a 3myuunoou 1114 Vi lav arm I I I A i s 'ty page Dageg m2 f- THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTS FILES SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting DATE AND r-Mond ay May 8 1972 - 9 00 a m 12 20 p rn PARTICIPANTS President'ngon- Vice President-Agnew secretary of State Rogers Secretary of Defense Laird Secretary of Treasury Connally Director of Central Intelligence Helms Director of Office of Emergcy Preparedness Lincoln Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger President's Press Secretary Ziegler Mr John Negroponte NSC Staff Notetaker President Nixon As youare allzaw are we have an important decision to make today on Vietnam The current situation which is certainly not as critical as portrayed by the pressis nevertheless in the balance There are serious questions as to Vietnam's equipment and will General Abrams needs more assets We've sent air'primarily TheSoviet summit is jeopardized by each option open to us -- Doing nothing Only bombing the North Blockading or mining and bombing Thus today we need a cold-blooded analysis Regardless of how we have helped the South Vietnamese we have done reasonably well in some places and poorly in others I am surprised at the fact that we have provided inferior equipment to that furnished by the Soviets They have provided 13 new weapon sytems big tanks-big guns this shows what the South Vietnamese are up against The South Vietnamese fighting performance is a mixed bag Even by the most optimistic assessment - EYES ONLY W4 wunuull' 11111 1 Tammy Q 19% By MAM Date law TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 2 there is a substantial danger that South Vietnam may not be able to hold up particularly in H_ue ubut in Military Regions and IV where most of the population lives they arev doin g quite well Hue is of symbolic-importanceand they may attack within the next few days Putting it in those terms the real question is not what will happen to South Vietnam but what we have to do to affect the situation We could wait the situation out This is atempting course If the South Vietnamese can't do the job on the ground it wOuld be tempting for'political reasons We could blame the opposition for getting us into the war and then for not letting us out Congress undermined us at the negotiating table and we could tell the U S people let's flush it because South Vietnam couldn't hack it This is a tempting proposition It could be s old Our Democratic friends would buy it and a great numberof vRepublican friends would buy it as well But there are problems The major one is that if in the future after all the effort in South Vietnam a 'Soviet'L's'upported opponent succeeds over a p S supported opponent this could have considerable effect on our allies and on the United States 4 Our ability to conduct a credible foreign policy could be imperiled This leaves out the domino theory but if you talk to the Thai the Cambodians the Indonesians and the Filipinos as I have the fact of a U S failure and a Communist success would be considered a failure of U S policy Secondly the diplomatic track is totally blocked The public sessions have been unproductive Henry was in Paris last week and made every offer we had made previously and even more They flatly refused and in- sisted on our getting rid of Thieu releasing everybody from prison and so forth making a Communist takeover inevitable The Communists now think they're winning and they' re gettingtougher at the bargaining table Thirdly there is a considerable body of military opinion not a majority that we should put more air strikes into Hanoi and Haiphong The difficulty with this course is first the DRV will be better prepared second General Abrams needs assets for the battle in the South and third there is the serious question of effectiveness of resuming bombings on a regular basis This raises problem's similar to those previously faced and the question of what would be accomplished I The fourth and final course would be to adopt a program of cutting off the flow of supplies by sea and rail The effect of cutting off supplies by sea 3 TOP SECRET IEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY mum - - 1 th Athty g 0 avg Bye 21 zrgg' - 1 TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 3 can be conclusive but'the question of railis in doubt because of our experience from 1965-68 - - i Whatever we do it won't affect the battle immediately in the South except perhaps the effect The real effect will be three of four months from now for sure - As regards the summit this latter course might jeopardize the summit I think we have to realize that if the situation in Vietnam is as it is today there can't be a summit The Isurnmitis jeopardized by all these courses of action That consideration we h'avet'o as surne There will be no summit There is no good choice The bug-out choice is a good political one but I am not sure what this office would be worth after doing that The other military choices Would have graveforeign policy consequences and political consequences at home Nothing we can say is sure and all have serious risks regarding the Summit publicopinionand Congress Anyone who raises a questionof risky-must look at thechoices We face a situation where nothing is sure There are grave political risks and risks tothe country if we try one Of these policies and fail I believe the first course of action is the least viable It is the best politi- cally but it is the least viable for our foreign policy Escalation in the bombing or a naval and air cutoff have questionable value Neither will surely tip the balance to the Side of success It is only a question of degree The only question in regard to increased bembing or a cutoff is whether this provides South Vietnam with a better chance of success Admiral Moorer will brief on the military aspects of the mining and air 'activitie s Admiral Moorer I will firSt address the mining plan There are two kinds of mines the large mines and the second kind are the smaller Mark 36 de structor mines -- a special mine for the interdiction of small craft The area of concern is the Haiphong Channel It is ideal for mining because it is a narrow channel The green area is where we would place the big mines and any ship which hit a mine and sank would block the channel The red area shows where we would put the destructors The re are an average of 42 ships per month in Haiphong The pier can accommodate 16 to 17 ships and there is a separate off-loading pier for _l SECRET EYES ONLY - Au 3 1 11 in - 5 BYMARA Date 5% 25 92 TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 4 POL supplies The three mile limit is there It's been put in by the International Lawyers President Nixon The State and Defense Department lawyers have been working on this Admiral Moorer The DRIV claims a twelve mile limit The lawyers contend that because other countries such as the Norweigans and the Japanese claim a three mile limit and we mine beyond that three mile limit they could claim that mining up to the twelve mile limit would set a precedent Dr Kissinger Arnbassador Johnson came up with a formulation yesterday whereby we could make a proclamation that does not force a decision We could simply state that the mining is taking place within DRV territorial waters rather than specifying whether it is within claimed DRV territorial waters or territorial waters as We View them legally Admiral Moorer We shouldn't say what we wontonight 30 45 minutes before laying the mines there would be preliminary suppres- sive air actions prior to the mines going down President Nixon Would they all be dropped by air Admiral Moorer Yes Each plane drops four mines President Nixon Howmany planes wouldlwelose Admiral Moorer We will be using 6's and A- 7's We will not lose many It is not as much of a risk as our previous bombing of Haiphong There will also be gunfire support President Nixon When will the Newport News arrive Admiral Moorer It is arriving tomorrow The big mines will be set for 72 hours There is no flexibility on the destructors for the small mines and they can only be set for 2 4 hours so the destructors will be dr0pped 24 hours later The sterilizers make the big mines inactive within 120 days This is not absolutely precise but about 120 days We don't propose initially to put destructors in the channel itself because they have a life of 180 days TOP EYES ONLY c 30 Hal-r i - Jul u Authority 0 Isms TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 5 These mines are magnetic we have other mines which are more difficult to sweep but we are not putting them min the initial effort We could put them in if the other side makes a cencerted sweeping effort The mines are set off at random so that if a Sweeping could be made they could be set for three or four or'five passes They are not moored mines like the old 'World War I mines They are implanted on the ground The situation then would be that 72-hours afterthe'first drop the mine field would be activated -- - - We would lay the larger mines'i n this area and we would lay the de structors inside the rivers further south The blhackiline is the three mile limit the red is the twelve mile limit Near the DMZ we would lay destructors at Dong Hoi Quang Khe and Thanh Hoa These ports are used by little craft that hug the coast to supply routes leading to the Ban Karai and the Mu Gia pass We will reseed the mines as necessary and we can continually go back and reseed Associated with this action would be the suppressive air support for the mine laying aircraft With regard to the interdiction of the rail lines there are three rail lines from Hanoi to the Chinese border We WOuld attack the marshalling yards the junctions the railroad lines-andthe highway bridges We have already done some good work on the lines of communication As far as the level of effort is concerned we are already puttingZOO sorties per day in the Free dom Train area I We would augment thislby 100 sorties This would leave ample assets in the south Four additional squadrons and the Saratoga have been involved in the augmentation effort and would be used for suppression of air defenses andthen to hit the railand supply lines The ships could withdraw or stay If they stayed they would block the dock area but we would continue with the attacks against warehouses If the ships leave we would totally destroy the docks Laying the mines will be simple President Nixon Regarding the seaborne traffic is mining enough Won't we have to stop the ships Admiral Moorer The ships come from two directions Most come from South of Hainan The Soviet ships come from the Black Sea and not from Soviet pacific ports The destroyers would provide a screen to warn ships that the channel has been mined and we would take steps to be sure that cargo is not off loaded on the beach They cannot go into the ports without a pilot and there is not a chance of them going up knowing that the channel is mined TOP- SECRET TIVE EYES ONLY Athty a may ByithARA Dategzg - TOP EYES ONLY 6 Secretary Laird We have the names of all the ships on the way and the cargo they are carrying Admiral Moorer _Mr Helms will talk about the logistics aspects President Nixon How could our interdiction effort be more effective than it was from 1965 to 1968 Will we bemusing more Admiral Moorer Yes In 1965 to 1968 since so many supplies were by sea the railroad was being'used at 10-15 percent capacity Now there would be many more trains and targets and they would have to operate in the daytime The interdiction would'be much more effective now President Nixon Would wehave more planes now or less Admiral Moorer We would have less In 1968 we were running at 30 000 sorties per month about our present level President Nixon The only advantage could be the Secretary Laird We're now running 500 sorties a day or about 15 000 per menth Secretary couldn't we knockout the railroads Admiral Moorer The advantage is that then the railroads weren't used to full capacity When you get to the question of fuel there is an estimated 100 000 tons available which could last three months It is a very different proposition to bring fuel and food in by rail You cannot go after a logistics system one category at a time Secretary Rogers Are you satisified that the mining will block the channel Admiral Moorer Yes Secretary Rogers What about o_ff-' shore unloading Admiral Moorer They will try some off shore loading and perhaps they will use some of the China ports That's why we will be interdicting both the ports and the railroads But we can cut down the lighters to a trickle TOP SECRET EYES ONLY Authority a mq Date dgy u TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 7 Secretary Laird They'll use lighters They have thousands of them They off loaded Soviet ships near the DMZ with 500 lighters secretary Rogers In effect it would be a blockade if we attack the ships Dr Kissinger If it is inside territorial waters it is interdiction If we stop vessels outside territorial waters if would be a different matter President Nixon The difference 'would belone of not stopping vessels on the high seas Secretary Rogers If they off-load on the high seas Mr Lincoln If we attack ships off the coast then Why wouldn't this be a blockade Dr Kissinger We have the option 9f only attacking the lighters Secretary Laird You can t and attacking the docks Vice President Agnew If the boats have 72 hours to get out Dr Kissinger Why can't you go after the docks Secretary Laird I'm sure the Soviets Will keep ships at the docks Dr Kissinger The immediate operational question is that of whether you attack the lighters or the Ships - Secretary Laird The docks must go out in any event The military significance Will be in four or five months Most of the stuff is economic in nature and food Almost all the military equipment comes in by rail President Nixon What about Secretary Laird The POL comes through pelt facilities but they have four months' supply in country Secretary Connally What about the tanks Secretary Laird The tanks come in by rail -- so do the SAMS I EYES ONLY Q ARA Date a TOP EYES ONLY 8 0 Admiral MOOrer We have never been able to verify whether the come in by rail or by sea - President Nixon The main thing isthe oil Secretary Laird They have four months' supply if they go on ration they could stretch it to five months President Nixon Does that assume the planned air strikes Admiral Moorer The additional air strikes on POL storage points and warehouses have thus far been limited to South of the 20th parallel President Nixon It would not make sense to take this risk unless we go all out on the rail facilities in a fashion better than in 1968 and we cannot have any stop-start bombing We must 'stoP movement into Haiphong particularly the oil we must bomb the power plants and the attacks must be heavy There is no easy way I would liketo think-that the mining is easy but there must be mining we must hit the railroads so they cannot divert to rail and we will be hitting stock piles in a substantially increased way north of the 20th parallel Either we do or nothing Admiral Moorer Compared to 1968 the number of DRV motorized vehicles and artillery is much higher President Nixon It is a different'war Admiral Moorer The consumption rates are much higher Mr Lincoln How'many planes will be diverted from South Vietnam Admiral Moorer The plan will leave General Abrams with what he needs in View of the recent augmentations a President Nixon Tell us what assets we had when we began and what we have there now Admiral Moorer We began with 17 destroyers now we have 36 We began with three now there are six We have ten more squadrons of air- craft and we have doubled the B-52 capability Secretary Connally In a real sense we are not taking anything away from General Abrams EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY it Anthority 9375 1332M ARA Date 12 21247 3 TOP EYES ONLY 9 President Nixon Abrams has double the resources Secretary Connally Is there any doubt that you can'tknock out the three rail lines - Admiral Moorer I am confident-we can Secretary Connally I don t think we should do this if our planes cannot knock out the rail lines 7' Vice President Agnew What about Admiral Moorer Yes they have SAMs They fired 250 of them on the last Hanoi raid and achieved one hit Last night just west of Hanoi there was only light SAM firing Secretary Laird They still have 8 000 SAMs and have fired 7 000 of them 'Secretary Rogers How effective will these measures be Do you think they are the most effective or is there something else we could do Admiral Moorer The only other more effective measure would be an amphi- bious landing President Nixon That is the other Option We have the Marine division in Okinawa I have said we would not introduce ground tr00pso Leaving the mining out can we step up the bombing on Hanoi and Haiphong Admiral Moorer Yes We could hit the marshalling yards and the ware- houses on the docks President Nixon The problem with respect to bombing is the restraints The difficulty is civilian casualties Mining may be the mos humane course in this kind of situation I Secretary Rogers We would be doing all three First maximum effort in South Vietnam secondly the docks third at blockade President Nixon I have to decide at 2 00 pm Admiral Moorer We are planning to execute TOP EYES ONLY UniputhUl-L Anna- i 3 Authority 9-95 Date 51 21247 3 OP EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 10 President Nixon Whatever we do we must always avoid saying what we're not going to do like nuclear weapons I referred to them saying that I did not consider them necessary Obviously we are not going to use nuclear weapons but we should'leave it hanging over them We should also leave the threat of marines hanging over them To protect our 69 000 forces if the GVN collapses the 18 000 Uo S personnel in Da Nang would be in great peril In terms of ground forces an offensive role is one quest- ion a defensive one is something else We shouldn't give reassurances to the enemy that we are not going balls out I like the three to twelve mile limit question I think we should leave it Open Whether we hit ships or lighters should also be left Open Admiral Moorer There are enough supplies in the DRV to permit the continuation of current Operations The question is what happens next August and next year if we leave the situation as it is President Nixon It is tempting to do nothing We are already doing a hell of a lot We have doubled the B 52 s We have upgraded the army But 'we must think of where we are going to be There Moscow with the situation as it is Further down the road in September or October assuming South Vietnam holds they will have an enormous incen tive to give us one last punch just before the elections Whoever the demo- cratic candidate is McGovern Humphrey or Teddy Kennedy both the DRVV and Moscow would like nothing better than to have these men in office When we are out can South Vietnam survive The problem is if South Vietnam goes down the tube next year we have to look at this in terms of U S foreign policy Should we not do things now to seriously impair the DRV ability to attack then One thing I am certain and that is that we cannot be sure that this will work It depends also on South Vietnam Do we take great risks regardless of whether the GVN f10ps or not The bombing option is perhaps Open The difficulty is that unless we take off the wraps your feeling is that it is not going to be effective Mr Helms will you now brief the situation Director Helms Director Helms then read the briefing paper attached at Tab A Sec'retary Connally To Director Helms Why doesn't your assessment give consideration to continuation of what we're doing now What if the EYES org I I ULanuunxnuu 1 3 Authority 2 2 Date a ZYQ TOP EYES ONLY 11 69 000 tr00ps are trapped Where are you with respect to U S Opinion and world opinion What happens if we continue the way we are President Nixon When we asked Dick to prepare a briefing it was to brief on the effects of the contemplated course of action - Secretary Laird I have sent you a net assessment on the capabilities of North and South Vietnam President Nixon That'is only part-of it The bigger question is that of the effect on the U S and world opinion of continuing what we're doing and failing or doing what we are considering and failing The best of both worlds would he to continue as we are and succeed The reason we are considering this or bombing is that we feel the current situation is one which carries a great risk of failure How much'Will this change the situation I think there is a better than even chance thatif we do nothing we will fail I think there is a better than even chance of success if We do this Secretary Connally The greatest risk is failure by doing nothing more We have been there ten years If there is a Dunkirk then this will be a failure on the part of the United States It will destroy a Viable foreign policy for the United States It will ensure your