' EYES ONLY UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR J un e 30 197 5 Dear Jim Here is the paper you asked for last Saturday regarding the first-use of nuclear weapons--the US Soviet and French positions It looks like the media interest stirred up by your statement on first-use in Korea and by the President's remarks in his press conference last week has died down My guess is that not much will come of the House resolution introduced last Thursday by Ottinger with 66 co-sponsors for a US policy declaration renouncing the first-use of nuclear weapons l It is my view however that we should gradually move further away from first-use threats rather than back towards our position in the 1950's see pp 2-3 in the attached paper In the long run I believe it will be increasingly in the US interest to make the threat of first-use of nuclear weapons less and less accepted as a legitimate use of military power For such threats might some day be used against one of our allies or friends and we must then be in a posi tion to maintain a firm -defensive coalition abroad and the fullest domestic support at home Indeed the historical record shows that the Soviets found it much easier to make nuclear threats than we did although Western resolve has rendered such threats so far unsuccessful For the broader domestic debate on nuclear policy it is essential to make it absolutely clear that the highest officials in the US Government firmly disting'u ish between conventional weapons and nuclear ones whether tactical or strategic Sincerely The Honorable Ja es R Schlesinger The Secretary of Defense 1-- ----------- Fr le -------------------------4 6 30 75 ACDA First Use of Nuclear Weapons U s Policy Summary The US has supported only a very narrow range of tions on the use of nuclear weapons rest ic- A central argument for our position has been that the UN Charter distinguishes not between one weapon and another but between the legitimate use of force for individual or collective self-defense and its illegitimate use for aggressive purposes On the ba is of this distinction we have sought to preserve the right to use nuclear weapons not only to deter and if necessary respond to nuclear attack against ourselves or our allies but also to deter and if necessary respond to a large-scale conventional attack against ourselves or our allies whether by another nuclear power or a non-nuclear weapon state NNWS Accordingly we have resisted proposals for prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons as well formulations which would categorically rule out the use of nuclear weapons against all NNWS u S Public Positions on the Use of Nuclear Weapons While the United States has remained reluctant to accept formal restrictions on the right to use nuclear weapons first with the sole exception of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty covered below there has been a gradual but major change in the US position regarding the manner or circumstances - 2 in which we might actually use nuclear weapons particularly tactical nuclear weapons We have clearly moved away from the position of the 1950's that tactical nuclear weapons were interchangeable with conventional weapons For example on December 8 1953 President Eisenhower said o o atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed service In the United States the Army the Navy the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use And again in 1954 President Eisenhower's message to the Congress stated A wide variety of atomic weapons--considered in 1946 to be mere possibilities of a distant future--have today achieved conventional status in the arsenals of our armed forces Similarly in 1954 Secretary of State Dulles said The present policies will gradually involve the use of atomic weapons as conventional weaporis for tactical purposes If that occurs and there is a replacement of what is now known as conventional weapons by a different type of weapons they will of course be used As late as 1957 Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson stated before Congress The smaller atomic weapons the tactical weapons in a sense have now become conventional weapons o o o As a contrasting theme President Johnson stated on September 7 1964 For nineteen peril-filled years no nation has loosed the atom against another To do so now is a political decision of the highest order It would lead us down an uncertain path of blows and counter-blows whose outcome none may know No President of the United States can divest himself of the responsibility of such a decision - 3 - The only time the U S has formally and explicitly agreed to restrict itsright to use nuclear weapons was when it adhered on May 12 1971 to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Article III of that Protocol requires that the United States not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Latin American states party to the nuc1earfree zone arrangement In adhering to Protocol II the U s submitted a formal statement of understanding that The United states Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a contracting party in which it was assisted by a nuclear - weapon state would be incompatible with the contracting party's corresponding obligations under Article I of the treaty In 1971 President Nixon in response o a press conference ques on egarding the us of airpower n In ochina te I am not going to place any limitation upon the use of airpower except of course to rule out a rather ridiculous suggestion that is made from time to time o o that our airpower might include the use of tactical nuclear weapons As you know o o o this has been speculated on for a period of 5 years and I have said for a period of 5 years that this is not an area where the use of nuclear weapons in any form is either needed or would be wise On May 23 1974 in response to Swedish questions on mini-nukes the US Delegate to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament stated In response to speculation that further development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons would blur the present distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons - 4 I wish to state categorically that the US Government has no intention whatever to treat such tactical systems as interchangeable with conventional arms We fully appreciate that the distinction or firebr ak between nuclear and non-nuclear arms is a major factor in preventing nuclear warfare and we will not act to erode this distinction NPT Review Conference At the NPT Review Conference in May 1975 many non-aligned states called for commitments by the nuclear powers never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states The US and the other nuclear powers opposed such an undertaking The US Representative noted that mutual security arrangements have alleviated the security concerns of many non-n clear weapon states and that non-use assurances could undercut such commitments to allies thus raising concerns about their security and increasing incentives for acquiring independent nuclear weapons capabilities Pointing out that the principal security concern of non-nuclear weapon states is not the threat of nuclear attack by the US USSR and the UK but rather the possibility of conventional armed conflict with neighboring non-nuclear weapon states the US Representative expressed doubt that a non-use commitment would serve as a powerful incentive to renounce nuclear weapons He concluded that o a non-use undertaking applied worldwide could involve the risk of reducing the security of non-nuclear weapon state members of mutual security relationships without at at the same time providing assurance that the security concerns of those non-nuclear weapon states to which the undertaking would largely be addressed would be effectively alleviated We therefore do not believe the objective of non-proliferation or the goal of universal adherence to the NPT would be well served by such an undertaking - 5- Sbviet Position The Soviet position on the first use of nuclear weapons - has changed considerably In the 1950's the Soviets ini- tiated or supported proposals for a blanket prohibition of nuclear warfare and in particular for a prohibition of the first-use of nuclear weapons against any country More recently there are signs that the Soviets wish to preserve the threat of first use At the 1972 UN General Assembly the Soviet non-use of force proposal--which failed to preclude use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression--led to a dispute with the PRe Grornyko explained that the renunciation of the use of force would in no way affect the right of individual or collective self-defense No one can challenge the inalienable right of the states and peoples subjected to aggression to repel it by employing all possible means - 6 - French Position The French position on non-first use assurances has largely paralleled our own Thus in June 1974 France agreed to restrict its use of nuclear weapons be becoming a party to Protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Although the French Government stated that it had interpreted Article III of the Protocol as presenting no obstacle to the full exercise of the right of self-defense confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations However at a press conference on October 24 1974 President Giscard d' Estaing said The French nuclear deterrent can only be used against powers that are themselves nuclear powers or against powers which might threaten our land One must question the motives that lead non-nuclear countries to acquire nuclear powers and one must do something about lessening the importance of these motives and perhaps even doing away with them and that is why the position o which consists in not using our nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers as an instrument of pressure or thereat may be precisely one of the means preventing the proliferation of these nuclear weaports Since then the French have issued no further clarifica- tions or formal policy statements regarding this position                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu