinated for such access on February 5 l986 2 DOD OI W In June 1986 Montes supervisor provided written certi cation to the Personnel Security Division that he was not aware of any reportable security problems concerning her This annual management certification was required by Regulation 5200 2-R Personnel Security Program January I987 which sensitized supervisory of cials to employee behavior problems with security implications such as alcohol abuse nancial dif culties unfavorable involvement with law enforcement agencies mental and emotional problems or foreign contacts or drug use Also in June 1986 the background investigation initiated shortly after Montes entry on duty at the BIA was completed Hf-l tam SW43 When the Defense Investigative Service agent broached the issue of her loyalty Montes strongly professed her loyalty as a U S citizen who had never advocated the overthrow of the US Government and further mentioned that she had never been a member of any subversive group She explained that as a result of her extensive political discussions in school she had often expressed views critical ofcenain U S policies but those criticisms were fully within her rights under the Constitution Montes would later admit during post-arrest debriefings that she realized early on in her DIA career particularly after the June 1986 Defense investigative Service interview that she had to be much more careful in expressing her opinions on US policy than she had been as a graduate student W The Personnel Security Division adjudications staff conducted a full security evaluation of Montes as a employee in July 1986 based on the results of the completed Defense Investigative Service background investigation In I 000034 ola one use a sis-1 SAM On July 10 E986 directed thatawritten case re erra ac Ion tea a crsonne I ice General Counsel and appropriate management for possible probationary ring of the employee A Persnonel Seciurt 'si nervisor of cial later discussed the referral with the bull who advised that the case was not su a result of that advice the Ell Jena 0 orn-mgai r3424 decided not to pursue a forma en re erra an 1 ontes was Ified eligible for SCI access She had been functioning on a temporary SCI waiver since September 1985 U The Night Job Picks Up SAW-F As Montes settled in as a new will she increased the frequency of her clandes me mee ings w1 u-ans meetings initially took place in New York City usually at restaurants selected by the Cubans Her Johns Hopkins classmate accompanied her to at least two meetings Montes became concerned about traveling to New York City by train to meet with her Cuban handler She asked the Cubans to send someone not af liated with the Cuban Mission to the United Nations to meet with her in the Washington DC area Beginning in approximately January l936 and continuing through late 1998 Montes met with Cuban handlers in Metropolitan Washington DC She speci ed certain areas where she was unwilling to meet because she was fearful of street crime she was not comfortable in the downtown area The Cubans accommodated her request with the stipulation that meeting sites normally restaurants selected by them had to be close to a Metrorail station Those contacts took place once every 2 to 3 weeks normally on the weekends S Montes decided early on that to avoid detection she would never remove any classi ed information from DIA workspaces She believed that she would not leave a paper trail if she communicated intelligence information to the Cubans by memorizing her recollections employees confronted defensive physical security measures on a daily basis because security guards conducted random inspections of bags and packages carried into and out of DIA facilities These measures reinforced Montes belief that it would be unwise to take any classi ed material out of her workplace 8 Signi cantly this scheme played to Montes' grandiose perception of herself as a comrade-in-arms with the Cubans By passing classi ed information verbally and constructing notes from memory Montes saw herself as an equal with her Cuban comrades not as a menial espionage tool extracting classified documents from enemy installations She informed the Cubans that she had no intention of passing intelligence information on countries other than those in which she had an interest primarily Nicaragua and later Cuba and she would not attempt to gain access to classi ed information that was not within her purview In large measure Montes decided what sensitive intelligence she would provide to the Cubans and how she would provide it which meant that she would not be amenable to tasking that did not relate directly to her assigned duties In her mind these conditions gave Montes signi cant control of her espionage activities However Montes consistently left security matters such as meeting site security counter surveillance and transmission security to the Cubans U Sharpening Skills as a DIA Analyst-19864990 Much ofthe rst year of Montes employment at the BIA consisted of waiting f01 full SCI access approval and takin From 1986 111 FBI 'Jli' t 111nm 424 mire-1 per ormance appraisa Although rating her aswm noted that she did not have the opportunity to fully demonstra er potentia because of security and training factors He commented that her high intelligence and positive attitude presaged hi her latings when she achieved full time pe1f01mance in her field Montes was 3ng my 1 F4 4 in October 1986 One mont t directors of the Is ense ecurity Assistance Agency and the DIA congratulated her for her outstanding assistance as an interpreter at a Defense Security Assistance Agency conference with representatives of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces Montes took her first of cial overseas travel as a DIA employee in Januaiy and Feblualy of 1987 when she traveled to El Salvador 5 weeks and Guatemala 1 week 1n conjunction with an analyst a1ea oiientation program Hei annual career a- 1aisal for the e1iod July 1986 through June 1987 rated her as which was higher than the previous appraisal She was ii'Ertrililln promo to in November 1987 Montes continued to expand her ana 1c nowledge by' a mg several DIA technical courses as well as a 3-day Signals Intelligence SIGINT orientation course at the NSA She produced a number of intelligence research papers on El Salvador and Guatemala during the period August 1987 to November 1988 works which were described by her supervisor as praised by policy makers the Military Departments and the Intelligence Community for their timeliness and clarity Her supervisor also provided written certification to the Personnel Security Division during the annual rating cycles in 1987 and 1988 that no reportable security problems had been noted regarding Montes job performance When she received her annual a raisal in June 1988 she had so impressed her superiors that she received them The rating review of cial noted that she was am one most capa as 9 311 13 in the office and had high potential In Decembet 1988 Montes was 1 romoted to In the Space of 3 yeals she was p1 omoted Q'lo ous gill-Elli but it won more than 10 years before she was promoted agam SW-FL Montes described her working conditions at the DIA as superb she had no disharmonious relationships and believed that she was granted more than I 000036 rating w1t a recommenIation or a ity superiors a so nominated her for the BIA Meritorious Civilian Service Award She received the award in a formal ceremony on December 3 1990 as a Cuban Clandestine Reporting Source SM As Montes improved her skills as an intelligence analyst she was also learning the intricacies of the Cuban spy trade The first years of her clandestine activity were the most dif cult for her She had to adapt her persona in the workplace to blend in with hardworking She exercised care not to voice personal beliefs as she had in graduate school about US policies in Central America As a matter of self discipline she tried very hard not to say or write any comments that she could not validate with available intelligence information Additionally she believed that the DIA could monitor and trace its employees computer use so she was careful to search classi ed systems for topics and reporting that she could explain as being within her legitimate area of analytical responsibility SW-F in actual fact the BIA which is IIw1e igence Communications responsible for the integrity of cm 1 stem a secure intellience Ilatform used the worldwide All ilnisy 10 US CL 53 424 Between 986 and 1989 Montes had to adapt to a variety of handlers and to changes in operational tradecraft procedures and paraphernalia For example A Second Clandestine Trip to Cuba U Security Reinvestigation - 1991 In March 1991 the BIA Personnel Security Division noti ed Montes that she was scheduled fora Periodic Reinvestigation A Periodic Reinvestigation for DIA civilian employees military personnel and contractors is based on the DCID 1 14 requirement that all personnel with continuing access to Top SecrethCl be reinvestigated on a recurring 5-year cycle The Periodic Reinvestigation covers an individual s life history since his or her previous investigation whereas an initial Background investigation covers a 10-15 year lol 000038 Wm period Additionally the Periodic Reinvestigation has less extensive investigative coverage UM-3999 0n the Personnel Security Questionnaire that Montes submitted for the Periodic Reinvestigation she indicated that she had paid her debt to Johns Hopkins and was formall ranted her Masters of Arts degree in 1988 She also prior to DIA employment she had admitted to 35 DIA application papers The Defense nvesttga 1ve erv1ce completed the Periodic Reinvestigation of Montes in September 1991 Johns Hopkins records con rmed the award of her Master of Arts degree Five coworker and supervisory references who were contacted by Defense Investigative Service investigators commented favorably on her UH-13999 Montes was extensively interviewed on two occasions during the reinvestigation by Defense Investigative Service agents The rst interview was wide-ranging covering such security topics as her of cial and unof cial foreign travel forelgn contac ts dru use and nances She admitted that she had inaccurately initially applied for a position w1 1n exp atne hat she had told DIA authorities that Shem once in 1979 when the use actually took place in 1982 while she was an emp of the She further explained that she had misreported the incident out of concern that she would not be hired by the DIA and that she did not understand the seriousness of being honest and truthful at the time Montes claimed that this misrepresentation had bothered her ever since and she wanted to set the record straight She denied any personal knowledge of the unauthorized disclosure of classi ed information or involvement with any hostile intelligence activity Two days after the interview Montcs contacted the Defense Investigative Service a cut to re ort additional personal information She said that she had during the summer of 1978 while in Madrid Spain or er un ergra uate juntor year study program The second interview was conducted to obtain a sworn statement from her on her misrepresentation of facts of her past She claimed that at the time of her 1935 DIA applicationmission of would be more detrimental than if she claimed suc use a occurre severa years earlier Although she had been a Federal employee in 1982 Montes claimed that she did not have the security awareness at the that had been instilled in her by the BIA Ll #989 The Personnel Security Division conducted an adjudicative review of the Defense Investigative Service Periodic Reinvestigation in October 1991 The review noted that Montes untruthfulness related not only to The case a JU we or commente a 1 on es seeme ave a endency to twist the tr uth to hel own needs ahd her honesty was still some cause for conce1n adve1se security action was unlikely because the oliginal deception had occu11ed 6 yea1s p1eviously The adjudicative 1eview concluded that the extensive DIA interviews of Montes should impress upon her the seriousness of her omissions l-ler SCI access eligibility was recettified In Ma1ch 1992 appioximately 5 months after the Defense Investigative Service Pet iodic Reinvestigation inte1view Montes submitted a Privacy Act request asking for her security case history info1mation back to 1986 Montes was well ve1sed' 1n Fleedom of Infoimation Act and Privacy Act 27 men-seem Ol procedures from her previous employment at the In accordance with agency Freedom of Information and Privacy Act policy her case file was reviewed by Personnel Security Division specialists and all investigative material was released to her Montes later claimed that her request was purely for personal reasons but that she did photograph the investigative reports and pass them to the Cubans The Cubans were interested not so much in the material itself but that a U S Government employee could access her own security history through provisions of the Freedom of Information Act U Coupling Analytic Expertise and Espionage Activities From 1990 to I994 Montes continued to build her expertise as a analyst and as a Cuban spy She was highly regarded by DIA supervisors for her professional accomplishments and consistently earned the highest marks on annual performance ratings She also sharpened her skills through attendance at various advanced training venues and of cial travel to Central American countries The second-level supervisor of Montes endorsed her annual appraisal for the period July 1990 to June 199 with the comment at was one of the leading Central American at as well as a leading expert on the region While this supervisor was aware that her political views leaned to the left he never questioned her loyalty to the United States He observed that Montes did not develop close relationships with people at work When she was thrust into a nonprofessional setting like an office birthday party she would get nervous dget and leave as quickly as she could to get back to work She was sometimes seen by her peers as cold 89 Sometime in 1990 Montes was reassigned within the work on Nicaragua issues Although she had been doing some ana Nicaragua while she was assigned to the El Salvador target she now became a full-time Nicaragua specialist Montes later commented how ironic it was that she was assigned the Nicaragua portfolio the same year the Nicaraguan people democratically elected Violeta Chamorro president thus the basis for her initial moral outrage at U S policy toward that country was no longer relevant She did however continue to provide the Cubans with classified information on developments in Nicaragua while she tried to find a way to switch to working the Cuba account which she achieved in February 993 Montes explained that her moral realignment from helping Nicaragua via the Cubans to directly helping Cuba stemmed from a realization that the United States might find a pretext to invade that island The U S invasions of Grenada and Panama along with the reduction of Sovieti Russian military and economic support to the Castro regime after 199i made it clear to Montes that Cuba was increasingly in big trouble 89 The Cubans put into effect a significant upgrade in reporting and communications rotocols for Montes in 1990 Althou she had been tb U Exce 1 tional Analyst Program Affords Another Visit 131 11 1b1111 1 111 1 1111131 511 4133 531313 15 SAW-F In late 1991 Montes was one of seven DIA employees selected to attend an executive development course at George Washington University in Washington D C In 1991 and again in 1992 she also applied for the more advanced executive leadership development course but was not selected She cited her interest in interagency policy planning as one of the reasons for applying In July 1992 she attended a 2- week National Senior Intelligence course which was an element of the career progression track formid-level Montes diligence as a p1oductive membei ofth 1111111111 11111111 i 1 4 was also iecognized in July when she was a_ain - iven an bum 1aisal this time with am e1 c1f01mance a m She ended 1992111111 er se cc 1011 0 pa 1 presuglous xceptional Analyst Program The progiam was established to stimulate innovative thinking broaden ana a1 d 112 101 111111-1111311111131 5 011 135 J 11o 1 521 s 3 13 403 31313 13 1 die 5C1 H 513 403 See Ei CIA 11 1 1 1312 1 3 51 1 1 811114-11 i 5 Monies was situated to bu11d her professiona repu a 11m an even 11a achieve status as the preeminent Cuba 29 DOD OI Wm analyst in the and arguably the entire Intelligence Communit Her superiors continued to be impressed with her ability and rated her on the erformance appraisals of 1993 and 1994 Additionally she was awar in 1994 for her exceptional analytical accomplishments Montes Encounters and Beats the Polygraph L11 111131 1otis c 5-11 I was 133 3 IS Il'lg a grap C p tl i en 5 egan her employment' 1n 1985 policy on the use of the polygraph is included 1n Directive 5210 48 Polygraph Piogram December 24 1985 The Polygraph Institute is responsible for oversight of all polygraph-related organizations The Polygraph Institute provides centralized training certification and recertif'ication of DOD polygraphers at its Fort Jackson South Carolina facility The Polygraph Institute also manages annual inspections of selected DOD polygraph facilities to ensure that all programs conform to standa1ds The Polygiaph Institute also conducts continuin research ol rah methodolo_ and Issues examiner trainin_ ola 1111131 - s1oL1 1 151124111119719 UHFQUQ The DIA can only administer CSP and Security Issue Resolution examinations CSP examinations consist of an authorized set of questions dealing with espionage sabotage terrorism and unautho1ized fo1eign contacts 01 disclosures ofclassified information Imlementation ofthe nol ranh within the 113 - u2 d narra we reports 0 po ygrap es 1esu we retaine 1n emp secu1'1ty les for the active life of that le The ctual examination charts however are retained for onl 90 da 5 10 1 1325 a ma one DIA 1111131 to us dos 1111 1 are UHF-BUG Counterespionage Efforts Against Cuba SAME-3 US Government Human Intelligence HUMINT collection operations against the Cuban target suffered a series of setbacks in the years prior to 1990 The Cuban Intelligence Service ran a highly effective double agent program against US intelligence agencies from 197'8 to 1937' when a defecting Directorate of Intelligence of cer provided information about Cuban Intelligence Service operations and capabilities Based on this and other reporting the US Intelligence Community assessed the Cuban Intelligence Service as a first rate intelligence service with the ability to run highly aggressive operations against U S interests throughout the world The Directorate ofIntelligence focused largely on exploiting human sources of information and its officers showed exceptional pro ciency in recruiting and managing agents The Cuban modus cperandi was originally modeled on tradecraft developed by the premier Soviet intelligence service the Committee for State Security and the East German Ministry for State Security The Cubans developed somewhat more exible operational procedures such as recruitments generally made on the basis of ideology not money and targeting women and Hispanic males for penetration of U S Government entities which had been a long-standing intelligence priority for them EDDIE 1 4w 1 are so C a ans-1min but Mic anus-1 sacs Secs lo a an 1mm OI Fol but 1 4 c1 tens $011 51 1 nos 1am owmg a a Iona ecurity ounc1 responses to Presidential Review Directive 44 the president issued Presidential Decision Directive 24 Counterintelligence Effectiveness May 3 1994 The intent of this Directive was to increased cooperation coordination and accountability among all U S counterintelligence agencies To ensure that all relevant departments and agencies exercised the full and free exchange of information necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the U S counterintelligence effort Presidential Decision Directive 24 ordered the establishment of a National Counterintelligence Policy Board and a National Counterintelligenee Center The following sections of this report show that the well-meaning intent of Presidential Decision Directive 24 did not inspire counterinteliigence entities to cooperate or coordinate instead interagency rivalries and personal rancor persisted through a major portion of the Montes espionage case 32 mm 100044 WW U Part IV Maturation as Analyst and Spy From 1994 to 1998 Ana Molntes continued to mature as a intelligence analyst and as a penlallr 1 11 la_ han Intellience Service Sm ashighly by both 511113 11 54133 Set ga ermgs ere aca-em1cs an overnment of cials discussed Cuba- related lssues According to Montes she attended these meetings to expand her understanding of Cuba success passe- recei 1 1e er security clearance and access to These events de ned a period when Montes further established herself as a consummate professional in both her public and clandestine lives om 1111111 14 11 1 - 3 rll11 Soc 5 t In ri c J #5403 See Din him 1 Mel lh3l3l nnan 1 31 13 1 4m A 1 4112 has 5 1 11 51 a dds Soc 5 DIA 1mm Hm in 1 1 3 42 1 12 UHFQIUQ Eli's hjf'i dbl Mid 50 LLSC 4U3l SEC 5 1 111 13 111 1111 11 11 1 4111 1111131 SDU EC 03 511 1 13 Ella 111111 1 111121111111311 to L1 S C 4 24 1 111 1111111 11114111113151 Lil-312 ec 424 13111- 113111 1 11 15 01 19111 U MOHIES efforts 1113 cc 5 1 11a- 151131 111 L1 5 awarded her the National Intelligence e111 mate I 1stinction Certi cate of Distinction lS awarded for sustained superiOr performance of duty of high value or for a single act of speci c merit and is one of the highest awards that the DCI can bestow upon a member of the Intelligence Community The award was presented by then-Deputy George Tenet and signed by then-DCI John Deutch The nal sentence of the citation stated Ms Montes strong sense of Intelligence Community responsibility fostered the strengthening of a collegial strategy among working Cuba reflecting great credit upon herself and the Defense Intelligence Agency Montes was recognized as a leader 1n he1 area of expertise DIR 10 USE 1'3 424 U Attendance at Academic Forums essmg 0 e1 superviso1y amsevere diffelent academic groups that focused on Cuba When questioned about Montes attendance at these meetings one of he1 supe1viso1s stated Being exposed to multiple ways of thinking makes a person a better analyst W Ana Montes associated with at least two groups based in Washington D C the Cuba Study 311111 and the Center fo1 Defense Information CD1 eorge own orme a 11 roup 11 car 5002 the gloup moved to T1inity University 1n Northeast Washington D C Accoiding to the group web site it comptises individuals from a wide ideological spect111m drawn from academia the legislative and executive branches of government and various non-governmental organizations All meetings are strictly off-the-record by invitation only The goal of the Cuba Study was to improve the quality of debate on Cuba and Cuba policy Montes attended Cuba Study G1oup meetings from approximately 1990 to 998 U The CD1 is a Washington D C think tank with of ces in Moscow Russia and Brussels Belgium The CDI was founded in 1972 by retired senior U S military officers and is dedicated to strengthening security through international cooperation reduced reliance on unilateral military power to resolve con ict reduced reliance on nuclear weapons a transformed and reformed military establishment and a prudent oversight of and spending on defense programs One focus for the is cooperative security between the United States and Cuba 8 3 JF ace-Hint our ibim 1 1ii'ci U Events Surrounding the Brothers to the Rescue Incident SW13 DIA had few security concerns about Ana Montes One signif' cant concern surfaced after Cuban Air Force fihters shot down two Brothers to the El IFC DIHI ends 10 ioiib In early February 1996 the CDI arranged for several retired American flag officers to tow Cuba The 301 web site stated that a delegation of U S military experts organized by the CD1 met evely year with Cuban military and political of cials in Havana to exploiew um ibiis 1oL1 so ibiis-i UM LIME 1D 431 See Appendix for background on the Brothers to the Rescue incident UHF-GHQ Montes first learned the incident on the evening of February 24 from Later that same evening a senior intelligence of cer rom er ivision a called Montes and directed her to report to work the next morning Sunday February 25 at the Defense intelligence Analysis Center Montes spent most of the morning reading incoming message traffic about the Brothers to the Rescue incident When she arrived a coworker and her supervisor were performing similar duties Late in the morning they received a call advising that the Joint Chiefs of Staff was forming a task force and requesting that Montes and her supervisorjoin the group at the Pentagon They arrived at the Pentagon at approximately 1 i am and spent the rest of the day working there Montes claimed that she was exhausted and left the Pentagon sometime between 8 and 10 pm According to the secondhand recollections of a coworker Monies should have worked until 10 but received a phone call became visibly agitated and left early at 8 pm According to the coworker s recollections he thought her actions were very odd and they played a role in reporting his concerns about Montes to DIA Montes Spent approximately 2 weeks detailed to the Pentagon She provided Cuban subject-matter expertise and intelligence support to the Joint Staff Brothers to the Rescue Task Force seer-1 In April 1996 the coworker reported his concerns about Montes to His concerns related to the Brothers to the Rescue incident and her involvement with academic groups Montes coworker surmised that the CD1 debrie ng and press statement and the Brothers to the Rescue incident were not coincidental He believed that the Cuban Intelligence Service orchestrated the events to influence U S public opinion and he believed that Montes was involved The coworker based his concerns primarily upon four facts 1 Montes had voiced her opposition to U S policy toward Cuba in the past thlt'll 1 lite gene 50 LLSE sacs mm 1 4 3 Montes arranged a February 23 1996 debriefing for representatives by U S Government employees and 4 On or about February 25 1996 a representative of the CDI announced to the press that the U S Government shared blame for the Brothers to the Rescue incident 5011 t sans 1mm The Directorate for intelligence l-E supports the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of Defense the Joint Staff and Uni ed Commands now called Combatant Commands It is the national-level focal point for crisis intelligence support to military operations indications and warning intelligence in the and Combatant Commands intelligence requirements Do DIG th In II 3 000043 FBI lt'ii1l 59 U3 ti DIA Willi 1 46 biiFllti l-Bl but 1 1 4m ions to use a sad U On November 13 1996 the DIA Special Agent interviewed Montes At first Montes believed the interview was part of a normal Periodic Reinvestigation For her security clearance When she realized that the interview related to the Brothers to the Rescue incident she relaxed and provided satisfactory responses to all questions posed The DIA Special Agent also interviewed other US Government personnel who had knowledge of the Februaryr 23 1996 debrief meeting with the CD1 The results of those interviews validated Montes statements The Special Agent could not substantiate the allegations lodged by Montes coworker U Signi cant Travel and Recognition U This section focuses on significant events in Montes professional and clandestine travel from 1994 to 1998 and on the signi cant recognition Montes received during this period cm mm nun 1o use 424 A June 1996 Supplement did not signi cantly change the 197'9 Agreement it simply clarified supplemented and modernized the ambiguities that arose after more than 16 years ofchange in both organizations DoLlliG 'r1 1 a1ir i mm 3mm Hm snag 10 use 3424 UHF-GHQ During this period Mentes received man awards and new nition for her anal a skills In 1994 she received 0mm and In une ontes an per ormanee applalsa ven though her su ervisor nized her as es anal st in several areas of res onsibility In er s 3 receive a 1 een ears of Serwce the Gavernment BITE mate 1n 38 000050 WW U Security Processing In late August 1996 Montes completed the paperwork necessary to begin the process for the regular Periodic Reinvestigation of her security clearance In September 1996 DIA opened the reinvestigation The Defense Investigative Service completed its portion of the investigation in December 1996 and the BIA adjudication staff completed its portion by March 1997 The Defense Investigative Service and the DIA adjudication staff did not note any areas of security concern Montes retained her clearance and access to highly classified information In February 197 the H11Andoctrinated Montes for a new sub- compartment of the BIA lull 42 In March 1997 conducted a security review of Montes 0 so no ernoimnation for indoctrination into a National Reconnaissance Of ce b l'll' In May 1997 she was indoctrinated for bill IOU are I administratively debriefed Montes from She was asked to come in_erson to sign the debrief forms -u never 5 owed up Montes had access to 3191 1911 until the day of her arrest For a complete listing of Montes access to sensr ive programs and information see Appendix D U Connterespionage Efforts Against Cuba FBI only 1 are 50115 13 tare UHF-GHQ From 1994 to 1998 the relationship between the FBI and the was somewhat tentative In March 1995 a employee was appointed as the rst liaison of cer to the FBI Headquarters National Security Division He served in the position for 18 months He said that when he first reported The FBI was still not comfortable with an outsider working in their midst They played everything very close to the vest It was a little better by the time 1 left and it has gotten better over the years The FBI was very selective about what they told the liaison officer and the did not want him to be too aggressive He stated that The philosophy was that they finally had someone in the room and they didn t want me to do anything to get kicked out of the room UleG tam 1 4m cm by-n tens so use a aos see a om- than Mp Danica J 1411 CIA mm 1 11 1113 5 0 3 4113 81311 13 1mm 1 41m 11 11 11 5131151 11-11331 1111111 nm- 11 1111 1 11 1 1mm 1 USE 9 412115193 5151 11131 1 41 1 1111131 110 I131 01A in 1 413 cm mm 111131 11 6 13 51-103 1 1121 1 Mic 113111 1 $113150 LJS 33 13 3 5' 403-1 1 111 FBI Ln- 11 1 41m 1121131 1113 15 51 1 111 11- 112111 1 41 ml b 1111 11 11 11 50 11 31 11 11 MU 1 41 4 II 1111 b il 5D U5 C See Appendix for information abou_ IRU See Appendix for information ab0u_ 40 0D0052 rat thtt't 1 4m tenet an US C a r-nl thIt1J 1 4m nits so LJ 5 r dos 1mm In June 1995 the appointed a point of for the The point of contact was an Air Force ml as a Special Agent in the Air Force I me pecaa nves tga tons ccording to the Air Force Special Agent the FBI did not have a clear understanding of the structure and functions of the Over the course of3 to 6 months the Air Force Special Agent met twice with FBI Special Agents During the first meeting he stated that he briefed the FBI on the functions of the Military Departments their counterintelligence elements and some of their personnel information systems He mentioned that the FBI Special Agents seemed appreciative of the information but also seemed overwhelmed because it was all new to them At the time the FBI officials were surprised that the did not have a central database for the entire Department The Air Force Special Agent told us that he did not believe that the FBI shared all of the information they could We found that the FBI did share information with the Special Agent but there simply was not much to share rat tenant ganja rant tract tans so use a ans-1mm um ten-1 1 4m nitrite FBI but 1 rue so use 3 ans 1mm um 1 rife surge l8 th In 2003 the Of ce ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense Command Control Communications and Intelligence became the Of ce ofthe Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence The FBI and the Military Departments are the only US Government organizations authorized to investigate espionage Title I8 U S C section 3052 authorizes the FBI to conduct counterintelligence investigations on US persons Title 10 U S C section 802 authorizes the Military Departments jurisdiction to enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice Since IO U S C section 90621 makes espionage a violation oftlte Uniform Code of Military Justice the Military Departments are authorized to conduct counter-intelligence investigations of military personnel A significant portion of the does not fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice To ensure that all elements receive counter-intelligence support Instruction 5240 10 Counterintelligence Suppott to Uni ed and Speci ed Commands May I4 2904 assigns Executive Agent support roles to each ofthe Military De artments The 000 assigned an Air Force Of ce of Special Investigations Special Agent to thew because the Air Force is the Executive Agent for counterintelligence matters in Ice 0 ecretary of Defense 41 new DOD OI 1 hit-3 USE 3403-1nu1xms 1 4m mm mm 51 use 5 elm-mm 1 DEN 5011 341 UH-FEES Support for the Analyst s File Environment System mm 1 anus c 5 03 1mmum gum 1 4m In I 3 000054 DOE-1132 1 41 um may 3 12 1 EDDIE 1 10 U Prelude to Catching a Spy FBI 134 5 hf Li 5 2 f5 DUE mu 13- mm 1 DIA 0001133 in 11 111 USE 5 40 3 1 413121 gamut rm 1mm 14 12 11113 51111 5 1 1103-1111111 1111 1 41131 1mm 1 1 41 1 1mm 1 11m 111131 50 1151' 1 4m 11 111115 r-B 1 11131 5011 511 5 403-10111 DIA mm 1 411 1 tmtma 1 41 1 bus 51 1 1 15 1 FHA 11111 11 1-131 mm 1 1 c11t11131 501 131 5403 1 23an 191111 1-1112 rm tom 1 111's 1mm 5 11 131 F- 41213-111111 BIA 1 111 1 11 1 b11131 51011 3 3-- mm 1 1112 1b'11'r'1 FBI 11 11111 1 4113111119 5 1 Dame Dania 111111 1 4121 CIA 111111 Luna 5011 55 1103 Sn 6 rm 1 51 11 15 015 WY 1 4113 It I GODDEE Wm U Part V A Prominent Life Unraveled mm 1ou 5 o 424 ibjitey From 1998 to 200 the U S Government continued its search for the Cuban penetration agent of the Intelligence Community The period opens with the Intelligence Community using the profile information in its attempt to identify the Cuban penetration agent and closes with the arrest and imprisonment of Ana Montes as a Cuban spy oia- tone UN-13999 Concerns 403 SCI 6 t'b'ii' i L'rli li I'Jnl'm'j' in U Signi cant Travel and Recognition U This section focuses on signi cant events in Montes of ciai and clandestine travel from 1998 to 200 and on the signi cant recognition she received during this period I U Travel for Official Government Business FHI chm 1 4w hurt so 55403 1 4m tens 10 LLS c 42-1 out out 1 run tins 5343- SJFN-F- In Jul 2001 Montes visited the m mm 24 to attend brie ngs an on unprovlng lol I 000058 Wm U Travel for Personal and Clandestine Purposes UHF-GHQ H l 1 4m bus so usc tun 1 4m Um 1 4m bus DDUIG J 1 4m WW um e111 1 rue UHF-GHQ U Respect for Montes Deepens UHF-GHQ Du1ing this pe1' iod Memes received man awa1ds and 1ec0gnitien f01 her anal tic skills 111 Jul l998 she another Ieceme1 s was awah-e lol I 000060 WW U Additional Access seat-1 From early 1999 through 2001 Montes gained access to several sensitive SAPs In January 1999 she was briefed into the and was administratively debriefed flom the re ram after er arres In February 2000 which was related to the BIA or a list of Montes access to we to orma SEE ppenux I A Potential Fellowship at the National Intelligence Council Clouded by an InSpector General Investigation WIFE-HO The Fellowship SW-F In 2000 the National Intelligence Council began a new program that offered Research Fellow positions to talented applicants Since I975 the National Intelligence Council had developed into an all-source center of strategic thinking Drawing on the best available expertise inside and outside Government it provides the DCI and Government policy makers with an authoritative voice on the complex international issues of today and those that lie ahead In September 2000 Montes applied for one of the Research Fellow positions In her application she stated that the position would provide her with the time she did not have in her current position to investigate issues of high interest to policy makers If approved DIA management did not object to her beginning the program in January 2001 The National Intelligence Council approved her application in November and she planned to begin the fellowship on January 2 200 Montes was scheduled to become the first DIA employee to participate in the fellowship program UHF-GHQ The Resealch Fellow position 1equi1ed that candidates successfully complete a polyg1aph examination Montes noti ed the National Intelli ence Council that the start date of he fellowshi- restarts U1013099 DIA Inspector General Investigation and its Aftermath om thus to use 5 4221 must This section will not describe the substance ofthe SAPS to which Montes had access because in-depth knowledge ofthose programs is beyond the scope ofthis review 49 OI Eil 113 I 424 bjf j DIP 10 5 3 424 m5 U 1 ontes was In er-wewe an 0 nspec or eneral on Januaay 4 200 Mia 10 LLSE 42-1 SAW-F On Februar 13 2001 the Director DIA froze all rotational assinments 'd ma mg a a -encompassmg ecision was that the DIA had been ovelextended In terms of the number ene some rehef' 50 DD 0062 bill MGJIFJ SW-F In early March 2001 Montes learned of the freeze on external rotational assignments for all employees Her polygraph examination was postponed and she was told that it would be rescheduled when the freeze was lifted Montes Lam one muse 5 424 gage Counterespionage Efforts Against Cuba FBI SD rnl him I 5 5 c ananin th11 1 4 ci USE ti lhll bit-13 Mil 1 5 3- i 403-1llil111 Ell- V bill l 14M moms but 1 ate legs so a ans-1mm om mm 1 4m auxin 1 qnu-I 14 5 as us v 1 a claim Um b lL mm 1 4m Isuzu so so a was FBI 1 4m 51011 5 5 1103-1 mm mm 1 4m chnaE mm lr c mm 1 anal so use 5 4034mm em- but 1 am hui E 900113 mm mm FBI mm 14 6 lens so use a mm mm 1 4m 1493 was 59 use a is 1M1 om 41mm 1 4m mm - Home 1111 111 11c1 UHF-BBQ Search for Travel Records in Guantanamo Early on judgment was that the unknown subject was most like employed at CIA pril 1998 when FBI of cials met to discuss the unknown subject the partici ants agree be in ormation on the unknown subject s travel to Guantanamom was a key investigative lead b111 1 1 1 1111 11131 BODIES 41c 0 er 1nvest1gato1s con en- a ey were not aware of offer Had such an offer been made CIA officials believe they would have een to obtain FBI to share information collected Dol JlC i' 1_ b1111 1 r2111 FEII Ga-According to the former foreign policy advisor to the Commander Guantanamo Naval Base air travel to Guantanamo may be accomplished in several ways The Navy using leased commercial aircraft generally 737s transports passengers from Norfolk Virginia to Guantanamo via Jacksonville Florida Until recently those ights also stopped at the US Naval Air Station in Roosevelt Roads Pue o Rico In addition two small charter air carriers Lynx Air and Air Sunshine fly several times a week from Fort Lauderdale Florida direct to Guantanamo However personnel are not authorized to use this mode of travel It is generally used by contractors of cials of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Naturalization Service the and family members of personnel serving in Guantanamo 141 1 ru1 1n1111 1 11 11 1111111 so use 11 11934111111 hi I 000064 WW the Air Mobility Command Scott Air Force Base Illinois were routinely destroyed a er 6 months This effort did not develop any leads UMFO-U-Q Clues to an Elusive Profile tum idle Lugs 50115 4-103 See 5_ 1 4m 51 33 50 qua-Hum minim but 1 4m mm mm 5011 51 gaos em a thETllF 51 11 1 are tam 5o 11 31 3 403 Hin 5 0 Laue will iu U513 mum-1 menus mm 1 are mug 5o H 313 no use rms-mun lbw 1 4m FBI bu-n mm 5o 403-1UH1 DDUIG trim Laue F51 till thEBl an 5 1 dos-mm Douro him cm 1 rife crane so use 5 40 3 eac- e bHr'leJ Downs I am - 1 34an 1 4m run-3 50 U513 45403 as 5 1 an rm 1mm 1 Ebli - l- 5 5 3 d133 Sec 5 N gambit - - - natal U111 DJUL 1 3-1403 SEQ 6' mic FBI mm 54 000066 tom Ia tom lope one 50113 5 5 403 as s lbll'l 54oz Hillt ll n1 Goran's tbltil om amt Mtg tblt3 so us 5 4o Sec lemma DoL nti but 1 41th FBI tom 1 are renal so at onolo tom 1 rem renal so use 4mm An Supervisory Special Agent told us that the agents were conducting the investigation in a very professional thorough and methodical manner They developed analytic matrices to identify possible leads As they eliminated at possible lead they investigated the next lead Both the and the were on their list they simply had not yet reached the point ofthe investigation that included those agencies 55 NW Oi WW U Serendipity Emma mm 1 4m 1 4M 5n LI 5 11 r FBI mm am 15 13 t 403-131 1 Mic may 5 0 56 000068 1 4m ed use 403 1tljt ll tutti Mite bjlt3t 51 gees mm mm 1 1t LIE- t are-i usihll ll Fljl' but 1 4m Ingmar-n use 40 34am mm but bite tblt r'itfi FBI team 1 4m lens so LL25 c is dds 1mm om mm 14in All FBI of cials we interviewed denied making this statement The DIA eounterintelligence Special Agent that followed up on this statement determined that it was made by an individual detailed from the 01A to the FBI who simply did not care for Memes and that the was not investigating Memes at the time the warning was issued 57 DOD OI Danna 1 4m mun 1 11 13 51 USE qua-Hum mm- qum 1 4m tn U The End Game UHFQU-Q Building the Case against Montes F81 mm 1 4M bum an L1 FBI 14 31 US 11 tins 1pm muf n ww 11 010 tam 1 4m Hg mac 5 runs-101 1 memm FBI mm 140 bu-3'1 40 1mm Lam mm FBI mam 4 13 6 fr-I EDI EhhH' 1 4 I I J unuh ml tn J Ir l mm 1 so use 403mm um mu-U lam thma 1 41 abuse gets-tram 1111 b 1111 runs at 5 21 111h15711E The Investigative Wheels Begin to Turn 1 1 4m Fni third 1 rite so use ans 1131111 SW The leadership consistently apprised senior of cials on the status of the Montes case On November 27 the DIA informed the Joint Counter-intelligence Evaluation Office about the investigation and briefed the who then briefed the SECDEF and the Deputy Secretary of Defense After the Office of the Secretary of Defense was briefed about the case senior FBI Headquarters of cials interacted with the JCEO providing itzgwith periodic Updates on the status of the case The FBI briefed the Director DIA every 2 weeks throughout the investigation because the Director wanted to make sure that DIA was doing everything possible to assist the FBI in pursuit of Montes urrsouoi In September 1993 the Deputy Secretary ofDefense established the JCEO to ensure an adequate flow ofinforrnation relating to espionage investigations The Deputy Secretary wanted a mechanism through which he and the SECDEF could be apprised ofcounterintelligence matters The JCEO evolved into the CIFA investigations within the CIFA in May 2002 lF- Fat 5un11 11111 59 DOD OI llr'lt't 4'03 1mm W but 1 dtc bits an Lise ripe-mm mm 1 ate thus 50 La 3 40 31am 30W The Of ce oflntelligence Policy and Review is for advising the Attorney General on all matters relating to the national security ofthe United States The Of ce prepares and les all applications for electronic surveillance and physical search under the FISA 0f1978 I mum 1 4m FBI tam 1 4m tuna 501 151 - was mam Duh mm 1 4m mm bug 50115 Fnl hjq13 1 4m burs-a W113 MHz-1mm Dm WW 879515411 In June the Director Director the General Counsel the the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Security and Information Operations the Director National Reconnaissance Office and the Chief of the - met to Montes Intel ence Communit accesses magg- SAW-F Also in June 2001 the FBI Headquaiters senior leadership met with Do Internal Security Section officials to provide information about the Montes investigation so the Chief of the Do Internal Security Section could make an informed decision about assuming Do responsibility for case SW In July the FBI senior leadership met with the Director DIA to provide a status report on the Montes investigation and the Director DIA met with the to discuss the case W In August the FBI senior leadership met once again with DUI leadership officials and then the Director to provide an update on the Montes investigation Further the Chief of the JCEO met with the Director to discuss the case Speci cally the JCEO was concerned about Montes continued access to sensitive information the JCEO wanted to minimize Montes access to sensitive information in a non-alerting fashion 31 place a time limit on the FBI investigation and provide the basis for terminating Montes employment should the FBI investigation fail to develop evidence to support a prosecution lth assume responsu ility for the Colombia account a move that would enable her to access additional sensitive information In the aftermath of September 1 1 the Director DIA stated that his plate was overflowing he not only had to deal with the intelligence activities of his agency in support of national security but he had to offer comfort to the families of those DIA members who died at the Pentagon on that fateful believed that the L'melmdf1 cometo arrest Montes He called the Md '3 and told him This is it Mon es a JUS een ass1gne o'm Iamagc ssessment Team that would perform those duties shortly after the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Team members were gearing Up for their assignment which included several days of training The Director wanted resolution before bombing operations began in Afghanistan He said that he would not wait any longer for a decision The FBI Headquarters leadership believed that in a perfect world the FBI would have had more time to monitor Montes activities with the prospect that she may have eventually led the FBI to others in the Cuban spy network Instead September 1 1 2001 and its aftermath helped determine the timing of her arrest Efforts to ensure that Monies did not learn ofthe investigation were successful During our interview of her in September 2004 she said that she never heard from anyone at the DIA that there were suspicions about her being a spy Monies did state hoWever that the week before her arrest she was aware that she was being followed but that she could not ee because she couldn t have given up on the people she was helping 62 190074 Waterman The Finale to More Than Sixteen Years of Espionage W Several days after September 11 2001 FBI Washington Field Office and DIA counterintelligence of cials met to begin preparations for Montes arrest Similarly the JCEO and DIA carefully began to coordinate noti cation of the senior leadership of Montes impending arrest UH-F999 On September 21 2001 when FBI Washington Field Of ce Special Agents interviewed Montes at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center they informed her that they had information from a senior official in the Cuban Intelligence Service concerning a Cuban penetration agent that implicated Montes During the course of the interview Montes refused to sign a Classi ed Information Nondisclosure Agreement and she asked to speak with an attorney The FBI Special Agents then read Montes her Advice of Rights she signed it after it was amended to reflect that she refused to answer questions without counsel present Montes was then arrested for conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States in violation of 18 U S C section Til-4 a and UHF-999 Several officials from DIA FBI and the JCEO stated that once the FBI launched its investigation of Montes it became the best example of cooperative information sharing that they had experienced U Post Arrest U On March 19 2002 Ana Beicn Montes32 pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage in violation of 18 U S C section 794 a and To communicate deliver and transmit to the government of Cuba and its representatives of cials and agents information relating to the national defense of the United States with the intent and reason to believe that the information was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of Cuba and that Montes committed acts to effect the objects of this conspiracy in the District of Columbia and elsewhere all in violation of 18 U S C 294 c U As palt of her plea agreement Montes waived her right to plead not guilty and her right to a jury trial She also waived her rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States that would have protected her from the use of self-incriminating statements in a criminal prosecution Montes is required to be available for questioning by Federal state and local law enforcement agencies and to be available for debriefings by law enforcement and intelligence of cials Montes is required to voluntarily submit to polygraph examinations to be conducted by a polygraph examiner of the U S Government s choice The results of the polygraph examinations are admissible in proceedings to determine Montes compliance with the plea agreement Montes obligation to cooperate pursuant to the plea agreement is a lifelong commitment Between her man and her plea Montes was housed at the Orange County Detention Center in Orange Virginia rm 1 my one so us lbllill Lot's 3 U On October 2002 Montes was sentenced to 25 years in prison with 5 years of supervised probation upon her release She currently is serving her sentence in the Carswell Federal Medical Center Fort Worth Texas mt BELEN MONTES 57 DOB U Ana Montes arrested on September 2 l 2001 DoDl i in 1 die I WNW U Part VI Findings Recommendations and Observations W This section contains 1 ndings and 5 observations We found less than optimum sharing of counterespionage information between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities We discovered that the CIFA was not effective as the focal point for counterespionage investigations and that this shortcoming inhibited the identi cation of unknown espionage subjects within the We found signi cant polygraph and SAP de ciencies Further we determined that the BIA does not have an adequate counterespionage infrastructure to meet its needs and has difficulty retaining highly skilled investigators The DIA also does not have Standard Operating Procedures on counterintelligence inquiries nor does it have a comprehensive program to determine the suitability of prOSpective employees Hal mm one so use vim-1on1 U Finding 1 In the years preceding the identi cation of Ana Montes as a penetration agent for the Cuban intelligence Service management indifference interagency rivalry personal rancor and lack of appreciation for and understanding of counterespionage roles structures and responsibilities led to iess than optimum sharing of countereSpionage information between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities One of the first actions in any espionage investigation is to direct investigative and analytic resources from a vast amount of information on unknown subjects toward identifying a suspect The FBI and its Intelligence Community paitners cannot effectively convert unknown subjects into espionage suspects without sharing information In this finding we will first explore authoritative counter-intelligence and counterespionage guidance and then demonstrate how those imperatives were overlooked or ignored by organizations exposed to information that led to the arrest of Ana Montes 65 NW Oi WW U Authoritative Guidance U During the past 25 years the U S Government Executive and Legislative Branches issued authoritative guidance that highlighted the criticality of sharing counterintelligence and counterespionage information so LL36 dos mm U On May 3 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 24 succeeded Presidential Review Directivex NSC-M Directive 24 ordered the creation of a new national 66 00 00173 WW counterintelligence policy structure under the auspices of the National Security Council to coordinate counterintelligence policy matters and to foster greater cooperation among the departments and agencies with counterintelligence responsibilities Directive 44 further required an exchange of senior managers between the CIA and the FBI to ensure timely and close coordination between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities It also established the National Counterintelligence Policy Board which consisted of one senior executive representative from the the the the 008 and the a Military Department counterintelligence component and the National Security Council Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs The National Counterintelligence Policy Board exercised oversight reSponsibilities for the National Counterintelligence Center and was responsible for the regular monitoring and review of the integration and coordination of US counterintelligence programs EizjafilG um i 9 Presidential Decision Directivei NSC-TS Counter-intelligence Effectiveness Counterintelligence for the 2 31 Century December 28 2000 is another counterintelligence related directive Presidential Decision DirectivefNSC-T S stressed that while there had been dramatic improvement in the coordination of counterintelligence activities there was a need to meet the challenge of an expanded and diversi ed threat to the national security of the United States Presidential Decision Directivei NSC-T S pointed out that the importance and complexity of the issue required a commitment to cooperation coordination and collaboration Presidential Decision Directive NSC-TS established the National Counterintelligence Board of Directors and the NCIX who serves as the substantive leader of national level counterintelligence and coordinates and supports the detection and neutralization of espionage against the United States 683 The FY 2004 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for the portion of the National Foreign intelligence Program asserts that effective counterintelligence support must be unencumbered by traditional organizational and cultural bias that has traditionally been an impediment to change The FY 2005 National Foreign Intelligence Program Congressional Budget Justi cation mentions that security processes and procedures should not become barriers to achieving the vision of open and efficient exchange ofinformation across the intelligence Community The National Foreign Intelligence Program notes that an open and ef cient exchange of information requires cooperation and a willingness to practice risk management NQ-FQ-RPWM-R OI WNW U Marginal Success Two recent reports demonstrate that although repeated guidance on information sharing has been well-intentioned success has been marginal and remains elusive U In August 2003 the Inspector General Dol issued Review of the Performance in Deterring Detecting and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen The report indicated that FBI penetration efforts in the late 1970s and I980s suffered from a lack of cooperation with the CIA and from management inattention Throughout the 1980s the FBI did not work cooperatively with the CIA but the early 1990s saw signi cant improvement especially in the 1985-1986 cases involving the loss of assets operating against the Soviet Union However the report mentioned that the FBI failed to keep the CIA apprised of information on non-CIA espionage investigations which undermined the effort to identify Hanssen As the I-Ianssen investigation unfolded the FBI focused on a CIA suspect and lost a measure of objectivity and failed to give adequate consideration to other possibilities In sum the report claimed that the CIA could not function as an effective counterbalance to the FBI in the Hanssen case because it was not an equal partner in the hunt for the espionage agent U The 2004 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States states that Agencies uphold a need-to-know culture of information protection rather than promoting a need to share culture of integration and stresses that information procedures should provide incentives for sharing to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge While the National Commission report focuses on counterterrorism information sharing it can also be applied to counterespionage U Management Indifference W Our examination of the Montes eSpionage case found at least 1 1 examples of management indifference that impeded counterespionage information sharing Management indifference to compliance with guidance on sharing counterintelligence information was reflected by the lack of cooperation forthrightness and management oversight and action 3 NF- In ll-31bit 1 4M thus setter FBI mm 1 4m lens so us 3 grins-1m t1 as 000080 ta 1 4m magi 1 41 momma mm mm nus-3 5E1- Usc 403 3 91 mm 5mm 6 aim-1mm - so LLELC 1 4m so use 2 qua mm 1 4m FEM mm 1 4m 50 L15 C 54103 1cm1 rt mm 14m clans 5 0 ma-mnn FBI 69 DOD OP Lat-2 CIA tth-TJ 5-0 use 3 40 33 HIE-J may 50 U311 33 403 11311 uni b'n' 11 mm 5 am CIA mm 5-0 I 3 c 4U3 Eier61 1 1 5n 51 34013 -3 thn mm 1 1m 70 000032 UODIG WU 121 0 I ml b unit-1 Him Eat H 511 f 1103 I'm Ei 1 arm cm 5r use 403 Sec 1 4m an USU sins-1mm mum name mm 5011 513 guns-mun nun 1 4m tal 'HEj 33 th UDDIG cum 14m FBI mm 1 4m tuna 5L1 use Bonus mm FEll mm 1 4m tans sumac name mm 14cc FBI mm 1 4m 551103 101 DnDliZ- lrff lif no FBI 5- 51' 534mm nouns mm mica batz31 5cr U51 3 403 1mm Donn b1m 1 4m 5 0 5 3 5' 403-101 1 Emma mm 1 mm 1 1an busy so L153 4 3 3-1unu I - 1 1 J nun-1 I mus 50 13 6 5 40 3 Se 54 21 55 Hzll ME 1 3 1 am ninja so LJ S L 5 I I I 3 100084 1 4m nonna- momma hue FBI mm 1 die thET-t so b' neuralgia bus so use 31103 Soc 5 but latte h3g3 sense 35403 1mm U Interagency Rivalry and Personal Rancor Notwithstanding abundant guidance to share counterespionage information investigations are conducted by human beings with biases and insecurities Personal character traits sometime interfere with ef cient information flow among organizations We found several instances where interagency rivalry and personal rancor led to less than optimum sharing of counterespionage information bull 51 LIED f 1 -- ltst ova thtt 1 50 USED 2403 55 1 -1tc hits-J so use 5 40oolo Elam- n ct cm tutti so use l3 4m bet aim 1 4m 1 4m SOUSG -'lD-'3-1t1itil ttc For rent tblt3i on List 3- ans 1mm Salim-F The intelligence cycle consists of identifying information gaps collecting needed information analyzing the information collected disseminating the intelligence product to the customer and receiving feedback on the usefulness of the intelligence provided Customer feedback often generates additional collection requirements Despite this time-honored process the FBI was often not a good customer Several of cials told us that the insular attitude of the FBI made it extremely dif cult to get feedback from the Bureau A senior of cial said Getting the FBI to give infomtation is dif cult The FBI gives enough information for us to brief up our chain of command but not much more than that I would go back to the FBI to get more information and the FBI would say Over the course ofthe last 5 years I have been telling the FBI that it is in everyone s best interests to give up the information because we are working as a team not only to arrest and prosecute but also to protect the loss of DOD information I4 c was so use a 493mm -- l-Jl -n assist a Ens-1mm Ill I 100085 rnl was busy 5nuscaaos-nt1n G Limited Appreciation for and Understanding of Counterespionage Roles and Responsibilities SAN-F The is the largest branch of the US Government with more than 1 million civilian and military employees The has its own arcane language and organizational infrastructure It is often a daunting task for personnel to navigate the complex bureaucracy to accomplish their mission For those outside the the task can be even more challenging A organization responsible for countereSpionage must therefore be easily recognizable to non-DoD entities In our review of the Montes breach we found several instances where a limited appreciation for and understanding of counterespionage roles structures and responsibilities led to less-than optimum sharing of counterespionage information 1 4m b t1jl 1 urns so 5 ti om mm 1 4ch tons so use 5 nos a FBI than so 5C dos-mm we FBI out 1 4m Data 50 use a dill-HIM Danie mm trite race has so use was 1mm In bonus than 1 ti-Hat muse sea-i U A Final Thought on Information Sharing SH-4F Promulgation of DCI Directive 81' reinforces the maxim that the broadest possible sharing of intelligence information is fundamental to the mission ofthe Intelligence Community Sharing intelligence information at the earliest possible point maximizes its potential value and given sufficient safeguards protects sensitive sources and methods The Directive 8f recognizes that when multiple data sources collection techniques and analytical viewpoints are brought to bear on a problem the whole can indeed be greater than the sum of its parts Once Ana Montes was identi ed as a possible Cuban espionage agent the investigative resources of the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities focused on that target in the most professional manner imaginable Notwithstanding that professional investigation reluctance to share vital information enabled Montes to continue her clandestine activity for a number of years with a certain degree of comfort While the principle of need to know is a lofty aspiration balancing need to know with a need to share Optimizes mission success U Recommendation 1 UUFQU-Q We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence request the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum to conduct a comprehensive joint evaluation of counterespionage information sharing The Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum could use the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Research Report Research on Information Sharing Between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities May 3 2002 as the starting point for its counterespionage evaluation UHF-GHQ Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and indicated that in July 2005 76 100088 the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum will be requested to conduct a joint evaluation of counterespionage information sharing 77 DOD 0 roe WNW U Finding 2 The CIF A has not been effective in its role as the focal point for counterespionage investigations in part because it has experienced dif culty marshalling resources to examine counterespionage activities operations case leads and investigations that might result in the identi cation of unknown subjects within the M Foreign intelligence and security services pose a signi cant espionage threat to the However the has not organized its countereSpionage assets to effectively meet this threat This nding discusses the organization of counterespionage assets the manner with which has tried to address counterespionage weaknesses and how the CIA is organized to confront the same threat The March 24 1994 Presidential Review Directive Counterintelligence Effectiveness asked the among other Intelligence Community members whether there was a focal point for determining when foreign intelligence reporting becomes a counterintelligence concern that requires a law enforcement reaponse such as an espionage investigation In 1996 the established the Investigations Working Group to function as the focal point for national-level operational anomalies otherwise known as unknown subject cases Also in 1996 the created the Defense Unknown Subject Team to act as a specialized investigative team to focus on unknown subject capionage leads and investigations which appear to have no speci c information indicating the potential subject s Military Department affiliation or unit of assignment The Investigations Working Group provided guidance direction and oversight to the Defense Unknown Subject Team whose members included counterintelligence investigators from the Army Navy and Air Force On May 6 1998 the approved the establishment of the JCEO to inform senior of cials of all signi cant counterintelligence activities in a timely manner To facilitate access to all relevant information and to coordinate counterintelligence activities JCEO positions were to be lled by liaison of cers from the FBI the CIA and the military counterintelligence components U Directive 5 05 69 Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity February 19 2002 established the CIF A as a Field Activity Its mission is to develop and manage counterintelligence programs and functions including the detection and neutralization of espionage against the The CIFA assumed the mission and functions of the JCEO Although investigativejurisdiction over espionage subjects resides with the military counterintelligence components and the FBI the components are responsible for reporting all signi cant counterintelligence activities to the CIFA Um-19149 The 000 organizes counterespionage around the Military Departments Under 10 U S C 3013 c 7 5013 c 7 the Military Departments are the only entities empowered to conduct counterespionage investigations Some agencies have limited authorization to conduct preliminary investigations to deveIOp leads for the FBI and the Military 73 UOQDQU Departments For organizations that do not have this authority the Military Departments provide Executive Agent support as detailed in Instruction 5240 10 Counterintelligence Support to the Combatant Commands and the Defense Agencies May 14 2004 Swim-F We found that the Executive Agent arrangement is not effective in meeting the espionage challenges facing the Foreign intelligence and security services target the entities that handle classified material While some specialized military units may handle a great deal of classi ed material the majority of the classified information resides in the defense agencies field activities and executive level offices While Military Department counterintelligence agents are highly trained professionals they rotate too frequently to Operate as subject-matter experts for complex organizations such as the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff This results in ad hoc counterespionage support for organizations that are at greatest risk In 1995 when the FBI needed a point of contact form m the task fell to the Air Force Office of Special Investiga ions ice 0 pecial Investigations detachment that rovides 'su ort to the Office of Wretary of Defense appointed aw He did not have the author1 to access any orma mm on side the ll orce so the appointed representatives from the Army and the Navy to assist the FBI as appropriate However the other representatives also did not have the authority to access civilian cm In ment records for or anizations warms Wee Establishing the Investigations Working Group and the Defense Unknown Subject Team in I996 were positive steps that the took to address unknown subject espionage leads and investigations However the Investigations Working Group did not include a cadre of vetted and investigators working continuously to identify unknown espionage subjects across the entire The Investigations Working Group continues to meet periodically The Defense Unknown Subject Team was mainly staffed by detailees from the Military Departments the arrangement created a significant problem When faced with tasking directions from their parent organizations detailees often tended to defer to their Military Department As a result support to the Defense Unknown Subject Team suffered Further the Defense Unknown Subject Team could only proceed with an investigation if other agencies willingly shared information Many times the FBI the Military Departments and other agencies did not share information with the Defense Unknown Subject Team The Defense Unknown Subject Team was disbanded in late 2003 due in large measure to a lack of meaningful sUpport from the Military Departments counterintelligence organizations Positions in the JCEO were filled by liaison of cers from the FBI the CIA and the Military Department counterintelligence components As was the case with the Defense Unknown Subject Team JCEO detailees would often be tasked by their parent organization to accomplish actions that took them away from their DoD-wide counterespionage duties Several JCEO liaison officers told us that they were underutilized and were not given all relevant counterespionage information to conduct effective investigations One FBI Special Agent said that he was misused by the JCEO He believed that he was 79 DOD Oi WW detailed to provide expert guidance and advice on counterintelligence matters involvingjoint equities but that did not happen He said that certain JCEO of cials created an undesirable work atmosphere for detailees running off at least three agents from the Air Force Of ce of Special Investigations and two from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Further he said that the CIA recalled its representative from the JCEO because he was misused to date the CIA has not re lled the position The FBI eventually removed its liaison of cer from the JCEO and does not intend to provide a replacement UHF-9H9 A number of factors to include the reliance on detailees the primacy of the Military Departments over countereSpionage and the reluctance to share relevant information have contributed to CIFA dif culties in marshalling resources to examine counterespionage activities operations case leads and investigations that might result in the identi cation of unknown subjects within the The CIA confronts the es - iona_e threat throu the Hi om 'l Ilip 5D SE i 3 I403 SEED l3 Eli's tb 1j_ lhllal USE 4621 SEC 5 CIA 50 Sen 5 80 009092 WW U Recommendation 2 -8 We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence formulate a plan to establish permanent Foreign Counterintelligence Pro a billet to build a c-un oramzation similar to ma ions sous the Functlons of the new orgamza - acting as the central point of contact for all counterespionage inquiries from outside - identifying and resolving all unknown subject espionage cases within - hosting a forum where vetted counterintelligence and special agents meet regularly to discuss openly all available counterespionage information - establishing investigative leads for the Military Departments counterintelligence components and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 0 sharing all counterespionage information from the Military Departments and agencies in accordance with Executive Orders statutes and Directives 6 Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and stated that the needs this capability and that CIFA is the appropriate organization wherein a -likc entity could be established financed and managed The Under Secretar a so stated that a D00 cm to Sta one on so would require the support -69 Review Response Although the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred we request specific actions planned and milestones for completion of the recommended action 31 new DOD WNW U Finding 3 131-1 1111111 1 41 1 11 1131 sou so 111113 Sec e 1111 1111111 1 411-1 By the late 19903 the Polyg1aph Institute began ptoviding fo1mal ol ra hexamine1s The cuuent 3 en a more 1'11 11 countermeasures after 0 countelmeasmes examinels ale encourage comprehensive continuin I education course in o 32 NOW 0001094 Dug ygr ap ute prom es ins me 1011 on po ygrap countermeasures during introductory and recerti cation courses dissemination of informatlon on the subject is not widespread SAN-F U The Intelligence Production Program establishes policies procedures and production reSponsibiIities to satisfy the foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of the warfighter policy maker and force development and acquisition organizations The goal of the Intelligence Production Program is to provide complete responsive and functionally integrated military intelligence to consumers in the most ef cient manner possible The Director DIA is charged by Directive 5105 21 Defense Intelligence Agency February 18 1997 as the Intelligence Production Program Production Functional Manager As the Production Functional Manager the DIA performs strategic planning for centralized management of defense intelligence production and facilitates the assignment and transfer of production responsibilities in the Intelligence Production Program U Recommendation 3 a UHFQU-Q We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency assign 3 Production Program Intelligence Functi I - the I Dl' EMS TOILEC 5 I Field 1 1 for the unuro ful ll-E 83 DOD OI UHF-GHQ The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence indicated that the Polygraph Program Manager in CIFA will provide requests for scheduled as well as ad hoc production on countermeasures and foreign use issues via to the Counterintelligenee Production Requirements Manager h We recommend that the Director Counterintelligence Field Activity Research polygraph countermeasures and then collaborate with polygraph manufactures to develop produce and distribute new countermeasures detection devices for use by polygraph community consumers U Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Polygraph Institute is conducting research on countermeasure detection As a by-product of that research it has identified speci c criteria and training that polygraph examiners can use to identify efforts to employ polygraph countermeasures The three major polygraph manufacturers are producing effective countermeasure detection devices as an option with their polygraph systems Additionally the Polygraph institute drafted a new chapter for the Federal Examiner s Handbook FEH Chapter 18 that will require examiners to employ these devices as an aid to countermeasure detection That chapter is currently being staffed with all federal programs for formal incorporation The Federal Examiner s Handbook standardizes Specific procedures and requirements that are binding for all polygraph programs ii Um-1999 Develop comprehensive polygraph standards for the Del polygraph community to increase the effectiveness of polygraph countermeasures Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation that will increase the capability to detect andfor neutralize polygraph countermeasures applied against OIG eas WW the He stated that Chapter 18 of the Federal Examiner s Handbook will provide those standards for polygraph examiners Establish a comprehensive polygraph countermeasures course at the Polygraph Institute that requires all Do polygraph examiners to attend the course within 1 year of graduation from initial polygraph training and thereafter requires them to attend refresher training at least biennially UHFQUG Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Polygraph Institute has already signi cantly increased the number of polygraph 'f exan'rsmer wh recei eci cuntermeasure detection train1n_ Since 200 rope IU 10 a 4 34 1315111 arge pa 3 F1116 0 IE I-emam tom 16 examiners an effective marketing of Polygraph Institute personnel who championed the importance of increasing polygraph examiner awareness and ability to neutralize polygraph countermeasure efforts In addition Chapter 18 Federal Examiner s Handbook requires 40 hours of comprehensive countermeasures detection training and follow-up training on a biennial basis These standards will become accountable items for polygraph programs under the Quality Assurance Program inspection schedule iv Direct all polygraph programs to report to the Polygraph Institute all polygraph examinations in which countermeasures are con rmed 1o use 424 U Finding 4 The polygraph directive is out of date UHF-GHQ Over the past 20 years Governmentwide polygraph policies procedures and techniques have changed signi cantly For example Directive 5210 48 states that The authority to expand use of the polygraph in beyond that authorized has been limited to a test program involving not more than 3 500 persons to be conducted during Fiscal Year 1985 The 3 500 person ceiling was lifted in October 2004 Also since Directive 5210 48 and its implementing regulation were promulgated in 1984 and 1985 respectively the titles and responsibilities of several of ces within changed The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is now responsible for polygraph policy and the CIFA is the Executive Agent charged with polygraph responsibilities Furthermore the DOD Polygraph Institute is now reSponsible for U S Governmentwide polygraph education We realize that updating the Directive 5210 48 is predicated on a change to 10 U S C section 1564a The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security 2005 Legislative Strategy cites the need to update the Directive However the Strategy indicates that Directive 5210 48 cannot be updated because wording in 10 U S C section 1564a links the Directive to the polygraph program The Legislative Strategy seeks to change 10 U S C section 1564a by adding language that expands the categories of personnel for which polygraph examinations may be administered The language will state that CSPs are required for those who have access to other information whose unauthorized disclosure or manipulation would have signi cant potential impact upon national security as determined under standards established by the Secretary of Defense U Recommendation 4 UHF-GHQ We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security continue working with Congress to change polygraph provisions in 10 U S C section 1564a and then update Directive 5210 48 and Regulation 5210 48-R accordingly U Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation Due to an unusual situation regarding a 1987 Federal law the Directive cannot be updated until the law is changed The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has submitted a legislative proposal that would change the law in 2005 U Review Response We consider management comments to be responsive to our recommendation We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence keep us apprised of the status of the legislative proposal to change 10 U S C section 1564a and once the law is changed to advise us of the update to Directive 5210 48 and Regulation 5210 43-R lol I 000098 WW U Finding 5 UNI-1999 The DIA does not use pee-employment polygraph examinations as part of the screening process for positions that require access to Top Secret material The DIA does not perform pre-employment polygraph examinations for positions that require access to Top Secret material in accordance with Directive 5210 48 However the NSA a entity and all other non-DoD intelligence agencies require pre-employment polygraph examinations for civilian employees UHF-GHQ The requirement to administer a CSP to DIA employees originates from Directive 5210 48 which prescribes polygraph examinations to assist in determining eligibility for employment with or assignment to the BIA in positions that have been designated by the Director DIA as critical intelligence positions U uithermore the December 13 1988 DIA Policy Statement #04-88 Security Requirements for DIA Open Systems Architecture states that all authorized users of Open Systems Architecture now termed the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System must possess Top SecrethCI access as governed by DIA Manual Sensitive Compartmented Information SCI Security Management December 10 1984 DIA Manual 50-1 was superceded by BOB Manual 5105 21-M-1 Sensitive Compartmented Information Administrative Security Manual in August 1998 DIA personnel who possess Top SecrethCI access and have access to a Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System computer terminal are candidates for CSP examinations a po ygrap ue ers some -u no a rom engaging in or expanding espionage activities The review shows that in the Pollard Souther Hall and Pelton espionage cases none of them would have applied for positions where a CSP was a condition of employment All four feared that a CSP examination would have uncovered their espionage activities Ironically in 1985 when Montes applied for a position at DIA she knew that DIA did not require a pre-employment polygraph like the NSA or CIA U On February 28 1994 the Joint Security Commission issued Rede ning Security A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence The report states that The polygraph is a signi cant espionage deterrent CIA and the NSA two agencies that routinely use full-scope polygraphs to screen applicants present a strong case that the polygraph serves as an efficient and effective cost-containment hiring tool When admissions made by a subject during a polygraph test result in a disquali cation these agencies are saved the considerable cost and time of conducting a background investigation In addition the Office of Medical Services reported to the Commission that full scope polygraphs enable WNW it to detect and screen out 50 percent to 75 percent of the most troubled applicants While senior of cials at the CIA and the NSA acknowledge the controversial nature of the polygraph process they also strongly endorse it as the most effective information gathering technique available in their personnel security systems They argue that without the polygraph the quality of their work force would suffer immeasurably Every CIA NBA and DIA polygraph examiner that we interviewed echoed those sentiments The Acting Chief of the CIA Polygraph Of ce characterized the pre-employment screening polygraph as an effective means to gauge the conduct of background investigations Additionally CIA of cials believe the screening exam is a cost- and time effective segment of the hiring process that is temporary access can be granted to an employee pending completion of a full background investigation Finally the polygraph process is seen as a security deterrent because new CIA employees are made aware of behavior they should avoid during their career The Chiefofthe CIA Personnel Security Group wrote that As a matter of business practice the Agency does conduct polygraph testing as early as possible in the applicant process This allows the Agency to use suitability information obtained during polygraph testing at the earliest point possible in applicant processing UHF-GHQ The Chief of the BIA Polygraph Branch told us that with increased polygraph assets 20 polygraph examiners and 1 I examination rooms the BIA Polygraph Branch will be capable of conducting pro-employment CSPs He contends that pie-employment polygraphs are more desirable for two reasons First it is far easier not to hire individuals with security issues than it is to fire them Second a pro-employment CSP assists background investigators in investigating security issues raised during an examination The Chief concluded that pro employment CSP examinations save time and money by greatly reducing the time it takes to conduct a background investigation U Recommendation 5 We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency use pro-employment Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph examinations for every Defense Intelligence Agency position that requires access to Top Secret material Management Comments The Directo1 DIA concurred Il l principle with our recommendation and stated that all DIA em-lo ees a I 000100 WW The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence commented that currently the Director has the authority to designate positions as critical intelligence positions that would be subject to testing to assist in determining their eligibility for employment However any additional increase in personnel awaiting CSP examinations before entering on duty could create a backlog that may effectively delay employment start dates and cause a possible shift in internal priorities within the broader DIA polygraph missions The Under Secretary stated that the legislative proposal that submitted to update its polygraph directive would authorize all Components to implement CSP examinations as they deem necessary in determining initial eligibility for personnel for assignment to critical or sensitive positions based upon certain risk assessment criteria U Finding 6 Ur @9993 The DIA does not retain in perpetuity the charts of CSP examinations U The DIA administers an effective CSP program Evidence that DIA complies with policy and procedures and meets the standards ofa Federal Government polygraph program is found in the results of numerous I a 124 rayon U All DIA personnel in positions designated by the Director DIA as critical intelligence positions are as a condition of employment periodically subjected to CSP examinations The authority to administer a CSP is contained in Directive 5210 48 The Directive states that the scope of the polygraph examination must be limited to counter-intelligence topics Questions permitted pursuant to the Directive are I Have you ever engaged in eSpionage or sabotage against the United States I1 Do you have knowledge of anyone who is engaged in espionage or sabotage against the United States 0 Have you ever been approached to give or sell any classi ed materials to unauthorized persons 0 Have you ever given or sold any classi ed materials to unauthorized persons 0 Do you have knowledge of anyone who has given or sold classified materials to unauthorized persons Have you had any unauthorized contact with representatives of a fOt'Blgl l government om hitat t UHF-BUG Regulation 52 I 48- stipulates that polygraph examination results should be destloyed within 3 months from completion of the investigation fl in which the 1101 1a was authorized' however the olic or 1 1 31 1o _o 42 it11t7JlEi Elli-5 tutti USE 424 L'rli t' in ll 10 ELC Willie-HQ may not have been 0 rnuc asms ance investiga 01's as ey soug ten 1 an unknown subject believed to be conducting espionage on behalf of Cuba but they may have provided valuable insight in terms of comparative analysis for the post- arrest period when Montes had to submit to polygraph examinations as a condition of her plea agreement with the 1 1 8 Government Those examinations are expected to continue inde nitely to test Montes cooperation with the US Government As a result of management comments we revised Recommendation 6 to indicate that all entities with polygraph programs should digitize and retain all CSP examination charts for a minimum of35 years U Recommendation 6 UNFQEQ We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence direct all entities with polygraph programs to digitize and retain for a minimum of 35 years all Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph examination charts UHF-GHQ Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and stated that a requirement will be incorporated in the revision of Regulation 5210 48-R to digitize and retain the charts for 35 years Iron-WW U Finding 7 UHF-999 The DIA does not use a coordinated approach to determine prospective employee suitability UM-19199multidisciplinary coordinated approach to determine prospective employee suitability They coordinate the work of personnel specialists security of cials polygraph examiners and in a logical and systematic way to make hiring decisions The DIA an organization with far fewer employees than the CIA or the NSA does not employ those techniques UHF-999holistic approach to vetting prospective employees through the security clearance process When a CIA applicant has clean polygraph charts that individual can be granted temporary access to classi ed information pending completion of a full background investigation The CIA uses a panel of medical security and personnel professionals to scrutinize those applicants with security or unresolved polygraph dif culties Should a prospective NSA employee have security or unresolved polygraph dif culties the application goes before an NSA Application Panel which is similar to the CIA panel The NSA panel addresses suitability and security issues that might have surfaced during an applicant s background investigation UHFOUQ When Ana Montes applied for a position in 1935 DIA security clearance adjudication standards were codi ed in DIA Regulation 50-8 Personnel Security Program October 2 1975 which stipulated that granting a security clearance must be based on common sense using all available information The basic criteria for granting security clearances were excellent character discretion and unquestioned loyalty to the United States and the applicant and members of the immediate family had to be citizens of the United States Regulation 50-8 also listed 21 supplemental criteria for not granting a security clearance including espionage the forceful overthrow of the US Government criminal acts and other nefarious activity UHF-GHQ In August 1985 the BIA Security Office ordered an initial Personnel Security Review of Montes and a DIA investigator conducted a pre-employment interview of her On August 23 1985 the BIA Security Of ce noti ed the Personnel Of ce that it did not object to tendering a formal job offer to Montes and if she accepted the position she would be eligible for an interim Top Secret clearance upon entering duty with DIA Montes began her career with DIA on September 30 1985 She was granted an interim Top Secret clearance pending completion of a background investigation which was initiated by the Personnel Security Division on October 2 1985 Unlike the CIA or NSA the BIA did not and still does not use polygraph screening or testing as a precursor to employment In 1985 prospective DIA employees including military members were only subjected to comprehensive background investigations As a result the background investigation and a cursory security investigation formed the basis for evaluating Montes eligibility for access to classi ed information WW In June 1986 DIA completed the background investigation initiated shortly after Montes began he1 employment with the agency Sevelal security concerns were raised including falsi cation of her Master of Artsd - _1'ee from o11 1 1131 1 1 11 111 511 1 nsand her trustworthiness determined that because 1ona1'y emp oyee should be reviewed by the Personnel Office for possible dismissa ac 1on series of discussions and informal notes to the Personnel Office and the DIA Of ce of the General Counsel followed but no formal action was ever taken As a result Montes was certified eligible for SCI Montes 12'1 posed numerous dif culties for of cials could not agree er aim was a securlty or a personnel issue The Director DIA declared all positions to be categorized as critical intelligence positions The June 1995 DIA Manual Personnel Security Program DIA Manual 50-8 indicates that all DIA positions are special sensitive thus personnel in those positions require access to The 1997 National Counterintelligence Center report Review of Security and Counterintelligence Findings from Community Damage Assessments suggests that candidates for pa1ticularly sensitive positions may warrant coordinated examinations by personnel Specialists polygraph examiners and security of cials The CIA and the NSA have heeded this advice the BIA has not 0 ns Ho 1 11 1- 1111 31 1011 so 11% U Recommendation 7 G We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency institute a coordinated employee vetting program that uses personnel specialists security of cials polygraph examiners and to determine the suitability of prospective employees G Management Comments The Director DIA concurred in principle with our recommendation and stated that senior DIA personnel and security of cers will coordinate with CIA and NSA of cials to assess their applicant and employee suitability review programs and make appropriate recommendations to the Director in August 2005 When the BIA determines the resource and funding implications the Director will decide what can be done within existing resources and will seek additional resources if required The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence supports this recommendation Review ResPonse We consider management comments to be responsive to our recommendation We request that the BIA provide us with the results of its assessment of the CIA and NSA applicant and employee suitability review program and DIA actions contemplated within 6 months of the date of this report U Finding 8 U0131989 The cu1 1ent counte1e5pionage force structure at DIA is inadequate to meet the needs of the agency Several attempts to resolve this shortcoming have not survived the F01 ei_n Counterintelli-ence Plogram budget process The DIA 1 1m that 34 94 identi es Fo1eign Counterintelligence nuild process Once a year DIA reaffirms its base budget and identi es shortfalls in funding for current and future missions 2 years out DIA ranks these shortfalls and submits them as either unfunded requirements or overguidance to the BIA Financial Executive Staff The Financial Executive Staff consolidates all DIA Foreign Counterintelligence Program submissions and ranks them as an agency priority before submitting the package to the Program Manager for the Foreign Counter-intelligence Program CIFA Furthermore DIA has dif culty retaining highly skilled counterintelligence investigators because the agency cannot offer the 25 percent Law Enforcement Availability Pay differential that investigators at other agencies receive as an added incentive USE 41311 UHF-GHQ in an a ency with approximately the BIA currently has Special Agents respons1 - or coun ermg espionage During the perlod leading to the identification of Ana Montes as a generation agent for the Cuban anellien nce Service andm 1 that followed when ii 39 Special Agents were asmgne DIA 1 devoted more than 9 percen of then t1me focusmg on Monies I er ma ers ranging from mundane to crucial were given little or no attention UHF-GHQ Recognizing the retention problem DIA has submitted a Foreign Counterintelligence Plogram initiative labeled Counterintelligence Cl Investigations Support Giowth every year since 2002 The initiative would add investigators to upgrade the ext1eme1y limited DIA counterintelligence investigative capability the reason being that additional pelsonnel would allow greater cove1age of counterintelligence and security interviews of all newly assigned or hired civilian and military personnel counterintelligence debriefings of all personnel departing DIA an upgraded counterintelligence review of all foreign contacts by DIA personnel and an upgraded counterintelligence review and assessment of all unof cial travel by personnel Finally the initiative pointed out that without increased force structure The ability to deter DIA peisonnel from taking steps to engage in espionage on behalf of a foreign power and the ability to detect DIA personnel alieady potentially serving as fo1eign spies will remain hinder ed To date the initiative has not received suf cient priority among othe1 Foreign Counterintelligence Prog1am primities to warrant funding app1o va The Senioi Progiam Manager recognized that since September 1 l 2001 counterintelligence progiams suppo1ting the Global War on Terroiism have 1eceived the highest Foreign Counterintelligence Program ranking Countelespionage enhancements have not fa1ed neally as well DIA 10 USC 417- additional secur1ty investrga or pos1t1ons au orlze 94 131mm 000105 indicated that eneral Defense sop-WW Intelligence Program budget have improved the capability of his organization However the number of counteiintelligence and counterespionage positions by the Fo1eign Counterintelligence Prog1am has 1emained static The 1 1 mentioned that the investigations of ce has dif culty attracting quali ed app Icants because DIA does not offer pay incentives and cannot compete with other agencies or private contractors f01 the talent 1'equi1ed to accomplish its mission Proposals fo1 incentive pay have beenre Human Resources Dir' ect01ate Comments made by the 11113 1 11 0 511 31 12-1 illustrate the point He said that although he recelve security investigators he could not am act quali ed applicants because he could not offer salary incentives He lamented that he had difficulty retaining investigators because once tr ained they look fo1 opportunitie agencies that oerff ngcentive pay Finally he said that the Olga lj-jll l Wi 11 11 111131 musc- 113 1 caseload has11 111 1 1 1 01 since 2000 and as a result the cigan1za1on as uecome reactlve rather an proactive because of personnel constraints UM-1999 As a result of management comments we revised Recommendation 8 to clarify that DIA counterintelligence personnel cannot receive Law Enforcement Availability Pay U Recommendation 8 UHF-999 We recommend that the Director Counterintelligence Field Activity address and give high priority to the Defense Intelligence Agency Foreign Counterintelligenee Program initiative to upgrade the Defense Intelligence Agency counterintelligence investigative capability UHF-GHQ Management Comments The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence partially concurred with our recommendation The Under Secretaiy stated that policy does not authorize DIA personnel to conduct counterintelligence investigations Counterintelligence personnel in DIA are not classi ed as 18 Criminal Investigators and thus no link exists to Law Enforcement Availability Pay They may conduct initial inquiries until a determination is made that an investigation is warranted At that point the matter is referred to the FBI or to the Military Department counterintelligence investigative agency that has Title reaponsibility for conducting the investigation All organizations with organic counterintelligence personnel should use existing policies and programs to attract and retain the necessary counterintelligence expertise UHF-GHQ Review Response We consider management comments to be responsive to our recommendation We recognize that DIA counterintelligence investigato1s are not classi ed as 181 C1iminal Investigators and as such do not qualify fol Law Enforcement Availability Pay Nonetheless DIA 1s woefiilly short ofqualified highly skilled countelintelligence investigators Timely and positive action is warranted in response to DIA Counter intelligence Program requests for an upgraded capability Wm U Finding 9 om unit 1 41's runs to SE 51-4241 om him 1ou st Hart DIAS bit 1'1 th3Lil-5 12 UN-F999 In an August 24 I999 memorandum Changes to Special Access Program Oversight Committee Procedures and Organization the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered the Director of the Special Access Program Oversight Committee to develop a plan to consolidate all program access clearances into an integrated database The Chief of Security for the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition Technology and Logisticsi Special Programs 5 I E 000103 WW who is responsible for implementing a DOD-wide SAP database told us that the Military Departments had to standardize security forms and procedures and resolve reciprocity issues before the integrated access database could become a reality However the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics continued its pursuit of a centralized SAP registry The 2002 Defense Planning Guidance included language that directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics the and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to formulate a Program Objective Memorandum funding request to support the development of an integrated SAP information management system The information management system will include databases to manage budget personnel access security information and archiving requirements among others issues Consideration will also be given to integrating Military Department and defense agency SAP databases into the architecture of the information management systems or sous On June 6 2003 the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency was given Executive Agent responsibilities for the SAP information management system and was directed to eld the system by 2007 Once fielded system operations and resource responsibilities will shift to the SAP Coordination Office which will retain oversight responsibility On May 28 2004 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics promulgated speci c requirements for the system and implemented the August 1999 Deputy Secretary of Defense order to develop a single DOD personnel access database that creates a single common authoritative information reference for personnel security information and SAP access The Chief of Security for the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition Technology and Programs said that the SAP information management system would be tested in March 2005 and is expected to become fully operational in early 2007 Computer hubs are scheduled to be placed at all combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate before the system becomes operational U Recommendation 9 a We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics continue the process of establishing 3 central registry for personnel with access to Special Access Programs Mil 1 din 10 USS 51-1124 DUO DIG 000109 U Finding 10 UHF-GHQ The DIA does not have Standard Operating Procedures for counterintelligence inquiries that lead to support of counterespionage investigations conducted by the FBI or the Military Departments G DIA counterintelligence Special Agents were aggressive and proactive in identifying Ana Montes as a suspected espionage agent and provided outstanding support to the FBI during the nearly year-long investigation leading to her arrest However DIA does not have Standard Operating Procedures for undertaking inquiries that may result in FBI or Military Department counterespionage investigations The lack of speci c procedures caused some confusion in coordinating actions within the and with the FBI and may have delayed the identi cation of Montes as the individual who t the pro le of the sought after Cuban spy nured counterintellience Special Agents in never possessed Standar perating roceures pecta gen 5 a ways used an informal ad hoc approach to problem solving As evidence mounted that pointed toward Montes the Special Agents did not appreciate the procedures to effect liaison and coordination with the FBI and the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense When the Special Agents began to seriously focus on Montes in September 2000 they tried to convince the FBI of through personal contacts with the Washington Field Of ce This informal aiiroach eventualli resulted in the FBI decision- 69 Had DIA possessed Standard Operating Procedures the Special Agents would have known that counterespionage concerns must be formally presented in writing to FBI Headquarters using an 81 I referral as outlined in the June 1996 supplement to the 1979 Memorandum of Understanding and Section 811 c ofthe Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995 Section 811 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995 50 U S C section 402a governs the coordination of counterespionage investigations between Executive Branch agencies and the Military Departments and the FBI Section 811 referrals advise the FBI of any information regardless of its origin which may indicate that classi ed information is being or may have been disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power The Special Agents also would have ltnown that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence must be advised of any signi cant counterintelligence referrals to the FBI in accordance with Instruction 5240 6 Counterintelligence Awareness Brie ng Program July 16 1996 Had DIA forwarded the 81 I referral the FBI may have been formally alerted to the critical nature of the undertaking and may have acted more swiftly to label Montes the suspect Alerting the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence might have sensitized the issue within the sooner than it did As a result of management comments we revised Recommendation 10 to clarify that DIA does not have Standard Operating Procedures for counterintelligence inquiries that lead to support of counterespionage investigations conducted by the FBI or the Military Departments 98 000110 sop WW U Recommendation 10 fG We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency develop and issue Standard Operating Procedures for counterintelligence inquiries that lead to counterespionage investigations in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Military Departments Management Comments The Director DIA concurred with our recommendation and stated that a revision ofthe DIA manual on security investigations will contain a section dedicated to the conduct of espionage inquiries The revision will be completed in August 2005 Danie 1 4m Wm U Finding 11 SM During the latter stages of the Montes investigation the BIA could have jeepardized the outcome by not strictly following Operations Security procedures stats During the latter stages of the Montes investigation DIA of cials did not strictly follow Operations Security e-mail procedures on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System The mission of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System is to deliver secure information to intelligence consumers around the world This Operations Security deficiency could have jeopardized the outcome of the investigation Operations Security is the process of identifying Critical information and analyzing friendly actions to identify actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be pieced together to derive critical information useful to adversaries and select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation em but 1 4m one 10 ation use 5442-1 Lam uni 1 411 3 ennui 100 000112 0m gnu-1 1 4m buTnE rm mm 1 die Janie-J USE 3349 1 4m burnt mm 1 4m bum 501 13 4 403 14331 1 1 4m SW All of the e-mail messa as cited above were sent durin the cried when A was conductin 101 DOD OI 15 case en LITES 1 10 en W While examining DIA Operations Security practices during the Montes investigation we conducted a forensic analysis of more than 3 000 e-mails We found that at least 85 empioyees had knowledge of the FBI Montes investigation Those individuals included officials in the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense the BIA and the National Reconnaissance Office The list did not include FBI an of ciaIs who may have been aware of the investigation Although the number seems excessive certain of cials such as those in the of ces of the General Counsel the CIFA the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and many others had a rightful need to know Although it is recognized that the DIA SAFE System and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System e mail application are separate systems maintained by different technicians with unique internal authorities and capabilities sensitive counterespionage investigations require cautious action the fear of compromise cannot be overstated U Recommendation 11 We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency reevaluate the Operations Security risks associated with using the Joint Woridwide Intelligence Communications System to disseminate close hold information during counterespionage investigations G The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence indicated that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security already directed through a memorandum to the field that all counterintelligence investigative reporting will be submitted via Portico a secure communications network for the counterintelligence community The upcoming revision of Instruction 5240 4 Counterintelligence Investigations and Significant CI Activity Reporting will codify the requirement for investigations to be reported through Portico to 1 I I 000714 atop WW U Observation 1 After Ana Montes was identi ed as a suspect the investigation leading to her arrest and conviction was a model of ef ciency and effectiveness On October 13 2000 DIA counterintelligence Special Agents and FBI Special Agents met to discuss the pro le of a Cuban unknown subject The DIA of cials presented compelling evidence that Montes fit the pro le The FBI believed that the BIA of cials had resented suf cient evidence to orwar roug arres 200 the FBI the and the DIA collaborated and cooperated with such profound professionalism that the FBI led investigation could easily be used as a model for the future Hallmarks of the investigation included collegial sharing of information in a timely fashion continuous and continual feedback of actions planned or taken and senior leadership involvement Without exception every FBI and of cial we encountered during our review told us that the Montes investigative process unfolded seamlessly and prompted them to conclude that it was the very best counterespionage investigation they had ever experienced SAN-F DIA counterintelligence Special Agents and FBI Special Agents provided weekly updates on the Montes case to the JCEO who in turn provided numerous timely brie ngs and information papers on the case to the SECDEF and Deputy Secretary of Defense the and other senior of cials FBI and DIA Special Agents frequently briefed the Director and Deputy Director on the progress of the case The Director DIA stated that when he learned that the agency may have had a spy in our midst he knew that it was extremely important to coordinate everything related to the case with the FBI Particularly noteworthy was the FBI desire to consult with the Director to receive advice on matters uniquely related to the agency The Director DIA also met regularly with the DCI and senior FBI of cials to discuss the ongoing investigation and to outline a contingency plan that would eventually lead to the arrest of Montes He also regularly conferred with the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and was apprised of the FBI presentations to the congressional intelligence oversight committees on the status of the investigation Although the Director DIA was somewhat frustrated by the slow pace of the investigation particularly given the magnitude of the case and its potential impact on national security he understood that the ISA Court would deliberate and eventually provide the necessary authority to proceed In sum the Director DIA said that he was comfortable with what was being done and was well informed W A senior JCEO of cial stated that once the SECDEF knew about the case the Montes investigation became the best example of information sharing with the FBI that the JCEO had ever seen That sentiment was echoed many times over in our discussions with senior of cials who were involved directly or functioned on the periphery of the Montes investigation An FBI Special Agent s comments regarding the cooperation between agencies typi es the latter stages of the investigation briefed a multitude of of cials within the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense to include the Of ce of the General Counsel and provided periodic updates on the status of the case He also briefed the Director DIA every 2 weeks and said that the Director was very interested and wanted to make sure that DIA was doing everything possible to make the investigation successful 103 NQ-FQR-MI-M-R OI Finally he said that Our interaction with DIA was the best that I have experienced on any espionage case with any agency during my career DODIG 1 run- 1 I 000115 sop WW U Observation 2 UMP-GHQ Severely limited dissemination of damage assessments and other reports on espionage cases prevents opportunities to share lessons learned U rLFlelG Damage assessments and reports detailing espionage cases perpetrated against the United States are valuable tools for decision makers and others engaged in countering that inimical threat to national security We recognize that responsible distribution of those reports is both prudent and wise and that the need-to-know principle must be strictly enforced However our experience in attempting to gain access to reports on recent espionage cases warrants repeating so that future reviews and evaluations can prevent delay and obfuscation More importantly sound lessons learned cannot be applied without an awareness of shortcomings failings and successful actions aggregated from past espionage activities seats The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence charged the Department of Defense Inspector General to use the basic framework of the Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames reports authored by the Inspectors General of the and the CIA respectively as guides to accomplish the Montes evaluation We learned that the Do had issued three separate reports on the Hanssen case--onc highly classi ed with restricted access one classi ed Secret 1N0 Foreign Dissemination and one 3 -page unclassified Executive Summary Review of the Performance in Deterring Detecting and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence provided us a copy of the 31-page unclassified Executive Summary In our attempt to comply with congressional direction we asked the and then the FBI for a copy of the Secretl No Foreign Dissemination report on Hanssen we were denied access We sought guidance and support from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and were advised that we could only obtain the document from the originator Out of options we discontinued our effort to obtain a document that would have signi cantly assisted us in formulating the framework for this report We experienced no such difficulty in obtaining access to the CIA report on Ames SW-F Reluctance to share information of this sort is not unique or particularly surprising The 1997 National Counterintelligence Center Review of Security and Counterintelligence Findings from Community Damage Assessments complained about the narrow distribution of reports on the Ames case The review indicated that the Ames Damage Assessment Team under the direction of the Community Management Staff completed its report in l995 That review and earlier reports issued by the CIA Inspector General the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence did not contain separate sections on counterintelligence and security And except for the congressional reports which were unclassified none of the reports or assessments listed in the National Counterintelligence Center s 1997' review received wide distribution in the Intelligence Community or in the The Center concluded that the damage assessments were so highly classi ed and controlled that the reports went tojust a handful of US Government offices 105 NW DOD OI WNW U Observation 3 on errorts Statement Number 9 Law Enforcement Counterterrorism and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 91 suggests a similar view The poor state of the information systems meant that access to information depended in large part on their personal relationships with individuals in the operational units or squads where the information resided In short didn t know what they didn t know primary information management system designed using 19805 technology already obsolete when installed in 1995 limited the Bureau s ability to share its information internally and externally The FBI did not have an effective system for storing searching or retrieving information of intelligence value in its investigative les l 403 FBI tum trite bus so use swamp IIGS-lti iil _1 06 'tta-t-sta IG 000118 FBI DU tinting in 1 1 Mic-1 I one 50lJ S t3 5 ans-1mm UHF-9H9 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States Staff Statement Number 9 outlines FBI strategic analysis dif culties with respect to terrorism The Staff Statement said It is the role ofthe strategic analyst to look across individual operations and cases to identify trends and develop broad assessments ofthe threat to U S interests The goal is not abstract Such analysis drives collection efforts It is the only way to evaluate what the institution does not know The FBI had little understanding of or appreciation for the role of strategic analysis in driving investigations or allocating resources FBI agents failed to see the value of strategic analysis nding it too academic and therefore irrelevant and did not know what they didn t know We observed similar circumstances regarding counterespionage l- lzll but 1 are one so us C 5 tins-1mm sacs-trim 108 0001 20 Da- JG hi 1 43 F l b lIH 1 4 11 50 USC 5 403 HIJHJ rm MI 1 run mania E 5 DOD DIG 000121 name an we U Observation 5 UHF-GHQ The adoption of risk management as the operating information technology philosophy successfully postulates that it is possible to balance the risk of disclosure against the cost of protection 1 a runs 10 sea-1 UIIFQU-Q The DIA has adopted a risk management perspective - ccorI mg to its m'usti' be cost-effective and ef cient in a risk management environmen categorizes its employees as trustworthy The vast majority of DIA civilian and military employees require access to highly classified and extremely sensitive information Those employees must out of necessity be screened and vetted prior to assignment to the agency A DIA employee gains access to DIA information systems when depending on the level of ascces re ire the em llU ee s su-ervisor re uests that access through the ma- runs 1n use a 42-1 reviews a da a-ase owmg a emp earances anI en grants emp eyes the required access Should an employee require access to a different system for the emIloyee must obtain that access through the CIA is noti ed when an employee departs DIA and le ua 5 computer accesses W The DIA information technology policy of risk management is an effective way to provide employees with broad access to classi ed information while limiting the risks to national security The DIA provides employees with access to information technology platforms based on need to know Ana Montes indicated that she did not download classified information from her system neither did she stray outside her area of expertise because she feared that the BIA monitored her computer at all times Having received DIA information technology security awareness training Montes was mindful that her computer was always prone to being monitored The DIA proactively informed its employees that their systems were susceptible to monitoring at any time That warning coupled with security awareness training may have deterred Montes from downloading classified information from her work station to supply hard copy information to the Cubans We found no evidence to suggest that Montes ever secreted classified information on her person and carried it out of her work place for delivery to the Cubans tam Hie roast so us secs him a a securl ru es anI regu 3 tons canno _uarantee that rum out one no us a rare to those standards Nevertheless cos bloc a clear articulation of the standards bolstered by strict enforcemen 0 seem procedures can create an atmosphere that promotes security awareness and may help deter or prevent espionage UHF-999 protects DIA information systems develops an- promu ga es po totes re a e- ose systems and protects information systems in a way that is comparable to other Intelligence Community agencies DIA Regulation 50-23 Information Systems Security 110 100122 INFOSEC Management March 1 2002 is the primary operating document for DIA information systems no t 42 1 i 3 8 also responmble for the 0 nt Wot dw not 111113 mus c DIA thus IUUBE 1424 but-11151 111 DOD 0113 100123 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK U lol I 3 000124 U Part VII Appendixes DOD DIG 000125 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK U 114 DOD DIG 000126 WW U Appendix A Montes Of cial and Unof cial Travel U 1937 Ema thus 1011 313 542 U 1991 - HS NQFQ-RN-IMR DOD OI U 1992 0 U None U 1993 DIE-V 1O 42 - iU xpege Elm mm 1 4m mum 194 mm 5-124 HSA mm tuna an LLSE 5 10 nme DM- bus to H 333 a 49- Em mm 5011 51 bug 1DU S C 442 1 U 1994 42 1 mm 1 11 12 LI SC t 492 Um tuna 10mm i' nn1e D A' 1UU S C 5342-1 UHF-9159 116 000123 1 4m U 1995 ma tum 0 Ei I fh1f3'l IRE 424 U 1996 219 but 4 7-1 CIA mm 1 4m 51311 31 -103 5c-c mm- mm 1 111m 424 Lam- 1 414 In LISC 5 12 1 1 501 15 1 1 49 1 ans mm 59 I 117 DOD Of U 1997 U 1993 EM mam muss DIA than tilts mus15-103 Sec 13 1 am 31 33 51mm Du mm000130 U 1999 U 2001 um bus THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK U 120 DOD GIG 000132 WNW U Appendix B Montes Awards Recognition and Training U 1985 U 1986 113 UHF-9 1519 um It'll-5 hill-F3 i U 1987 uxxpaue_ U 1983 Dl Rina U 1989 U9129199 191 5 I - iuxipeggi 1999999 U 1990 - - We 0 UHF-GHQ EJIA may - #119199 9 mus-J tuna U 1991 - UHF-GHQ b 1191 I U 1992 lU FQggi UHF-GHQ um- bug I hue 8 U 1993 - U 1994 WW wave UHFQUQ wrmue_ U 1995 - mum U 1996 mue mime IBIA 121- 50 u C i #193 Sec Li I U 1997 - - - - - U 1999 mega - UHFQJUQ - 3 U 2000 - um-2999 - Wm - U 2001 3 1 1 11m THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK U 26 WNW DOD GIG 000138 U Appendix C Background on the Brothers to the Rescue Incident U The Brothers to the Rescue is one of several Cuban exiie groups based in lorida 35 A group of Cuban exiles formed the organization in 1991 as an air search and rescue force to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees eeing Cuba in small boats and rafts When the rafter exodus slowed in 1994 the focus of the group s activities shifted In July 1995 while a otilla of small boats organized by another Cuban exile group conducted a political demonstration off the Cuban coast the president of the Brothers to the Rescue Mr Jose Basulto ew his Cessna 337' aircraft over Havana dispersing propaganda leaflets and religious objects A television reporter accompanied Mr Basulto and videotaped the streets of Havana from the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft A Miami television station later aired the videotape A Cuban Air Force ghter did escort Mr Basulto s aircraft in Cuban territorial airspace but took no action against it U On two nights in January 1996 Brothers to the Rescue aircraft again dropped propaganda lea ets on Havana The Cuban government charged that the aircraft violated Cuban territorial airspace Mr Basulto acknowledged that the Brothers to the Rescue dropped the lea ets He stated however that Brothers to the Rescue aircraft released the lea ets outside of Cuban territorial airspace and the wind carried them over Havana Apparently the Cuban military did not detect the aircraft on either night U On February 24 1996 a group of three Brothers to the Rescue aircraft led by Mr Basulto departed Opa Locka Airport in Miami Mr Basulto led a ight plan for a search and rescue mission for Cuban rafter refugees The area of the mission was approximately 25 nautical miles north of Havana At approximately 3 00 pm Eastern Standard Time just before the aircraft crossed the twenty- fourth parallel marking the boundary between U S and Cuban Air Defense Identification Zones two Cuban Air Force ghters launched from San Antonio de los Ba os Air eld which is southwest of Havana At 3 21 pm and 3 28 respectively the Cuban ghters intercepted and shot down the two trailing Brothers to the Rescue Aircraft The lead Brothers to the Rescue aircraft entered and left Cuban airspace without incident At 3 35 pm the Cuban Air Force launched a second pair of ghters The second pair of ghters intercepted the j 5 U The description ofthe Brothers to the Rescue incident is extracted from the Office ofthe Inspector General of the Department of Defense Policy and Oversight Report Number 97-01 1 The Response to the Brothers to the Rescue Incident Phase March 28 I997 12 tor WW OIG 000139 WW remaining Brothers to the Rescue aircraft piloted by Mr Basulto approximately 25 nautical miles east of the shoot down area They took no action against the aircraft At 5 08 Mr Basulto landed safely at Opa Locka Airport 6 Appendix D Montes Accesses to Sensitive Programs and Information This compilation of Montes accesses is based upon data received from a variety of sources it may not reflect the totality of Montes access to sensitive programs The list does not describe the substance of the sensitive programs and information to which Montes had access because in-depth knowledge of those programs and information is beyond the scope of this review nuns by Lacy Ha 113 3 muse - grail UHF-999 as Dr s hit-3 - 1n 1 4m thus to us as mm 1 4 in bus so u le bit-3 3 1-3 1 as a 42 1 10 use 434 Wt mm to Us a 19 a 31 ex 1on3 UIIFQHG P'e- baa-i 1c in gt UHF-9149 site our 11 111312 Lira lens IO 5 12a b 53 55M 1 Dun 10 us 5 UHF-GHQ 5 49-1 WW UHF-GHQ DIA- l'bHCu Uxa eue 9 UH-11989 Dame 1 dm 1D 05 51 5332 53 fi'fi iif i ' f figl wmue WE-GHQ 5135 Wail-1999 U5129559 UHF-999 5'3 513% W- 5- 5 4 34 mm mm 101551 13 10 0 5 C 5 424 am hue- 1 10 42- 130 000142 WNW Appendix E haunt 131 DOD O1 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK U DUDIG DOD 04G 130144 U Appendix F Report Distribution Of ce of the Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security Director Counterintelligence Field Activity Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs General Counsel of the Department of Defense Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight Joint Staff Director Joint Staff Director for Intelligence Inspector General Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Inspector General Department of the Navy Director Naval Intelligence Inspector General Director Marine Corps Intelligence Department of the Air Force Director Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Inspector General mop WW Other Defense Organizations Director Defense Intelligence Agency Inspector General Director National Agency Inspector General Director National Reconnaissance Of ce Inspector General Director National Security Agency Inspector General Central Intelligence Agency Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support Inspector General National Counterintelligence Executive Department of State Inspector General Department of Justice Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Inspector General Congressional Committees and Subcommittees Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following committees Senate Committee on Appropriations Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Senate Committee on Armed Services House Committee on Appropriations House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House Committee on Armed Services 134 NW 3 000146 Wm U Part Management Comments DOD DIG 00014 WW U Of ce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics Comments Final Report Reference OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MOD DEFENSE PENTAGGN WASHINETDN tn EDI-31300 AEWJI TEIH IHDLEGY mo room-Ice 12 April lilil MEMOKIW BUM DEPUTY GENERAL FDR INTELUUENLE DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTOR GENREAL Response to Finding 9 or the Review at Actions taken to Dentin Ducct rad Investigate the Espionage of Ana Belch Monies U References null report page 94 and 95 Finding 9 subject same as ohm-e metro In the aim-a reference you state in fit-c pages 94 and 95 17636 Dot also attempted to develop a plan to consolidate all Special Access Program into a central Registry in an August 2d 99 rrteom ndum Thames to Special Access Fromm Oversight Procedures and Otganiaarioo the lit- putjtr Secretary of Defense ordered the Director ofthc Special Access Program Oversight Gonunlttee to develop the Plan This is an incorrect stolen-tent The August 24 1999 more states The Director of the SAPCIC will dawlop a plan for approval by the SAPDC in October for the consolidation ol'all program access clearances into an integrated database The difference being detest database versus all Slut-lal Access Program into a Central Registry There is a major dl erence in creating a Special access Program registry and an access databrse Therefore recommend the draft report be changed to re ect the actual wording in the August 24 1999 memo Revised trees In addition ltulte to the quote died on the vine became to Military Reutsed did not want to include their data and than be held responsible for providing updates to the database I monument that this quote be removed and replaced to more sccurrtely state my intent which was there were many policy issuus that had to he untested prior to Implementing changes toward an aucgtated database Each Military Department had to work through the standardization oi security anus and procedures Also identiltiag and resolving reciprwity issues with the other agencies and belts-con Special Access Program and Sensitive Compartment security poi-cerium Therefore the actual Iowan implementing the integration of the Militant Depmnraats' access databases was delayed for a couple of wars To state that lsaid that the concept died on the incorrect The concept has always been active the policy at that time 1999 bud to be changed mt-i6 An additional correction to you drait report is on page 95 second paragraph when you reference that SAP IMS be elded by 1008 needs to change to 200 The 6 June 100-4 memo speci cally states will sorta-Ilene the elding of the SAP 1M8 within our years warm - Revised I concur with your msornn-tcndalion 9 that the continue the process of establidting a Do central registry for with access to Special Ant 1 Programs I also 'reconunend the above changes be made to be more accurate Rick L Fulgium illicl of Security In I DUDMB WW U Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 500D DEFENEE PENTAGON DC 20301-5000 a a 1335 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL SUBJECT Remnse tn DOD IG Repel-t Pruject Nn 0012 Thank you for the nppurturu'ty to comment on the review ofcircumstanccs surrounding the espionage conducted by Defense Intelligence Agency employee Ana Memes This is a very comprehensive review nt'n mrnpiea matter and yuur Elaff should he The attachment remnants a input from my of ce and the Counte nlelligenee Field Activity cum We intend to lake mantivc aggressive action consistent with our cement to the recommendations to enlr time the security of the Department of Defense and the nation In same instances your recommendations will be re ected in Depanment wide policy that will enhance our efforts to identify those Who would abuse the trust placed in them and betray our country Pie- 151 5tnl'l' il' 'uu haw - any question-r ilnlt tl 13 WW DOD DIG 000149 Final Report Reference Final Rap-art Reference comm Response to the Findings and Recommendations of the Draft DODIG Review of Actions Taken to Deter Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ann Helen Monies U U The following comments are provided concerning the eleven recommendations presented in the report 0 FEES Recommendation I We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence request the intelligence Community inspectors General Forum to conduct I comprehensivejoint evaluation of counteresplonnge information sharing The Intelligence Community inspectors General Forum could use the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Research Report Research on Information Sharing Between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities May 3 2002 as the starting point for its counteresplonnge evaluation a U Concur The Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence will submit such a request within 30 days of this response 6 Recommendntion 2 We recommend that the Under of Defense for Intelligence formulate a plan to eunhlish permanent Foreign Counterintelligence Program billets CE mini-cilia ge organization similar to the 4032 can't Functions of the new organisation should Include but not be limited to I I IAI I inns En USE 403 SEC CIA acting as the central Doll point of contact for all counter-espionage inquiries from outside Del identifying and resolving sil unknown subject espionage cases within Doll hosting a forum where vetted Doll and special agents meet regularly to discuss openly r all available counteresplonage information ileciutliemtrk t 133 3 000150 Final Report Reference establishing counter-espionage leads for the Military Departments counter-intelligence components and the Federal Bureau of Investigations and sharing all counteresplonnge information from the Militan- Departments and Del Agencies in accordance with Executive Orders statutes and Del Directives QConcut The Depamnent nee ability and CIFA is the appropriate organization wherein a like entity could be established nanced and managed CIFA has an organizational that would support such an elemen cm in InltU a D50 ll require the support ofthc FBI and 5 I 1 slate 33 5011 Fable-J Recommendation 3 a WW We recommend that Director Defense Intelligence Agency BIA assigns a D011 Production Intelligence Fn um Ehit 1'51 W424 unmet 31 om may toner-51 121 mmcEt Dirt bn jt to C 542-1 3191' thTi-J 1i 3 qu Manager in CIFA will provide requests for seiteduledfad hoe ueil on on countermeasures and foreign use issues via 1 u 53 D U Field Activity ti 9338 Research polygraph countermeasures and then collaborate with polygraph manufaeturera to develop produce and distribute new countermeasure detection devices for use by polygraph community consumers DOD 01G In Final Report Reference or U Concur The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute is conducting research on ootmterrncasure detection As a byproduct of that research they have identi ed speci c criteria and training that polygraph examiners can use to identify efforts to employ polygraph countenneusures The three major polygraph manufacturers are producing effective countermeasure detection devices as an option with their polygraph systems Additionally the Quality Assurance Program QAP has drafted a new chapter for the Federal Examiner s Handbook Chapter 13 that will require examiners to employ these devices as an aid to detection That chapter is currently being staffed with all federal programs for funnel incorporation The FEH standardizes speci c procedures and requirements that are binding for all polygraph programs Develop comprehensive polygraph standards for the Don polygraph community to increase the effectiveness of polygraph countermcasu res 13689 Concur Presumably the intent is to increase the capability to detect andior neutralize polygraph countermeasures applied against DOD In this matter Chapter 18 oftite will provide those standards for DUI polygraph examiners it includes guidance for polygraph eaanuners to incorporate anti- procedures as routine measures to prevent countenneasures efforts and counter-countennessures to be applied when countermeasures are suspected or encountered during an examination F689 Establish a comprehensive polygraph countermeasure course at Del Polygraph Institute that requires all Dal polygraph examiners to attend the course within one year of graduation from initial training and therentter requires them to attend refresher training at least hicnnlally moo Concur has already significantly increased the number of polygraph exanuncrs who countermeasure detection minimon our use 42 1 tourut nu ensi- 42-1 rour ur effective marketing of personnel who championed the I 000152 Final Report Reference importance of increasing polygraph examiner awareness and abilityr to neun'alizc polygraph eountenneasure efforts This will be further expended by the mandate in Chapter ll to require 40 hours of comprehensive countermeasure detection training and the additional mandate for follow-up training on a biennially basis These standards will become accountable itenut for polygraph programs under the QAP inspection schedule le F639 Direct all Dal polygraph programs to report to the DOD Polygraph Institute all polygraph examinations in which countermeasures are con rmed me win 1 etc lotto 1o L112 em genetic 10 LI 5 - cell hill HFxl I U Recommendation 4 We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security continue working with Congress to change Do polygraph provisions to ill section 1564 and then update Dal Directive 5210 48 and Del Regulation 521048-11 accordingly 0 U Concur Due to an unusual situation regarding a 1937 federal law the Directive cannot be updated until the law is changed 1131 has submitted a legislative pmposal to change the law hopefully this year EON-11W 141 DOD DI Final Report Reference 69% save Recommendation 5 We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency use pro-employment Co Scope Polygraph examinations for or cry BIA position that requires access to Top Secret materiel rose Comment Currently the Director DIA has the authority to designate positions as critical intelligence positions that would be subject to counterintelligence scope polygraph testing to assist in determining their eligibility for However any additional increase in personnel awaiting Counterinteliigenoe Scope Polygraph esantinations before entering on duty could create a backlog that may effectively delay emploment start dates and cause a possible shift in intcmal priorities within the broader DEA polygraph missions The legislative proposal that the Department has submitted to update its polygraph directive would authorise all components to implement ESP examinations as they deem necessary in determining initial eligibility for personnel for assignment to critical or sensitive positions based upon certain risk assessment criteria Recommendation 6 We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence direct all DollI entities with polygraph programs to digitize and retain In perpetuity all CSP examination charts 0 FGHG Coneur with comment A requirement will be incorporated in the revision of Do Regulation 52 to digitize and retain the charts The concept of perpetuity is probably too long We will rceonunend retention for 35 years as this is a reasonable estimate for the length of a govemment service career Gy eeotnmendation 1 We recommend that the Director Defense Intelligence Agency institute a coordinated security vetting program that uses personnel specialists securityr oiliclals polygraph examiners and to determine the suitability of prospective employees 0 U Comment USDU supports this recommendation Recommendation 8 We recommend that the Director Field establish FCIP funding for ma Law 69mm no I D00154 Final Report Reference Enforcement Incentive Pay to recruit sufficient start and retain highly skilled counterlntelligence Investigators a sane Non-concur in part DIA personnel are not authorized by Revised policy to conduct counterintelligenee investigations Counter-intelligence personnel in DIA are not classi ed as 18 ll Criminal Investigators and thus no iink exists to law Enforcement Availability Pay They may conduct initial inquiries until such time that a determination is made that an investigation is warranted At that point the matter is referred to the FBI or to the Military Department counter-intelligence investigative agency that has Title responsibility for conducting the investigation All organizations with organic Cl personnel should use existing policies and programs to attract and retain the necessary Cl expertise I Recommendation 9 a G We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics continue the process or establishing it Dan central registry for personnel with access to Special Access Programs om bin printouts to use 4342-1 - out out 1 4m east to 1342-1 0 U Comment supports this moomrnendarion - Recommendation 10 We recommend that the Director nefense Intelligence Agency Din develop and Issue Standard Operating Procedures for counteresplanage investigations 0 999 Comment DIA is not authorized to conduct counterintelligenee investigations That does not limit DIA Cl Special Agents from other proactive measures including conducting preliminary eounterintelligence inquiries and making investigative referrals To avoid contusion an internal Standard Operating Procedure SOP should establish authoritative guidelines for referral EON-FEW 143 DOD 0 Final Report Reference com procedures and coordination requirements for connterespionege investigations 1 II We recommend that the nlreetor Delense Intelligence Agency reevaluate the Operations Security risks associated with using the JWICS to disseminate close-hold information during in vestlgatlo ns 0 U Comment This is an excellent recommendation The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligencc and Security has already directed through It memorandum to the eld that all counterintelligence investigative reporting will be submitted via Portico a secure communications network for the counterintelligenee community The upcoming revision of 000 Instruction 5240 4 Counter-intelligence Investigations and Signi cant CI Activity Reporting will codi r the requirement for investigations to he reported through Portico 144 000156 U Director Defense Intelligence Agency Comments Final Roport DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EC Mil- 2 May 2005 51-0236le To Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Evaluations Department of Defense 400 Anny Navy Drive Arlington VA Subject U Review and Development of Action Plans - Ana Beien Memes investigation Reference 16 Draft Proposed Report 22 Mar 05 Review of the Actions Taken to Deter Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Helen Morales Project Number I l U The Defense Intelligence Agency DIM has reviewed the referenced report and concurs with some of the Department of Defense inspector General 16 recommendations directed speci cally to this agency in other cases we agree in principle but need to seek additional resources in order to fully implement the recommendations There are some inaccuracies or nut-interpretations in the report that should be changed 2 U Finding It as written contains factual errors and unsupponable conclusions For example DIA Counterintelligertoe and Security personnel are not authorized by a Hot directive to conduct counterespionage investigations as stated in the nding Also the statement lack of speci c procedures caused some may have delayed the identi cation of Monies is not supported by the events DIA CI investigative of cers were commended for their prompt action in identifying Monies as a possible Cuban agent in the ongoing FBI investigation They exercised appropriate judgment in contacting FBI counterparts with whom they had excellent working relations hips These actions materially expedited not delayed the identi cation and subsequent apprehension of Montes 3 have directed the following actions be tat-ten to satisfy the Dot It recommendations directed at DIA a Recommendation 3a The Director DIA assign a Do Production Program Intellience Functional Code to the Counterintetii _ence Field Activit for the - Lilli thll-i 10 Li t Die tbltEJ must 53-124 Lan- tens to 5 3 goes totmEt Final Report Reference b Recommendation 5 The Director DIA use pus-employment Counter- intelligenoe Scope Polygraph CSP examinations for every DIA position that requires access to TOP SECRET material Response Cottcur' tn principle All DIA employees are SECRETS med Information seem-it clearance c G Recommendation The Director institute a coordinated employee vetting program that uses personnel specialists security of cials polygraph examiners and to determine the suitability of prospective employees -63 Response Concur in principle Senior DIA personnel and security officers Will coordinate with the Central intelligence Agency and National Security Agency of cials to assess their applicantfemployee suitability review programs and make appropriate recommendations to me within 90 days of this letter Once we understand the resourceiliinding implications we will decide what can and cannot be done within existing resources If required we will seek additional resources Din tbiill- Lots tori eaten a Recommendation 9b out him c 5424 01 10m eso seConeur Lin-I him 1 tine 51 3 tortsc gate-4 e Doll 0 Recommendation 10 The Director Din develop and issue standard operating procedures for counter-espionage investigations 6 Response Concur Current revision of the BIA manual on security investigations will contain a section dedicated to the conduct of espionage inquiries The revision will he completed within 90 days or this letter f QDOD Recomnendelton II The Director om reevaluate the operations security risks associated with using the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System to disseminate close-hold information during counterespionsge investigntions 3 000158 Final Report Reference DUDIG ME 11 in arm- thjf r 5 124 g 5- 4' Hm enclosure are L- 4 Ic u Admi n 5 Navy Dirermr inaI Report Reference Revised Revised Revised WW U Administrative Comments on the Del 16 Draft Proposed Report Review of the Actions Talren to Deter Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ann Brien Monies UJPage l paragraph l linelir Recommend Delete Iword loyalty substitute pro-Cuba proclivity - Rationale The Defense intelligence ailment r BIA source did not question Montes' loyalty rather her name personal views toward Cuba I Source DIA Investigative Report dated 1996 2 9MP Page 36-37 paragraph 3 lines - Recommend Delete sentence beginning According to and ending noti cation in Pemn l The 1979 memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the Department of Defense sets formal requirements for reporting initial one pected disclosure of classi ed material to a foreign power When Did investigators contacted the FBI in October 2000 regarding Mentor they were not acting within the context ofan initial referral but rather to alert the FBI ol'a possible suspect in an ongoing FBI Unknown Subject investigation 1 Source DIA Cl Investigations Staff 3 mi-F Page 57 paragraph 2 lines 5-7 I Recommend Delete part of sentence um t item to the attention of the and replace with the FBI personne no reason to equate the case term safe' with I - - b'jt'l J Rationale information regarding an unspeci ed reference to safe FBI investigative personnel however had no logical basis for connecting the vague case term to the BIA classi ed message system - Source DIA CI Investigations Staff 4 W Page 57 paragraph 3 line 2 Recommend Delete port of someone worked at and replace with had access to the Dirt SAFE system - I Rationale Factual correction officials initially suspected that the Cuban Unknown Subject under investigation by the had access to the SAFE system but did not traces on a suspect within until additional case details became available- Source Cl analyst and investigator staffs not gonna to LIL-TE a 424 43 NW 0 000160 Final Report Reference 5 W Page 57' paragraph 3 lines ll-l2 a Recommend Delete leave history and 'Tound and replace with travel vouchers and confirmed respectively - Ci investigators con nned that Monte s had traveled DIA will 1t LJ 3 C 324 i a a revrew of her travel vouchers not her leave race I 6 Source DIA Cl Investigations staff 6 Page 53 paragraph I lines 2-3 I Recommend Delete access tothe tutlmovm subject investigation and replace with were aware that the FBI was attempting to identityr a Cuban agent with possible access to the BIA SAFE system I Rationale Factual correction DIA CI investigators were concerned that a large number of Din and Of ce of the Secretary of Defense personnel were aware that the FBI was conducting a oounterespionaga investigation involving a Dbl information system but these individuals did not have access to speci c inv tigative information Solace BIA CI Investigations staff 7 SHE Page 58 paragraph 2 end ofparograph Recommend Add the following sentence to and oftha paragraph The DIA investigators subsequently built a convincing picture of effective Cuban intelligence service deception support to their agent operations Rationale The not If report fails to depict the important denial and deception aspects of the Monte and other Cuban intelligence operations Source Cl Investigations staff 3 U Page 94 paragraph 1 line 3 - Delete the head of an agency with original Top Sacral classi cation and replace with the Deputy Secretary of DefenaefSecratary of - Rationale Factual correction in Source Do Regulation 5200 141 9 Pages new nding ll in its entirety a fey-Sm statement of error does not have standard operating procedures 301 s that function a wartime for counterespionage investigatiom Revised Revised Revised Final Report Reference WW -6 Ciatj ggtign of fact DIA is not authorized to conduct ootutterespionage investigations DIP conducts limited Cl inquiries and provides investigative support to oounterespionsge investigations of the FBI and military services DIAM 50-14 Securin Investigations is the Dial guidance on investigative matters b Most DIA ae vitiea were conducted without bene t it authoritative guidelines DIA investigative personnel in the Monies case used Del directives and Office of the Garters Counsel guidance as au toriuttive guidelines c ETSuranng statement o gmr BIA special agents did not understand the procedures to effect liaison and coordination with the FBI and OSD and did not know to make a formal written 811 refenal to FBI headquarters 91 tag The Dirt special agents one a retired Air Force Of ce of Special Investigations special agent and the other a fonncr Naval Criminal Investigative Service special agent had worked numerous Ct actions and referral procedures The Minutes case was not an 811 referral which is used for reporting initial suspected diselostue of classi ed material to a foreign power When DIA investigators contacted the FBI they were not making an initial referral but were alerting the FBI to a possible suspect in an ongoing unknown subject espionage investigation DEA investigators had no information to suggest any speci c classified material had beendisclosed to Cuba The DIA investigators1 experience with the suggested that face to-face discussions would be faster and more productive than a written referral- d Sim-F5 5W Finding It states the absence of an SOP caused confusion particularly with respect to Do senior of cial noti cation and cites the following quote from a Din special agent We have no procedure in place to notify Do we have urequirement to do so le m'gn of fact This quote was taken out of context The quote was not about noti cation to senior of cials additionally and oecuned after 051 had been advised and the FBI had initiated an investigation It addressed what should happen if Monies was observed during Stu-veillanee removing a classi ed document from the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center lt slte was observed leaving with a classi ed document the issue raised Was whether we had a requirement and procedure to notify DIA leadership for a real time decision on whether to confront Ms Monies before she left the facility DOD GIG 000162 Final Report Reference seem ofunsumhle conclusions Lack oi specilic procedures msy have delineate-1 the5 identti' cation of Monies as Cuban spy aim The same day that BIA special agents learned the basic information the FBI was using to search for the unknown Cuban spy DIP special agents identi ed Monies and contacted the FBI squad handling the case The FBI Wily rejected Memes as a suspect and hand In be convinced otherwise A formal written 31 I referral may have alerted the FBI to the critical nature of the mdertaking and the FBI ma r have acted more swiftly to label Monies a suspect err-Clari cation of fact BIA experience has been that it takes the FBI 3 to 9 months on average to respond to an St I referral The FBI mmnnarily rejected that Monies was the unknown espionage ease subject The FBI had to be convinced over the course of several face- to-faee contentious meetings to consider her as a 51 13pr 10 Pages 93-100 Finding ll in its entirety Recommend Revise Finding 11 to document that DLA SAFE and the Joint Worldwide intelligence Communications Systemeierosofi Outlook are we systems maintained by separate systems technicians who hate separate internal authorities and capabilities 4 Rationale While DIA concurs with ii regarding the need for improved operatimu security procedures ' the accompanying nding em in the description of information technology access vulnerabilities A technician working SAFE message archives cannot access a Cl investigator's Outlook email Source Din Cl Investigations staff and systems assurance staff Revised 30015 In 1 432 cm mm 50 use 403 Sec 6 bus bu-me Final Report Reference Revised Revised DOD DIG 000154 Final Raport D6016 mm Mic CIA thus 50 a 403 Sec E Reference Revised 153 DOD Oi WW U Central Intelligence Agency Comments ina Report Reference lm Revised 1b In 0 00 1166 Final Report Reference Revised Revised Information Provided Demu- my 1 1 Hit Final Report em 1 Revised Rev ised Revised Revised I Final Report UM 1 -1ch bum DIR mm 10 USE Reference Revised Revised LloL th Final Report Ram-61133 mm 1 4m 1 Revised Revised Revised Final Report cm tin-1 1 run mus WW '3 Reference Revised Revised Revised Revised Revised 159 NW DOD OI Final Report Reference Mtg CIA mm Revised Revised Revised DoLllG' II Final Repon mm 1 4m cm mm 1 1 ch th- JJ FBI mm 1 4m 50 USE 4 33-1mm Revised Revised 61 Dot 0 Final Report Reference Revised 162 Final Report Reference cm mm mus mum 163 DOD 0 EJUDIG lb In 1 4M U Inspector General Department of Justice Comments Final Report Reference US Department a l uslicn Federal Bureau of Inva lgallen 1 229 11 BY LIAISON April 19 1005 Ms Susan Woodside Associate Director Of ce at Oversight and Review United Sum Department of Justice Fm David W Szady Director Counter-intelligence Divisinn Subject UNITED STATES OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL DRAFT REPORT ON AN A MDNTES Reference is mid to a March 30 2005 w-ilh enclosure from the United States Department of Julian Of ce ovaemght and Review regarding master As you are aware the Federal Bureau FBI was requested to review dra report entitled OF ACTIONS TAKEN T0 DETER DETECT AND INVESTIGATE THE ESPIONAOE ACTIVITIES OF ANA HELEN which was written by the United States ofDel enu Of ce ol'lhe Inspector General DIG 15 new 164 WNW DOD OIG Final Report HIP-SEW- Ms L Susan Wmdsidt Mandate Director FBI He adqua m has revicwcd the afaramcnlioned report and has the following obtarvations to provide which will mist in clarifying certam Mutants made within the document In order to assist in any revision the Chou and the page numhm of the information to be corrected are provided T5 1 4m mug 51 1 L-LS CL 513 Ll 3 3 40 3 1mm F131 tuna 5-0 Si trammm 5 0 40 3 Sec r 5 4034mm FEII Ft litblm 1 4M 5-D LIE- 5 EdtlZI I-qulttj RBVised mm 1 4m 51 at USU-OJ is advised that FBI Headqumm has no concerns with respect to the classi cation of the USDOD 010 upon Should USDOJ haw my questions regarding the contents of this communication plum contact FBI Headquarters LI WEBER-ETFinal Report Reference Ms L Susan Woudside Mancini Director r'ril him in Hue 66 New 6 000178 U Team Members U This report was prepared by the Of ce of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence Department of Defense Of ce of InSpector General nouns we ma nus In use 4 24 Defense Intelligence Agency r4 i HUID 1 Ul' Ul i 1'11 1 Ul i f f lY11 DOD DIG 000180