political defeat Mr Presi- dent if we fail If anything happens you can't'win with the doves You can t run the risk of 69 000 American soldiers being trapped President Nixon Your point is to provide greater leverage if South Vietnam collapses - Secretary Connally Yes Secretary Laird We wanted two years The election in 1968 was decided on the Vietnam issue The problem is in South Vietnam The problem is not caused by equipment In not a single M-48 tank has been knocked out by a President Nixon The ARVN had 48 tanks -- they have 500 I saw the figures Secretary Laird The problem facing South Vietnam is whether they are willing to stand and fight and search out the artillery Their marines are doing a good job but not the others We have the guns but we need the Spotters President Nixon We don't have Spotters Regarding the tanks all but nine of ours were knocked out Our small tanks are no match for the T-54s 4 TOP EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 3 authority 2 3-Way '5 WM ARA Date a 2% TOP EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 12 I North Vietnam has ten times as many ta'nks You recall that the Defense Department Opposed my sending heavy tanks there Secretary Laird The problem is Spotting artillery The South Vietnamese spotters work within the South Vietnamese camps The North Vietnamese spotters are better They accurately pinpoint the South Vietnamese The reverse is not true We are using C-130s with infrared against their artil lery This is becoming more effective When the NVA put 4 600 rounds of artillery into Quang Tri on the last day it caused panic General Lam was not so good He had disagreements with General Abrams We are making certain changes The point is that the battle in South Vietnam is going to be decided on the ground Air and naval support are important but they won't win unless there are improvements in the RVNAF leadership General Minh the Three Corps Commander wants out The ARVN has to change its leaders - The ground battle in South Vietnam is important If we take the course we are contemplating it will have an effect in four to six months I think North Vietnam will stay the course with a election coming up _These actions will give the impression of working for four to six weeks but then after that they will not President Nixon It' might help next year Secretary Laird I agree it might help next year We are already extended to l 6 billion dollars We can't get money from Congress We are drawing from all over the world for this I'have Seen two administrations place everything in Southeast Asia This Administration has been able to build its strength in Eur0pe It has come tocertain understandings with the USSR and China If we do this I think'we will go into the campaign on the defensive and it will be a minus We should not be on the defensive I President Nixon You disagree with Secretary Connally You mean that we should just look at this question from the point of view that if the South Vietnamese can't make it just resign ourselves to the fact and make a plus out of our other policies Secretary Laird I think South Vietnam can make it Hue may go but it will not be as bad as 1968 President Nixon Your point is South Vietnam can make it without either the strikes or sea interdiction You don t think from the stand- poiqnt it would be helpful even beyond the elections I TOP EYES ONLY - U lvbunuunn E'Aiithority' Q 39 ng ARA Date 541 2 42 1 I TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVELY EYES 13 Secretary Laird It will not have a bearing now President Nixon But what about the future Secretary Laird Yes But even in the future it is perhaps doubtful President Nixon Suppose we are wrong Suppose Vietnam fails How do we handle it You don t assess the risks for our policy Secretary Laird We must hedge on equipmento We have given them every- thing they have asked for and will continue If they don't have enough incen- tive then all the equipment in the world won t save them Secretary Connally Wl'y do you use the argument that cost is too great You aren't going to save any money Secretary Laird The military equipment route is the cheapter route Secretary Connally Explain that to me ' Haven'tall the assets already been sent there Secretary Laird We are conducting a massive air campaign in the DRV and in South Vietnam It runs up into tremendous amounts of money Just to give you an example one B552 strike costs 40 000 dollars in ammunition Dro Kissinger What you are doing is arguing against the present sCale of air effort Vice President Agnew I don't think if we just let things go we can afford to let South Vietnam slideo When South Vietnam goes it will be utter collapse if something isn t done It will be a complete loss oflU S diplomatic credi bility around the world We must move the Soviets off centero We must move off gradualism We should stop saying what we are not going confrontation with the Soviets There is still the possibility of a face- saving solution in Parisa Before a confrontation with the Soviets they could go to the DRV and say let's find a solution What will happen if we let South Vietnam slide into defeat President Nixon These are all things we don't know Vice President Agnew If there is a collapse the Soviets will be encouraged 'in the Middle East in the Indian Ocean It will be a green flag for wars of TOP EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY Larval-M Authority - 236 B3 MAM Date 32 32341 TOP EYES ONLY 14 national liberation anywhere I personally believe in the domino theory President Nixon We could do this and still fail Mel Laird is aware of this The South Vietnamese could still collapse Then it would only be a chip for our Prisoners of War Vice President Agnew By'not doing anything more we would be giving testimony to our weakness The EurOpeans have let us be out in front of every fight they have If something happens with the Soiriets then let the Soviets be nervous Politically and domestically I think it will be Vicious for the Administration but Mr President if I were sitting where you are I would say we have got to do something We're the greatest peeple in the world for handcuffing ourselves We are compulsive talkers I don't think you have any Option The effect could be great in South Vietnam It could stOp the erosion of the internal structure and-beat DRV morale Mr Lincoln I believe the domino theory President Nixon I think we all do The real question is whether the Ameri cans give a damn any more American's don't care about Cambodia Laos Thailand and the Philippines No President could risk New York to save Tel Aviv or Bonn We have to say it -- our responsibility is to say it -- because we must play a role of leadership A lot of people say we shouldn't be a great power That is all well and'good if there were not another couple of predatory powers on the scene The Soviets already have a tremendous capability and the Chinese are develoPing one If you follow Time the Washington Post the New York Times and the three networks you'could say that the U S has done enough Let s get out let's make a deal with the Russians and pull in our horns The U S would cease to be a military and diplomatic power If that happened then the U So would look inward towards itself and would remove itself from the world Every non- Communist nation in the world would live in terror If the U S is strong enough and willing to use its strength then the world will remain half-Communist rather than becoming entirely Communist Mr Lincoln We really have to hedge against a failure in South Vietnam even if the chance of failure is only ten percent Those who criticize us will say why didn't we do it sooner This action hedges against it Four or five months from now it is likely to be of some help It is a less inflamatory step than just actually bombing I TOP EYES ONLY Enter - 3 p 5235 - - Date a 22 42 TOP EYES ONLY 15 I have one technical concern and that is the question of availability of air I power In the short run can it be better used in support of our air mission in South Vietnam than in this interdiction President Nixon I understand the problem Hue is a little bit like Verdun The Germans and the French decided it was important and fought for it Three million men were killed as a result Hue is a hell of a symbol General Abrams is using as much as he can Secretary Laird Abrams is dividing up his planes between l 2 and 3 President Nixon Abrams has 35 13-525 which he does not allocate every day They are used for targets of Opportunity Admiral Moorer He also has a call on the resources Operating north of the DMZ President Nixon One advantage of this Operation as distinct from bombing more is that if we bombed more our credibility will be diminished If we do this option it will be with the assumption that Abrams will have all the resources he needs The main battle is in the South The reason there was no second strike on Hanoi and Haiphong was because General Abrams did not want to divert the resources I was much persuaded by the needs that he expressed and if the military commander says what he needs we will support him Vice President Agnew Whateverwedo we should do it all First we should free up the air Second we should Surprise them and third we should lessen the domestic impact The clocks are part of this We should go the whole route Secretary Connally I couldn't agree more It is not only a question of Vietnam but Laos Cambodia and all of Southeast Asia Mr President you say United States people are sick of it You said we will withdraw If Viet name is defeated Mr President you won't have anything I agree it won't happen in three weeks but it is a mistake to tie our hands as we didin the mid-1960's At that time many Americans thought we were doing this on a no win basis If we move we ought to blockade we ought to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong It is inconceivable to me that we have fought this war without in icting damage on the aggressor The aggressor has a sanctuary If Russia gets away with it here like it did in Bangla Desh then it will be all of I TOP EYES ONLY - - - 0 3 Date 21 7 TOP EYES ONLY 16 Southeast Asia Where next The Middle East -We must think about these things The other problem is South Vietnam s ability to survive President Nixon Then you would approve this Operation Secretary Connally Don't let them nibble you to death on this You've got to make a conscious decision one way or another What the peOple want is leadership President Nixon There is no sure choice I will have to decide before 2 o'clock Everything you say will have to be weighed Secretary Rogers will evaluate the world aspect We see risks of confrontation We must have in mind the fact that the USSR with so much on the plate might move to cool it rather than heat it up so there is a question pabOut the USSR there I think we have to bear in mind that they expressed concern about the pro blem They expressed an interest in getting Hanoi back to the conference table I don t know'whether they can in uence Hanoi to do something But as far as the USSR is concerned thiswcourse may be anincentive or disin pentive Secretary Rogers If there is a failure in South-Vietnam that is disastrous for our policies President Nixo_n_ Even if we try Secretary Rogers Secondly we shouldn't be carried away I think the U S pe0p1e think you have done enough and that you have done very well The question therefore is whether there is something more you can do to be effective I agree with Dick's Helms paper 'It is a good one We assume the effect will be good LBJ said that it didn't work Do we think it will work It is clear that it won't have the effect militarily in the short term and maybe it won't have any effect at It could have a effect on both South Vietnam and North Vietnam and if so that would be But it could have the Opposite effect both on the battlefield and domestically I think it's going to be a tough one with our people and with our allies We- will have some help from the British and a few others As for Congress and public opinion I think they will chargethat this will have no military effect It looks from Dick's Helms paper that most sup- plies can come by rail Maybe they can't but I'm assuming that the CIA paper is right on this I TOP EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY we - I Authority 'h Date 512114 OP EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 1 7 If we do this and fail I think that would be worse and more damaging to our prestige I don't know whether it will be effective or not We must rely on the military If this will strengthen the 'military hand and the hand of the South Vietnamese I think we should support it Could we wait Per- haps a week Is there a time factor I learned in my discussiOns from the Europeans that the DRV wants to destroy the summit Secretary Connally This will put the summit in je0pardy but I don't think it is certain that they will cancel it Dr Kissinger I think that if we do this'there is a better than even chance that the Soviets will cancel the summit President Nixon I couldn't go to the summit if conditions in South Vietnam are the same as now or worse Secretary Connally It is better for the Soviets to cancel the summit than us Secretary Rogers The question is is it going to work or is it going to hurt us Vice President Agnew I think we are better off if we do it even if we lose Hue Secretary Laird Let s not make so 'much out of Hue We lost it in 1968 Vice President Agnew The media are making a big thing out of Hue That is something we cannot help Secretary Laird The problem is one of assets Dr Kissinger The problem with all thesefigures is that one cannot con- struct a program analysis approach type model The fact of the matter is that they would have to redirect 2 2 million tons of seaborne imports At present they are only importing 300 000 tons by rail We did not step all of their rail tran3port in 1965 68 - President Nixon It is very different now Sihanoukville is cut - Now we will cut off the pOrt Dr Kissinger They have a theoretical capacity but they can't use trains by day and if you analyze every segment of the railroad in China you will TOP EYES ONLY Enters a latte i 139w ARA Date a 27 TOP EYES ONLY 18 find that one segment of the railroad is apt to get overloaded You can't throw these figures around without a better analysis It is easy to say that they have a four months' capacity and could go all out and end the war but they would end with zero capacity Another possibility is that they would try everything in one month or alternately cut way down on theirractivities One thing is certain they will not draw their supplies down to zero President Nixon The key point is if it is militarily effective Looking to the future we have tothink about whoever sits in this chair after the election We must consider the long term advantages as well as the short term If South Vietnam goes and we have done this Bill s Secretary Rogers View is that we are worse off John's Secretary Connally and the Vice President's view is different i My View is that either way if South Vietnam goes as far as the political situation is concerned we are done What is on the line is an election The only effective thing is to decide now that if South Vietnam isn t going to succeed then we should withdraw b fore the debacle blame it on the Senate and pull out I could make the God damnest speech to this effect and win the election but I couldn't bring myself to do that because I know too much 'I'm not sure that U S training is equal to Communist style training This is no discredit to us We are different and we believe in permisiveness The North Vietnamese fight because they re afraid of what will happen to them if they don t I My main point is that I Will consider the possibility of simply chucking it now blaming the doves for sabotaging the negotiating track and encouraging the enemy and telling the North Vietnamese we'll do everything they want to get back our prisoners of war _The price they are demanding for our prisoners of war is not just a deadline for the withdrawal of our forces We ve tried that They won't give back those prisoners of war until we get outta Southeast Asia totally At least with this Option we have something to bargain for POWS We certainly can t pay the price that they have demanded Vice President Agnew I disagree that this is a viable political alternative I don't think we can sell it Pr esident Nixon We have several choices The first is a bug out The second is the choice of continuing to do what we're doing The risk of this course is failure In any event we are not going to Moscow When I came back from Communist China I didn't get a damn thing on Vietnam TOP EYES ONLY Authority into i BYE-LVN ARA Date 51% TOP EYES ONLY 19 We go to the Soviet Union we agree on principles credits and we toast each other at a time when Soviet tanks are kicking hell'out of our' allies If we act and then we have 'a summit perhaps we can do that The real preposition is are we better off letting the dust settle or will more drastic action tip the balance in a decisive way I will have to weigh these All of you come down on these matters in varying degrees and shades It comes down not to whether we lose in Vietnam but first what can we do to prevent that and second what should we do to make the losses palatable if we do in fact lose - Secretary Connally One option was negotiations and last fall and spring there was hOpe for negotiations but that h0pe is down the drain We have lost the negotiating option At the Inoment our country's future is in the hands of the South Vietnamese and whether they stand and fight 'We cannot allow this situation to continue - Secretary Laird I am limited to 2 dubillion dollars annually I have put in 2 9 billion dollars already hiding it under the table I am taking it out of the hide of the Services Secretary Connally You're already pregnant Secretary Laird It's a question of where you are next year If you are to have a viable policy you can't break down your whole force posture You've got to have the support of the pe0ple and the Congress Vice President Agnew If we don't get anywhere on the Vietnam question then we won't be anywhere anyway Secretary Connally 'We can't make this decision on the basis of cost You can't convince me that if you bomb the railroads the ports of Haiphong and Hanoi you can't persuade me that it won't affect the both in South and North Vietnam Secretary Laird I agree Secretary Connally Maybe you can give the South Vietnamese the necessary will by doing this President Nixon The U S way of training may not be the most effective Sec retary Laird That may be so but I would only say that in the battle of An Loc when the North Vietnamese tanks attacked the only NVA who was not chained to his tank was the tank commander himself TOP EYES ONLY Authorifyw i Date TOP EYES ONLY 20 Secretary Rogers Is it going to work with respect to South Vietnam and North Vietnam Is it going to work with resPect to public Opinion Con- gress and so forth President Nixon The answer is that we aren't sure I have to balance all these things The risks of doing what we're doing versus the risks of doing more I find Mel s Secretary Laird analysis of the military situation reassuring but General Abrams'- message of May 2 was not reassuring Mel would you agree that you would not be surprised to see South Vietnam fold Secretary Laird Out of 44 province capitals maybe the Communists will take five President Nixonzl I ll decide by 2 00 p m In the meantime if we decide to do this I will want the operative aspect to be checked with Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird If we do this we will want to put it in the most conciliatory terms and yet in strong terms as well This is a decision of great import We must keep this in confidence Everyone must support the decision I don't want to see columns appearing in the papers saying who agreed and who didn't agree If we decide to do this it won't work unless we do it with all-out ferocity I don't know how it will affect the Vice President s trip to Japan Vice President Agnew A few hundred thousand student demonstrators won t bother me I would not want to assume that the summit is cancelled Secretary Rogers I won't go back to Europe Assistant Secretary Hillen- brand is over there President Nixgni If we do it we will need all the big guns here in 'Washing- ton Secretary Laird I think it would be a mistake for me to cancel my meeting with the military planning group of NATO the week after next Secretary Rogers Whatever you decide Mr President you will have our total support President Nixgii First I will weigh Mel's options Second I will weigh the bombing option which I don't like and third I will weigh the Operation TOP EYES ONLY 'Z qll' A thgrigw i WM ARA Date g g - TOP EYES ONLY we have discussed today which does not take so much from General Abrams The meeting ehded at 12 20 p m TOP EYES VONLY 21                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu