2513 3 AKA as to runner relevant papers u P nu 333532 How disposed of 9109 M310 T29 87$ '9th Ea GM 3 911 7 Rabbi 13 30 0 Wm m 336 hag mm 1 9 5 Sle in1493JP 32qu k UM x ak whom I We vmu km 30 Msi i quggi QJ 48 Must vow I n cm Ubl L ha Hist km 90 791 Whit A m 156 rut RP co Mu My NMWEE W1 MM 1w New RE 011 Im- -mL-m-nn - U ctinh I ndex References tn later relevant pape i 4Rh76 - 1 11 53 w LL11 1 5 10 11 1 90 11 13 o1 United 315103 to the United llations Cypher 0% $ 14 - mL Lil J U L J- BULIOLJ Sir P Dixon do 1021 ii 4 12 and ep tember 22 1958 septenbor 21 1958 3 5 09 3 5-3- 22 1958 1 1 Jill in I twhw'Jk a' 8-4 3 L 1 ddressed 4454 141 933 Office telgmg No 1021 of eeptenber 21 zepeated for information to fiashington Kauai Q Following from the secretary of State it my meeting with the President this 2orning he began by saying that he did not see a solution to the problem of the off shore islands that made sense The Eationalist osition on the islands was militarily ridiculous Even if they wanted to invade the mainland possession of the islands did not help dhat they needed for that purpose was a good amphibious potential He had offered that to Ghiang provided the islands were evacuated but without success In aaying that the esident did not indicate that he thought there was any sense in Chiang acting against the mainland or that he had encouraged this The President however was ready to bribe Chiang in any reasonable way to remove his forces but Chiang always replied that if the Kationalists left the islands he himself would go The United States had been considering whether it was 33 'ible to have an independent in Formosa without Chianu but they had not found suitable people for it 2 I asked him about the supply position on juemoy He said that it was not immediately critical They were now landing stores by use of amphibious tanks and each tank containing 5 or 6 tons The Commists were hitting one occasionally but it was the best way of circumventing the bombardment 3 I asked that would happen if the forest talks broke down The President did not reply I suggested it would be much easier for the allies of the United wtates if the United States offered further talks at a higher level for example between Foreign ministers The President said that the United totes public would not stand for him taking part in a meeting with the head of the Chinese Government but he did not exclude the possibility UK Ffission lies York telezgan Fife 1023 -2- to it ereir's possibility of a Foreign Ziinisters' meeting I reminded him of achieve 1951 I suggested that it might be possible to have a meeting sm of the United tates the finited Kingdom the and Comth China with perhaps the Indians present Cin this issue I thought the Indians might be helpful at such a meeting The President said that he had read ifehru's strong speech against Joznsunism and it might well be that they would help in negotiating some settlement I repeated that the ' 'arsa7 talks might fail and the situation grow worse If real hostilities were in prospect the United mam and European public Opinion would not understand Uni ted states failure to attempt a higher level meeting The President appeared to agree He said that he knew that he had not got United States public opinion behind him in the way for example that he had had it over Lebanon He said that a democratic Government could not go to war without the support of the bulk of its people 2 The President then said he thought it was time that they and we really talked this thim out with all its basic problems and without anyone abandoning their responsibilities I told him of my talks with the Japanese foreign Ef nister He said that discussions at issues like the effect of a new policy on the Overseas Chinese ms exactly the kind of issue he had in mind for discussion He then referred in parenthesis to some proposals which he said the United States had made about two years ago to the Nationalists as to how to maintain their position with the Overseas Chinese 5 I asked him about the nature of United States military action should it be necessary He said that they would proceed by stages and he implied the same kind of stages as 3271' Dulles did in his last conversation with me I returned to the topic more than once and eventually he said very firmly that his own perscmal View was that it was out of the question to use nuclear weapons for a purely local tactical coxmter-battery task If nuclear weep were to be used that should be for the big thing He said Ihen you use nuclear wealms you cross a completely different line I said that I was very much relieved to hear him make this statement about action Lotion with conventional weapons against the Chinese batteries shelling the islands and supplies coming into them was one thing I think it would be understood by people more easily But if as he had put it the line was crossed and SECRET nuclear v-2- a scion Iewfiork telegan id 1011 to Foreign 01 39 Ti'g $ 11 J nuclear bombs were used we would he in a very different and much more dwgerws situation the President was very r clear and decisive as to his own view on this point although he did make a 13 338ng reference to conditions being different if the 7th Fleet were itself attacked 730 did however say that this attitude about the use of nuclear weapons as his personal view end not necessarily the advice that he would get from the service chiefs 6 when talking about demos a I said that I wmdered use ther its future could lie in some form of guaranteed independence Uhiang's army was getting more and more Formosan and the Fomossns themselves night very well like to stay independent The President said that one difficulty would he he to keep then independent without a Great Power counter-poise to Shine in the area I said that thought an international guarantee might be the answer to this the President said that it would be very easy for the United states to keep such an hidependent i ormose economically alive Their present overall support was at the rate of 1 700 million a year a large preportion of which was military 7 Iiith regard to Note the President said there was a limit to What he could agree to accept The Jets was so ml of distortions and untruths that he had had to return it He said he was at a loss to understand Idarushehev He now felt any statement of was a lie I said that I wondered whether Khrushchev had some personal chip on his shoulder for example 'armoyance that he had not yet met the President face to face at a summit tall-t fe had some reason to believe that he was annoyed because his visit to the Lnited had not yet been repaid The President repeated that he could not understand Khrushchev's behaviour hr Dulles wee going to make a statement tomorrow repeating the United States positicm in answer to Khrushchev's latest Note 8 The President repeated his gratitude for us stm iing by him He was sure it had not been easy I said that on the point of not using force it was not difficult for us to give support Jhatever our views on other aspects as he knew our public opinion was disturbed and needed very careful handling 9 3303 - 1 91 -931 559-91 tel-'1 9 9931 -1049 10 1 to - oreig-r 103L106 - 1 4 2 7 - 5- 9090199109 1 39 9 3999 01 122 92 9110 are 99 10110 9 9 he P193 13 39 11230 3 very 1 911 13 111191 bad the sates ov -r1101 0701' 193 9 2'1 He 91753 31 9 12 52 9 1 191 1111 1'16 3101' 91399 1 to 9'2913011 to fight for these two 1921911115 31 there had to be a 11 319 the our 1'31 cued 9111 01 L'tates 9 1mm re mo bottsr 1 39 10 111 - 910911 people understood about hem om 110' 2 1 -- 2 1-1 5 - - vuvm ud 1 lx- 7 1e 1 13 91 6 22 0 31 3 3 5311311036 13 13 3137 9931033 13 impossible 101 2 the resie e at to tolerate 3 51 2 5 v5 39 on the 11 3 212 013 9r mar-0 13 995911546 the 1302391171191 batturies are reasmwi did -10 reject the idea 01 12119191219 meeting if the 9 rsaw talks 1 ziled itl1 1 33 19 G it be 99 hammer- 1 91139 1123 Chou he med 1300 311911 11' it 9 9199 011109 1131 rogsrd 2 wider meeting 05 12 01 1111 it big- 1191 13191 that he Vic- 3 politely 11113996 00L 0 e like Dulles is ready to go 9 1011 93 59 pressure on the Uhinese giationelists 529 is oonsider '93 the of 911 alts mative ref-vine to 2111993 9 15 9111510119 o c ve 9 full discussion 1719 71 93 01 15 31 192 - 19113110 211 011 for the 13959111 Sewers of 01191193 1'9 90133 9 over for example hox' to handle the Overseas 11199 rug Priva '2 eeretary 521 Crash j 1107 6 ir 3 7 Hog-er 1119 7129 Tiiorland Head of 9 1 2193 em 1393099191 5249 9 1 1 tn                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu