DECLASSIFIED 5mm sm a 's's 11's 2 125112040 Re uie'oi MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE POLICY SUBJECT The Next Steps in the North Korea Nuclear Issue U President Bush informed President Roh in early July that the orth Koreans must fulfill their international obli ations withouL conditions As you recall from Hawaii it is by no means a certainty that the South will agree to the issuance of such a demand to the North In fact all of us are concerned that the South itself_wants to reserve the option of reprocessing at some future date Nevertheless no reprocessing is something which the 6 3 should insist on for both oreas This concept was laid out in your private memorandum to Bob Gates in mid-August but he has not responded to you before you meet Kim Chong Hwi on September 22 but you must move modified linka I We 255 9 god 2 9232 03 cache 3 mm 295 9% 9 PXa fv 9253 pa fg 23 9% 5 was no Manse a mere it Here is the gameplan I propose l my Step 2 w Upon your return from New York you call Bob Gates Reggie Bartholomew and Arnie Center to brief them on the results of the meeting and to discuss with them the modified linkage concept You need to tell them whether you sensed in New York that Kim is willing to ask the North to stop reprocessing and why you believe the modified linkage strategy has the best chance for stopping the North Korean program Step You need to ask Bob Gates to readdress this issue with Brent Scowcroft and see if the modified linkage strategy is acceptable You will need Bartholomew and Center's help here Step If the response from Scoworoft is positive you will need to discuss this strategy with SECDEF and CJCS These need to be accomplished in October Step Yen travel to Korea in late October to inform Hwi of this modified linkage strategy and get the Sou accept this strategy which calls for no reprocessing peninsula Kim Chong th Koreans to on the entire Step If the South Koreans come back with a positive response in November then at the SCM in late November SECDEF give the go ahead to bargain to the So Koreans and discuss with them how to implement this strategy Meanwhile we will begin staffin1 on the com-rehensive approach I briefeo you last week _ DECLASSIFIED 3 790 904 15 5%- 790 5 I '2 a ease '0'3 1 GM 019 2 2 e292 70 '3 0 96 15 Viercm '0 503 50ng 730 4 0900 TC You must be p rabnally engaged in the above steps since thie problem can new oelysbe teeolved at the highest levels of this government The pereueSive work to be dene both with ROKG and USG rmey be toe difticult for the short time we have Thie is why a dua1 traok strategy may be best - uarantee that the difiedrlinka etrete w Nevertheleseg'l'continue to eel that the second approach puts us in the moral high ground and the beet position in the very likely event that the North continues to march on with its weapons program undeterred my me 5 veg E- 1553 43 3 3 3 3 1703 uscgse z 5 0 13526 DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED BY 5 095 DATE 2 F 13 20 FOIA CASE g 2                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu