20911 THE WHITE HOUSE MEMBRANDUM FDR MR KARL D JACKSON Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs MR w RDEERE PEARSON Executive Secretary Department or State 136 JOHN a DUBIA Executive Secretary Department of Defense WASHINGTON December 13M3 PROVQST MCNEIL Executive Secretary Central Iatelligence hgenCy COL GEORGE SUMRALL JR Secretary Jbint Chiefs cf Staff MS 3mm swim Executive Secretary Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ll SUBJECT Meeting on Korea Nuclear Program l h December 17 at p m program provided shortly plus one Please call your att Secretary s office 456-2224 DECLASSIFIED Attachment Tab A Andrew Card Agenda 20 The national Council Deputies Committee will meet On in the White House Situation Rnom to discuss next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear The agenda is at Tab A Attendance should be limited to principals e zfce to the The background paper will he F sittmann Executive Secretary r SEC-BET 5 5th SechCom-Nrmx u 5 5 I W $555507 STAVE EQUITIES 513 guowm 253$ REE-RUTHES i- AGENM scam mam 4a mmam mm MR mum-3 m GAMEPLAN PAPER 9- s'mm mmosm BMW 2% me mums mm mm Isatmm MEMO in ROM mama mm- 5mm cam Ems JOINT gamma 5mm WITH m-s 3333mm 55 DECLASSIFIED BYOW DO J MW - '1 DECLASSIHED ts- arm nap-J mash a 20911 Tuesday December 1991 I am 2 13 1130 Agenda II Howe II Debrief on Recent ACDA Mission Ronald Lehman Discussion of Next Steps junold Renter IV Draft Talking Points for Kanter DECLASSIFIED Wang - I SEQ-BET naeumwomo i COMMITTEE MEETING ON NORTH KOREA DECEMBER 17 991 The objectiva of this meeting is to consider approval oi a game plan to bring North Korea's nucleacoweapons program under control as outlined in the attached papex In additiCH this meeting should consider approval of the following specific steps w1th North Korea in ew Yo to be double tracked by means of by Ambassador Roy 1n Beijing inviting the North Koreans to sand 3 high level official - preferably Party Secretary for Internatioral Attairs Kim Sowng Sun to meet with a USG counterpart in New fork prior to President Bush s arrival in Seoul on January 5 the 3 5 represented by Aaaistadt secretary or other approgriate official The meeting should be held before President Bush arrives in and ROK in order to underscore his public statements there regarding the North Korean nucleat issue and out support ot ROK positions 9f talking Paintg for tho Preliminary nd high 0 Boijxng wron instructions a cable for double tracking the contact - to those countries having relations or orth alerting them to our potential influence with the concerns about tho North Korean nuclear probloh 1 DECLASSIFIED hack- 31 a SEKPOL 3531 12f12 9l x7 7i7 drafted NSHastings cleared BAP LDAnderson Acting - CFKartman I OFFICE OF THE ASSWRETARV OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301-2400 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR THRU ACTING DIRECTOR SUBJECT DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program U Gib Tomorrow at 1430 there will be a Deputies Committee DC meeting on the North Korea Nuclear Program at the White House to be chaired by new Deputy National Security Advisor_ Admiral Jonathan Howe The purpose of the meeting is two foldz to discuss the gameplan on the strategy to deal with the North Korean nuclear program and to approve a one time high level 0 8 meeting with the DPRK on the nuclear issue The gameplan TAB B lays out the steps which the U S will take in the next two months with the next decision point being the late February IAEA Board of Governors meeting The plan calls for Continued international effort working with Japan the Soviet Union China and other key friends and allies such as the UK and Australia to pressure DPRK 2 Ensuring that the ROKs press the North at North South talks on this issue During Ron Lehman s trip recently we provided more ammunition for the South by agreeing to the concept of a North South inspection regime Frankly we are concerned that the South seems to have rushed ahead with a non aggression agreement while placing the nuclear issue off to the side we will know more after the North South nuclear talks this weekend 3 The need to clearly enunciate our position on a peninsula ban on reprocessing and enrichment to the world and especially to DPRK directly via a high-level oneetime meeting A core demarche cable to friends and allies is necessary to do the former but that cable has been stalled at State on desk we expect the discussion at the DC on the gameplan to be generally non contentious but some points needed to be emphasized by you can he found in Th3 A A central element in the gameplan is the one time high- level meeting to ensure information gets to Kim 11 Sung we will send the same message via the Chinese simultaneously This meeting is necessary to let the North Koreans know directly of our concern about their nuclear program and inform them how we measure progress signing IAEA safeguards is not enough but the North should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo's November 8 policy of foreswearing the development- including reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear weapons There is no dispute within or with the ROK that such a meetingh if approved by the DC will take place before the President's visit to Korea However how forwardmleaning should the U S be is in dispu e - The attached talking points C for the onewtime meeting is in our-view much too forward 1eaning we believe that the fact this meeting is taking place at possibly USP's level is a carrot The promise of a second meeting which clearly connotes dialogue towards better relations is another carrot It is far too early to use the word normalization in this first meeting especially since thus far the North's strategy is to stall and impose additional conditions while refusing to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement We want to see the North sign and implement safeguards agree to a reciprocal non nuclear policy with the South and agree to at least trial inspections before we hold a second meeting The second meeting should not be characterized as the beginning of normalization dialOgue The points drafted by State reflect the views held by AS Solomon and they are not satisfactory to Don This View is shared strongly by the JCS Talking points on this issue for your use are in TAB A chex related issues which may arise dosing the DC meeting re-Team-Spirio 92 polioy The ROKs-are divided over whether to hold Team Spirit 92 with the Blue House leaning toward postponement and MND wanting a bigger and better one to show nesolve Our position is that we defer to a decision by the ROKs wwhich we predict to be a decision to postpone USER has indicated that Januaxy 1 is the last date for a decision to postpone As for NCND a Bob working group der the digestion of 9213 lookin oi hi Attachments EAR Talking Points for Use TAB Gameplan Paper TAB State Proposed Draft Talking Points with DPRK Bob 259 sea 9 WW egos f' Hugo-559 o'a I Tins-mo 1 0st FOR MR LILLEY asundernam r If the ROKs are only halfuhearted on the nuclear issue we will have a-great deal of difficulty gathering international pressure on the North especially if the North signs an IAEA safeguards agreement by February but does nothing else To keep the pressure on and to clearly state our position that the North must reciprocate Roh's mononuclear policy -to include foreswearing of reprocessing-ewe need to send the core demarche cable out to friends and allies 0 7 2 5 95 390 Anew MEETING 9 It w Draft talking points reflect the position that normaliza tion should be presented as the carrot to entice the North to stop its nuclear program However DPRK track record has been very poor We have seen no movement but only a series of additional demands Putting normalization forward could lead the North to believe that its program is paying off and weakening our resolve It could also alarm the South 7 5 0299 03 Don only agreed to a one time meeting to specifically and clearly explain our position on the nuclear issue to the Narth The current draft is unfocused and goes beyond what is wise we need to say up front what our concern about the nuclear program is and what DPRK most do 1 Sign and implement safeguards 2 Agree with Roh's non nuclear principles and sign up to South s Joint Declaration and Initiate trial inspections ASAP to include Yongbyon PXQ I The carrot would be another meeting obviously leading to better relations and potential normalization if the North does the above first There is no need to be so forward leaning a I - nm mm H IlI-iilEl-n o f I 7115 never puts a p an that seeks to persua e North are to giye up its pursuat of nuclear'waspons by diplomatic politxcal and economic measures We are making progress in mobilizing ntexnational pressure on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons grogram Our nuclsa weapons decisions 5eou1 s subsequent preposal Eu 6 non-nuclear Korea o secretaries Cheney and Baker and the recent wagon South Prime Ministerial talks have focused global and regional attention on the issue Japanese terms Ea DPRK normalization have toughened Beijing may press the orsh harder and may be willing to work quietly with us to gas the probl m under control Du deferral of troop reduction% has strengthened Seoul's and Japan's can idence in'ou reliability and remanded Pyongyang that pursuit of nuclear weapons is not cost-free We must now build on this momentum Responding to those inc 25 issued a Fore on woula teasing grassures Pfongyang n-s t Eamon Elements of the statement were encouragan but 1 conhamns 'in nge of IAEA inspectio of North Korean nuclear activities to North Korean inspectiaas o 8 5 bases in she RGK and oalleda ss dirBCt negotiations with the U S on simultaneous nuclgar weapons I insooctions in the North and South -none of union was As wezl there is a well established history assessable to us _ sznq axpncuatzons that it wi$l stem only to of Pyongyang tax last mznute additional canvass Seoul's back off at the recent unof icial acknowledgment that there are o nuclear weapons in the ROK has not elicited any further response rom - 3 We have to recognise that the odds may be agaxnst us in pursuing th s glen to get the North Korean program undo control Intelligence analysis indicates that we may not know when the Yongbyon repzocessinq plant sees not and aha we 60 not know whether North Korea may have egrscassed some material already Given the patsecr stailing on the safeguards issue it is possible Pyongyang has no intention of changing course If so its asm will be 0 a v D939 NH 5 out aszugbm ED- 352 0 53 U4 G9 rh- u u delay diffuse iotexnatioual pressure and use any oppoxtunity to seem onthcomzng Without making meaningful concessions There are early indications moreover that the North may attempt to move and hide its reprocessing facilities than agtee to inspection Or the North may sign but not implement IAEA safeguards at the eleventh hour hoping to short circuit international pressure our plan for the next Eew months tambines escalating international p essure with concrete inducements Eo Pyongyang In addition to gaining DPRK aaooptauoe of lama safeguards our short-term objective is a Verifiable freeze on orth Korea's reprocessing elfort Du long-team objective is for North Korea to sign on to the same non-nuclear grinciples that the ROK has adopted by means of a credible North-South agreement As we have fOIEsnadowod in Seoul Beijing and Hoscow the plan includes a meeting to present our positions to the North Koreans but not to negotiate with them Between now and the late February IAEA Board of Governors BOG meeting our plan focuses largelrgon diplomatic persuasion ana laying out thu positiva benefits-for Pyongyanq of cooperation with us on problem After that we would seek to maximize international pressure and fort DPRK economically and diplomatically With ng_13gg1n We would send a core demarche to those countries that-have rotationsg'or potential influence with North Korea It would'seek to widen the range of bilateral pressures on the Noxth ks in osce ou own message and build a diplomatic record thag would enable us to gain support for possible later coercive di iomatio measures As we launch and follow up this we should stress the urgency of the problem but eschew rpetotic that would qain the DPRK symoathy or appear to beck lt into a corner This camgaign should make clear to the Draw that the costs of continuing its nuclear efforts include further diolomatio isolation The President's January trip can rein orce this message as he voices our concerns in Austrazla Rinoapore Korea and Japan We need to stay in close touch with IQEXQ which has now linked normalization not only to this safeguaxds but to an end to reprocessing We want-the Japanese to to dangle the carrot of normalizatzon and 1 5 but if the North continues to stall e want the so benefi to consider tougher measures in coordination other vis-a-vis the DPRK after February DECLASSIFIED a a similar upgroaoh should be takon with china trying to press Beijing to bear down on the DEER We can engage the Chinese in New York Beijing and Vienna hoping they will cannot hold back international canvey to Pyongyang that they 1 We should make clean that stepped up pressure for can pressure in the than and the UN must be pursued if North Korea hasn t come around by lace February We may al o wish'to discuss with the Chinese our need for more reliable information regarding north Korean nuclear efforts We cannot be absolutely certain of PRC matives howevon and it is unllkely they would be prepared to take any measures they percelved as putting the survival of the Pyongyang regime in guestion his assue and has raia d_it with us sevaral times in the past few weeks most nota ly in a letter from RM Shevardnadze to Secretary Baker we have prepared a reply and talking points for Seoxatary Baker to one with Shevardnadze 0 encourage a strong of ort to bring Pyongyang around to in lude Deputy Foreign Ministe Rogaghgv's visit there in late December We would let Moscow know of our illingness to meat with the North to seek improvement of elations in-exohange for roagonsihle behavior but we would' itrean the need-for otronger measures if nothin92comes of this 3 late February As with China we may wish to discuss the exchangas on North Korean nucleus need for ln ormutio - With Republic officials we would use many oi the is seized of efforts some themos To improve chances success- ou allies would not seek digest action against Pyongyang at the December BOG meoting Instead we 5 would lay down markers seeking support for a yonoible _resolution by the late February BOG meeting Such a resolut on would notify the aeouzity Council of the ailuxe to terminate IAEA technical-assistance to honor obligations orth Koran and call on member states to do llkewiae This a would have wide support though we will have to woxk'hard on the Chinese It would be harder to impose sanctions immediately i tho DFRK were to sign a safeguards accord as the ratification pracuss and implementation would prooide the DPRK ample excuses for further delay Once the IAEA Sent 3 resolution to the UNSC the Council usgent basis to fulfill iLs NPT obligations There may be substantial problems with nis course however There may on chance that the Security Cnunc l would be wilan adage sanctions or other coercive measures an_nlo_1AEAl in the we and Him Thus while moving ahead in the IAEA and disoussing'v options with governments sucn as China offers a means of maintaining international prcsaure we will need to weigh 7 carefully whether and how we engage this issue in the security Council We should keep in mind however that other nterested governments e g Australia and Japan may press for etorral to the UNSC in any ease and that the threat of resort so UN action is ar important element or our own strategy to move the 092K whether or not we ultimately press a vote Ultimately should we find we cannot assure UNSC approval to coercive maneutea countries to pursue sanctaona outside-the an umbrella In this instance as at the UN Chinese particzpaclan Would be critical to success yet Beijing's Position is likely to be problematic Ministerial talks have shown the As the recent Prime- Horth South channe is croo al to any solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems At the December 10-13 prime Ministerial talks Seoul followod up Rah s recent announcement with a concrete proposal to discuss a HOK-DPRK non nuclear agreement including a ban on reprocessing and enrichment and a bilateral inspection regime North and South agreed to talks on this issue to take Place December at The South has told us 1 will be the basis that they have insisted that their Propose other than a merging of the ROK's and the DPRK's proposals Cheney had told the RGK that we could consider bases under the right circumstances Inspections should he reciprocal simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities They should also follow public meat of both Korea to a non-nuclear policy reciprocal inspections could not the same Eunction as IAEA Secretar 1 inspections of v 5 replace and would not serve sareguaada This was conveyed by the Lehman team an greater detail to Seoui which incorporated it into its proposals for a bilateral inspection regime and trial insuoc i ns DECLASSIFIED us- The results of the recept Prime-Ministerial talks while positive point to a potential danger of divergence between ourselves and the R036 So far the RDKG has avoided euphoria and kept the focus on the need for progress on the nuclear stue However even the appearance of Si 9 poli ical resonance in Seoul Noxth 50uth dialogue will haw with elections scheduled later in 1992 the ROKG may be reluctant to move from dialogue with the North-to tougher measures including cutting of North South trade which would be important to any embargo As we did with the Lehman visit we will need to coordinate closely with the ROK at every step to assure that the-nuclear issue'is pursued vigorously and to coordinate on the man policy and technical issues which Pyongyang Next spring's Team Sp rit exercise regularly tses as an excuse to break off dialogue will be a or our two governments need to consider carerully as we pursue the overall problem Many key figures in the HOK are now considering a postponement of Term spirit This unprecedented last year we consulted closely with the ran over the potential of Team Spirit to disrupt the North South dialogue In the and the ROK decided it wished ho proceed with the exercise although this is by no means certain this year The President's visit in January will afford an opportunity 6 most authorirative level to coordinate-policy at th a problem we need to bring the Because of the urgency of th bilateral track into glay rapidly to tell the worth Koreans what we expect of them to reinforce the Rox in its dialogue with zoom and to lay down clearly the incentives we can provide if they put their nuclear program under acceptable controls To In this We Mould hold a high level US-DPRK meeting as SOOI as possible to support the aox's proposals but a before the Hre idenh's early January visit to Asia and Seoul so that his can be used to highlight our policy and strengthen interhational support for our eEEorzs Some axgliminarx_qgnnan would be necessary to implemen the dec1sion to hold a high level meeting We would pass a message to the DPRK in New York and double tr-ck it tze Chinese government in order to keep the PRH engaged and o a rure delivery to the highest levels in Pyongfang 5 our are ready for a high level I - nessage we would state that concerns on the nuclear ISSUE expl nn waeting to discuss our ally our requirements for anal c early and unequivoc arm DECLASSIFIED concerns and outline a concept for potential normalization we would also state that we were proceeding on the assumption that there will be continued progress in NorthuSDuth dialogue Finally we would lay down one critical roe at each succeeding stage marker one that we would reinfo acrcaiizariono Through the latter proviso we would seek to achieve a g ggjg Ereese on reprocessing while any taiks If we were successEuJ in maintaining this as a condition for further progress we would have achieved at least a temporary albeit not fully verifiable solution to the reprocessing problem we would indicate a willingness m the Wm ormallratucn under the right to move step by step towa'd conditions We would rev ew our nuclear proliferation concerns -resee it the DPRK refuses to implement we would and the consequences we 5 safeguards Emily and promgusy abandon reprocessang emphasize the primacy of uhe North-South channel and strongly support Ron's proposals Eo a summit and for a North-South eprocesaing and the development of nuclear agreement to forego 1 weapons To make our package attractive we would lay out a gameplan of clearly defined incentives for moving to a better relationship with the North in which improving US-DPRK ra1atiouscncontingeno upon resolution of the nuclear issue and continued progress in Hort Sout ue wou1d facilitate - of its political and economic The incentives and steps we enviooge are as follows Once the DFRK brings into force a safeguards egreemenn prov ding for inspections or all DPRK nuclear material to 1 include visits to all suspect facilities we would gh level normalization dialogue establish a 'rormal 111 site full implementation or IAEA sareguarus and conclusion of a North-South agreement banning 9055335103 nucl ar and production nuclear materral with appropriate insooctien_provisions we u uid be prepared to make a positive interzm move taward corralzzation This could be an the form of offices escabLished in capitals trade lxaison er rnreres secrions as in Havana L'r iif'f' Iran nu wa DECLASSIFIED ' ill ll ll -7- Thereafter we would intensiE and move toward full in other are35vwe g proliferation sugport for North Korean access to nocmal conditions This approach would g ve the a proposal up front I DPRK by presenting an others Learned of it strengthened The Pro during his January vis WM r February if the is move to the IAEA and if Eeasihl coercive diolomatio course support for sanctions approach over the next of offering positive ince elicit Pyongyang's the face of a deteriorating the Pyongyang regime would respond to off that would our multilateral it to Seoul few months and measures initial diplomatic not consider jeopasdize ou DECLASSIFIED our no normalization as North-South dialogue and terrorism and Ear diplomatic col ERR a serious watid take the face sidenu oould make still stalling we will a to he UN to yursuo a If we are to have multi we till have to build support for our ntheS to the No It is just possible my and even greater and Japanese leaders that we since S h dis s ion strategy rmaliaation effort progress was achieved missile This could include IFIs it Pyongyang ma ations with others positive argument from the be hard to re use As position would be this approach pub c have to lateral a policy ed to that in isolation although 1 cost should 'hould demonstrate hha has fail our incentives Wu - lmw - Hog 21mm i I - Demarche in many capitals to keep pressure on DPRK and continue to build international consensus Letter to PM Shevardnadze w egg ge egemge z Continue to seek informal talks among v Coordinate with Seoul on December 10-13 North South talks especially re ROKG proposal on nuclear and related issues - IAEA Board of Governors meets in Vienna DPRK's failure to sign safeguards agreement to he discussed orthaSoqth tq1ks io Seou1 R05 tabies non nuo1e r proposals based on Rohts Hovember 8 announcemeot on i g egemher Preliminary approach through New York Bei3ing to set no highmlevel meeting in New York Set out precondition re reprocessing mention possibility of normalization dialogue if DRRK signs and implemehts'IAEA safeguards regime - 5- High level meeting in New Support ROE proposal by dangling normalization a Rogaohev trip to Pyongyang Soviets to gross North Korea - President s trip to Asia Natiohal Assembly speech in Korea reflects state of play with North Korea reaffirms security commitment to ROE geoge Possible AIS Solomon follow-up discussions in Seoul Beijing and Tokyo 0 Ja a North 50uth talks in Pyongyang Possible Rob-Kim 11 Song summits a 2r 2 IAEA guard of Goirernors meeting If the North has not implemented the agreement the board could report to the UNSC Mama Possible UNSC consideration of sanctions Let Team Spirit exercise Conventional military enhancements e g Patriots Stealth fighters play a prominent role as promised during SCM QHGEEHIEESEIB DECLASSIFIED Wakes-Heme sea one as ease '0 a 0225210 oxen 79a 9 rm hue- uwa x l - OS 3 ELI-U- 223 1 03 re t- L BM TALKING POINTS WIHIHARSE 033 156 WITH DPRK 0 You have repeatedly suggested dinett y and indire tiy that higher level discusSion between our two governments could help to remove the sources of concern that prevent lotions from improvin bilateral re 0 we are satisfied un er current circume ances with the established channel between our polgtical counselors in Beijing During Secretary Baker's vzeit to Beijing however his hosts insisted that a higher level dischesion woulo be productiveae_#kn h m udeiwug a you not no ere willing ed to inform on in New york as soon as practical 0 hold such a dieensei -orrangomonte oen'be mede if your-governmeng wishea to sen an authoritative represent from Pyongyang we propose a meeting on peoemher 27'0 28_in new York _poliey ievel of our be chosen from the rs could attend as hosts 1 have been authoriz The 0 8 side would government on ambassado Steel Ck this meeting we will be prepared to disenes-tne - following eo' deep connexns -- v 5 and other neighboring countri uolear issue on the regarding the Potential methods to resolve concerns chant your nuclear program and security-in northeast Asia potential normalization agalogue Korean peninsula Conditions for a kaki L between the DPRK and the Era will continue to promote progress us and reiterates that'h 0 1n the North 8 North-South dialogue is an essential condition The creation and continuation of a v 5 dialogue also depends on progress on nuclear es-es n morth 30uth channels We hope tha in the upcoming meeting in the DPRK responds yoeitively to the denuolearizetion proposal tabled by the ROK at the last round of Frime Minister talks 1360 r- we maiuifh-QS I DECLASSIFIED 1 -3- - 0 Finally I mum caution you on a critically important point ShOJld we at any time learn that the DPRK is producing eayona grade useable nuclear material or eveloping nuclear weapons we would be unable to proceed AQk -q further in the airection of dialogue md normalizatio mx 'n SEKPOL 3 4 6 DECLASSIFIED a a p f n -V 1 you can sitions 0 Recent events make this meeting eesential'oo the hear from us directly and authoritatively our 90 issues of special Concern to the 8 6 government and people but especially your nuclear program We also wash to make clear our View of the opportunities presented to North Korea by changing world realities especially the opportunity to participate in a process leading to peace security 'and economio development on the Korean penineLla and in Northeast Asia ocompanie by an historic The end of the Cold War has been a effort by the U _ano the Soviet Union President Bush's September 27 announcement' of nuclear war of nuclear policy was a major stop in this direction significant social ea in the world have been most of the nations of At the some tint political changes transformation in In the space 05 one generation Asia has into the moot fo ia1y developing region have enjoyed tremendous economic growth decade We believe that all nations of 5 share this growth and prosperity 4 Aaotheo-positive effect of the end of the gold War is a new tooue on reducing weapons and eapeoialzy weogono of mass destruction including nooleax weapons proliferation of weapons and the techno ogy of weapons of mass destruction and easing regiOnal tensions are making mejor The v 5 and the Soviet Union reductiOns in nuclear weapons and cooperatinggto ensure - that nuclear proliferation fo'not an outcome of reorganization-0E the SOViot Union china has indicated that it will soon join the NET -- There have been breakthroughs in longustonding regional disputes such as Cambodia and some progress in the Middle Boot talks region should Your admission to the UN and welcome progress in your of Korea have also 'aialogue with the Republi contributed to this positive trend toward reducing tensions XOut- hu ckea VAOW 'Tk u 3 I Elk ask D org $1 4 ML jam 10 x wot-ki y K-twok 15 at 21 wa - - 13 3 6 R s-Rug Nt b um HL way 4 0 Mo- We om- M-AW ken-k Elsa-Ar Fatwa 0' 2mm v5 duo-5 Baum-u o f u 55555 - a i We are Eully committed to doing everything in our power to encourage these trends an buttre s movement oward a worl in which all nations will be secure peaceful prosperous and stable It should be clear rom thiomthot no holieve north Korea should also benefit from these positive trends we supported your admission into the UN - In our View north Korea is at a crosoroads i3 its 5 relations not only with the United stages but aoso with the root of the world Yoc can through your actions and policy decisions make progress toward improved relations with you neighbors and with the Unitod States and get on the tuna co dynamic economic growth - In deciding to enter the UN earlier this year yoor -government ghve an indication that it mighh bo ppopared to move in those new directiono inoluding hy'Enz illing its international obligations as called for by tno'UH Charter We welcomed an supported this effort by co sponsoring the entry of both Korean into the UN without prejudice to evcntuaz reunification on terms acceptable to all Koreans Our strong preference is to sustain oreas wieh the ultimate goal of paving the way Eoward normal relations And we are pfeporoa to take steps to reciprocate poo hive actions in ways which will be of considerable benefit to you and your people The actions we look to you to tone are welgiknown to you thxough our contacts in the Beiging channel and which we have restated consistently since 1988 But first and foremost among our concerns foethe nuclear inane who elimination of international suspicions about your nuclear program is a matter of - fun amantal importance and urgency It is tho issue which will most significantly affect whether our'contoctn can go forward or whether our relations will he sat back ongoudoring carious _m We are firmly opposed to nuclear weapons proliferation by any country yours included There is bruad support for this position among countries in the region and the international Community and a shared determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapcns Ln this very sensitive part of the world as there was Ln tye Gulf A nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula Would constitute a threat to international secu itx and would be unacceptable to the rest of the world - Indeed even the current you are deteloping nuclear weapons inhibits North Korea's relatiuns other countrieel It is also very destabilizing as t ccula to ensure their security 3 a It is possible that you are seeking a nuclear capability under the misapprehension that this addi icnal military capacity would enhance your security weapons c their own we look to you to meet your unconditional iq ernetional obligations as a signatory to the by signing-and implementing fully and an IAEA %afeguerds agreement We also look to you to wark out an agreement with the Republic of Korea on the banning of all nuclear reprocesalag en enrichment capabilities ongige Peninsula This is the only way to assure that there is no nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula a h The u s task the initiative in improving bilateral relations 45th your country in 1988 with measures that faciltatea contact between our countries 3 At that time we indicated that relations could improve an a reciprocal basis and we noted a number cf specific areas where we lccked for improvement we have welcomed the beginning of progress in the areas of North-South dialogue the return of a very limited numbet_of Korean war and academic exchanges and family reunions We look ta continuing progxess in these and other areas Ear our relations to Advance President Bush also took a major initiative in his September 27 declaration on nuclear policy in 'h The objective of this global initiative is to deckeaae the risk of nuclear proliferation and war and to enhance the security of all nations As we have declared frequently the v 5 poses no threat to north Korea nor are we seeking to interfere in your internal affairs The v 5 affirms its obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat on use of force except in accoraanoe with the UR Charter agaimst the territorial integrity or political independence of any country including the FPRK None of its weaponsawill ever be used except in self ce anse or othelwiaa in with the UN Charter Tile is an internationally legally binding commitment we have undertaken and honor In addition ROK President Rah announced on ovemher 8 a comprehensive non nuc1e r polio which stressed the RDK's acceptance of internati nal inspection of its nuclear facilities and committal the nox neihhr to acquire nuclear weapons grade material 20 to reprocesa or gna ch nuclear material We welcomed and fully supportea Bhatdstatement We also supported the orncept of a joint declaration of nonunuolear policy by Kbraas as propose by ghe ROKG in Seoul a few days ago 1 Taken together the two initiatives no fax toward achieving an objective you have state that you share with no and the' 036 a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weayens or the capacity to develop them However in onde _for this objectiVe to be fully attained your government must accept the same degree of inopection and verification as the ROK has already accepted or is now groyoaing to deal with the reprocessing issue Thus we now look to the DPRK to reciprocate the leoent v 5 and Ron pulley initiatives by -- Fulfilling its NPT obligations unconditionally by accepting and implementing by an early date the IAEA agreement on full aoope safeguards of allwuuolearu-um- materials ana facilities Eully the ROKG proposal at the December 10-13 North-South talks regarding the nuclear issue including trial inspections of one civilian and one military facility before the end of January fr I eel If the DPRK responds gositively to the opportunities in the present situation ano end its nuclear weapons program we are prepared tofnove toward normalization of our uautsen tex relations We believe other countries wool respond kg similazly and we would urge them to do so onene15 - use my I Once you have signed and ratified the IAEA safeguarcs known agreement providing for inspections of all your nuclear N h iwg activities and the inspection process has begun includin physical inspection of all suspect reprocessing - facilities we are prepared to regulaggne these colitical level contacts in New York to include descuosion of the full range of relevant issues of concern including the possibility of the normalization of relations When IKEA inspections have been fully implemtnted and when the DPRK and ROE have mutually agreed to abandon all reprocessing and enrichment activities on a notifiable basic we are prepared toEbpen formal discussions on full normalization 05 U DPRK relations mga hagk md unvi kk Hmb M- As progress is sustained in the nuclear area as well as in other esenbial arcas most importantly the NO tn Scuth dialogue but including matters at missile proliferation limitations on chemical and biological weaponsw accounting and tetroxismn we will take additional s ogs toward normalization of our relations including 2 development of economic and diplomatic relationa -E-' This process of normalizing our relations could include urging our friends to move more expeditiouslg toward normalization with you and negotiations on apoeeprgate economic benefits I For our part otter our concerns on nuclear proliferation issues have been fully met we are prepare to take steps to contribute to other confidence building an garma control measures in Korea The beginning 02 this process of normalizing out bilateral relations should provide you with the means of planning for a better economlc future for your people the expansion of your international standing and a more secure future we must stress from the outset that esolution of the problems of the Korean peninsula is fundamentally a matter for the Korean people we will support and acilltate internationallyvacceptable agreements reached between North and South Korea DECLASSIFIED Adam We continu to support the efforts of the Korean people to achieve pe ce u1 reunifccation and believe the North South dialogue is the best means to achieve that objective In that regard we believe the time has come for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two Korean sides as proposed by President Ron This would build on the progress already made at the last round of talks and Lhe talks at Panmunjom on nuclear issues If you do not respond tr the positive steps we and the ROKG prepoee which wv preter to be tge path follow and if ynu do not'ferego your nuclear weapons development there will be a steady expansion of international opposition to your nuclear-activities As a final point I would reiterate that our3w1111n9n955 to pursue this positive course toward normalizatio jwill and if we gain information that you are engaged in producing weapons grade useable nuclear material or developing nuclear weapons 3 IF ASKED FOR FURTHER LEVEL MEETINGS I believe that I have fully and definitively explained oux position However if there are any elements on which you desire clarificaticn you can communicate with us tngeugh the existing channel in Beijing To reiterate we are prepared to regulariee this higher level channel if you sign and implement a IAEA safeguards agreement And when you and the South have agreed on a verifiable ban on reprocessing and enrichment we are prepared to initiate a formal normalization ieingue a a 9 I snows DECLASSIFIED In reply refer to 1 91 09269 MEMORANDUM FOR USDP THROUGH ISA SUBJECT ACDA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue U noon Director Ron Lehman led a small interagency team to the Republic of Korea Rom last weekend for the purpose of discussing with the South Koreans how they should handle the North Kerean nuclear issue with the North Koreans at this week s North- South ministerials The team was composed of representatives from RCDA State JCS and 0813 During the visit nirector Lehman impressed upon the South Koreans that the North Korean nuclear issue shot-1d front and center in the ministe The temainder of the short visit was devoted to revising a draft joint declaration which the South plans to propose to the North at this week s ministerials There were some serious deficiencies in the ROK proposal which raised Ls concerns The three major ones were 1 The ROKs placed in the middle of this declaration a joint agreement to observe IAEA safeguards Our View is that this is an international obligation of North Korea and should not be part of a North and South agreement 2 The ROKs wanted to limit the inspection regime described in the declaration to only military facilities of both sides leaving the civil sites to be inspected by the 1293A cur position is that IAEA inspections have proven to be inadequate to detect a covert weapons program and may not cover the suspected reprocessing facility so we must be able to have the Rom probably with 0 5 participation-examine Yonghyon and other suspected civil sites 3 The ROK wanted to state the purpose of these inspections as to check on presence of nuclear weapons our position is that this comes too close to sounding like checking for 0 3 weapons Besides the North has no nuclear weapons for us to checks rather we want the inspection regime to vanity that both North and South are hiding by the joint declaration I DECLASSIFIED i 2 The ROKs balked at our changes initially claiming that this ma es the declaration too tough for the North Koreans to accept and more disturbingly olain ng that it is difficult to pressure the North on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing is legal This latter position is a reversion to old ROE thinking which we frankly thought disappeared with President Roh Tas woo's November 8 nonmnuclear policy announcement The ROKs exhibited a lack of confidence in or perhaps understanding of-wthe strength of Ron's policy and were hesitant to press the North to reciprocate this policy we spent the better part of the visit explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inepections the need to press the North to stop reprocessing the powerfulneSS of Ron's November 8 pronouncement and the costs which are mounting far the North At the end of the visit our changes were accepted by the ROKs Specifically in the final draft of the joint declaration reference to EAEA was moved to the preamble civil sites were included in the proposed inspections and the purpose of these inspections is to confirm that the North Koreans adhere to a non nuolear policy similar to Ron's See TAB A As for trial inspections the BOKs will propose that separately in a Prime Minister speech in the ministerials 55h The ROKs are very concerned that once the North signs the IAEA safeguards agreement- which may take place at the late February InEh hoard meeting -international pressure will dissipate we explained-that Japan is hardening its position and we are working with friends and allies on pressuring the North to not just sign a safeguards agreement but actually to reciprocate Ron's non-nuclear policy We do not know if we succeeded in diapelling all of the concerns but it is clear that we have to do some more work to convince the ROKs For the next two months the ROKs appear to accept our carrot and stick approach It is important that we send out the so-called core demarche cable to friends and allies This cable states definitively our goal of getting the North to reciprocate Ron's non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing It would clearly state that signing of IBEA safeguards is insufficient to allay the world's concerns The sooner we get this cable out thegeaSier it is to avoid the accusation that we are moving the goalposts on our demands This would have the added benefit of showing the ROKS that there is international support for seeking a stop to DPRK reprocessing This same message would be given to the North Koreans at the highmlevel bilateral which is being proposed for late December The second thing is to engage the Chinese in more depth on the issue The ROKS told Director Lehman that they thought China s role was very important especially if the UN Would be involved later and they pleaded for the v 5 to lobby the Chinese more on this issue The RDKs believe that China although it works always in indirect ways has more influence with the North than any other country The current gameplan of including this issue as talking points in wide ranging talks with the Chinese - 3 foreign minister is not fooussed or quick enough A high-level trip Specifically to discuss this issue seems in order State PM has just sent a memorandum to USP Kanter about this suggestion 73 Finally it was clear from this visit that the ROKs are divided on what to do with 1992 s Team Spirit exercise Minister of Defense Lee explained in strong terms to Director Lehman his desire to see a bigger and more visible Team Spirit to demonstrate resolve to the North However the Blue House seems to lean towards a postponement fearing that an exercise announcement would jeopardize progress in North-South relations We were told by USFK that any cancellation decision must be made by January 1 due to the extensive preparations required State and ACDA will be inquiring with DOD soon whether this January 1 date is firm and whether planning can go forward without any public announcement They believe that if the North by February is still dragging its feet then an announcement at that time to conduct Team Spirit as a stick measure would be extremely effective Hence this is an issue which will he discussed in the interagency arena for the next two weeks This was a very useful visit for explaining 0 8 positions to the ROKs and also persuading them on the strategy to deal with the North on the nuclear issue Nevertheless with the rapid development of a reprocessing capability by the North we must continue on a fast track with follow up actions as proposed in this memorandum A DC meeting has been tentatively set for_ Monday December 16 where the many of the above issuesh will be addressed Eden Y WOon Col USAF Attachment a s DECLASSIFIED g t l- PAEEHEE BF 95 13015 99 OF 2 3909492 013113 NOD335 ACTION mro Lac-m1 Ans Ha 1mm DEC 9 1991 am 3919942 m 33 1-5 4 0 5999517 ate 91 q aw fqo mmanssv 3mm W s I TO WASHDB IMMEDIATE 8485 Qme t Mswm 13m $50 - ' zI SECUCFME r1 ALSO PASS TD FOR AMBASSABDR GREGG AGS PREL FARM MNUC as LEHMAN us new rnopom mm A unn uuctzaa mm BECLARATIOR REF STATE 397594 I ENTIRE TEXT 2 DISCUSSIDNS DURING ACDA DIREBTRR 6 9 'vaszr CENTERED nu none ran wiru NUCLEAR h ISSUES AT THIS uonra souru PRIME MINISTERIAL as nepanwusnr I3 AWARE BHRING THE PM Intus THE one WILI fauna A JOINT u s DECLARATION novsmn n a uou uuctenn INITIATIVE THIS an agar roan AFTER A senses of HIGH INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETINGS DECEMBER 4-5 IPRIOR ID nr usuiruoucars courAIusn IN Errati I 3 R08 BASIC DRAFT TRACKED IN GENERAL WITH 0 3 THINKING SERIOUS DIFFERENCES EXISTED WERE ADDRESSED BY DIRECTOR LEHMAN WITH THE KOREAHS DISCUSSIONS CENTERED 0 THE IISTINCTIDN BEIHEEH IAEA Ti mG HF 95 SEOUE 13935 33 OF DE 9993691 323919 09386 INSPECTIDHS AND ART BILATERRL INSPECTION AGREEMEHT THE NEED TO INCLUDE CIVIL SITES TN ANT HIS BILGTEHHE INSPECTIGH AGREEMENT THE UNHCCEPTABILITT 0F HAVING AS THE STATED 0F HILRTEHHL INSPECTIONS TO CHECK FOR THE PRESENCE OF WEAPONS EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT WOULD BE 183T THAT AND TRIAL INSPECTIONS 4 ID THE END THE RDHG SIDE AGREED WITH FIXES AND WILL FRDVIDE THE MODIFIED JDINT DECLARATION SEE PARA 6T TO THE HORTH DURING THE DECEMBER 15-13 PM TALKS THEY WILL A150 TRIAL IHSPEGTIDHS AS SUGGESTED BY US IN THE PRIME MATH SPEECH ONCE AGAIN THE RDHG IMPRESSED THE 0 3 TEAM WITH HDRH DONE REGARDING STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE NORTH USG GDHGERHS DHCE SDHFAGED HERE TAKEN DY ODR 5 THE ROHG AGREED WITH THAT THE HHGLEAH ISSUE WILL BE AND AT THE TALKS THE JOINT DECLARATION WILL BE USED BY THE RDHG TD THE FDDR POINTS OF HDVEMBER 25 THE STRATEGY T0 EEAD TD A MGIDR ON THE NUCLEAR ISSDE AHD T0 PM ADVISED DONG DDK THEY ARE- DETERMIHED TO COME OUT OF THE FIGHT DDRIHG THIS AS 5 BEGIN TEXT DE IDIHT DECEAHATIDH THE AND THE SOUTH HIEL STRIVE T0 GREATE AN ENVIRONMENT FATDRABLE TO THE PEACEFDE REDHIFICGTIDH 0F DIVIDED TATHEHLAHD AND TD T0 PEACE IH ASIA AND THE HDRID BY SECDRIHG A NUCEEAR HEHPDH-FREE KOREAN PEHIHSHLA AHD ELIMINATING CHEMICAL AND DIOLOGICAE WEAPONS FRDM GDR LAND THE SOUTH AND THE HORTH BY THE NDH-PRGLIFEHATIOH TREATY A NUCLEAR SAFEGDARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTEREATIDNAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY END -1th lit-p91 - J 53 15 was E'sFAREWEE OF O5 SEOUL IBOTR OR 0f O2 6909491 O23913 08386 ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OR ALL ROCLEAR-RELATED FACILITIES AND MATERIALS ON THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES IR AOOITION TO BISCHARCIRG TREIR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS THE SORTH AND THE RORTR RAVE AOREEO AS FOLLOWS ARTICLE 1 THE SOUTH ARR THE NORTH WILL OSE NUCLEAR ENERGY SOLELI FOR REACEEOL PURPOSES ARR DO NOT MANUFACTURE POSSESS STORE DEPLOT OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLE 2 THE SOOTH AND THE NORTH WILL NOT P033533 NUCLEAR REPROOESSIRG ARR RRANIOM ERRICRMERI FACILITIES ARTICLE 3 THE SOUTH ARR IRE RORTH WILL ACTITELT ARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS EOR TOTAL ELIMINATION- CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL REAPOIIS ARI ABIBE BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA ARTICLE 4 IN ADDITION TO IAEA INSPECTION OF THEIR NUCLEAR EACILITIES ARR MATERIALS THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL AGREEO INSPECTIONS OR ANY MILITARY ARR ART CIVIL FACILITIES MATERIALS AND SITES IN TRE RORTR ARR THE SOUTH IR A MARRER TO BE AOREEO UPON BY BOTH SIRES ORDER TO CONFIRM COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABOVE ARTICLES 0 THESE FACILITIES AND SITES WILL BE SELECTEO BI THE IRSPECTIRO SIDE ARTICLE 5 THE SOUTH ARR THE NORTR WILL DISCORS ARR DECIDE OR DETAILS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 OT PROCEDURES TO BE ESTARLISREO DECEMBER 199 PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CHUNG won ECLASSIFIED imrae m re ism - 31 5 - 1 I'muo rr PAGE 95 0F 85 3875 0F 92 9909432 619116 323913 NGDEIBE PRIME MINISTER or was PEOPLE REPUBLIC 0F KOREA vsou uvuus mun sunsunanr WL DECLASSIFIED 5 mm 2va aumumsz mega ougsnm er mz DEQARMSUH aim- 37 on u - Karim Paulrm i 'mra mm m msuaassv sum um comm a we Durante 43315755 3 a am- may macaw E iwr mam 5mm - 38 3 mwassv mm was mm m ms nu 515 5 amen Tan m mm mm 141152151135 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RPPRORER TO THL IRR-IHTCIEAR OICIOI OR THE RTTITOOI THE LATE HEITIHE RT PRHHURIIRL II II OF HRRT M3 LEI SEE-YOUNG HOTEO THIS JOIHT AGREEHEHT HRS THI FIRST OFFICIAL OOEWEHT ROREEO OT OF BOTH SIDES HOULO ORSIC ER-KORERH RILRTIOHS UNLIHI THE JULY 4 19 JOINT OHLT OERLT HITH THIS IS TRTEROEO TO BIRD BOTH SIOIS ARR REQUIRES BOTH SIDES TO SIBHIT IT TO THEIR RESPECT RATIFIERTIGI PROCESSES RS SUCH IT T5 HOST NORTH-SOUTH ROREEHEHT THE HE ALSO CRLLEO IT RRIOR REITIEVEHEHT HHICH COULD BRIRI ABOUT A HRJOR BURROS IR THIS RRO OURL EHTRY IHTO THE OIL LIE SRIO HILL LAY FIRE FOUROATIOR TOR THE FUTURE OT WSICTIOR OR OF OR SEOUL 13322 EDITION FOR PR TAGS PREL PRRH HRHE KS RR US SUBJECT PRIHL HIHISTEBS SIOR JOIHT RSREEHERT OH 13 RS HOST OTHER ROKG OFFICIALS HAVE LEE HOTEO THE NORTH HI OPIHEO THRT THI REED TRHGIOLT PROOF OT PROGRESS IN THE OIRLOGUE RS STEP TO BETTER RELATIOHS HITR OTHER WRIES RRO RR HEARS OF EHOIHG ITS OIFFICULTIES AND ITS ISOLATION 311E SRIO NORTH ORERR REPRESEHTRTIVES THAT EOORWIC 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ERRLI PROGRESS- OF PEOPLE SHIRT THE NORTH HAS TERRFUL OETI-IIS THE HEETIRI ROH TOT FT THE BLUE HOUSE RFTEIZ THE SIGHIRL CEREHORI 15 TOLLOHIHO IS RR UHOTFICIRL HHICH THI ROI OF HROE OF THE FIHRI RORELHEHT HHERERS TH KEEPING RITH THE OF THE EHTIRE PEOPLE FOR THE PEACEFUL URIFICRTIOH OF THE LARO THE SWIH TRIO THE HORTH RIRFFIRH THI UHIFIERTIOR PRIHEIRLES EHUROIRTEO JR TIIE JULY 4 1912 IDIOT LCHHIRIIOHE ROTH PRRTIES RRI OETERHIREO TO RESOLVI FOLITIERL ROD COHFROHTRTIOH HUD ACHIEVE HRTIORRL RECOIISILIRTIOR UHERERS ROTH DESIRE TO PROTOTE EXERAHRLS RRD COOPIRRTIOR TO ROVRHCE HRTIORRL INTERESTS ARI PROSPERITI HHERERS ROTH RECOGTIIZI TORT THEIR RELOTIOHS CORSTITOTE A SPECIAL PROYISIOHRL RELATIORSRIP GERREO TO - WSECTIOR OI OT OB STOOL 13322 CIREPRC FOR FPR IRES PREL RS IR U5 SUBJECT PRIHE HIRISTERS SIOR JOINT ROREEHERT OR ORIFICRTIOH RRO HITRERS ROTH PLEDGE TO THEIR JOIHT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL UHIFICRTIOH TREREFORI THI PRRTIES HERETO AGREE RS FULLOHS RRTIULL 1 THE SOUTH ROD THE HORTH SHALL RESPECT ERCR POLITICAL REID SOOIRL SISTER RRTICLE 2 BOTH PARTIES SHALL HOT IRIERFERI TH EACH INTERNAL AFFAIRS RRTICLE 3 BOTH PARTIES HOT SLRROER ARR UILIFT EACH OTHER cosmmuaw 0F 4 I 1309432 DEC at hf cal 4 I - ARTICLE 4 BOTH PARTIES WALL HOT ATTEMPT TWINE TO SAHOTAGL ALIC- THE OTHER - ARTICLE A REITN PARTIES SHALL TOTETHEE TG THE PRESENT ARHISTICT REGIME INTO STATI OE PEACE BETTIEEH THE SOUTH ARE THE NORTH AIR SHALL ABIOI THE PRESENT HILITAR- ARRISTICE TO 19 53% OAT 1L SUCH TIME SUCH A STATE E-T PEACE TAKEL HOLT AETICLL 6' BATH PARTILT- SHALL EONFROHIATIOH OR THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE ARI SHALL LOOPERATE ARI TO NATIONAL INTERESTS AHA ESTER ARTICLE TO ENSURE CLOSE ROTH PARTIES A SOUTH-NOAH LIAISOR OFFICE AHALL BE ESTABLISHEO A1 HITHIR THREE NORTH-21 OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE AGREERERT ARTICLE 9 A SOUTH-HORNE SHALL BE ESTAELII-HEEL NITRIC THE THE INTER-KOREAN HIGH-LEVEL TALES HITHIN ONE NORTH OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE Oi THII- AGREEMENT HILL 1 TO OISCUSSIHS CONCRETE HETAORES TO ENSURE THE IHPLENIHTATION OUSERUANCI OF THE ACCOROS OH SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION- ARTICLE BOTH PARTIES SHALL HOT USE ARRET PORCI AUAIRST OTNEI ARR SHALL NOT HALE ARREI AOGRESSIOH AGAINST EACH OTHER ARTICLE TH DIFFERENCES OF OPIHTOH ARR ARISING BETHEEN IRE THO PARTIES SHALL BE THROUGH OIALOOUE ARR NEGOTIATIORS ARTICLE 11 THE OEHRRCATIOR LINE AND AREAS EOR NONAGBRESSIOR SHALL BE IOERIICAL HTTH THE OEHRRCATIOH LINE IN THE ARHISTICE AOREENENI OF JULIET 1953 ARR THE AREAS THAT HAVE BEER THE JURISDICTION OE THERE OROER HAITI THE PRESENT ARTICLE 13 AND HHARAHTEE THO PARTIES SHALL CREATE SOUTH-ROBIN JOINT MILITARY HITHIN THREE 31 OF THE EFFECTIVE RATE OF THIS AGREEMENT THE SAID SHALL DISCUSS AND CARRY OUT STEPS TO BUILD HILITART CONEIOENCE ARR REALIZE REOUCTIDNS INCLUOIHG THE RUTHAL ROTJEICATIOR ARR CONTROL OF MAJOR ROUEHERTS OI UNITS AND MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES THE PEACETOL UTILITMIOU OE THE BEHILITARIZEO ZONE EXCHANGES Of PERSONNEL RHD IHFORHATIOH PHASEO REOULTIOHA 1N AWAKEHTS THE ELIMINATION OF HEAPOHS OF RATS DESTRUCIIUI SURPRISE ATTACK CAPABILITIES ARR THEREOF ARTICLE-13 A TELEPHONE HOTLIRE SHALL BE INSTALLED BETHEEN THE HILTTART- AUTHORITIES OF BOTH SIDES BI WI SECTION O5 OF OR SEOUL 13322 CIRCPAC FOP EPA TAGS PREL FARM NNUC RH U5 SUBJECT PRIME MINISTERS SIGN AOIRT AGREEMENT ON TO PREUEHT ACCILTEHTAL ARNEO CLASHES AND AVOID THEIR ESCALATION ARTICLE 14 A SOUTH-ROBIN MILITARY SORCOHRITTEE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED NITHIH THE TRAHEHORE OE THE INTER-LORETTA HIGH-LEVEL TALKS HITHIN ONE NORTH OF THE EFFECTIVE RATE IT THIS AEREENENT 1H OROER TO 015121153 CONCRETE HEASURES TO ENSURE THE IHPLEHEHTATIOR AND OBSERUANCES OF THE RECORDS ON NOHAGGRESSIOR AND TO RESOLUE 5011 17 094192 STATE 5' I EORFROHIATIO LE If PROMOTE ANT 9 THE HATIOHAL ANL- TE HELFARE THE ENTIRE PIOPLE ROTH PARTIES SHALL ECOTRIHIC IXEUAHGEI COOPERATIET INCLUDING THE JOINT LE RESOHRCE TRAOL me - A RENT f5 CELT-TIRE AHI- 3E1 Ii PROJECTS ARTICLE 1 FAITH SHALL CARR LAEHARLER COTPERATIIR- T1 DIVERS IIELOL SCIENCE IDHCATIOA LITERATURE ARTS HEALTH HOME THE PUELISHIIH- ALE JOLIEHAEISA AIR PUBLICATIONS IR RENTER ARTICLE 13 BOTH PARTIES SHALL OLIARALITEI OE AREAS FREE INTER-LORETTA TRAVEL ARE ARIIELE ROTH PARTIEA SHALL PIRATE CORRESPOHOENCE REHNIOHE- ALTO VISITS HEWLETT EARTH HERBERL AHA OTHER SOUTH AHA NORTH SHAH REMOTE THE RECOHSTITOTIOH IARILIES 1115 IT OR SHALL TREE HEASHRES TO BELIEVE OTHER 15 UL ARTICLE OOTH SIRE SHALL RAILTMAOS ALE THAT HAVE BEER ELLIOTT ARR SHALL OPEL LARA SEA AND AIR ROUTES ARTICLE IO ROTH PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH ARL- LINR FACILITIES TOR SOUTH-NORTH POSTAL TELECOLOLHNIEATIORS SERVICES AND SHALL GUARANTEE THE OI HAIL ARTICLE 21 ROTH PARTIES SHALL EMPERATE OR THE ILIIERRATIONAL STAGE IR THE ECORLHLIC CULTURAL ARR VARIOUS 03E FIELOS AND OUT JOINT BUSINESS A '13 ARTICLE 22 10 RECORDS ON EXCHANGES AND EMPEAATION IN THE ECONOMIC CULTURAL AND UARIOHS OTHER FIELDS ROTH PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH JOINT COLALITTEES FOR SPECIFIC SEETORS IHCLIIOIHG A EXCHANGES ARR COOPERATION COUHITTEE HITHIN THREE LLOHTHS THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT ARTICLE 1 3 A SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGES ANTI COOPERATIGI SUBCU-ALITTEE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED HITRIR TILE FRAHEHORK OI THE INTER-LOREAN TALKS HITHTR ONE Hum 11- THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ARREEHEHT NITH A T0 OISCUSSINE WHCBETE HEASORES TO ENSURE THE IRPLENENTATION AHA OBSERUAHCE OE THE RECORDS OH EMA-NORTH EXCHANGES ALTO COOPERATION ARTICLE 24 THIS ARREEREHI HAY BE AHEHOEO OR SOPPLEHEHTEO BY COACUREHCE BETHEEN ROTH PARTIES ARTICLE 25 THIS ARREENEHT SHALL ENTER TRIO TORCE AS OF THE DATE ROTH PARTIES EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION FOLLOLHNG THE CULPLETIOH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PROCEOURES TOR RRINRIHG 1T INTO EFFECT er - an a an saw 13322 cmcpar FOR ms 9m max HAVE 115 m us SUBJECT PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON HATE DECEMBER 13 1991 Eun TEXT as 3 a 4 1309432 DEC 91 06 55c use                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000 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