- - 103 SECRET-H fa- 19 TDP SECRET tAP l 15 53 MEMORANDUM CF Hansel Eh Iccana Participants Department cf State Secretary Dulles Gerard C Smith Asst Secretary Palicy Planning Department cf Defense _Dcnald A Quarles Deputy Secretary Mansfield D Sprague Assistant Secretary Wilbur Brucker Secretary of the Army '3 g Secre tar McElrny _3 It Themes 3 Gates Jr Secretary cf the Navy James H Dnuglas Secretary cf the Air Fnrce' 331 General H F Twining Chairman JCS all Admiral Arleigh Burke Chief of Naval Dperatiens General Maxwell D Taylcr - General T D White Admiral Charles C Triehel General Cutler General ea summum FDM Secretary Dulles said he wanted tn raise fur cnnsideraticn whether cur basic strategic cnncept is_retaining the confidence cf cur allies and ccntinuing tn create sufficient fear in the Enemy tn deter aggressien He said he alsc wanted tn ask some questicns ahnut the significance cf the present strategic fermula - Secretary Dulles recalled having originated the cnncept_e massive retaliaticn in_l 53 when id was realized thetwit-was-impnseihle far the asses Elli SECRET TDP SECRET in Free to match the conventional'strength of the Soviet Union The opposing concept at that time had been enunciated by former President Hoover who urged a fortress America strategic doctrine Secretary Dulles said his idea had been intermediate to the two extremes of recreating large scale conventional forces and withdrawing to fortress America The striking power of the force behind the massive deterrent while protecting the United States would protect many other nations That doctrine of deterrent has worked over the past eight years and only with reluctance did the Secretary now express the opinion that in the future although the doctrine would not become invalid its application would- be limited Since 1950 the destructive power of nuclear weapons had immensely increased The Soviet Union has developed a very large nuclear weapons capability A nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR could result not only in destruction of the Soviet Union and the US but could make all of the Northern Hemisphere uninhabitahle or in any event risky to inhabi t The Secretary ques tioned whether massive use of nuclear weapons could be consistent with the survival of the US Secretary Dulles said our allies are coming to feel that the US would_not in fact inaugurate general nuclear war in the event of a limited attack by the Soviet Union and that our only way to help them will increasingly be a _purely theoretical thing Secretary Dulles expressed concern about the of US reaction to an bigucus Sovia aggressivelmov-es -Hc spdke- of -the- awful ' responsibility that woul- d o_vc on tt_c Presidcnt TDP SECRET SECRET 1'1 and his successors in office if a basis for decision arrived Even if there was no doubt in the minds of US officials as to their determination to open up general nuclear war with the Soviet Union if our allies are attacked in force Secretary Dulles said that our allies are beginning to have doubts that the US would so enlarge the conflict as to bring'about its own destruction Probably present European governments' go along with our strategic doctrine The United Kingdom-seems to be placing more dependence on it ' even more than we Uwing to their fiscal exigenciesl the Exchequer is writing their strategic doctrine But the Tories seem now to be a minority government and if a Labor government succeeds they may well take a different view of things They may feel that the United Kingdom's'security is not compatible with a US doctrine of general nuclear war and nothing else in the event of an attack on Europe adenauer cannot survive forever There are presently fairly stout governments in France and Italy but there is a rising tide of opposition to our strategic concept The tide is still sub merged because of the existence of governments _favoring our policy governments which grew up with this policy But the Secretary queried if new governments will not be more skeptical Secretary Dulles also expressed concern as to how our strategic_concept would work assuming a Soviet attack on Germanyl Turkey or Iran in which in the first_instance US forces were not involved Would we rush forces into the hostilities and thus establish the US-Soviet forces clash required by our doctrine or would we stay clear of 'the fight The Secretary reported the concern of Iran at the Baghdad Pact meeting in January that we would not rush forces in - 5 ms at is 'Hr Quarles at this point recalled that the President at the Paris HATD meeting had flatly told the Turks that we would come immediately to their defense in the event of an attack Secretary Dulles asked if since the massive retaliation doctrine was first conceived weapons developments had not occurred which would permit the US to begin to consider an area defense concept He recalled that the massive retaliation doctrine had been based on'the fact that area defense possibilities did not exist The US family of nuclear weapons_had not then been developed Perhaps they were not sufficiently developed now but would not this be the case shortly Could we not consider a doctrine permitting of-local defense against local attack He recalled that in Korea we believe that the use of nuclear artillery'would add greatly-to defense capabilities and the same situation may exist in Italy and Iran Secretary Dulles asked if the doctrine that any overt hostilities between the US and USSR signified all out war means that the Department-of Defense development and production of weapons is limited to the implementation of such strategy or is the Department of Defense producing weapons to reflect possible new strategic concepts which different kinds of weapons would permit Are we becoming prisoners of our strategic concept and caught in a vicious circle Secretary Dulles then summed up by saying in 195D and succeeding years the concept of massive retaliation was imperative because it was a practical concept He feels now that the strength of the deterrent derived from that strategy will rapidly deteriorate as_the consequences of_putting the doctrine into action become so appalling Also our present strategic concept may not continue to be the only practical one as tactical and clean nuclear weapons become available TDP secagg Tor seesaw l Secretary Dulles spoke of the large political responsibility which the Secretary of State bears Under present strategic doctrine perhaps we can hold our NATE allies in line for one or two years but not much longer than that He does not challenge the validity of our strategic doctrine if it is just for today or tomorrow He does challenge it if we are prisoners of this doctrine and if our weapons production planning reflects the rigidity of this doctrine He believes that urgent efforts should be made to find strategic variants which will be more credible than our present doctrine Secretary'HcElroy opened by saying that the questions raised by Secretary Dulles were approv priate and timely The developing destructive capability of nuclear weapons raises the question of whether nuclear weapons will in fact be unuseable in war as proved to be the case with chemical war- fare weapons In response to Secretary Dulles' question he agreed that weapons design and produc- tion reflect strategic doctrine If our strategic doctrine is to change there will have to be con- sequential changes in the weapons Secretary Dulles interjected the point that he was not suggesting giving up a massive retaliatory capability but he was urging that the US develop more flexibility Secretary HcElroy said that some knowledgeable people doubt if tactical nuclear weapons could be used in war without bringing about the use of very large yield weapons The enemy has a great conven- tional preponderance and we must find ways to match this fact SECRET 3 '1 -5- General Twining said that we are not rigid We are beginning to approach sufficiency in large yield weapons and small yield weapons are being developed and produced at a good rate He said if the Soviets attack TurkeyI we cannot save Turkey unless we use the deterrent The allies would have no more confidence that we would help them out in a limited way than in a very large way by the use of massive retaliation He felt that by moving away from the massive retaliation doctrine we might lose the alliance Secretary McElroy acknowledged that there has been a change in the balance of force He cited the case of Berlin The Soviets could take it faster than Turkey Secretary McElroy said that the conditions for use of tactical nuclear weapons had not been spelled out nor has our will to use them in peripheral situations been established or disclosed For example would we use them if the Korean hostilities were renewed We need a doctrine cover ing the interim situation between the use of con- ventional weapons-and of massive retaliation We hope we can use tactical nuclear weapons in' limited war without bringing on all-out nuclear war The matter is certainly worth studying Perhaps we can come up with some doctrine governing the use of clean tactical weapons Admiral Burke said we now have a massive retaliation capability and we should keep it for the all-out situations The nest step to consider would be a big war not necessarily involving the USSR and the US We are now producing nuclear weapons for that type of situation Then there are smaller instances which we can handle with con ventional weapons There are also ih hetween sitoations in which we would perhaps use nuclear TUP got senses s weapons and perhaps we would not But we must move fast in all situations 'We are not hank- ing on massive retaliation for all situations Secretary_Dulles said he was very encouraged to know this and recalled that Churchill had said some time ago that nuclear weapons had saved Europe from aggression He doubted that Churchill would say the same for the situation over the next ten years General Taylor said he agreed entirely with Secretary Dulles' analysis of the strategic situa- tion Certainly we can deter a big war Dur military posture is oriented in the right direction now but our hearts are not entirely in the job of developing limited tactical weapons systems By lQE - l we can have nuclear weapons deliverable by recoilless-type weapons and with a yield of 10 tons of a kiloton 'With such weapons area defense is entirely possible if we work hard at it Secretary Dulles pointed out that the world works not unlike a small community He pointed out that policemen didn't have machine guns The London police for years used only sticks He acknowledged that circumstances had forced us to depend on a strategic concept which was quite limited and one that won t work in the coming years Fortunately future circumstances may no longer require the doctrine as an exclusive one Mr Quarles stated that he saw the need for re-enamination of the concept but he felt that the logic which had led to the concept had a certain inevitability about it and he thought a re-enamina- tion would endorse the doctrine Area defense would be possible if the US had a monopoly of nuclear but since h boviet Union has them in TDP sates l P SECRET large numbers and has great manpower superiority there would be the same imbalance as had led to the enunciation of the massive retaliation doctrine in the first place An attempt to set up area defense around the Sino Soviet bloc would lead as Secretary Dulles had said in 195D to no gain in defense and bankruptcy for all During recent years technological developments have not favored the defense The opposite has been the case Dur best defense is in a strong offense at places of our choosing Therefore the argument for new strategy breaks down if the Soviet Union is the enemy If you are considering hostilities against a third power which does not have nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union keeps out of the fight then certainly we should have more flexible strategic doctrine - Secretary Dulles said that perhaps a re ewamination would lead to the same result but in that case are we not wasting money testing to develop clean and small nuclear and atomic weapons if we have no strategy for their use Secretary HeElroy said he thought that Mr Quarles1 views were not inconsistent with a re esamination of our strategic concept There was no doubt of the appropriate reaction in the event of an all-out US-USSR attack He was con cerned about situations such as Indonesia Secretary Dulles said that he was not happy about Indonesia General White said that we were not dependent entirely on large weapons and that the percentage of low yield weapons in stockpiles was increasing Secretary Dulles again pointed out that we haJa no strategy for usiag these smaller scale weapons He contrasted the academic pastime of TUP SECRET log steer 1 - developing strategic theories with the bitter choice that a President would have to make authorising all out nuclear war Secretary Dulles emphasised the great risk of placing the security of the US on the assumption that the President Hr Eisenhower or his successors -- would decide for all-out nuclear war He emphasised the responsibility I before one's God of taking this action and the risk of a policy of putting so grave responsibility on the President Mr Quarles recalled that each time this issue had been put to the President during the past three years he had given the guidance that we should plan on the use of nuclear weapons when required by national security considerations and that he would authorise their use General Taylor said it was difficult to find a good use for tactical nuclear weapons since even these involved tremendous battle field destruction Secretary Dulles spoke of the awesome decision that faced President Truman in and said that the situation today would be immensely more diffiu cult What the President thinks he will do in a contingent situation is one thing what he actually would do when faced with an ambiguous Soviet attack or probing operation in-Europe is another In vSecretary Dulles' judgment the President would not order strategic bombardment of the Soviet Union if the Soviet attack in Europe was not a clear cutI all out attack Mr Gates pointed out that there are very large differences in the national resources required for different types of strategic bombardment -- that isJ whether cities were targets or whether other targets were tc be hit SELRET Tor-sscasr -11 General Gutler said he had talked to the President about this matter referred to by Mr Gates and said he would send a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense regarding the specific nature of our deterrent and our strategic bombing aims We could go to a different deterrentiinvolving lesser resources if that was considered desirable Secretary'HcElroy said that the purpose of the meeting this morning had been merely to lay out the problem He proposed that his people get up a paper on what approach should be made to the ra-eaamination He suggested that Secretary Dulles might want to designate someone to think along with us Secretary Dulles pointed out that the con- siderations involved in the restudy were of first importance and the factors were quite well known Ther fore he felt that the'study should be at a very high level Hr Quarles said that certainly there was lots to be done but that there was more in the record than had been referred to at the meeting today Secretary Dulles said that what we needed cannot'be kept in the record in the background we must have a publicly salable policyl or we would lose our allies General White reverting to the point made by Mr Gates and General Gutler as reported above asked if the US would be satisfied with a deterrent limited to knocking out one hundred Russian cities and letting'the Soviets know in advance was                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    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